| Operation Doppelschlag | |
|---|---|
 Admiral Scheer, photographed in early 1942 | |
| Type | Sortie |
| Location | |
| Planned | 1942 |
| Planned by | Kriegsmarine |
| Commanded by | |
| Target | Convoy PQ 18 |
| Outcome | Cancelled |
Operation Doppelschlag (Operation Double Blow/Unternehmen Doppelschlag) was a German plan for a sortie in 1942 during theSecond World War into theArctic Ocean by theKriegsmarine. The operation followedUnternehmen Rösselsprung, againstConvoy PQ 17 in July 1942 to attackConvoy PQ 18 the nextArctic convoy of the Western Allies.
Following the victorious operation againstConvoy PQ 17 (27 June – 10 July 1942), theKriegsmarine was keen to repeat the success. A plan was made to bring a powerful force of cruisers and destroyers against the next PQ convoy to destroy it. The Allies wished to avoid running another convoy in the continuous daylight of theArctic summer and deferred passage ofConvoy PQ 18 and its reciprocalConvoy QP 15 until later in the year. The German forces spent over two months at readiness before the convoys sailed in early September 1942.
A patrol line of U-boats (WolfpackEispalast (Ice Palace) was stationed in theNorwegian Sea to give early warning of a convoy. The ships ofUnternehmen Doppelschlag would be waiting in readiness at their bases. Once the convoy was detected the ships would sail north toAltafjord and wait. The risk of losing a capital ship in an engagement with the Allied fleet meant that only Hitler could give permission for the second stage, the sortie into theBarents Sea. Once out the ships would divide into two battle groups to attack the convoy from different sides.[1]
It was envisaged that the first group would engage and draw off any big ships with the convoy and the second group would attack the merchant ships while their escorts were distracted. It was this intended double blow that inspired the operational name. The ships intended to take part in the operation were theAdmiral Scheer,Admiral Hipper,Köln and six destroyers. Other German capital ships in Norway,Tirpitz andLützow were not available for the operation as both had been under repair since the end ofRosselsprung.[1]
Convoy PQ 18 sailed from Iceland on 7 September 1942. It was sighted on 8 September by a long-range reconnaissance aircraft and again on 10 September by an Ice Palace U-boat. On 10 September, the ships of operationDoppelschlag departedNarvik to move north to Altenfjord. The German ships were sighted by British submarines andTigris mounted an abortive attack.[2] The ships arrived at Altenfjord early the following day. TheDoppelschlag commanders, Vice-AdmiralOskar Kummetz inScheer, and Vice AdmiralOtto Ciliax ashore, pressed for permission to sortie but Hitler's insistence that no damage should befall the ships so restricted their freedom of action that AdmiralErich Raeder, the Navy's supreme commander, cancelled the operation.[3][4] The attack on Convoy PQ 18 was left to theLuftwaffe and theU-boat arm.
The German surface fleet had little effect on the passage of Convoy PQ 18, though its latent threat forced the commitment of many Allied vessels to Operation EV, the escort operation. The British thought that the failure of the German ships to attack Convoy PQ 18 was caused by British measures to defeat a sortie. In his report, Admiral Tovey wrote that the German ships remained at Altenfiord for several reasons. The strength of the fighting destroyer escort acted as a deterrent, the presence of British submarines off the Norwegian coast, German knowledge ofOperation Orator, the Search and Strike Force of torpedo-bombers based atVaenga, the continuous reconnaissance by RAF aircraft of the German anchorages and the awareness of theHome Fleet heading north-east on 12 September.[5]
In 1977, the British historian Peter Smith wrote that the German decision not to commit the ships to an attack on Convoy PQ 18 had been taken weeks before the convoy sailed based on the German analysis of the operation against Convoy PQ 17. TheLuftwaffe claimed the sinking of a cruiser, a destroyer, two escort ships and 22 merchant ships and the U-boats claimed 16 ships of 113,963 GRT and cut theLuftwaffe total to twenty ships and 131,000 GRT. Colonel-GeneralHans-Jürgen Stumpff, the commander ofLuftflotte 5, claimed that his aircraft has sunk 142,216 GRT of shipping but Convoy PQ 17 lost eight ships to air attack, nine to U-boats and seven to attacks by both. The Germans did not know that the convoy had been scattered against an attack by ships; theLuftwaffe thought that its attacks had caused the convoy to scatter and this mistaken impression affected later German plans.[6]
The next opportunity for an attack by German surface ships came in December, whenUnternehmen Regenbogen (Operation Rainbow), following a similar plan toDoppelschlag, was mounted againstConvoy JW 51B, leading to theBattle of the Barents Sea.[7]
