| Operation Desert Rat | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part ofLaotian Civil War;Vietnam War | |||||||||
| |||||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||||
Supported by | |||||||||
| Units involved | |||||||||
| Two battalions | |||||||||
| Strength | |||||||||
| Regimental-strength | 50,000 total; exact numbers opposing RLF unknown | ||||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||||
| Unknown | 121 killed 39 supply trucks destroyed | ||||||||
Operation Desert Rat (16 February – 3 April 1971) was a diversionary attack by a Laotian irregular regiment upon the crucial communist supply line, theHo Chi Minh trail. Carried out by theCentral Intelligence Agency sponsoredGroupement Mobile 33, the Desert Rat offensive struck the rear of the 50,000North Vietnamese troops combatingOperation Lam Son 719 beginning on 16 February 1971. With 16 daily tactical air sorties and airborneforward air controllers available, the Desert Rat guerrillas used their hilltop position near Moung Phine to spot targets for bombing. It also raided, skirmishing 110 times, killing 121 communist soldiers, and sowing 1,500 mines along North Vietnameselines of communication. On 20 March, it was assaulted by two communist battalions. The major threat of Lam Son 719 ended, leaving the communists free to deal with the minor one of Desert Rat. However, the guerrillas split into three columns and exfiltrated by 3 April 1971. TheRoyal Lao Government had lost control of the strategicBolovens Plateau to the communist invaders.

TheHo Chi Minh Trail was the key to theSecond Indochina War.North Vietnam'sPeople's Army of Vietnam depended on thatlogistics route to defeatSouth Vietnam. As a result, during 1969 and 1970, theCentral Intelligence Agency (CIA) urged its guerrilla battalions to raid the Trail to disrupt orinterdict the supply lines. Eventually, the South Vietnamese launchedOperation Lam Son 719 on 8 February 1971 in a failed incursion to cut the Trail. The South Vietnamese failure to sever thoselines of communications did not end ground assaults on the Trail. Indeed, Operation Desert Rat would be such.[1][2][3]
Operation Desert Rat was launched on 16 February 1971 as a diversion toOperation Lam Son 719. It followed immediately afterOperation Silver Buckle, which ended on 11 February, and was meant to distract communist attention fromOperation Lam Son 719.[4] If the operation succeeded in cutting the communist Route 23 supply line, it would starve out their troops on theBolovens Plateau. Moreover, if the Lao andSouth Vietnamese linked up their forces, theNorth Vietnamese forces would be segmented from one another.[5]

Operation Desert Rat began at Ban Houei Mun, which had also been both the start line and the after action rendezvous for the defeated troops ofOperation Silver Buckle. When the regimental-sizeGroupement Mobile 33 (GM 33) mustered there, it was exposed to accounts of PAVN ferocity in the Silver Buckle fighting before being helilifted into action. As GM 33's troops loaded up at 0730 hours of 16 February 1971 on 14 helicopters of the21st Special Operations Squadron, they came under communist rocket andmortar fire on thelanding zone. However, they succeeded in departing on their mission.[4]
With 16 daily sorties of tactical air power taking advantage of the guerrillas' air superiority, andforward air controllers to direct the strikes, GM 33 had overhead cover. The CIA-sponsored guerrillaregiment landed 15 kilometers southwest of the communist stronghold of Moung Phine. That same day, the Royalistirregular military GM 33 moved to jungled high ground between Routes 23 and 238. From their perch above the two communistlines of communication, the Royalists could fire on any communist traffic. GM 33 settled in to call in air strikes on any targets they espied, and to disrupt the communist rear with forays. Air strikes destroyed 39 PAVN supply trucks and set off 221 fires or secondary explosions while also cratering the road. In 110 skirmishes, the GM 33 irregulars reported killing 121 communists. The Royalists also sowed 1,500 mines along the communist-held roads. The guerrilla regiment would spend over a month in their position in the rear of the 50,000 communists opposing theSouth Vietnamese invasion, Lam Son 719.[4][6]
On 20 March 1971, GM 33 was slated to move down from its hilltop strongpoint and attack Moung Phine. Half an hour before their scheduled departure, GM 33 was struck by heavy weapons fire followed by an attack by two PAVN battalions. GM 33 held, but its commander lost radio contact with some of the subordinate units. After dark, guerrilla patrols began to infiltrate the Moung Phine Valley.[4]
Operation Lam Son 719 ended on 25 March. With that major distraction gone, the equivalent of a fullArmy Corps was freed to turn on the irregular regiment.Savannakhet Unit of the CIA, which was controlling the action, radioed in withdrawal plans for GM 33. However, the guerrillas had already split into three columns to return to base. Two of the columns rendezvoused at Moung Phalane on 29 March 1971. The third made it back to Savannakhet.[4]
During the operation, GM 33 troops had recovered a list of 21 communistespionage agents in Moung Phalane from the corpse of a North Vietnamesemilitary intelligence officer. All 21 agents were subsequently arrested by the Royalists while they held that town.[7]
On 3 April 1971, GM 33 moved to the rear at Nong Saphong. They left Moung Phalane defended by two battalions of GM 30.[7]
In the wake of Lam Son 719, Silver Buckle, and Desert Rat, the PAVN extended its territory westward into Laos toward theKingdom of Thailand to better defend the Trail. They occupied all the usualshort takeoff and landing airstrips usually used by the Royalists for their military operations against Moung Phine—Muong Phalane,Attopeu, Ban Houei Sai, Salavan,Paksong, Ban Thateng.[8] ThePathet Lao garrisoned the newly conquered Plateau, backed by three PAVN battalions.[5]