| One China | |||||||||||
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| Traditional Chinese | 一個中國 | ||||||||||
| Simplified Chinese | 一个中国 | ||||||||||
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| One China principle | |||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Traditional Chinese | 一個中國原則 | ||||||||||
| Simplified Chinese | 一个中国原则 | ||||||||||
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| One China with respective interpretations | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Traditional Chinese | 一個中國各自表述 | ||||||
| Simplified Chinese | 一个中国各自表述 | ||||||
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| One China policy | |||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Traditional Chinese | 一個中國政策 | ||||||||||
| Simplified Chinese | 一个中国政策 | ||||||||||
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One China is a phrase describing the relationship between thePeople's Republic of China (PRC) based onMainland China, and theRepublic of China (ROC) based on theTaiwan Area. "One China" asserts that there is only onede jure Chinese nation, despite thede facto division between thetwo rival governments in the aftermath of theChinese Civil War. The term may refer, in alphabetical order, to one of the following:
After theChinese Communist Party (CCP) defeated theKuomintang (KMT) in theChinese Civil War and the subsequentretreat of the ROC to Taiwan, the CCPestablished the PRC in mainland China while the ROC ruled over Taiwan and several outlying islands. During this time, both governments continued to claimlegitimacy as the government of all of China. Initially, international recognition of the two was split, but most countriesbegan to recognize the PRC over the ROC in the 70s, including the United Statesin 1979. The language in the United States' One China policy first arose in its joint1972 Communiqué with the PRC.
Under ROC PresidentLee Teng-hui in the 1990s, theAdditional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China were passed which effectively transformed Taiwan from a one-party state into a democracy, and limited civil and political rights to citizens in the "free area" (the area under itsde facto control, consisting of the island groups of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu and some minor islands), but did not alter language regarding territorial claims or national territory.[25] Subsequently, views on the One China principle in the ROC have been largely split along party lines:Pan-Blue coalition parties (including theKuomintang) adhere to "One China with respective interpretations", whilePan-Green coalition parties (including theDemocratic Progressive Party) reject it. Meanwhile, the PRC has maintained its One China principle.[26]
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TheDutch established a colony on Taiwan in 1624 based in present-dayTainan. Shortly after, theSpanish established a colony in Northern Taiwan in 1626, but were driven out by the Dutch in 1642. It was during this time that large-scale Chinese migration from nearbyFujian Province began.[27][28] The Dutch colony was later conquered byZheng Chenggong (Koxinga), aMing-loyalist, in 1662 as theKingdom of Tungning, before being incorporated by theQing dynasty in 1683 as part of Fujian Province. In 1887, it was officially made a separateFujian-Taiwan Province. Taiwan remained a province for eight years until it was ceded to Japan under theTreaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 following theFirst Sino-Japanese War.
While Taiwan remained under Japanese control, the Qing dynasty wasousted and theFirst andSecondRepublic of China (ROC) were established from the Beiyang regime to theKuomintang (KMT) from 1928. After the conclusion ofWorld War II in 1945, the Republic of China was given control of Taiwan.[29][30][31][32][33][34] In 1949, after losing control of most of mainland China following theChinese Civil War, and before the post-war peace treaties had come into effect, the ROC government under the KMTwithdrew to Taiwan, andChiang Kai-shek declaredmartial law.
An argument has been made that Japan formally renounced all territorial rights to Taiwan in 1952 in theSan Francisco Peace Treaty, but neither in that treaty nor in the peace treaty signed between Japan and China was the territorial sovereignty of Taiwan awarded to the Republic of China.[35][36] The treaties left the status of Taiwan—as ruled by the ROC or PRC—deliberately vague, and the question oflegitimate sovereignty over China is why China was not included in the San Francisco Peace Treaty.[35][36] This argument is not accepted by those who view the sovereignty of Taiwan as having been legitimatelyreturned to the Republic of China at the end of the war.[37] Some argue that the ROC is a government in exile,[38][39][40][41] while others maintain it is arump state.[42]
The ROC continued to claim itself as the rightful ruler of the entirety of China under the single-party KMT regime, and the PRC made a symmetric claim. In 1971, theUnited Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 replaced the ROC's seat in theUnited Nations with the PRC. From April 30, 1991, the ROC officially recognized the PRC thus abandoning theHallstein Doctrine, while maintaining the claim of anexclusive mandate as the legitimate ruler of China.[43] The ROC transformed into a free and democratic state in the 1990s following decades of martial law with the passage of theAdditional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China.[44] Afterwards, the legal andpolitical status of Taiwan has become more contentious, with increasing public expressions in favor ofTaiwan independence, which were formerly outlawed.
Within Taiwan, there is a distinction between the positions of the Kuomintang (KMT) and theDemocratic Progressive Party (DPP).
The Kuomintang holds the "One-China principle" and maintains its claim that under the ROC Constitution (passed by the Kuomintang government in 1947 inNanjing) the ROC has sovereignty over most of China, including, by their interpretation, both mainland China and Taiwan. After theChinese Communist Party expelled the ROC in the Chinese Civil War from most of Chinese territory in 1949 and founded the PRC, the ROC'sChinese Nationalist government, which still held Taiwan, continued to claimlegitimacy as the government of all of China. Under former PresidentLee Teng-hui, additional articles were appended to theROC constitution in 1991 so that it applied effectively only to theTaiwan Area.[25] The Kuomintang proclaims a modified form of the "One-China" principle known as the "1992 Consensus". Under this "consensus", both governments "agree" that there is only one single sovereign state encompassing both mainland China and Taiwan, but disagree about which of the two governments is thelegitimate government of this state. Former ROC PresidentMa Ying-jeou had re-asserted claims on mainland China as late as 8 October 2008.[45]
TheDemocratic Progressive Party rejects the One China principle, and its official position currently is that Taiwan is an independent and sovereign country whose territory consists of Taiwan and its surrounding smaller islands and whose sovereignty derives only from the ROC citizens living in Taiwan (similar to the philosophy ofself-determination), based on the 1999 "Resolution on Taiwan's Future". It considers Taiwan as an independent nation under the name of Republic of China, making a formal declaration of independence unnecessary.[46] Though calls for drafting a new constitution and a declaration of a Republic of Taiwan was written into the party charter in 1991,[47] the 1999 resolution has practically superseded the earlier charter.[48]
At least one observer of theTaiwan independence movement believes it runs counter to the PRC's sovereignty claims over Taiwan.[49] ABrookings Institution survey indicates that while Taiwan people overwhelmingly reject unification with the PRC, the vast majority do not support immediate formal independence of a Republic of Taiwan.[50]
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One interpretation, which was adopted during theCold War, is that either the PRC or the ROC is the sole rightful government of allChina and that the other government is illegitimate. While much of thewestern bloc maintained relations with the ROC until the 1970s under this policy, much of theeastern bloc maintained relations with the PRC. While the government of the ROC considered itself the remaining holdout of the legitimate government of a country overrun by what it thought of as "Communist bandits", the PRC claimed to have succeeded the ROC in theChinese Civil War. Though the ROC no longer portrays itself as the sole legitimate government of China, the position of the PRC remained unchanged until the early 2000s, when the PRC began to soften its position on this issue to promoteChinese unification.
One interpretation of one China is that only one geographical region of China exists, which was split between two Chinese governments during the Chinese Civil War. This is largely the position of current supporters of Chinese unification in mainland China, who believe that "one China" should eventually unite under a single government.[51] Starting in 2005, this position has become close enough to the position of the PRC, allowing high-level dialogue between the CCP and thePan-Blue Coalition of the ROC.[citation needed]
The revised position of the PRC was made clear in theAnti-Secession Law of 2005, which although stating that there is one China whosesovereignty is indivisible, does not explicitly identify this China with the PRC. Almost all PRC laws have a suffix "of the People's Republic of China" (prefix in Chinese grammar) in their official names, but the Anti-Secession Law is an exception. Beijing has made no major statements after 2004 which identify one China with the PRC and has shifted its definition of one China slightly to encompass a concept called the '1992 Consensus': both sides of the Taiwan strait recognize there is only one China—both mainland China and Taiwan belong to the same China but agree to differ on the definition of which China.[51] According to Taiwanese lawyer Chen Chang-wen, the new version changed from a subordinate relationship to an equal relationship, and the legislation only legalized its constitutional obligations.[52] Placing less emphasis on which government should represent One China is more compatible with KMT's position as well as the current ROC Constitution. This reformulation was also reflected in the 2022 PRC white paper on Taiwan.[53]
In practice, official sources and state-owned media never refer to the "ROC government", and seldom to the "government of Taiwan". Instead, the government in Taiwan is referred to as the "Taiwan authorities". The PRC does not accept or stampRepublic of China passports. Instead, a Taiwan resident visitingMainland China must use aTaiwan Compatriot Entry Permit.Hong Kong grants visa-free entry to holders of a Permit; while holders of a ROC passport must apply for a Pre-arrival Registration.Macau grants visa-free entry to holders of both the permit and the passport.
TheUnited Front, which consists of the eight other political parties in the PRC subordinate to the CCP, has adhered to the One-China policy and opposes Taiwan independence. Among the parties that accepted it are theRevolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang (a splinter left-wing party that broke away from the main Kuomintang) and theTaiwan Democratic Self-Government League.[26]
In 1950, PremierZhou Enlai stated that the principle that Taiwan is part of China is "not only a historical fact but affirmed by theCairo Declaration, thePotsdam Declaration, and the conditions after Japan's surrender."[54]
In its foreign relations, the PRC does not object to other countries having Taiwan trade offices, so long as those countries are not formally engaged in diplomatic activity.[55]: 34
Chiang Kai-shek held the view that there was One China that should be united under the government of the Republic of China; his adversary Mao praised him for rejecting the idea of 'two Chinas,' stating that Chiang "dared to defy the U.S. policy for 'two Chinas' in front of [John Foster]Dulles, proving that he is still a great nationalist."[56]: 43
On 1 August 1992, the ROC'sNational Unification Council passed the "Definition of One China Resolution", stating: "The two sides of the Taiwan Strait uphold the One China principle, but the interpretations of the two sides are different ... Our side believes that one China should mean the Republic of China, established in 1912 and existing today, and its sovereignty extends throughout China, but its current governing authority is only over Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matzu. Admittedly, Taiwan is part of China, but the mainland is also a part of China."[57]: 229 This resolution provided the basis for quasi-governmental talks between the ROC'sStrait Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the PRC'sAssociation for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS).[57]: 229
During these discussions, SEF stated that "each side expresses its own interpretation verbally in order to solve this sticky problem of [one China] and thereby reaffirmed the August 1st NUC resolution as SEF's interpretation of one China."[57]: 229 ARATS agreed to expressing these interpretations verbally and stated that "both sides of the strait uphold the principle of one China, and actively seek national unification, but the political interpretation of the one China will not be referred to in the cross-strait negotiations on functional issues."[57]: 229–230 This position later became known as the1992 Consensus, a phrase coined in early 2000 bySu Chi.[57]: 230
There is significant difference on Taiwan regarding recognition and understanding of the One-China principle. The Pan-Blue Coalition parties, led by the Kuomintang, generally accept the One-China principle. In particular, formerpresidentMa Ying-jeou has stated that "One China is the Republic of China".[58] ThePan-Green Coalition parties, led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), do not accept the policy and view Taiwan as a country separate from China. Former DPP presidentChen Shui-bian believes the 1992 Consensus forsakes Taiwan's national sovereignty, effectively ceding it to the PRC.[59] PresidentTsai Ing-wen rejected the 1992 Consensus categorically in 2019.[60]
When the ROC established diplomatic relations withKiribati in 2003, it did not require that Kiribati sever relations with the PRC.[61] However, the PRC did not accept dual recognition and severed ties with Kiribati as a result.[62] In 2024, the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it had no preconditions for maintaining diplomatic relations with other countries, in particular that it was not opposed to simultaneous recognition of the ROC and PRC.[63]
The ROC does not recognize or stamp PRC passports. Instead, mainland Chinese residents visiting Taiwan and other territory under ROC jurisdiction must use anExit and Entry Permit issued by the ROC authorities.
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Not formally recognizing the ROC is a requirement for any political entity to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, in effect forcing other governments to choose between Beijing and Taipei.[64][65] At times, the PRC has used financial incentives to entice smaller countries to recognize it over the ROC, and both the ROC and PRC have accused each other of dollar diplomacy.[66] Most countries that recognize Beijing circumvent the diplomatic language by establishingtrade and cultural missions that represent their interests on Taiwanese soil, while the ROC government represents its interests abroad withreciprocal missions.
The PRC has, in the past, attempted to get nations to recognize that "the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China ... and Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China." However, many nations are unwilling to make this particular statement and there was often a protracted effort to find language acceptable to both sides, for example that they "respect", "acknowledge", "understand", or "take note of" the PRC's One China principle (but do not say they "recognize" it). Thisstrategic ambiguity in the language used provides the basis for countries to have formal ties with People's Republic of China and maintain unofficial ties to the Republic of China.
Names such as "Chinese Taipei" (e.g. in the Olympics) or "Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu" (e.g. in theWorld Trade Organization) are sometimes used in some international arenas since "Taiwan" suggests that Taiwan is a separate country and "Republic of China" suggests that there aretwo Chinas, and thus both violate the One-China principle.
The United States' One-China policy was first stated in theShanghai Communiqué of 1972: "the United States acknowledges that Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.[3] The United States does not challenge that position." The United States has not expressed an explicitly immutable statement regarding whether it believes Taiwan is independent or not. Instead, Washington simply states that they understand the PRC's claims on Taiwan as its own. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker asserts that U.S. One-China policy was not intended to please the PRC government, but as a way for Washington to conduct international relations in the region, which Beijing fails to state.[67] A more recent study suggests that this wording reflected the Nixon administration's desire to shift responsibility for resolving the dispute to the "people most directly involved" – that is, China and Taiwan. At the same time, the United States would avoid "prejudic[ing] the ultimate outcome" by refusing to explicitly support the claims of one side or the other.[68]
At the height of theSino-Soviet split andSino-Vietnamese conflict, and at the start of thereform and opening of the PRC, the United States strategically switched diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China (ROC) to the People's Republic of China (PRC) on 1 January 1979 under the administration ofJimmy Carter. Congress quickly responded by passing theTaiwan Relations Act that defined relations with the ROC, but stopped short of full recognition. It also required the United States to provide Taiwan with arms sufficient to maintain its self-defense, but did not commit to defending Taiwan in the event of an invasion.
In 1982, PresidentRonald Reagan also saw that theSix Assurances were adopted, the fifth being that the United States would not formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. Still, United States policy has remained ambiguous. In theHouse International Relations Committee on 21 April 2004, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs,James A. Kelly, was asked by Rep.Grace Napolitano (D-CA) whether the United States government's commitment to Taiwan's democracy conflicted with the so-called One-China policy.[69] He stated "In my testimony, I made the point "our One China," and I didn't really define it, and I'm not sure I very easily could define it. I can tell you what it is not. It is not the One-China policy or the One-China principle that Beijing suggests, and it may not be the definition that some would have in Taiwan. But it does convey a meaning of solidarity of a kind among the people on both sides of the straits that has been our policy for a very long time."[70]
When PresidentBill Clinton visited Shanghai during his June 1998 visit to China, Clinton articulated the "three nos" for United States foreign policy towards China: (1) not recognizingtwo Chinas, (2) not supporting Taiwanese independence, and (3) not supporting Taiwanese efforts to join international organizations for which sovereignty is a membership requirement.[71]
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The position of the United States, as clarified in theChina/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy report of the Congressional Research Service (date: 9 July 2007) is summed up in five points:
These positions remained unchanged in a 2013 report of the Congressional Research Service.[73]
On 2 December 2016, US President-elect Donald Trump and ROC President Tsai Ing-wen conducted a short phone call regarding "the close economic, political and security ties between Taiwan and the US".[74] On 6 December, a few days after the call, Trump said that the US is not necessarily bound by its "one China" policy.[75][76][77] On 9 February 2017, in a lengthy phone call, USPresidentDonald Trump and PRCParamount leader Xi Jinping discussed numerous topics and President Trump agreed, at the request of Xi Jinping, to honor the "one China" policy.[78]
On May 23, 2022, U.S. President Joe Biden announced the United States would intervene militarily if China were to unilaterally invade Taiwan. Speaking in Japan, President Biden stated, "That’s the commitment we made," an apparent reference to the Taiwan Relations Act, which ensures military support for Taiwan, although the Act does not specifically guarantee direct military action by the United States in Taiwan. President Biden emphasized that Russia's military invasion of Ukraine created an "even stronger" burden to protect Taiwan.[79] China criticized Biden's statement as part of a "hypocritical and futile" pattern of encouragement to"'Taiwan independence' forces."[80] Biden later stated that his remarks did not represent a change from the status quo and the U.S. position ofstrategic ambiguity.[81] Secretary of StateAntony Blinken also delivered a speech in which he stated that U.S. policy regarding the island had not changed, and the State Department updated its fact sheet to reinstate a line stating "we do not support Taiwan independence."[82][83]
The 1972Japan-China Joint Communiqué entered into as the basis of diplomatic normalization inSino-Japanese relations states that the Government of Japan fully understands and respects the stance of the Government of the People's Republic of China that "Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China." and that it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of thePotsdam Declaration.[84]
Japan has recognized the People's Republic of China "as the sole legal Government of China" since 1975 but has maintained an ambiguous stance regarding the PRC's sovereignty claim over the island of Taiwan.[85]
In 1949, theSoviet Union recognized the People's Republic of China as the only lawful government of China. The ROC on Taiwan had cancelled theSino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance treaty in response. The Soviet Union voted to admit the PRC into the UN in 1971.
As with the past leaderships, the Russian government has accepted its support for the One-China policy that Taiwan is "an inalienable part of China, and opposes any forms of independence." as stated in Article 5 of the2001 Sino-Russian Treaty of Friendship. This was reaffirmed in January 2022 when Russian and PRC leadersVladimir Putin andXi Jinping discussed the situation in the midst of theongoing crisis in Ukraine and again in July 2022 by Russian foreign ministerSergei Lavrov asUnited States Speaker of the HouseNancy Pelosi visited Taiwan.[86][87][88]
Similar to other countries, the Philippines maintains a One China Policy.[89] However, despite officially recognizing the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China since 1975, it also maintains economic and cultural relations with the Republic of China (or Taiwan).[89][90]Lito Banayo, chair of the Manila Economic and Cultural Office in Taiwan remarked that the country's One China Policy only proscribes the Philippines to enter into political and military agreements with the ROC.[89]
The One China principle is an important factor inChina-Africa relations.[55]: 34 In 1971, 26 African countries supported the United Nations General Assembly vote through which the PRC became the sole representative of China.[55]: 34 The sole African country which does not recognize the PRC (and consequently which the PRC maintains no relations with) isEswatini.[55]: 22
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The People's Republic of China demands Taiwan acknowledge the One-China principle as a prerequisite to resume any cross-strait dialogue.[91] The PRC offers the chance for open talks and "unobstructed exchanges" with Taiwan as long as it moves to accept the 1992 Consensus.[35] The PRC's One-China policy rejects formulas which call for "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan"[92] and has stated that efforts to divide the sovereignty of China could be met with military force.[93]
The PRC has explicitly stated that it is flexible about the meaning "one China", and that "one China" may not necessarily be synonymous with the PRC, and has offered to talk with parties on Taiwan and the government on Taiwan on the basis of theConsensus of 1992 which states that there is one China, but that there are different interpretations of that one China. For example, in PremierZhu Rongji's statements prior to the2000 Presidential Election in Taiwan, he stated that as long as any ruling power in Taiwan accepts the One-China principle, they can negotiate and discuss anything freely.
However, the One-China principle would apparently require that Taiwan formally give up any possibility ofTaiwanese independence, and would preclude any "one nation, two states" formula similar to ones used in GermanOstpolitik or inKorean reunification.Chen Shui-bian, president of the Republic of China between 2000 and 2008 repeatedly rejected the demands to accept the One-China principle and instead called for talks to discuss One China itself. With theJanuary andMarch 2008 elections in Taiwan, and the election ofMa Ying-jeou as the President of the ROC, who was inaugurated on 20 May, a new era of better relations between both sides of the Taiwan Strait was established.[94]KMT officials visited mainland China, and the ChineseARATS met inBeijing with its Taiwanese counterpart, theStraits Exchange Foundation.Direct charter flights were therefore established.
One China was the formulation held by the ROC government before the 1990s, but it was asserted that the one China was the Republic of China rather than PRC. However, in 1991, PresidentLee Teng-hui indicated that he would not challenge the Communist authorities to rule mainland China. This is a significant point in the history ofCross-Strait relations in that a president of the ROC no longer claims administrative authority over mainland China. Henceforth, theTaiwan independence movement gained a political boost, and under Lee's administration the issue is no longer who rules mainland China, but who claims legitimacy over Taiwan and the surrounding islands. Over the course of the 1990s, President Lee appeared to drift away from the One-China formulation, leading many to believe that he was actually sympathetic to Taiwan independence. In 1999, Lee proposed aspecial state-to-state relations for mainland China–Taiwan relations which was received angrily byBeijing, which ended semi-official dialogue until June 2008, when ARATS and SEF met, and in which PresidentMa Ying-jeou reiterated the 1992 Consensus and the different interpretation on "One China".
After the election ofChen Shui-bian in 2000, the policy of the ROC government was to propose negotiations without preconditions. While Chen did not explicitly reject Lee's two states theory, he did not explicitly endorse it either. Throughout 2001, there were unsuccessful attempts to find an acceptable formula for both sides, such as agreeing to "abide by the 1992 consensus". Chen, after assuming the Democratic Progressive Party chairmanship in July 2002, moved to a somewhat less ambiguous policy, and stated in early August 2002 that "it is clear that both sides of the straits are separate countries". This statement was strongly criticized by oppositionPan-Blue Coalition parties on Taiwan, which support a One-China principle, but oppose defining this "One China" as the PRC.
The One-China policy became an issue during the2004 ROC Presidential election. Chen Shui-bian abandoned his earlier ambiguity and publicly rejected the One-China principle claiming it would imply that Taiwan is part of the PRC. His opponentLien Chan publicly supported a policy of "one China, different interpretations", as done in 1992. At the end of the 2004 election, Lien Chan and his running mate,James Soong, later announced that they would not put ultimate unification as the goal for their cross-strait policy and would not exclude the possibility of an independent Taiwan in the future. In an interview with Time Asia bureau prior to the 2004 presidential elections, Chen used the model of Germany and the European Union as examples of how countries may come together, and the Soviet Union as illustrating how a country may fragment.
In March 2005, the PRC passed anAnti-Secession Law which authorized the use of force to prevent a "serious incident" that breaks the One-China policy, but which at the same time did not identify one China with the People's Republic and offered to pursue political solutions. At the same session of the PRC Congress, a large increase in military spending was also passed, leading blue team members to interpret those measures as forcing the ROC to adhere to the One-China policy or else the PRC would attack.
In April and May 2005, Lien Chan andJames Soong made separate trips to mainland China,[95] during which both explicitly supported theConsensus of 1992 and the concept of one China and in which both explicitly stated their parties' opposition toTaiwan independence. Although President Chen at one point supported the trips of Lien and Soong for defusing cross-strait tensions,[96] he also attacked them for working with the "enemy" PRC[citation needed]. On 28 April 2008, Honorary ChairmanLien Chan of the then oppositionKuomintang visited Beijing and met withHu Jintao for the fourth time since their historic encounter on 29 April 2005 in their respective capacity as party leaders of both the Chinese Communist Party and the KMT. Lien also metChen Yunlin, director of the PRC'sTaiwan Affairs Office of the State Council.[97]
On 28 May 2008, Kuomintang ChairmanWu Po-hsiung made a landmark visit toBeijing,[98] and met and shook hands with the Communist General SecretaryHu Jintao, at theGreat Hall of the People. He also visited the mausoleum ofSun Yat-sen. Hu Jintao called for resuming exchanges and talks, based on the1992 Consensus.[citation needed]
Whereas the Six Assurances are guidelines to conduct relations between the United States and Taiwan and stipulate that the United States would not—......(6) formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan.
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{{cite journal}}:Cite journal requires|journal= (help)In the Chinese text, the word for "acknowledge" is "cheng ren" (recognize), a change from "ren shi" (acknowledge),used in the 1972 Shanghai Communique. During debate on the TRA in February 1979, Senator Jacob Javits noted the difference and said that "it is very important that we not subscribe to [the Chinese position on one China] either way." Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher responded that "we regard the English text as being the binding text. We regard the word 'acknowledge' as being the word that is determinative for the U.S." (Wolff and Simon, pp. 310-311).
The position of the United States, as clarified in the China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy report of the Congressional Research Service (date: July 9, 2007) is summed up in five points:
1. The United States did not explicitly state the sovereign status of Taiwan in the three US-PRC Joint Communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982.
2. The United States "acknowledged" the "One China" position of both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
3. U.S. policy has not recognized the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan;
4. U.S. policy has not recognized Taiwan as a sovereign country; and
5. U.S. policy has considered Taiwan's status as undetermined. U.S. policy has considered Taiwan's status as unsettled.
These positions remained unchanged in a 2013 report of the Congressional Research Service.
{{cite journal}}:Cite journal requires|journal= (help)一九四九年十月一日，中华人民共和国中央人民政府宣告成立，取代中华民国政府成为全中国的唯一合法政府和在国际上的唯一合法代表，中华民国从此结束了它的历史地位。这是在同一国际法主体没有发生变化的情况下新政权取代旧政权，中国的主权和固有领土疆域并未由此而改变，中华人民共和国政府理所当然地完全享有和行使中国的主权，其中包括对台湾的主权。国民党统治集团退踞台湾以来，虽然其政权继续使用"中华民国"和"中华民国政府"的名称，但它早已完全无权代表中国行使国家主权，实际上始终只是中国领土上的一个地方当局。
{{cite journal}}:Cite journal requires|journal= (help){{cite journal}}:Cite journal requires|journal= (help){{cite journal}}:Cite journal requires|journal= (help)唐永紅(廈門大學台研院副主任)進一步闡述道，在「九二共識」指的是雙方同意「兩岸同屬一個中國、共同努力謀求國家統一」，並非所謂的「一中各表」，「各表」實乃兩岸之分歧而非共識，而當年國民黨及其當局故意在台灣把「九二共識」說成「一中各表」，意圖將「各表」也當成兩岸「共識」，大陸從未認可；事實上，依據兩岸各自有關法規，兩岸不能相互承認，也就是不能把「各表」作為兩岸共識 。
most were from Fujian Province in China. ... More and more Chinese colonists arrived from Fujian to exploit the new colony.
The Japanese peace treaty of 1951 ended Japanese sovereignty over the islands but did not formally cede them to "China," either Communist or Nationalist.
While on October 1, 1949, in Beijing a victorious Mao proclaimed the creation of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Chiang Kai-shek re-established a temporary capital for his government in Taipei, Taiwan, declaring the ROC still to be the legitimate Chinese government-in-exile and vowing that he would "retake the mainland" and drive out communist forces.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)Enmeshed in a civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists for control of China, Chiang's government mostly ignored Taiwan until 1949, when the Communists won control of the mainland. That year, Chiang's Nationalists fled to Taiwan and established a government-in-exile.
For some time the Truman administration had been hoping to distance itself from the rump state on Taiwan and to establish at least a minimal relationship with the newly founded PRC.
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