Vom Kriege (German pronunciation:[fɔmˈkʁiːɡə]) is a book onwar andmilitary strategy byPrussian generalCarl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), written mostly after theNapoleonic Wars, between 1816 and 1830, and published posthumously by his wifeMarie von Brühl in 1832.[1] It is one of the most important treatises on political-military analysis and strategy ever written, and remains both controversial and influential onmilitary strategic thinking.[1][2]
Vom Kriege has been translated into English several times asOn War.On War is an unfinished work. Clausewitz had set about revising his accumulated manuscripts in 1827, but did not live to finish the task. His wife edited his collected works and published them between 1832 and 1835.[3]
His ten-volume collected works contain most of his larger historical and theoretical writings, though not his shorter articles and papers or his extensive correspondence with important political, military, intellectual and cultural leaders in thePrussian state.On War is formed by the first three volumes and represents his theoretical explorations.
Clausewitz was among those intrigued by the manner in which the leaders of theFrench Revolution, especiallyNapoleon, changed the conduct of war through their ability to motivate the populace and gain access to the full resources of the state, thus unleashing war on a greater scale than had previously been seen in Europe. Clausewitz believed that moral forces in battle had a significant influence on its outcome. Clausewitz was well-educated and had strong interests in art, history, science, and education. He was a professional soldier who spent a considerable part of his life fighting against Napoleon. In his lifetime, he had experienced both theFrench Revolutionary Army's (1792—1802) zeal and the conscripted armies employed by theFrench crown. The insights he gained from his political and military experiences, combined with a solid grasp of European history, provided the basis for his work.[1][3][4]
A wealth of historical examples is used to illustrate its various ideas. Napoleon andFrederick the Great figure prominently for having made very efficient use of the terrain, movement and the forces at their disposal.
Regarding Clausewitz’s intellectual-cultural background,Azar Gat argues that he expressed in the field of military theory the main themes of theRomantic reaction against the worldview of theEnlightenment, rejecting universal principles and stressing historical diversity and the forces of the human spirit. This explains the strength and value of many of his arguments, derived from this great cultural movement, but also his often harsh rhetoric against his predecessors.[5][6]
Clausewitz argued that war theory cannot be a strict operational advice for generals.[7] Instead, he wanted to highlight general principles that would result from the study of history and logical thinking. He contended that military campaigns could be planned only to a very small degree because incalculable influences or events, so-calledfriction, would quickly make any too-detailed planning in advance obsolete. Military leaders must be capable to make decisions under time pressure with incomplete information since in his opinion "three quarters of the things on which action is built in war" are concealed and distorted by thefog of war.[8]
In his 1812Bekenntnisschrift ("Notes of Confession"), he presents a more existential interpretation of war by envisioning war as the highest form of self-assertion by a people. That corresponded in every respect with the spirit of the time when the French Revolution and the conflicts that arose from it had caused the evolution of conscript armies and guerrillas. The people's armies supported the idea that war is an existential struggle.[9][10]
During the following years, however, Clausewitz gradually abandoned this exalted view and concluded that the war served as a mere instrument: "Thus, war is an act of violence in order to force our will upon the enemy."[11]
Clausewitz analyzed the conflicts of his time along the line of the categoriesPurpose,Goal andMeans. He reasoned that thePurpose of war is one's will to be enforced, which is determined by politics. TheGoal of the conflict is therefore to defeat the opponent in order to exact thePurpose. TheGoal is pursued with the help of a strategy, that might be brought about by variousMeans such as by the defeat or the elimination of opposing armed forces or by non-militaryMeans (such as propaganda, economic sanctions and political isolation). Thus, any resource of the human body and mind and all the moral and physical powers of a state might serve asMeans to achieve the set goal.[12]
One of Clausewitz's best-known quotes summarizes that idea: "War is the continuation of policy with other means."[11]
That quote in itself allows for the interpretation that the military will take over from politics as soon as war has begun (as, for example, theGerman General Staff did duringWorld War I). However, Clausewitz had postulated theprimacy of politics and in this context elaborated: "[...], we claim that war is nothing more than a continuation of the political process by applying other means. By applying other means we simultaneously assert that the political process does not end with the conclusion of the war or is being transformed into something entirely different, but that it continues to exist and proceed in its essence, regardless of the structure of the means it makes use of [...]."[13]
According toAzar Gat, the "general message" of the book was that "the conduct of war could not be reduced to universal principles [and is] dominated by political decisions and moral forces."[14][15] These basic conclusions are essential to Clausewitz's theory:
Some of the key ideas (not necessarily original to Clausewitz or even to his mentor,Gerhard von Scharnhorst) discussed inOn War include[17] (in no particular order of importance):
Modern perceptions of war are based on the concepts that Clausewitz put forth inOn War, but they have been diversely interpreted by various leaders (such asMoltke,Vladimir Lenin,Dwight Eisenhower, andMao Zedong), thinkers, armies, and peoples. Modern military doctrine, organization, and norms are all still based on Napoleonic premises, but whether the premises are necessarily also "Clausewitzian" is debatable.[21]
Some prominent critics have interpretedOn War as an argument for "total war".[a] The book has been blamed for the level of destruction involved in the First and the Second World Wars, but it seems rather that Clausewitz (who did not actually use the term "total war") had merely foreseen the inevitable developments that started with the huge, patriotically motivated armies of the Napoleonic era.[citation needed] These developments resulted (though the evolution of war has not yet ended) in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with all the forces and capabilities of the state devoted to destroying forces and capabilities of the enemy state (thus "total war"). Conversely, Clausewitz has also been seen as "The preeminent military and political strategist of limited war in modern times".[22]
The "dualism" of Clausewitz's view of war (that wars can vary a great deal between the two "poles" that he proposed, based on the political objectives of the opposing sides and the context) seems to be simple enough, but few commentators have been willing to accept that crucial variability[citation needed]. They insist that Clausewitz "really" argued for one end of the scale or the other. Clausewitz's use of a dialectical method to construct his argument, led to frequent modern misinterpretation because he allegedly explores various often-opposed ideas before he came to conclusions.
However, according to Gat, the opposing interpretations of Clausewitz are rooted in Clausewitz’s own conceptual journey.[6] The centerpiece of Clausewitz’s theory of war throughout his life was his concept of all-out fighting and energetic conduct leading to the great battle of annihilation. He believed such conduct expressed the very “nature”, or “lasting spirit” of war. Accordingly, Clausewitz disparaged the significance of themaneuver, surprise, and cunning in war, as distracting from the centrality ofbattle,[23] and argued that defense was legitimate only if and as long as one was weaker than the enemy.[24] Nevertheless, in the last years of his life, after the first six out of the eight books ofOn War had already been drafted, Clausewitz came to recognize that this concept was not universal and did not even apply to theNapoleonic Wars, the supreme model of his theory of war. This was demonstrated by theSpanish andRussian campaigns and byguerrilla warfare, in all of which battle was systematically avoided. Consequently, from 1827 on, Clausewitz recognized the legitimacy oflimited war and explained it by the influence of politics that harnessed the unlimited nature of war to serve its objectives. Clausewitz died in 1831 before he completed the revision he planned along these lines. He incorporated his new ideas only into the end of Book VI, Book VIII and the beginning of Book I ofOn War. As a result, when published,On War encompassed both his old and new ideas, at odds with each other.
Thus, against common interpretations ofOn War, Gat points out that Clausewitz’s transformed views regarding the relationship between politics and war and the admission of limited war into his theory constituted a U-turn against his own life-long fundamental view of the nature of war. Gat further argues the readers’ miscomprehension of the theory inOn War as complete and dialectical, rather than a draft undergoing a radical change of mind, has thus generated a range of reactions. People of each age have found inOn War the Clausewitz who suited their own views on war and its conduct. Between 1870 and 1914, he was celebrated mainly for his insistence on the clash of forces and the decisive battle, and his emphasis on moral forces. By contrast, after 1945, during thenuclear age, his reputation has reached a second pinnacle for his later acceptance of the primacy of politics and the concept of limited war.
Clausewitz and his proponents have been severely criticized by other military theorists, likeAntoine-Henri Jomini[25] in the 19th century,B. H. Liddell Hart[26] in the mid-20th century, andMartin van Creveld[27] andJohn Keegan[28] more recently.[29]On War is a work rooted solely in the world of thenation state, states historian Martin van Creveld, who alleges that Clausewitz takes the state "almost for granted", as he rarely looks at anything before the 1648Peace of Westphalia, and mediaeval warfare is effectively ignored in Clausewitz's theory.[27] He alleges that Clausewitz does not address any form of intra/supra-state conflict, such as rebellion and revolution, because he could not theoretically account for warfare before the existence of the state.[30]
Previous kinds of conflict were demoted to criminal activities without legitimacy and not worthy of the label "war". Van Creveld argues that "Clausewitzian war" requires the state to act in conjunction with the people and the army, the state becoming a massive engine built to exert military force against an identical opponent. He supports that statement by pointing to the conventional armies in existence throughout the 20th century. However, revolutionaries likeKarl Marx andFriedrich Engels derived some inspiration from Clausewitzian ideas.[30]
Referring to much of the current interpretation ofOn War as theEmperor’s New Clothes syndrome, Gat argues that instead of critically addressing the puzzling contradictions inOn War, Clausewitz has been set in stone and could not be wrong.[6]
Wir behaupten dagegen, der Krieg ist nichts als eine Fortsetzung des politischen Verkehrs mit Einmischung anderer Mittel. Wir sagen Einmischung anderer Mittel, um damit zugleich zu behaupten, dass dieser politische Verkehr durch den Krieg selbst nicht aufhört, nicht in etwas ganz anderes verwandelt wird, sondern daß er sich in seinem Wesen fortbesteht, wir auch seine Mittel gestaltet sein mögen, deren er sich bedient, [...].
Frederick the Great and Napoleon, the models for Clausewitz' military genius, were very different fromCarnot (whom Clausewitz never mentions) [...].
On War public domain audiobook atLibriVox
