| Part ofa series on | |
| Hindu philosophy | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Orthodox | |
| Heterodox | |
Sub-schools | |
| |
Nyāya (Sanskrit: न्यायः,IAST: nyāyaḥ), literally meaning "justice", "rules", "method" or "judgment",[1][2] is one of the six orthodox (Āstika) schools ofHindu philosophy.[2] Nyāya's most significant contributions to Indian philosophy were the systematic development of the theory of logic, methodology, and its treatises onepistemology.[3][4]
Nyāyaepistemology accepts four out of sixpramanas as reliable means of gaining knowledge –pratyakṣa (perception),anumāṇa (inference),upamāna (comparison and analogy) andśabda (word, testimony of past or present reliable experts).[5][6][7] In itsmetaphysics, Nyāya school is closer to theVaisheshika school of Hinduism than others.[2] It holds that human suffering results from mistakes/defects produced by activity under wrong knowledge (notions and ignorance).[8] Moksha (liberation), it states, is gained through right knowledge. This premise ledNyāya to concern itself with epistemology, that is the reliable means to gain correct knowledge and to remove wrong notions. False knowledge is not merely ignorance toNaiyyayikas, it includes delusion. Correct knowledge is discovering and overcoming one's delusions, and understanding true nature of soul, self and reality.[9]
Naiyyayika scholars approached philosophy as a form of directrealism, stating that anything that really exists is in principle humanly knowable. To them, correct knowledge and understanding is different from simple, reflexive cognition; it requiresAnuvyavasaya (अनुव्यवसाय, cross-examination of cognition, reflective cognition of what one thinks one knows).[10] An influential collection of texts on logic and reason is theNyāya Sūtras, attributed toAksapada Gautama, variously estimated to have been composed between 6th-century BCE and 2nd-century CE.[11][12]
Nyāya school shares some of its methodology and human suffering foundations withBuddhism; however, a key difference between the two is that Buddhism believes that there is neither a soul nor self;[13]Nyāya school like some other schools of Hinduism such asDvaita andViśiṣṭādvaita believes that there is a soul and self, with liberation (mokṣa) as a state of removal of ignorance, wrong knowledge, the gain of correct knowledge, and unimpeded continuation of self.[14][15]
Nyaya (न्याय) is a Sanskrit word which means justice, equality for all being, specially a collection of general or universal rules.[1] In some contexts, it means model, axiom, plan, legal proceeding, judicial sentence, or judgment. Nyaya could also mean, "that which shows the way" tracing its Sanskrit etymology. In the theory of logic, and Indian texts discussing it, the term also refers to an argument consisting of anenthymeme or sometimes for anysyllogism.[1] In philosophical context,Nyaya encompasses propriety, logic and method.[16]
Panini, revered Sanskrit grammarian, derives the "Nyaya" from the root "i" which conveys the same meaning as "gam" – to go. "Nyaya" signifying logic is there etymologically identical with "nigama" the conclusion of a syllogism.[17]
Nyaya is related to several other concepts and words used in Indian philosophies:Hetu-vidya (science of causes),Anviksiki (science of inquiry, systematic philosophy),Pramana-sastra (epistemology, science of correct knowledge),Tattva-sastra (science of categories),Tarka-vidya (science of reasoning, innovation, synthesis),Vadartha (science of discussion) andPhakkika-sastra (science of uncovering sophism, fraud, error, finding fakes).[18] Some of these subsume or deploy the tools ofNyaya.
Then was not non-existent nor existent:
there was no realm of air, no sky beyond it.
What covered in, and where? and what gave shelter?
Was water there, unfathomed depth of water?
...
Who really knows? Who will here proclaim it?
Whence was it produced? Whence is this creation?
The gods came after this world's production,
Who knows then whence it first came into being?"
The historical development of Nyāya school is unclear, althoughNasadiya hymns of Book 10 Chapter 129 ofRigveda recite its spiritual questions in logical propositions.[19] In early centuries BCE, statesClooney, the early Nyāya scholars began compiling the science of rational, coherent inquiry and pursuit of knowledge.[21]
Aksapada Gautama composed theNyāya Sūtras (by 2nd century CE), a foundational text for Nyāya, that primarily discusses logic, methodology and epistemology.[12] Gautama is also known as Aksapada and Dirghatapas.[22] The names Gotama and Gautama points to the family to which he belonged while the names Aksapada and Dirghatapas refer respectively to his meditative habit and practice of long penance.[17] The people of Mithila (modern Darbhanga in North Bihar) ascribe the foundation of Nyāya philosophy toGautama, husband ofAhalya, and point out as the place of his birth a village namedGautamasthana where a fair is held every year on the 9th day of the lunar month ofChaitra (March–April). It is situated 28 miles north-east ofDarbhanga.[17]
Concepts in the foundational text, the Nyaya Sutras, were clarified through a tradition of commentaries. Commentaries were also a means to defend the philosophy from misinterpretations by scholars of other traditions.[23]
The Nyāya scholars that followed refined, expanded, and applied theNyaya Sutras to spiritual questions. While the early Nyaya scholars published little to no analysis on whether supernatural power or God exists, they did apply their insights into reason and reliable means to knowledge to the questions of nature of existence, spirituality, happiness andmoksha. Later Nyāya scholars, such asUdayana, examined various arguments on theism and attempted to prove existence of God.[24] Other Nyāya scholars offered arguments to disprove the existence of God.[21][25][26]
The most important contribution made by the Nyāya school to Hindu thought has been its treatises onepistemology andsystem of logic that, subsequently, has been adopted by the majority of the other Indian schools.[10]
In theYājñavalkya Smṛti, Nyāya is mentioned as one of the fourteen principal branches of learning. TheMatsya-Purāṇa states that knowledge of Nyāya came from the mouth ofBrahmā. TheMahābhārata also mentions principles of Nyāya.[27]
The earliest text of the Nyāya School is theNyāya Sūtra ofAkṣapāda Gautama. The text is divided into five books, each having two sections.Vatsyayana'sNyāya Bhāṣya is a classic commentary on theNyāya Sūtra.Udyotakara'sNyāya Vārttika (6th century CE) is written to defendVātsāyana against the attacks made byDignāga.Vācaspati Miśra'sNyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā (9th century CE) is the next major exposition of this school. Two other texts,Nyāyaṣūcinibandha andNyāyasūtraddhāra are also attributed to him.Udayana's (984 CE)Nyāyatātparyapariśuddhi is an important commentary onVācaspati's treatise. HisNyāyakusumāñjali is the first systematic account of theisticNyāya. His other works includeĀtmatattvaviveka,Kiraṇāvali andNyāyapariśiṣṭa.Jayanta Bhatta'sNyāyamañjari (10th century CE) is basically an independent work.Bhasarvajna'sNyayasara (10th century CE) is a survey ofNyāya philosophy.[28]
The later works onNyāya accepted theVaiśeṣika categories andVaradarāja'sTārkikarakṣā (12th century CE) is a notable treatise of this syncretist school.Keśava Miśra'sTārkabhaṣā (13th century CE) is another important work of this school.[29]
Gangeśa Upādhyāya'sTattvacintāmaṇi (14th century CE) is the first major treatise of the new school ofNavya-Nyāya. His son,Vardhamāna Upādhyāya'sNyāyanibandhaprakāśa, though a commentary onUdayana'sNyāyatātparyapariśuddhi, incorporated his father's views. Jayadeva wrote a commentary onTattvacintāmaṇi known asĀloka (14th century CE).Vāsudeva Sārvabhauma'sTattvacintāmaṇivyākhyā (16th century CE) is first great work ofNavadvipa school ofNavya-Nyāya.Raghunātha Śiromaṇi'sTattvacintāmaṇidīdhiti andPadārthakhaṇḍana are the next important works of this school.Viśvanatha'sNyāyasūtravṛtti (17th century CE) is also a notable work.[30] The Commentaries onTattvacintāmaṇidīdhiti by Jagadish Tarkalankar (17th century CE) and Gadadhar Bhattacharya (17th century CE) are the last two notable works of this school.
Annaṁbhatta (17th century CE) tried to develop a consistent system by combining the ancient and the new schools,Prācina nyāya andNavya-Nyāya andVaiśeṣika to develop thenyāya-vaiśeṣika school. HisTarkasaṁgraha andDīpikā are the popular manuals of this school.[30]
The Nyāya metaphysics recognizes sixteenpadarthas or categories and includes all six (or seven) categories of theVaisheshika in the second one of them, calledprameya.[31]
These sixteen categories are:
According to Matthew Dasti and Stephen Phillips, it may be useful to interpret the wordjnana as cognition rather than knowledge when studying the Nyāya system.[35][36]
Nyaya posits that there exists a self distinct from the mind, which is distinct from the body.[37] The self is a nonphysical substance and is not inherently conscious.[38]
The mind (manas) is postulated as a distinct entity because one can have two perceptions at the same time of the same object, through two different senses.[39]
Metaphysics
Nyaya-Vaisheshika offers one of the most vigorous efforts at the construction of a substantialist, realist ontology that the world has ever seen. It provides an extended critique of event-ontologies and idealist metaphysics. (...) This ontology is Platonistic, realistic, but neither exclusively physicalistic nor phenomenalistic.
Acause is defined as an unconditional and invariable antecedent of aneffect and an effect as an unconditional and invariable consequent of a cause. The same cause produces the same effect; and the same effect is produced by the same cause. The cause isnot present in any hidden form whatsoever in its effect.
Nyaya recognizes three kinds of cause:
The following conditions should be met for something to be a cause:
Nyaya recognizes five kinds of accidental antecedents [Anyathasiddha]
| Part of a series on |
| Philosophy |
|---|
 |
Nyāya treatises onepistemology widely influenced other schools of Hinduism.[41] In Nyaya philosophy, knowledge is a type of "awareness event that is in accordance with its object by virtue of having been produced by a well-functioning epistemic instrument."[42]Pramāṇa, a Sanskrit word, literally is "means of knowledge". It encompasses one or more reliable and valid means by which human beings gain accurate, true knowledge.[41] The focus of Pramana is how correct knowledge can be acquired, how one knows, how one doesn't, and to what extent knowledge pertinent about someone or something can be acquired.[6][43] By definition,pramāṇas are factive i.e. they cannot produce false belief. So, while statements can be false, testimony cannot be false.[42]
Nyāya scholars accepted four valid means (pramāṇa) of obtaining valid knowledge (prameya) –
The Nyāya scholars, along with those from other schools of Hinduism, also developed a theory of error, to methodically establish means to identify errors and the process by which errors are made in human pursuit of knowledge. These includesaṁśaya (problems, inconsistencies, doubts) andviparyaya (contrariness, errors)[44] which can be corrected or resolved by a systematic process oftarka (reasoning, technique).[45][46]
Pratyakṣa (perception) occupies the foremost position in theNyāya epistemology. Perception can be of two types,laukika (ordinary) andalaukika (extraordinary).[47] Ordinary perception is defined by Akṣapāda Gautama in hisNyāya Sutra (I, i.4) as a 'non-erroneous cognition which is produced by the intercourse of sense-organs with the objects'.
Indian texts identify four requirements for correct perception:[48]Indriyarthasannikarsa (direct experience by one's sensory organ(s) with the object, whatever is being studied),Avyapadesya (non-verbal; correct perception is not throughhearsay, according to ancient Indian scholars, where one's sensory organ relies on accepting or rejecting someone else's perception),Avyabhicara (does not wander; correct perception does not change, nor is it the result of deception because one's sensory organ or means of observation is drifting, defective, suspect) andVyavasayatmaka (definite; correct perception excludes judgments of doubt, either because of one's failure to observe all the details, or because one is mixing inference with observation and observing what one wants to observe, or not observing what one does not want to observe).[48]
Ordinary perception to Nyāya scholars was based on direct experience of reality by eyes, ears, nose, touch and taste.[47] Extraordinary perception includedyogaja orpratibha (intuition),samanyalaksanapratyaksa (a form of induction from perceived specifics to a universal), andjnanalaksanapratyaksa (a form of perception of prior processes and previous states of a 'topic of study' by observing its current state).[47][49]
The Naiyyayika maintains two modes or stages in perception. The first is callednirvikalpa (indeterminate), when one just perceives an object without being able to know its features, and the secondsavikalpa (determinate), when one is able to clearly know an object.[50] Alllaukika andalaukikapratyakshas aresavikalpa, but it is necessarily preceded by an earlier stage when it is indeterminate. Vātsāyana says that if an object is perceived with its name we have determinate perception but if it is perceived without a name, we have indeterminate perception.Jayanta Bhatta says that indeterminate perception apprehends substance, qualities and actions and universals as separate and indistinct, without any association with any names, whereas determinate perception apprehends them all together with a name. There is yet another stage calledPratyabhijñā, when one is able to re-recognise something on the basis of memory.[51]
Anumāna (inference) is one of the most important contributions of the Nyāya. It can be of two types: inference for oneself (Svarthanumana, where one does not need any formal procedure, and at the most the last three of their 5 steps), and inference for others (Pararthanumana, which requires a systematic methodology of 5 steps). Inference can also be classified into 3 types:Purvavat (inferring an unperceived effect from a perceived cause),Sheshavat (inferring an unperceived cause from a perceived effect) andSamanyatodrishta (when inference is not based on causation but on uniformity of co-existence). A detailed analysis of error is also given, explaining when anumana could be false.[51]
The methodology of inference involves a combination of induction and deduction by moving from particular to particular via generality. It has five steps, as in the example shown:[52][53]
In Nyāya terminology for this example, the hill would be thepaksha (minor term),[53]: 31 the fire is thesādhya (major term),[53]: 21 the smoke ishetu,[53]: 31 and the relationship between the smoke and the fire isvyapti(middle term).[53]: 19
Hetu further has five characteristics[54]
The fallacies in Anumana (hetvābhasa) may occur due to the following[55]
Upamāna (उपमान) means comparison and analogy.[6][7]Upamāna, states Lochtefeld,[56] may be explained with the example of a traveller who has never visited lands or islands with endemic population of wildlife. They are told, by someone who has been there, that in those lands you see an animal that sort of looks like a cow, grazes like cow but is different from a cow in such and such way. Such use of analogy and comparison is, state the Indian epistemologists, a valid means of conditional knowledge, as it helps the traveller identify the new animal later.[56] The subject of comparison is formally calledupameyam, the object of comparison is calledupamānam, while the attribute(s) are identified assāmānya.[57] Thus, explainsMonier Williams, if a boy says "her face is like the moon in charmingness", "her face" isupameyam, the moon isupamānam, and charmingness issāmānya. The 7th century textBhaṭṭikāvya in verses 10.28 through 10.63 discusses many types of comparisons and analogies, identifying when this epistemic method is more useful and reliable, and when it is not.[57] In various ancient and medieval texts of Hinduism, 32 types ofUpamāna and their value in epistemology are debated.[citation needed]
Śabda (शब्द) means relying on word, testimony of past or present reliable experts.[6][58] Hiriyanna explainsSabda-pramana as a concept which means testimony of a reliable and trustworthy person (āptavākya). The schools of Hinduism which consider it epistemically valid suggest that a human being needs to know numerous facts, and with the limited time and energy available, he can learn only a fraction of those facts and truths directly.[59] He must rely on others, his parent, family, friends, teachers, ancestors and kindred members of society to rapidly acquire and share knowledge and thereby enrich each other's lives. This means of gaining proper knowledge is either spoken or written, but throughSabda (words).[59] The reliability of the source is important, and legitimate knowledge can only come from theSabda of reliable sources.[58][59] The disagreement between the schools of Hinduism has been on how to establish reliability. Some schools, such asCarvaka, state that this is never possible, and thereforeSabda is not a properpramana. Other schools debate means to establish reliability.[60]
Testimony can be of two types,Vaidika (Vedic), which are the words of the four sacred Vedas, andLaukika, or words and writings of trustworthy human beings.Vaidika testimony is preferred overLaukika testimony. Laukika-sourced knowledge must be questioned and revised as more trustworthy knowledge becomes available.[61][62][63]
In Nyaya philosophy, direct realism asserts that our cognitions are informational states revealing external objects. According to Nyaya, the world consists of stable, three-dimensional objects, and their system of categories accurately mirrors reality's structure. Nyaya philosophy emphasizes the importance of universals, qualities, and relations in understanding the organization of the world. These foundational elements are believed to play essential roles in determining thephenomenological, causal, and logical organization of the world, playing a crucial role in the classification of objects.[64]
Each school of Hinduism has its own treatises on epistemology, with different number ofPramanas. For example, compared to Nyāya school's fourpramanas,Carvaka school has just one (perception), whileAdvaita Vedanta school recognizes six means to reliable knowledge.[5][58]
According to the Naiyāyikas, ordinary perception (where direct perception takes place) involves direct contact between sense organs and objects. In the case of illusory perception, the perceived object is not present in the locus of perception. To account for this, they propose the theory of "presentation through revived memory" (jñānalakṣaṇapratyāsatti), where qualities known from past experience are projected onto what is presently seen. Thus, in the nacre-silver illusion, the shell is qualified by "silverness", not as a mental construction or a non-existent entity, but as silver existing elsewhere, and the means by which it is perceived without coming into contact with the sense organs is throughjñānalakṣaṇapratyāsatti.[65]
Naiyāyikas invokeJñānalakṣaṇapratyāsatti to explain cases in which objects are perceived without direct contact between the senses and the object. Three examples of its application are commonly given:[65]
In these examples, although there is no direct connection between the object and the sense organ, perception arises through the mediation of revived memory. For instance, the memory of sandalwood's fragrance is revived and projected onto the cognition of the sandalwood present at a distance. In the case of perceiving silver upon seeing nacre, the memory of silver influences the perception of nacre. The central idea is that past knowledge or experience can directly influence or shape present perception: the mind draws on revived memories and associates remembered qualities with the object being perceived to such an extent that it takes on the character of direct perception.[65]
Early Naiyyayikas wrote very little aboutIshvara (literally, the Supreme Soul). Evidence available suggests that early Nyāya scholars were non-theistic or atheists.[66][67] Later, and over time, Nyāya scholars tried to apply some of their epistemological insights and methodology to the question: does God exist? Some offered arguments against and some in favor.[21]
In Nyāya Sūtra's Book 4, Chapter 1, verses 19–21, postulates God exists, states a consequence, then presents contrary evidence, and from contradiction concludes that the postulate must be invalid.[68]
The Lord is the cause, since we see that human action lacks results.
This is not so since, as a matter of fact, no result is accomplished without human action.
Since this is efficacious, the reason lacks force.
— Nyaya Sutra, IV.1.19 – IV.1.21[68]
A literal interpretation of the three verses suggests that Nyāya school rejected the need for a God for the efficacy of human activity. Since human action and results do not require assumption or need of the existence of God, sutra IV.1.21 is seen as a criticism of the "existence of God and theism postulate".[68] The context of the above verses includes various efficient causes. Nyāya Sūtra verses IV.1.22 to IV.1.24, for example, examine the hypothesis that "random chance" explains the world, after these Indian scholars had rejected God as the efficient cause.[21]
InNyayakusumanjali,Udayana gives the following nine arguments to prove the existence of creative God and also refutes the existing objections and questions by atheistic systems of Carvaka, Mimamsa, Buddhists, Jains and Samkhya:[24]
Naiyyayikas characterize Ishvara as absent ofadharma, false knowledge, and error; and possessingdharma, right knowledge, and equanimity. Additionally, Ishvara is omnipotent and acts in a way that is good for his creatures.[69]
The Naiyyayikas believe that the bondage of the world is due to false knowledge, which can be removed by constantly thinking of its opposite (pratipakshabhavana), namely, the true knowledge.[70] The opening aphorism of theNyāya Sūtra states that only the true knowledge leads toniḥśreyasa (liberation).[33] However, the Nyāya school also maintains that God's grace is essential for obtaining true knowledge.[71]Jayanta, in hisNyayamanjari describes salvation as a passive stage of the self in its natural purity, unassociated with pleasure, pain, knowledge and willingness.[72]
 | This sectionneeds additional citations forverification. Please helpimprove this article byadding citations to reliable sources in this section. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. Find sources: "Nyaya" – news ·newspapers ·books ·scholar ·JSTOR(October 2025) (Learn how and when to remove this message) |
While initially distinct from Buddhism, Nyāya's rigorous approach to reasoning and epistemology profoundly influenced the development of Buddhist philosophy, particularly in the areas of logical analysis, epistemology, and the structure of doctrinal debates.
The influence ofNyāya on Buddhist epistemology is profound, especially in the development of the four majorpramāṇa (valid means of knowledge). Below is a breakdown of how Buddhist thinkers integrated and adapted Nyāya concepts in their philosophical systems:
| Nyāya Concept | Buddhist Adaptation | Key Buddhist Thinkers & Texts |
|---|---|---|
| Perception (pratyakṣa) | Buddhism expanded the concept of perception to include not just sensory data but also insight into phenomena's impermanence and interdependence. | Dharmakīrti'sPramāṇavārttika emphasizes direct perception to analyze impermanence and the non-self. |
| Inference (anumāna) | Buddhist philosophers, particularlyDharmakīrti, used inference to establish causality and to demonstrate the non-essential nature of self and phenomena. | Nāgārjuna's arguments against inherent existence use inference to show that all things depend on causes and conditions (dependent origination). |
| Comparison (upamāna) | Analogies are used extensively in Buddhist texts to illustrate complex, abstract ideas such as emptiness (śūnyatā). | Used by earlyMadhyamaka thinkers to clarify ideas of non-self and impermanence, and byVasubandhu to elucidate the nature of consciousness. |
| Testimony (śabda) | The Buddha’s teachings are treated as authoritative testimony, much like sacred texts in Nyāya. In Buddhism, this is used to validate the path to liberation (nirvāṇa). | Yogācāra texts often stress the importance of authoritative testimony (śabda) to understand the nature of consciousness and the path to enlightenment. |
Another significant area of influence was in the domain of logic. Nyāya's formal system ofinference (anumāna) directly impacted Buddhist logic, especially in the works of scholars likeDharmakīrti. Nyāya's focus on hetu (reasoning or cause) and the structure of valid arguments was adopted and modified by Buddhists in their development oflogical proofs (pramāṇa) to support doctrines likeimpermanence andnon-self.
In thePramāṇavārttika,Dharmakīrti reinterpreted Nyāya’s logical tools to fit within Buddhist metaphysical views. For example, Nyāya’s approach toinference was used to argue against essentialist doctrines by showing that all phenomena are dependent on causes and conditions (dependent origination), rather than existing inherently (svabhāva). InMādhyamika philosophy,Nāgārjuna andŚāntideva also employed logic and dialectical reasoning, heavily influenced by Nyāya, to argue against Nyāya’s own concept of an unchanging self.
The formal practice of debate (yukti) in Buddhist scholasticism, especially within monastic institutions, reflects the influence of Nyāya. The rigorous techniques of formal reasoning and logical debate in Nyāya were adopted by Buddhists to engage in systematic argumentation, not only with other philosophical schools but also within their own traditions.
Buddhist monastic institutions, particularly in India, followed a debate structure built onNyāya’s epistemological principles, emphasizing the importance of valid reasoning and evidence in defending doctrinal views. These debates often centered around thevalidity of pramāṇas and thenature of reality (impermanence andnon-self versus permanence and self). In Tibet and East Asia, these debates became central to the scholastic tradition and helped refine Buddhist thought over centuries.
The impact of Nyāya was not confined to early Indian Buddhist thinkers but continued to shape later Buddhist traditions. For example,Tibetan Buddhism developed sophisticated methods of debate and logic that were heavily influenced by Indian Nyāya. In theGelug school, thePramāṇa texts ofDharmakīrti became a central part of the curriculum, alongside Nyāya texts.
In addition,Zen Buddhism andChan Buddhism also exhibited traces of logical techniques influenced by the early scholastics of India, where rational discourse was used to sharpen the practitioner's understanding ofemptiness (śūnyatā) andimpermanence.
B.K. Matilal, a renowned scholar of Indian philosophy, was instrumental in highlighting the intellectual connections between Nyāya and Buddhist epistemology. In his work, Matilal emphasizes how Buddhist philosophers likeDharmakīrti incorporated and adapted Nyāya’s logical frameworks to argue forimpermanence andnon-self. Matilal further discusses how Buddhists criticized Nyāya’s essentialism, using formal logic and reasoning to refute Nyāya's claims about the permanence of the self and the inherent nature of things.
Matilal’s analysis of these philosophical interactions shows that, despite their doctrinal differences, Nyāya and Buddhism shared a common interest in developing systematic methods of reasoning and argumentation. His work underscores how both traditions engaged in a shared intellectual project of refining methods of knowledge acquisition and logical analysis, even as they differed on metaphysical views.
To illustrate the extent of Nyāya’s influence on Buddhist philosophy, the following table highlights key concepts adopted and adapted by Buddhist scholars:
| Nyāya Concept | Buddhist Adaptation | Example in Buddhist Philosophy |
|---|---|---|
| Pramāṇa (valid means of knowledge) | Developed into a Buddhist framework of epistemology, focusing on perception, inference, testimony, and comparison. | Dharmakīrti's epistemology in the *Pramāṇavārttika*. |
| Perception (pratyakṣa) | Emphasized impermanence and the changing nature of phenomena, incorporating insight intodependent origination. | Used to argue that all things are transient (impermanent). |
| Inference (anumāna) | Used for analyzing causality and arguing foremptiness and the absence of an inherent self. | Nāgārjuna's logical refutations ofsvabhāva (inherent existence). |
| Comparison (upamāna) | Employed as a method to explain abstract philosophical concepts through analogy. | Used in early Buddhist texts to explain complex doctrines. |
| Testimony (śabda) | The Buddha's teachings (Dharma) were treated as authoritative testimony. | Central to many Buddhist schools of thought, especially in theYogācāra tradition. |
| Logic of Debate (yukti) | Adopted in monastic debate traditions, leading to the development of Buddhist scholasticism. | Central to Indian, Tibetan, and East Asian Buddhist institutions. |
In addition toDharmakīrti andNāgārjuna, Buddhist thinkers likeVasubandhu andŚāntideva also utilized Nyāya-derived logic in their writings.Vasubandhu's work in theAbhidharma tradition integrated Nyāya’sinference andperception frameworks to argue foremptiness and theillusion of permanence in all things.
Moreover,Tibetan Buddhist scholars likeChandrakirti andJamyang Zhépa further developed these ideas, showing that the dialogue between Nyāya and Buddhism was not a one-way flow but rather an ongoing intellectual exchange that continued across centuries and geographical regions.
Numerous commentaries have been written on Nyāya-Sutra since its composition. Some of these commentaries are available onwww.archive.org for reference. A few of the commentaries are mentioned below:[73]
 | This article'slead sectionmay need to be rewritten. Please review thelead guide and helpimprove the lead of this article if you can.(August 2021) (Learn how and when to remove this message) |
 | This sectionpossibly containsoriginal research. Pleaseimprove it byverifying the claims made and addinginline citations. Statements consisting only of original research should be removed.(August 2021) (Learn how and when to remove this message) |
| This sectionneeds additional citations forverification. Please helpimprove this article byadding citations to reliable sources in this section. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. Find sources: "Nyaya" – news ·newspapers ·books ·scholar ·JSTOR(August 2021) (Learn how and when to remove this message) |
Nyaya philosophy does not establish a category ofa priori knowledge. This choice may be due to only consideringde re knowledge, notde dicto knowledge.[74]
It is significant that the namelogic is etymologically connected with the Greek wordlogos, which denotes both 'thought' and 'word' or 'discourse'. The significance of this etymological connection can be adequately appreciated if it is remembered thatlogic, in its rise and development in the western world, particularly in Greece, was closely connected withrhetoric. Thus the namelogic is of a tell-tale character in its application to logic in the West; and it may be taken to indicate how, almost from its very rise, western logic found itself in the firm grip of formalism and how it took more than twenty centuries for the scientific method underlyingAristotle'sOrganon to be redeemed, brought into prominence and implemented in theNovum Organum ofFrancis Bacon (1561–1626). The termlogic should not be taken to carry with it all these implications of European history when it is used in the phraseIndian logic.[75]
The essential features of logic in the Western tradition are well captured in the following statement by a famous logicianAlonzo Church:
Logic is the systematic study of the structure of propositions and of the general conditions of valid inference by a method, which abstracts from the content or matter of the propositions and deals only with their logical form. This distinction between form and matter is made whenever we distinguish between the logical soundness or validity of a piece of reasoning and the truth of the premises from which it proceeds and in this sense is familiar from everyday usage. However, a precise statement of the distinction must be made with reference to a particular language or system of notation, a formalised language, which shall avoid the inexactness and systematically misleading irregularities of structure and expression that are found in ordinary (colloquial or literary) English and other natural languages and shall follow or reproduce the logical form.[76]
Thus, the basic features of Western logic are: It deals with a study of ‘propositions’, specially their ‘logical form’ as abstracted from their ‘content’ or ‘matter’. It deals with ‘general conditions of valid inference’, wherein the truth or otherwise of the premises have no bearing on the ‘logical soundness or validity’ of an inference. It achieves this by taking recourse to a symbolic language that has little to do with natural languages. The main concern of Western logic, in its entire course of development, has been one of systematising patterns of mathematical reasoning, with the mathematical objects being thought of as existing either in an independent ideal world or in a formal domain.Indian logic however, does not deal with ideal entities, such as propositions, logical truth as distinguished from material truth, or with purely symbolic languages that apparently have nothing to do with natural languages.
The central concern of Indian logic as founded innyāya is epistemology, or the theory of knowledge. Thus Indian logic is not concerned merely with making arguments in formal mathematics rigorous and precise, but attends to the much larger issue of providing rigour to the arguments encountered in natural sciences (including mathematics, which in Indian tradition has the attributes of a natural science and not that of a collection of context free formal statements), and in philosophical discourse. Inference in Indian logic is ‘deductive and inductive’, ‘formal as well as material’. In essence, it is the method of scientific enquiry. Indian ‘formal logic’ is thus not ‘formal’, in the sense generally understood: in Indian logic ‘form’ cannot be entirely separated from ‘content’. In fact, great care is exercised to exclude from logical discourse terms, which have no referential content. No statement, which is known to be false, is admitted as a premise in a valid argument. Thus, the ‘method of indirect proof’ (reductio ad absurdum) is not accepted as a valid method−neither in Indian philosophy nor in Indian mathematics−for proving the existence of an entity whose existence is not demonstrable (even in principle) by other (direct) means of proof.
Indian logic does not make any attempt to develop a purely symbolic and content independent or ‘formal language’ as the vehicle of logical analysis. Instead, what Indian logic, especially in its later phase ofNavya-Nyāya starting with the work ofGāngeśa Upādhyāya of the 14th century, has developed is a technical language, which is based on the natural languageSanskrit, yet avoids ‘inexactness’ and ‘misleading irregularities’ by various technical devices. This technical language, being based on the natural language Sanskrit, inherits a certain natural structure and interpretation, and sensitivity to the context of enquiry. On the other hand, the symbolic formal systems of Western logic, though considerably influenced in their structure (say, in quantification, etc.) by the basic patterns discernible in European languages, are professedly purely symbolic, carrying no interpretation whatsoever−such interpretations are supposed to be supplied separately in the specific context of the particular field of enquiry ‘employing’ the symbolic formal system.[77]
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link){{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)| Philosophy |
|  | |||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Texts |
| ||||||||||||||||||
| Deities |
| ||||||||||||||||||
| Practices |
| ||||||||||||||||||
| Related | |||||||||||||||||||
| Major fields |
| ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Foundations | |||||
| Lists |
| ||||
