Nuclear sharing is a concept indeterrence theory in which anuclear-armed country deploys nuclear weapons on the territory of a country that does not possessnuclear weapons and extended itsnuclear deterrent to that country. Nuclear sharing typically also involves joint planning and training processes forpotentially using them, going beyondnuclear stationing ornuclear basing, which refer to a nuclear-armed country's deployment of nuclear weapons on foreign soil without an operational role for the host country's military and government.
It was originally conceived during theCold War, when theUnited States and theSoviet Union placed their own nuclear weapons in many non-nuclear countries of the American-alignedFirst World and the Soviet-alignedSecond World, as part of thenuclear arms race between the two sides. However, since thedissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the concept continues to be practiced by the United States andRussia. United States nuclear weapons, for delivery byfighter aircraft, are based inBelgium,Germany,Italy, theNetherlands,Turkey, and theUnited Kingdom. Russian nuclear weapons, for delivery by aircraft and short-range missiles, aredeployed in Belarus.
As part of nuclear sharing, the participating countries carry out consultations and make common decisions on nuclear-weapons policy, training, and deployment, and maintain technical equipment (notablynuclear-capable aircraft) that is required for thedelivery of nuclear weapons. In the event of a war that turns nuclear, the United States has publicly declared—with agreement from theEighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC)—that theNon-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would no longer be controlling.[1]
In the modern form, via the usage ofpermissive action links (PALs), includinganti-tampering systems, a host country is prevented from unilaterally detonating its shared weapons, on a short timeframe. This applies to currently shared United States and Russian weapons.[2] Due to the lack of transfer of operational control, this has been described by scholars asnon-substantive nuclear sharing.[3][4]
Historically, before the introduction of PALs in 1962, the US was aware that stationing or sharing agreements were insufficient to prevent host militaries from unilaterally seizing and using nuclear launch capabilities. Memorandums show that presidentDwight D. Eisenhower's goal was to “give, to all intents and purposes, control of [American nuclear] weapons” to European allies and for the US to “retain titular possession only.” This has been described by scholars assubstantive nuclear sharing. One example was the simple dual-key operation ofPGM-17 Thor IRBMs in the United Kingdom underProject Emily. The Royal Air Force officer key began the missile launch sequence, and the United States Air Force officer key armed the warhead, with no real protection from British seizure of the American key.[3][4]
In contrast to nuclear sharing, foreign deployment of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, without cooperation from the host country's military, is termednuclear stationing. This was the most common type of arrangement throughout theCold War, including all foreign deployment by the USSR,[5][6] and all US deployments in Asia and in European countries without sharing arrangements. Such early deployments were often highly secretive, with host governments sometimes not being informed entirely.[7]
A separate but related concept isnuclear weaponstechnology transfer, where a state is provided with assistance to develop an independent nuclear arsenal. Examples include French collaboration with theIsraeli nuclear program, Soviet collaboration with theChinese nuclear program, Chinese collaboration with thePakistani nuclear program., andUS-UK bilateral assistance after 1957.
Of the three nuclear powers in NATO (France, theUnited Kingdom and theUnited States), only the United States is known to have provided weapons for nuclear sharing. However, the UK also deployed, stationed, or tested nuclear weapons on the territory ofWest Germany,Singapore, and theAkrotiri and Dhekelia overseas territory on the island ofCyprus. France tested nuclear weapons on the territory of Algeria, then a colony. The United States began moving weapons to Europe in 1954, first to the UK, and then to West Germany. The US negotiated agreements with the Allied countries where US nuclear weapons would be stored, including Section 144b of the Atomic Energy Act, and a national stockpile agreement. It also negotiated additional agreements with France, West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Canada, and the UK for the use of nuclear weapons stored and controlled by US forces in West Germany. These arrangements included delivery of short-range nuclear weapons - including landmines, rockets, and artillery, as well as nuclear armed depth charges and anti-aircraft missiles. The US also negotiated a separate agreement with Canada to provide nuclear-armed anti-air and anti-ship weapons to defend North America. The US deployed nuclear forces in Greenland (Danish territory) and Iceland - as well as extensively in East Asia: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, but these were solely for delivery by US troops.[8]
Historically, the shared nuclear weapon delivery systems were not restricted to bombs. Greece usedNike-Hercules Missiles as well asA-7 Corsair II attack aircraft. Canada hadBomarc nuclear-armed anti-aircraft missiles,Honest John surface-to-surface missiles and theAIR-2 Genie nuclear-armed air-to-air rocket, as well as tactical nuclear bombs for theCF-104 fighter.[9]PGM-19 Jupiter medium-range ballistic missiles were shared with Italian air force units and Turkish units with US dual key systems to enable the warheads.[10]PGM-17 Thor intermediate-range ballistic missiles were forward deployed to the UK with RAF crews.[11] An extended version of nuclear sharing, the NATOMultilateral Force was a plan to equip NATO surface ships of the member states withUGM-27 Polaris missiles, but the UK ended up purchasing the Polaris missiles and using its own warheads, and the plan to equip NATO surface ships was abandoned.[12] In the later Cold War, the deployment of USPershing II and SovietRSD-10 Pioneermedium-range ballistic missiles to Europe resulted in the "Euromissile Crisis" including the 1979NATO Double-Track Decision.
Canada hosted weapons under the control of theNorth American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), rather than NATO, until 1984, andGreece until 2001.[13][14][15] TheUnited Kingdom also received UStactical nuclear weapons such asnuclear artillery andLance missiles until 1992, even though the UK is a nuclear-weapon state in its own right; these were mainly deployed in West Germany.[16]
After theSoviet Union collapsed, the nuclear weapon types shared within NATO were reduced to tactical nuclear bombs deployed by Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA), i.e. aircraft capable of carrying conventional or nuclear weapons.[13] According to the press, Eastern European member states of NATO have resisted the withdrawal of the shared nuclear bombs from Europe, fearing it would show a weakening of US commitment to defend Europe againstRussia.[17]
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| Country | Base | Estimated weapons | Host country dual-capable aircraft at base | US dual-capable aircraft at base |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Belgium | Kleine Brogel | 10-15 | General Dynamics F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon | None |
 Germany | Büchel | 10-15 | Panavia PA-200 Tornado IDS | None |
 Greece | Araxos | 0 (reserve mission only) | General Dynamics F-16C/D Fighting Falcon | None |
 Italy | Aviano | 20–30 | None | General Dynamics F-16C/D Fighting Falcon |
| Ghedi | 10–15 | Panavia PA-200 Tornado IDS | None | |
 Netherlands | Volkel | 10-15 | General Dynamics F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon | None |
 Turkey | Incirlik | 20–30 | General Dynamics F-16C/D Fighting Falcon | None |
 United Kingdom[20][21] | Lakenheath | 25-30[22] | None | Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II |
| Total | 125-130[22] | |||
As of 2025[update],Belgium,Germany,Italy, theNetherlands,Turkey, and theUnited Kingdom have been hostingUS nuclear weapons as part of NATO's nuclear sharing policy.[13][23] They are assigned to delivery by specific US and European aircraft wings, operating NATO-designated dual-capable aircraft.[24]
Inpeacetime, the nuclear weapons stored in non-nuclear countries are guarded byUnited States Air Force (USAF) personnel and previously, some nuclear artillery and missile systems were guarded byUnited States Army (USA) personnel; thePermissive Action Link codes required for arming them remain under American control. In case of war, the weapons are to be mounted on the participating countries' warplanes. The weapons are under custody and control ofUSAF Munitions Support Squadrons co-located on NATO main operating bases who work together with the host nation forces.[13]
As of 2025[update], 125 to 130 tacticalB61 nuclear bombs are believed to be deployed inEurope under the nuclear sharing arrangement.[25][26] The weapons are stored within a vault inhardened aircraft shelters, using the USAFWS3 Weapon Storage and Security System. European air forces operateGeneral Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcons (F-16s) andPanavia Tornados Interdictor/Strike (PA-200s), and are in the process of transitioning toLockheed Martin F-35A Lightnings II (F-35As).United States Air Forces in Europe operates F-16s at Aviano, Italy, and both F-35As andMcDonnell Douglas F-15E Strike Eagles (F-15Es) at Lakenheath, UK.[27] F-35As only operate under the USAF fromRAF Lakenheath. The use of stockpiled American B61s in Europe, via the DCA programme, is claimed to require authorization from the NATONuclear Planning Group in addition the US president.[28]
TheUnited States hasstationednuclear weapons in theKingdom of Belgium since 1963.[29] As of 2023[update], an estimated 10 to 15B61 nuclear bombs are stored atKleine Brogel Air Base, maintained byUSAFE's 701stMunitions Support Squadron and designated for the usage of the Belgian10th Tactical Wing, flying theirF-16 MLU fighter jets.[30]
In Italy, B61 bombs are stored at theGhedi Air Base and at theAviano Air Base. According to the former Italian PresidentFrancesco Cossiga, Italy's role in a planned retaliation consisted in striking with those nuclear weaponsCzechoslovakia andHungary had theWarsaw Pact waged nuclear war against NATO.[31][32] He acknowledged the presence of US nuclear weapons in Italy, and speculated about the possible presence of British and French nuclear weapons.[33]
The only German nuclear base is located inBüchel Air Base, near the border with Luxembourg. The base has 11Protective Aircraft Shelters (PAS) equipped with WS3 Vaults for storage of nuclear weapons, each with a maximum capacity of 44B61 nuclear bombs. There are 20 B61 bombs stored on the base for delivery by German PA-200Tornado IDS bombers of theJaBoG 33 squadron. The Tornado IDS aircraft were due to be retired by the end of 2024; while 2010 and 2018 assessments questioned what nuclear sharing role, if any, Germany would then retain,[13][34] in 2020 Germany (Fourth Merkel cabinet) announced that it would buy 30Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornets to replace the Tornado in its nuclear-capable role.[35] The Super Hornet was not yet certified for the B61 bomb, but Dan Gillian, head of Boeing's Super Hornet program, had previously stated his optimism about achieving this certification in a timely manner.[36] In 2022, against the backdrop of theRussian invasion of Ukraine, the Super Hornet order was cancelled and Germany (Kabinett Scholz) instead chose to order 35Lockheed Martin F-35 jets for nuclear sharing use.[37][38]
On 10 June 2013, former Dutch prime ministerRuud Lubbers confirmed the existence of 22 shared nuclear bombs atVolkel Air Base.[39] This was inadvertently confirmed again in June 2019 when a public draft report to theNATO Parliamentary Assembly was discovered to reference the existence of US nuclear weapons at Volkel, as well as locations in Belgium, Italy, Germany, and Turkey. A new version of the report was released on 11 July 2019 without reference to the locations of the weapons.[40]
In 2017, due to an increasingly unstable relationship between the United States and Turkey it was suggested that the United States consider removing 50 tactical nuclear weapons stored under American control at theIncirlik Air Base in Turkey.[41][42][43][44][45][46][47] The presence of US nuclear weapons in Turkey gained increased public attention in October 2019 with the deterioration of relations between the two nations after the Turkish military incursion into Syria.[48][49][50][51][52]
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In July 2025, experts concluded that between 25 and 30 United States nuclear weapons had been redeployed toRAF Lakenheath for the first time since 2008.[22] This was based on telemetry from a 15 JulyBoeing C-17 Globemaster III flight between New Mexico and the United Kingdom, as well as preparations for nuclear weapons storage at the base being documented since 2023.[18][19] The US and UK defense departments reiterated their policy to not confirm or deny nuclear weapon presence.[20][21] It is the only American nuclear base in Europe to hoststealth aircraft.
In 2022, after theRussian invasion of Ukraine, reports appeared about the possible inclusion ofPoland in the nuclear sharing policy, with presidentAndrzej Duda calling the country's lack of nuclear weapons a "problem" and saying that it was in talks with the United States about the possibility of nuclear sharing.[53] In June 2023, then-prime ministerMateusz Morawiecki declared Poland's interest in hosting nuclear weapons under the policy, citing the reported deployment of Russian nuclear weapons to its Kaliningrad region and Belarus, whileNational Security Bureau headJacek Siewiera said the country was interested in certifying its upcomingF-35A fleet as being capable of delivering B61 bombs.[54] In April 2024, president Duda said that Poland was "ready" to host nuclear weapons and had been discussing the matter with the United States government for "some time".[55] The current Polish prime minister,Donald Tusk, said that he wanted to speak with Duda to understand the intention behind the statement and that he wanted Poland to "be safe and well-armed, but [he] would also like any initiatives to be very well prepared by the people responsible for them and for all [Poles] to be convinced that this is what [they] want."[56] In May 2024, foreign ministerRadosław Sikorski accused president Duda of failing to consult with him on this and other major foreign policy announcements and said that he had "asked the president privately and publicly not to discuss such delicate and secret matters in public, because it [did] not help Poland"; he also said that theprevious Polish government had been told that the idea of Poland being involved with nuclear sharing was "not on the table".[57] After the announcement in March 2025 that France was considering the extension of its nuclear deterrence to other European countries (see next section), Duda welcomed this development[58] while simultaneously renewing his call for American weapons to be based in Poland.[59][60]
In March 2025, amid European concerns over whether the United States could continue to be relied on as an ally, the French presidentEmmanuel Macron said that his country would consider the possibility of extending the protection offered by itsnuclear arsenal to other European states. Both Macron and defence ministerSébastien Lecornu stressed that ultimate control over the weapons would be retained by France, and claims that the potential decision amounted to a plan for nuclear sharing were explicitly denied.[61][62]Friedrich Merz said that discussions on nuclear sharing should be held with France and Britain (which also has nuclear weapons) but warned that European weapons could only ever be a supplement to the existing American arrangement.[63]
The Soviet Union practiced nuclear stationing during the Cold War, primarily withWarsaw Pact countries. It stationed nuclear weapons inEast Germany,[64]Czechoslovakia, theHungary,[65]Poland,[66] andMongolia, as well as briefly inCuba during the 1962Cuban Missile Crisis.[67] It is possible thatsimilar arrangements were made with Bulgaria, but no sources have been found to date. In 1963, in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, theSocialist Republic of Romania made a secret declaration to the United States that it did not host Soviet nuclear weapons, and that it would wish to remain neutral rather than uphold its Warsaw Pact obligations in the event of a superpower conflict.[68]
Some historical evidence indicates during the 1973Yom Kippur War, the Soviet Union deployed nuclear weapons toEgypt, including possibly providing two warheads to SovietScud missile brigades, as well as the typical nuclear weapons stored on ships and submarines of the5th Operational Squadron based inSyria.[69]
On 27 February 2022, shortly after the2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Belarusiansvoted in a constitutional referendum with political and military reforms, including to repeal the post-Soviet constitutional prohibition on basing of nuclear weapons. The reforms also removed the country'sneutral status and allowed permanent basing for theRussian Armed Forces.[70] The referendum was criticized by the EU, UK, US, Canada, and other countries in the context of thecensorship andhuman rights violations against theBelarusian opposition.[71][72][73][74][75]
At a meeting on 25 June 2022, Russian PresidentVladimir Putin and President of BelarusAlexander Lukashenko agreed the deployment of Russian short-range nuclear-capable missiles.[76] Lukashenko has described the weapons as "non-strategic".[77] Russia supplied Belarus with nuclear-capableIskander-M missile systems in 2023,[78] with President Putin announcing the first delivery of warheads occurring as of 16 June 2023 in a speech at the St. Petersburg International Forum.[79] These missile warheads are believed to have avariable yield between 5 and 50 kilotons. Additionally, Russia has completed modifications necessary for BelarusianSu-25 bombers to carry nuclear air-dropped bombs and the pilots have received training.[80] The yield of these bombs is not believed to exceed 20 kilotons.[77] Belarus has reported full operation of the nuclear-capable Iskanders and Su-25s, and exercised their use with training nuclear warheads in May 2024.[81]
As of 2025[update], there is no conclusive open-source evidence that Russian nuclear warheads and gravity bombs themselves are being stored in Belarus, although the most likely location if so is a Cold War-era depot nearAsipovichy. In December 2024, Lukashenko stated Belarus was hosting "dozens" of Russian warheads. Putin has also stated that itsOreshnikintermediate-range ballistic missile could be deployed to Belarus in the second half of 2025, and that Belarus would play a role in nuclear targeting.[82]
Despite Lukashenko's statement on weapon usage "without hesitation in case of aggression against Belarus", which could indicate the transfer of operational control to Belarus, Putin emphasized Russian control was maintained, andGeneral Secretary of the CISSergey Lebedev described a "double nuclear button" for weapon usage.[77]
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It was common belief among foreign officials in 2010 thatSaudi Arabia andPakistan have an understanding in which Pakistan would supply Saudi Arabia with warheads if security in thePersian Gulf was threatened. A Western official toldThe Times that Saudi Arabia could have the nuclear warheads in a matter of days of approaching Pakistan. Pakistan's ambassador to Saudi Arabia,Muhammed Naeem Khan, was quoted as saying, "Pakistan considers the security of Saudi Arabia not just as a diplomatic or an internal matter but as a personal matter." Naeem also said that the Saudi leadership considered Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to be one country and that any threat to Saudi Arabia is also a threat to Pakistan.[83] Western intelligence sources toldThe Guardian that "the Saudi monarchy paid for up to 60% of the Pakistani nuclear programme, and in return has the option to buy a small nuclear arsenal ('five to six warheads') off the shelf".[84] Saudi Arabia has potential dual-purpose delivery infrastructure, includingTornado IDS andF-15S fighter bombers and improved ChineseCSS-2intermediate range ballistic missiles with accuracy sufficient for nuclear warheads but delivered with high explosive warheads.[85][86]
In November 2013, a variety of sources toldBBC Newsnight that Saudi Arabia was able to obtain nuclear weapons from Pakistan at will. The report further alleged, according to western experts, that Pakistan's defense sector had received plentiful financial assistance from Saudi Arabia.[87]Gary Samore, an adviser toBarack Obama, said, "I do think that the Saudis believe that they have some understanding with Pakistan that, in extremis, they would have claim to acquire nuclear weapons from Pakistan."[88] Amos Yadlin, formerly head of Israeli military intelligence, said "They already paid for the bomb, they will go to Pakistan and bring what they need to bring."[88]
According to the US-basedCenter for Strategic and International Studies think-thank, the BBC's report on possible Pakistani-Saudi nuclear sharing was partially incorrect. There was no indication of the validity or credibility of the BBC's sources, and the article failed to expand on what was essentially an unverified lead. Furthermore, if Pakistan were to transfer nuclear warheads onto Saudi soil, it was highly unlikely that either nation would face any international repercussions if NATO-esque guidelines were followed.[89] A research paper produced by theBritish House of CommonsDefence Select Committee states that as long as current NATO nuclear sharing arrangements remain in place, the NATO states would have few valid grounds for complaint if such a transfer were to occur.[90]
On 17 September 2025, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed theStrategic Mutual Defence Agreement, a week after theIsraeli airstrike in Qatar added to long-running concerns about US unpredictability and commitment to Gulf states defence.[91] The agreement states an attack on one country will be treated as an attack on both.[92] A senior Saudi official toldReuters, regarding whether Pakistan would provide Saudi Arabia with a nuclear umbrella, "This is a comprehensive defensive agreement that encompasses all military means."[93] Pakistani Defense MinisterKhawaja Asif initially suggested that the strategic agreement with Saudi Arabia might involve a nuclear element but later backtracked, stating that such a scope was not included. The ambiguity surrounding his remarks fueled speculation about the pact’s implications, with its precise terms remaining unclear. Ali Shihabi, a Saudi commentator with close ties to the monarchy, welcomed the “deterrence that comes from sharing Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella.”[92]
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| Background |
| Nuclear-armed states |
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In 2015, Russia accused the US of violating the NPT,[94] but since Russia resumed its own nuclear sharing arrangements, now with Belarus, it no longer makes this assertion. However, China accused the US of violating the NPT at a side event to the NPT review process in Geneva in July 2024.[95]
At the time the NPT was being negotiated, the NATO nuclear sharing agreements were well known and discussed publicly in the United Nations at the NPT negotiations in Geneva,[96] national parliaments,[97][98] NATO[99] and government press releases,[100] and in the news media.[101] The US and USSR discussed the wording of Articles I and II at length bilaterally and negotiated the wording to ensure that they were compatible with the NPT during an especially intense negotiation from 22-30 October 1966 on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York.[102] While some have erroneously claimed that such arrangements were secret or unknown, and that some signatories not have known about these agreements and interpretations at that time,[103] these claims have been thoroughly debunked.[104][105]
During the Cold War militarization of theIron Curtain region of Europe, the US and Soviet arsenals ofchemical weapons played an intertwined role with nuclear sharing.
The United States stationed chemical weapons at itsoverseas military bases, in Okinawauntil 1972 and in West Germany, until 1990. The Soviet Union likely stationed chemical weapons in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, based on post-Cold War evidence, but repeatedly denied this. Both sides developed a large arsenal of ground and air delivery systems: shells, mines, rockets, longer-range missiles, spray tanks, and many others.[106]
In 1969, theNixon administrationproclaimed a policy of no-first-use of chemical weapons, but maintainedits chemical arsenal as a deterrent to Soviet first use in Europe. British intelligence concluded that Warsaw Pact battle plans included a massive surprise battlefield attack with chemical weapons, intended to maximize casualties and causedemoralization.[106]
A 1984 RAND report argued that Soviet forces viewed chemical weapons usage as a matter of tactical advantages and disadvantages, and not as especially escalatory. In this vein, Soviet forces may be more likely to strike the rear than the frontline: threatening rendering NATO nuclear airbases in Europe inoperable with chemical attacks, includingpersistent chemical weapons, a fear which contributed to the development of theWeapons Storage and Security System for nuclear weapons at the bases. It also argued NATO would not be willing to respond to a Soviet chemical first use with nuclear weapons.[107]
About 100 of these (versions −3 and −4) are thought to be deployed at six bases in five European countries: Aviano and Ghedi in Italy; Büchel in Germany; Incirlik in Turkey; Kleine Brogel in Belgium; and Volkel in the Netherlands. This number has declined since 2009 partly due to reduction of operational storage capacity at Aviano and Incirlik (Kristensen 2015, 2019c). ... Concerns were raised about the security of the nuclear weapons at the Incirlik base during the failed coup attempt in Turkey in July 2016, and the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee for Europe stated in September 2020 that "our presence, quite honestly, in Turkey is certainly threatened," and further noted that "we don't know what's going to happen to Incirlik" (Gehrke 2020). Despite rumors in late 2017 that the weapons had been "quietly removed" (Hammond 2017), reports in 2019 that US officials had reviewed emergency nuclear weapons evacuation plans (Sanger 2019) indicated that that there were still weapons present at the base. The numbers appear to have been reduced, however, from up to 50 to approximately 20.
Neither Super Hornet nor Typhoon is presently nuclear certified, which could lead to a pause in Germany's participation in the nuclear sharing deal. "We certainly think that we, working with the U.S. government, can meet the German requirements there on the [German's] timeline," [Dan] Gillian said regarding this issue.