The note precipitated a crisis in Finland: activating the military provisions of the treaty would have frustratedFinland's post-war policy of neutrality in international affairs and greatly damaged Finland's relations with the West. One of the crucial goals of Finnish foreign policy was to reinforce the credibility of Finland's neutrality in the eyes of Western powers which were skeptical of the country's ability to resist Soviet influence.
At the time the note was sent, presidentUrho Kekkonen was inHawaii on vacation, during his visit to theUnited States andCanada. The proposed consultations threatened the achievements of the previous decade, during which Finland had attainedUN membership and the Soviets had vacated thePorkkala military base near Helsinki, leased to them in 1944 for fifty years. At worst, the note was seen as the possible first step towards establishing a Soviet military presence in Finland, and even further, thede facto end of Finnish independence.
President Kekkonen handled the matter by arranging a personal meeting withNikita Khrushchev inNovosibirsk. As a result of the meeting, the Soviet Union agreed to "postpone" the consultations indefinitely, charging the Finns with monitoring the security situation in Northern Europe. The Finnish interpretation of the agreement was that the Soviets thereby left the matter of initiating military consultations to Finnish discretion, and the crisis was defused.
The most common view today[citation needed] is that the Soviet Union was mainly motivated by a desire to ensure Kekkonen's re-electionin 1962. Kekkonen, who enjoyed the confidence of the Soviet leadership, was seeking re-election for the first time, and his main opponent,Olavi Honka [fi], was regarded as having a good chance of victory with the backing of a six-party coalition, including two major parties, theSocial Democrats and theNational Coalition. The extent to which Kekkonen may himself have been involved in orchestrating the incident is disputed, but it is commonly accepted[citation needed] that he was expecting a Soviet intervention in the presidential election, and Kekkonen is known to have planned dissolving theFinnish parliament, forcing his opponents to campaign together in the presidential election and against each other in the parliamentary election at the same time.
As a result of the crisis, Honka dropped his candidacy in November 1961, and in January 1962, Kekkonen was re-elected by an overwhelming vote of 199 out of 300 electoral college votes. During his second term in office, the Social Democrats were reconciled with Kekkonen'sAgrarian League, leading to a new era in Finnish internal politics dominated by this so-called "red earth" alliance.
30 October 1961: In Moscow,Soviet Foreign MinisterAndrei Gromyko hands over a note to Finnish AmbassadorEero A. Wuori, calling attention to theFederal Republic of Germany's increased military activities in theBaltic Sea and proposing "consultations on measures due to the threat of a military attack byNATO". President Kekkonen is informed of the note while resting in theHawaiian Islands. The President continues his original program of visits despite the note. Finnish Foreign MinisterAhti Karjalainen, who is part of the delegation, immediately returns to Finland.
1 November 1961: Kekkonen gives a speech at the dinner of theWorld Affairs Council in Los Angeles in which he states that the note has not brought anything new to therelations between Finland and the Soviet Union but that it instead reflects the tension prevailing in Europe. Foreign Minister Karjalainen, who arrives in Helsinki on the same day, announces that the President will give a radio and television message upon his return to Finland.
3 November 1961: President Kekkonen returns to Finland. On the same day in the presidential residenceTamminiemi, he meets Prime MinisterMartti Miettunen and Foreign Minister Karjalainen and tells them that he is preparing a speech in which he will announce that he will refuse consultations and withdraw his presidential candidacy.
5 November 1961: Kekkonen gives a radio and television address in which he appeals for Finland's policy of neutrality and states he considers it unnecessary to examine whether the conditions for negotiations required by theFinno-Soviet Treaty exist. However, Kekkonen does not withdraw his candidacy.
6 November 1961 Foreign Minister Karjalainen meets the Ambassador of the Soviet Union,Alexei Zakharov. Karjalainen suggests a discussion with Foreign Minister Gromyko on the political side of the note and postponement of military consultations. The aim of Kekkonen and Karjalainen is to start a discussion with the Soviet leadership only on the political situation, avoiding a discussion on the threat of war and the military situation. On November 7, Kekkonen informs the Finnish military leadership that military problems are not the main reason for the note. He orders the military leadership to stay out of the negotiations and to not raise the readiness level of Finnish forces.
10 November 1961: Foreign Minister Karjalainen flies toMoscow on a negotiating trip.
11 November 1961: Foreign Minister Karjalainen negotiates with Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Moscow. Gromyko states that the Soviet military leadership has been calling for military consultations with Finland for a long time and that the country's political leadership has so far rejected these demands because it has relied on Finland's foreign policy leadership. Karjalainen suggests the negotiations were limited to political issues. Gromyko demands that Finland demonstrate the continuity of its foreign policy so that military consultations might be avoided. Karjalainen suggests that bringing forward the parliamentary elections from July to February 1962 could be such a demonstration.
12 November 1961: Karjalainen returns to Finland and explains the results of the negotiations to President Kekkonen and the parliamentary groups.
14 November 1961: President Kekkonen dissolves the Finnish Parliament and ordersan early election to be held on February 4, 1962.
15 November 1961: Soviet Deputy Foreign MinisterVasili Kuznetsov informs Finnish Ambassador Wuori that bringing forward the parliamentary elections alone is not enough and that urgent negotiations remain necessary as the international situation has further tightened since the note was first sent, due to joint military exercises planned by theFederal Republic of Germany andDenmark.
17 November 1961: Ambassador Wuori receives a hint that President Kekkonen could travel toNovosibirsk in a week's time to meetNikita Khrushchev. Wuori arrives in Helsinki the same evening to meet Kekkonen, Miettunen and Karjalainen.
18 November 1961: The Finnish government proposes that President Kekkonen meet Khrushchev to resolve the note crisis. On 19 November, Ambassador Zakharov confirms that Khrushchev is ready for the meeting.
20 November 1961: U.S. AmbassadorBernard Gufler delivers a secret message from Kennedy to Kekkonen. The US president pledges non-military American support for Finnish neutrality and independence.[1]
22 November 1961: President Kekkonen leaves for Novosibirsk. According to Ahti Karjalainen, the atmosphere in Helsinki is such that Kekkonen's departure fromHelsinki Central railway station could have gathered large crowds to sing patriotic hymns as in autumn 1939 before theWinter War. This would have made Kekkonen's negotiations more difficult, so the president's entourage travels by car from Helsinki first toLoviisa, where Kekkonen meets his brother Jussi Kekkonen, and then toLuumäki, where the entourage boards the train to Moscow. FromMoscow, Kekkonen continues by plane toNovosibirsk the next day.
24 November 1961: Kekkonen and Khrushchev engage in all-day negotiations in Novosibirsk. Kekkonen suggests that the Soviet Union refrain from consultations to prevent an increase in war psychosis. In Kekkonen's opinion, Finland's policy of neutrality provides sufficient security guarantees for the Soviet Union. According to Khrushchev, the note has not been due to a lack of confidence in Finland, but to the increased military threat of theFederal Republic of Germany. According to Khrushchev, the Western military allianceNATO is coming under German control, and he is particularly concerned about German military cooperation withDenmark andNorway. Khrushchev states that the Soviet Union has full confidence in President Kekkonen and suggests that thanks to that confidence, military consultations may be postponed until an urgent need arises. Khrushchev also criticizes the actions ofVäinö Tanner andVäinö Leskinen, claiming that they are reviving the old brotherhood with Germany and working against the Soviet Union.
25 November 1961:Olavi Honka withdraws as presidential candidate. The decision is his own, as the Soviet Union has not made this a condition for waiving consultations. On the same day, Kekkonen returns from Novosibirsk to Moscow and meetsChairman of the PresidiumLeonid Brezhnev in theKremlin for lunch.
Urho Kekkonen arrives in Helsinki (Finland) from Novosibirsk (Soviet Union) after his negotiation trip on 26 November 1961
26 November 1961: President Kekkonen returns to Finland and gives a radio and television address at 9 pm in which he announces that the Soviet Union has given up the demand for consultations. Kekkonen says that the Soviet Union has confidence in Finland's policy but adds that "if we cause that confidence to run out by our actions, the fault is our own".
