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| Nicaraguan Revolution | |||||||
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| Part of theCentral American crisis and theCold War inLatin America | |||||||
Sandinistas using anMG-3 Aerial bombing by theNational Guard | |||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||
Supported by: Other supporters
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MAP-ML (1978–1979) Supported by: Other supporters
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| Strength | |||||||
1978–1979: 1981–1990: | 1978–1979:
1981–1990:
More[42]
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| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 1978–1979:
1981–1990:[39]
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1978–1979 offensive: 10,000–50,000 killed (up to 7,000 civilians)[48] 1981–1990: 32,000–43,000 killed (3,800 civilians reported dead)[48][49] Total: 42,000–78,000 killed (incl. 4,000–22,000 civilians)[48][47] | |||||||
| More than 600,000 left homeless and 150,000 refugees fled to Costa Rica, Honduras, and the United States.[48] | |||||||
TheNicaraguan Revolution (Spanish:Revolución nicaragüense), orSandinista Revolution (Spanish:Revolución popular sandinista) was an armed conflict that took place in the Central American country of Nicaragua from 1978 to 1990.
It began with rising opposition to theSomoza dictatorship in the 1960s and 1970s, the overthrow of the dictatorship in 1978–1979,[50] and fighting between the government and theContras from 1981 to 1990. The revolution revealed the country as one of the majorproxy war battlegrounds of theCold War.
The initial overthrow of the Somoza dictatorial regime in 1978–79 cost many lives, and the Contra War of the 1980s took tens of thousands more and was the subject of fierce international debate. Because of the political turmoil, failing economy, and limited government influence, during the 1980s both theFSLN (aleft-wing collection of political parties) and theContras (aright-wing collection of counter-revolutionary groups) had to receive aid from theSoviet Union and theUnited States, respectively.
A peace process started with the Sapoá Accords in 1988 and the Contra War ended after the signing of the Tela Accord in 1989 and the demobilization of the FSLN and Contra armies. A second election in 1990 resulted in the election of theUNO, and the Sandinistas lost power until 2006.
Following theUnited States occupation of Nicaragua from 1912 to 1933 during theBanana Wars, a hereditarymilitary dictatorship led bySomoza family took power, and ruled from 1937 until its collapse in 1979. The Somoza dynasty consisted ofAnastasio Somoza García, his eldest sonLuis Somoza Debayle, and finallyAnastasio Somoza Debayle. The Somoza era was characterized by economic development, albeit with risinginequality andpolitical corruption, strong US support for the government and its military, as well as a reliance on US-basedmultinational corporations.[51]
In 1961,Carlos Fonseca Amador, Silvio Mayorga, andTomás Borge Martínez formed theSandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) with other student activists at theUniversidad Nacional Autonoma de Nicaragua (UNAN) inManagua. The founders were experienced activists. Amador, first General Secretary, had worked with others on a newspaper "broadly critical" of the Somoza family titledSegovia.[52]
Consisting of approximately 20 members during the 1960s, with the help of students, FSLN gathered support from peasants and anti-Somoza elements, as well as from the communistCuban government, the socialist Panamanian government ofOmar Torrijos, and the social democratic Venezuelan government ofCarlos Andrés Pérez.
By the 1970s the coalition of students, farmers, businesses, churches, and a small percentage of Marxists was strong enough to launch a military effort against the regime ofAnastasio Somoza Debayle. The FSLN focused on guerrilla tactics, inspired byFidel Castro andChé Guevara. They launched an unsuccessful campaign in 1963 known as the Raití-Bocay campaign in rural, northernJinotega Department, where "when guerrillas did encounter the National Guard, they had to retreat...with heavy losses."[53][54] Further operations included a devastating loss near the city ofMatagalpa, during which Mayorga was killed.[55] During this time, FSLN reduced attacks, instead focusing on solidifying the organization.
Fonseca died in combat in November 1976. The FSLN then split into three factions that fought separately: theMaoistTendencia GPP ("Guerra Popular Prolongada" or ProlongedPeople's War), theMarxist-LeninistTendencia Proletaria ("Proletarian Faction"), and theLeft-wing nationalistTendencia Tercerista ("Third Faction"). The latter was the most popular and was led byDaniel Ortega, who eventually became the FSLN'sGeneral Secretary in 1984.[56][57]

Cuban intervention in Nicaragua under the leadership ofFidel Castro was critical in the military success of the FSLN. The arms, funding, and intelligence that the Sandinistas received from the Cuban government helped them overcome the National Guard's superior training and experience. Castro's support of the revolution at the same time the Somoza government (and later the Contras) received help from the U.S. is one reason why the conflict is considered aproxy war of the Cold War.[58]
In the 1970s, FSLN began a campaign of kidnappings, which led to national recognition of the group in the Nicaraguan media and solidification of the perception of the group as a threat. The ruling regime, which included theNicaraguan National Guard, trained and influenced by the U.S. military, declared a state of siege, and proceeded to use torture, rape,extrajudicial killings, intimidation and press censorship in order to combat the FSLN attacks. This led to international condemnation of the regime and in 1978 theUS cut off aid over itshuman rights violations. In response, Somoza lifted the state of siege.[12]
Other opposition parties and movements began to consolidate. In 1974, theUnión Democrática Liberal (UDEL; English: Union for Democratic Liberation) was founded byPedro Joaquín Chamorro Cardenal, editor of the Managua newspaperLa Prensa. The alliance included two anti-Somoza liberal parties as well as conservatives and theNicaraguan Socialist Party.[59]
On 10 January 1978, Cardenal was murdered, allegedly by the Somoza regime, andriots broke out in Managua targeting the Somoza regime.[60] Following the riots, a general strike on 23–24 January called for the end of the Somoza regime and was successful at shutting down around 80% of businesses in Managua and the provincial capitals ofLeón,Granada,Chinandega, and Matagalpa.[60]
In the words of William Dewy, aCiti Bank employee who witnessed the Managua riots:
"Our offices at the time were directly across the street fromLa Prensa and in the fighting that followed part of our branch was burned, but not intentionally. They were going after the Somoza-owned bank. In the turmoil they torched the [Somoza] bank and our building also burnt down. It was clear [to the U.S. business community] that the Chamorro assassination had changed things dramatically and permanently for the worse." — Interview with Morris H. Morley, 17 October 1987[60]
On 22 August 1978 the FSLN staged a massive kidnapping operation. Led by Éden Pastora, the Sandinista forces captured the National Palace while the legislature was in session, taking 2,000 hostages. Pastora demanded money, the release of Sandinista prisoners, and "a means of publicizing the Sandinista cause."[12] After two days, the government agreed to pay $500,000 and to release certain prisoners, a major victory for the FSLN. Revolts against the state and guerrilla warfare continued.[12]
In early 1979 theOrganization of American States supervised negotiations between the FSLN and the government. However, these broke down when it became clear that the Somoza regime had no intention of allowing democratic elections.[citation needed]
By June 1979, following a successful urban offensive, the FSLN militarily controlled all of the country except the capital. On 17 July, Somoza Debayle resigned, and on 19 July the FSLN entered Managua. Somoza Debayle fled to Miami, ceding control to the revolutionary movement. His Nationalist Liberal Party became practically defunct, and many government functionaries and business figures overtly compromised withsomocismo chose exile. The Catholic church and the professional sectors generally approved of the new reality.[61]

Immediately following the fall of the Somoza regime, Nicaragua lay largely in ruins. The country had suffered both a bloody war and the1972 Nicaragua earthquake just 6 years earlier. In 1979, approximately 600,000 Nicaraguans were homeless and 150,000 more were either refugees or in exile, out of a total population of 2.8 million.[62]
In response, a state of emergency was declared. The US sent US$99 million in aid. Land and businesses of the Somoza regime were expropriated, the courts were abolished, and workers were organized into Civil Defense Committees. The new regime declared that "elections are unnecessary", which led to criticism from the Catholic Church and others.[12]
The Somoza family had managed to build and rebuild Managua into a large, modern city during the 20th century, but it was surrounded by an almostsemifeudalrural economy with few productive outputs outside of cotton, sugar and other agricultural products. All sectors of the economy of Nicaragua were determined, in great part, by the Somozas or their supporters, whether by directly owning agricultural brands/trusts, or actively choosing their owners (local or foreign). Somoza Debayle himself was (incorrectly) alleged to have owned 1/5 of all profitable land in Nicaragua. Somoza or his people did own or give away banks, ports, communications, services and massive amounts of land.[63]

The Nicaraguan Revolution brought immense restructuring to all three sectors of the economy, directing it towards amixed economy. The biggest economic impact was on agriculture, in the form ofagrarian reform, which was proposed as a process that would develop pragmatically along with other changes (economic, political, etc.).[64]
Economic reforms overall needed to restart the economy. As a developing country, Nicaragua had an agriculture-based economy, susceptible tocommodity market prices. The rural economy was far behind in technology and devastated by the guerrilla warfare.
Article 1 of the Agrarian Reform Law says that property is guaranteed if it is used efficiently and described different forms of property:
The principles that defined the reform matched those of the Revolution: pluralism, national unity, and economic democracy.[64]
Agrarian reform developed in four phases:
In 1985, the Agrarian Reform distributed 950 square kilometres (235,000 acres) of land to the peasantry. This represented about 75 percent of all land distributed to peasants since 1980. The reform had the twofold purpose of increasing support for the government among thecampesinos, and guaranteeing ample food delivery into the cities. During 1985, ceremonies were held throughout the countryside in whichDaniel Ortega gave each peasant title to land and a rifle to defend it.[65]

The Revolution brought many cultural developments. TheNicaraguan Literacy Campaign(Cruzada Nacional de Alfabetización) focused on high school and university students drafting teachers as volunteer teachers. Within five months they claimed to have reduced the overallilliteracy rate from 50.3% to 12.9%.[66] In September 1980,UNESCO awarded Nicaragua the "Nadezhda K. Krupskaya" award. This was followed by literacy campaigns of 1982, 1986, 1987, 1995 and 2000, each of which was also awarded by UNESCO.[67]
The Sandinistas established a Ministry of Culture, one of only three inLatin America at the time, and established a new editorial brand, calledEditorial Nueva Nicaragua and, based on it, started to print cheap editions of basic books rarely seen by Nicaraguans. It founded anInstituto de Estudios del Sandinismo (Institute for Studies ofSandinismo) where it printed the work and papers ofAugusto C. Sandino and those that reflected the ideologies of the FSLN, such asCarlos Fonseca and Ricardo Morales Avilés.
Such programs received international recognition for improvingliteracy,health care,education,childcare,unions, andland reform.[68][69]
Amnesty International noted numerous human rights violations by the Sandinista government. They contended that civilians "disappeared" after their arrest, that "civil and political rights" were suspended, due process was denied detainees, detainees were tortured, and "reports of the killing by government forces of those suspected of supporting the contras".[70]
The Sandinistas were accused of committing mass executions.[71][72] TheInter-American Commission on Human Rights investigated abuses by Sandinista forces, including an execution of 35 to 40Miskitos in December 1981,[73] and an execution of 75 people in November 1984.[74] TheLos Angeles Times noted that "...the Miskitos began to actively oppose the Sandinistas in 1982 when authorities killed more than a dozen Indians, burned villages, forcibly recruited young men into the army and tried to relocate others. Thousands of Miskitos poured across theCoco intoHonduras, and many took up arms to oppose the Nicaraguan government."[75]
The Heritage Foundation, a conservative American think tank with close ties to theRonald Reagan administration,[76][77] charged the Sandinista government with human rights violations, including press censorship. It charged that the government censored the independent newspaperLa Prensa.[78] French journalist Viktor Dedaj, who lived in Managua in the 1980s, contended thatLa Prensa was generally sold freely and that the majority of radio stations were anti-Sandinista.[79][full citation needed] The Heritage Foundation claimed that the Sandinistas instituted a "spy on your neighbor" system that encouraged citizens to report any activity deemed counter-revolutionary, with those reported facing harassment from security representatives, including the destruction of property.[78] Heritage also criticized the government for its treatment of theMiskito people, stating that over 15,000 Miskitos were forced to relocate, that their villages were destroyed, and that their killers were promoted rather than punished.[78][80][81]
TheUnited Nations, theOrganization of American States andPax Christi disputed Heritage's allegations of anti-Semitism. According to them, individual Nicaraguan Jews had their property expropriated due to their connections with theSomoza regime, rather than because they were Jewish. They cited the fact that there were prominent Sandinistas officials of Jewish descent.[82] In contrast to these organizations, theAnti-Defamation League supported allegations of Sandinistaantisemitism. It worked closely with Nicaraguan Jewish exiles to reclaim a synagogue that had been firebombed by Sandinista militants in 1978 and expropriated in 1979.[83]

TheCarter Administration attempted to work with FSLN in 1979 and 1980, while theReagan Administration supported ananti-communist strategy for dealing with Latin America, and attempted to isolate the Sandinista regime economically and politically. As early as 1980–1981, anti-Sandinista forces known asContras began forming along theHonduras–Nicaragua border. Many of the initial Contras were former members of Somoza's National Guard and still loyal to him, then in exile inHonduras.

In addition to Contra units loyal to Somoza, the FSLN began to face opposition from members of ethnic minority groups that inhabited Nicaragua's remoteMosquito Coast region along theCaribbean. These groups were demandingself-determination,autonomy, and freedom from persecution, but the FSLN refused to grant these and began using forced relocations and armed force in response.
Upon taking office in January 1981, Reagan cancelled U.S. economic aid to Nicaragua,[84] and on 6 August 1981 he signed National Security Decision Directive 7, which authorized the production and shipment of arms to the region but not their deployment.[85] On 17 November 1981, President Reagan signed National Security Directive 17, authorizing covert support to anti-Sandinista forces.[84]
Armed conflict soon erupted, further destabilizing the region upset by civil wars inEl Salvador andGuatemala. TheCIA-backed Contras secretly opened a "second front" on Nicaragua's eastern coast and Costa Rican border.[citation needed] As the civil war opened cracks in the national revolutionary project, FSLN's military budget grew to more than half of the government's annual budget. A compulsory draft called theServicio Militar Patriótico (Patriotic Military Service) was also established.[86]
By 1982, Contra forces had begun carrying out assassinations of members of the Nicaraguan government, and by 1983 the Contras had launched a major offensive. TheCIA was helping them to plant mines in Nicaragua harbors to inhibit foreign weapons shipments.[87] The 1987Iran–Contra affair placed theReagan Administration again at the center of secret support for the Contras.
The1984 Nicaraguan general election took place on 4 November. Of the 1,551,597 citizens registered in July, 1,170,142 voted (75.4%). Null votes were 6% of the total. International observers declared the elections "free and fair",[88] although theReagan administration denounced it as a "Soviet style sham". The national share of valid votes for president were:
TheEsquipulas Peace Agreement was a mid-1980s initiative to settle the military conflicts that had plaguedCentral America for years, sometimes decades. It built upon groundwork laid by theContadora Group from 1983 to 1985. The agreement was named forEsquipulas,Guatemala, where the initial meetings took place. US Congress efforts were helped by Capitol Hill lobbyistWilliam C. Chasey.
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In May 1986, summit meeting Esquipulas I took place, attended by the five Central American presidents. On 15 February 1987,Costa RicanPresidentÓscar Arias submitted a Peace Plan that evolved[clarification needed] from this meeting. During 1986 and 1987, the Esquipulas Process was established, in which the Central American heads of state agreed on economic cooperation and a framework for peaceful conflict resolution. The Esquipulas II Accord emerged from this and was signed inGuatemala City by the five presidents on 7 August 1987.
Esquipulas II defined measures to promote national reconciliation, an end to hostilities,democratization,free elections, the termination of all assistance toirregular forces, negotiations on arms controls, and assistance torefugees. It laid the ground for international verification procedures and provided a timetable for implementation.
The Sapoá Accords at March 23, 1988 represented the beginning of a peace process in Nicaragua. The name of the accords comes from Sapoá, a Nicaraguan town near the border withCosta Rica. Sandinismo in 1988 was coming to an end as the Soviet Union began limiting its support. This in turn limited Sandinista government options to continue the conflict, forcing them to negotiate for peace. The accord was mediated byJoão Clemente Baena Soares at the time asSecretary General of the Organization of American States and thenArchbishop of ManaguaMiguel Obando y Bravo[89][90] Since Nicaraguan conflict was aproxy war between the USSR and the US. Peace process management relied on then Soviet ambassadorVaino Väljas' mediation depending on recentUS-Soviet agreements since US did not have an Ambassador to Nicaragua from July 1, 1987 till May 4, 1988.[91][92][90][93]
Since the very moment of inception, under the political guidance and technical and financial support from thegovernment of the U.S., the existence of UNO was marked by grave structural deformations, derived from its own nature. In its conformation concurred the most diverse currents of the Nicaraguan political and ideological range: from the liberal-conservative -traditionally anticommunist and pro-U.S., to Marxist-Leninists from moscovian lineage, openly declared supporters ofclass struggle and enemies ofcapitalism in its superior development stage.[94]
— Roberto J. Cajina
In the1990 Nicaraguan general election, the UNO Coalition included:[94]
Aquí al lado (del Fortín) estaba el Repollal, donde llevaban todos los chavalos que agarraban presos en León y ahí los mataban.