| Te Pā Whakamarumaru | |
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| Agency overview | |
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| Formed | 1956[1] |
| Headquarters | Pipitea House, 1–15 Pipitea Street,Wellington,New Zealand 41°16′37″S174°46′46″E / 41.276823°S 174.779439°E /-41.276823; 174.779439 |
| Employees | 300 |
| Annual budget | Total budget for 2024/25[2] Vote Security Intelligence  $122,834,000 NZD |
| Minister responsible |
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| Agency executive |
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| Website | nzsis.govt.nz |
TheNew Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS;Māori:Te Pā Whakamarumaru) isNew Zealand's primary nationalintelligence agency. It is responsible for providing information and advising on matters includingnational security (includingcounterterrorism andcounterintelligence) andforeign intelligence.[3] It is headquartered inWellington and overseen by a Director-General, the Minister of New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, and the parliamentary intelligence and security committee; independent oversight is provided by theInspector-General of Intelligence and Security.
SIS was established on 28 November 1956 with the primary function of combating perceived increases in Soviet intelligence operations in Australia and New Zealand.[4] Since then, its legislated powers have expanded to increase its monitoring capabilities and include entry into private property. Its role has also expanded to include countering domestic and international terrorism, chemical, biological, and cyber threats.
The organisation has been criticised for its role in numerous high-profile incidents such as the 1974 arrest ofBill Sutch on charges of spying for theSoviet Union,[5] the 1981 assassination attempt byChristopher Lewis on QueenElizabeth II,[6] and the 1996 invasion of GATT Watchdog organiserAziz Choudry's home.[7] It has also been criticised for its failures to anticipate or prevent incidents such as the 1985 bombing of theRainbow Warrior,[8] the 2004 purchasing of New Zealand passports by Israeli "intelligence contract assets",[9] and the 2019Christchurch mosque shootings by an Australianalt-right white supremacist terrorist.[10]
In the first half of the 20th century, domestic intelligence and counter-subversion were primarily in the hands of theNew Zealand Police Force (1919–1941; 1945–1949) and theNew Zealand Police Force Special Branch (1949–1956). During theSecond World War, the short-lived New Zealand Security Intelligence Bureau (SIB) took over.[11] The SIB was modeled after the BritishMI5 and was headed by Major Kenneth Folkes, a junior MI5 officer. However, the conman Syd Ross duped Major Folkes into believing that there was a Nazi plot in New Zealand. After this embarrassment,Prime MinisterPeter Fraser dismissed Folkes in February 1943 and the SIB merged into the New Zealand Police. Following the end of the war in 1945, the police force resumed responsibility for domestic intelligence.[12]
On 28 November 1956, theFirst National Government established the New Zealand Security Service (NZSS). Its goal was to counter increasedSovietintelligence operations in Australia and New Zealand in the wake of thePetrov Affair of 1954, which had damaged Soviet-Australian relations. The NZSS was again modeled on the British domestic intelligence agencyMI5 and its first Director of Security,BrigadierWilliam Gilbert, was a formerNew Zealand Army officer. Its existence remained a state secret until 1960.[4][13]
The NZ Intelligence Community (NZIC) developed further in the late 1950s due to growing concerns about political terrorism, improvements in weaponry, news media coverage, and frequent air travel. As terrorist threats grew, along with potential connections to wider groups, the adoption of counter-insurgency techniques increased in New Zealand. In response to this, theNew Zealand Parliament enacted the 1961 Crimes Act to allow improved targeting of possible terrorist suspects and scenarios.[14] In 1969 the NZSS was formally renamed the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service.[15] That same year Parliament passed the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act to cover the agency's functions and responsibilities.[16]
Various amendments were later made to the Security Intelligence Act, including the controversial 1977 amendment under Prime MinisterRobert Muldoon, which expanded the SIS's powers of monitoring considerably.[17] The 1977 Amendment Act defined terrorism as: "planning, threatening, using or attempting to use violence to coerce, deter, or intimidate". The Immigration Amendment Act of 1978 further expanded the definition of terrorism.[18]
In 1987,Gerald Hensley, Chair of the NZIC, stated that the State Services Commission became attracted to the concept of "comprehensive security", taking into account not only human-made threats such as terrorism but also natural hazards.[clarification needed] This was also a response to the severing of intelligence-sharing arrangements New Zealand had with the United States in 1985 over nuclear policy.[19] Following the attempted hijacking of anAir New Zealand flight and thebombing of theRainbow Warrior in 1985, Parliament enacted the International Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act 1987. The Act gave censorship powers to the government around matters of national security and terrorism. This was a significant departure from New Zealand's previous conformance to international norms and laws.[20]
At the end of the 20th Century and beginning of the 21st, the NZIC adapted to emerging chemical, biological, and eventually cyber threats. These three areas became a key point of integration between the intelligence community agencies. Cases of terrorism overseas promoted the NZ Intelligence Community to regularly exchange information and meet the growing demands of addressing non-state actors.[21][22]
The SIS is a civilian intelligence and security organisation. Its stated roles are:
As a civilian organisation, the SIS's remit does not include enforcement (although it has limited powers to intercept communications and search residences). Its role is intended to be advisory, providing the government with information on threats tonational security or national interests. It also advises other government agencies about their own internal security measures, and is responsible for performing checks on government employees who requiresecurity clearance. The SIS is responsible for most of the government'scounter-intelligence work.
In 2007, it was reported that the SIS wished to expand its role into fightingorganized crime.[24]
The SIS is based inWellington, with branches inAuckland andChristchurch. It has close to 300 full-time staff.[25]
The Director-General of the SIS reports to theminister of New Zealand Security Intelligence Service.[26] Independent oversight of its activities is provided by theInspector-General of Intelligence and Security.[27]
The SIS is administered by a Director-General. As of 2024[update], it has had eight directors generals:
The SIS has been involved in a number of public incidents and controversies.
In 1974, the SIS was the source of information that led to the arrest ofBill Sutch, an economist and former civil servant, on charges of spying for theSoviet Union. Sutch was acquitted and the SIS was criticised for having accused him,[5] although it has also been alleged that the SIS was correct in its accusation.[28] The SIS released most of its files on Sutch in 2008.[29]
In 1981, the SIS was criticised for drawing up a list of 15 "subversives" who participated in protests against the1981 Springbok Tour, a visit by South Africa'sapartheidrugby team. Characterising individual protesters as "subversives" was deemed by many to be a violation of the right to protest government decisions.[30]
Also in 1981, an SIS operative inadvertently left a briefcase, containing a copy ofPenthouse, three cold meat pies, and notes of a dinner party hosted by a German diplomat, on a journalist's fence inWellington, where it was found by the son of another journalist, Fran O'Sullivan.[5]
In March 2018, the SIS released a memo confirming that an assassination attempt was made on QueenElizabeth II during her 1981 visit in Dunedin despite alleged efforts by theNew Zealand Police to cover up the incident. The perpetrator was 17 year-old Dunedin teenager Christopher Lewis.[31][32] Lewis electrocuted himself in prison in 1997 while awaiting trial for an unrelated murder.[6]
In 1985, the SIS failed to prevent the French operation in whichDGSE operativesbombed theGreenpeace vesselRainbow Warrior, killing a photographer.[8]
In early June 2020,Radio New Zealand reported that the NZSIS had raided theCzechoslovakian embassy in Wellington in 1986 as part of a joint operation with the BritishSecret Intelligence Service (MI6) to stealWarsaw Pact codebooks in order to break into the encrypted communications of Soviet-aligned countries during the Cold War. This operation would have breached theVienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. This revelation came to light as a result of an RNZ podcast series calledThe Service, produced by Wellington writer and documentary maker John Daniell, whose mother and step-father had both worked for the NZSIS. Daniell said that his step-father was involved in the raid and had claimed it was a success. Daniell's account was corroborated byGerald Hensley, who served as the head of thePrime Minister's Department under the-then Prime MinisterDavid Lange, and former NZSIS officer Kit Bennetts.[33] In response, both former Prime MinisterHelen Clark andAndrew Little, who is the Minister in charge of the NZSIS andGovernment Communications Security Bureau (GCSB), refused to confirm that they had authorised raids on embassies based in New Zealand.[34][35] RNZ also reported that the SIS had spied upon Labour MPRichard Northey under the pretext of his support for racial equality and nuclear disarmament. At the time of the spying, Northey was chair of the Justice and Law Reform Select Committee, which was responsible for financial oversight of the SIS, and of legislation altering its powers.[36]
In 1996, two SIS agents broke into the home ofAziz Choudry. Choudry was an organiser with GATT Watchdog, which was holding a public forum and rally against anAPEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) Trade Ministers meeting hosted in Christchurch. The Court of Appeal ruled that the SIS had exceeded their legislated powers of interception.[7] Parliament later amended the SIS Act to give the SIS powers of entry into private property.
In 2004, it was alleged that the SIS was spying onMāori individuals and organisations, including those associated with the newMāori Party, for political purposes under the codename "Operation Leaf".[37] A government inquiry led by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security later rejected these claims in April 2005. The prime minister,Helen Clark called the allegations "baseless".[38]The Sunday Star-Times, the original source of the story, printed a full apology and retraction.
In December 2008, it was discovered that a Christchurch resident, Rob Gilchrist, had been spying on peace organisations and individuals including Greenpeace, Iraq war protesters, animal rights and climate change campaigners. He confessed to the allegations after his partner, Rochelle Rees, found emails sent between him andSpecial Investigation Group (SIG) officers, having found the emails while fixing Gilchrist's computer. Rochelle Rees was a Labour party activist as well as an animal rights campaigner. Gilchrist was said to have passed on information via an anonymous email address to SIG officers including Detective Peter Gilroy and Detective Senior Sergeant John Sjoberg. SIG is connected with SIS. Gilchrist had been paid up to $600 a week by police for spying on New Zealand citizens, reportedly for at least 10 years. Gilchrist also said he was offered money by Thomson Clark Investigations to spy on theSave Happy Valley Coalition, an environmental group. The incident implied members of New Zealand political parties were spied on by SIS and SIG.[39]
In 2002, the SIS issued a security risk certificate forAhmed Zaoui, anAlgerianasylum-seeker, and recommended his deportation. Zaoui was detained under a warrant of commitment. Inspector GeneralLaurie Greig resigned in March 2004 after controversy over comments perceived as biased against Zaoui. The risk certificate was subsequently lifted, allowing Zaoui to remain.[40]
Until 2003 the SIS was reluctant to release information on potential people of interest either under the Privacy Act or the Official Information Act due to security concerns. In 2003 it adopted a new archives policy, enabling wider release of such information. Information must still be declassified, but would be released "regardless of whether the information reflects unfavourably on [the SIS] or shows it in a good light."[41][42][43] In 2017 the Privacy Act was amended to make the SIS subject to most of its principles.[44]
In July 2004, the SIS wascriticised for not knowing that Israeli "intelligence contract assets" had been in New Zealand fraudulently purchasing New Zealand passports. This came to light when the New Zealand Police discovered the fraud. The case became world news and an embarrassment for both the SIS andMossad. Two of the Israelis involved (Uriel Kelman and Eli Cara who had been based in Australia) were deported to Israel, while two non-Israelis believed to be involved (American Ze'ev Barkan and New Zealander David Reznic) left New Zealand before they were caught.[45][9]
In November 2009, the SIS was criticised for asking university staff to report their colleagues or students if they were behaving suspiciously. The SIS said it was part of an effort to prevent the spread ofweapons of mass destruction.[46]
In July 2011, the SIS was involved in an investigation ofIsraeli backpackers who were in New Zealand at the time of the2011 Christchurch earthquake, in which one of the Israelis was killed. The Israelis were alleged to have beenMossad agents attempting to infiltrate the New Zealand government's computer databases and steal sensitive information. The investigation concluded that there was no evidence of a Mossad operation.[47]
After the 15 March 2019white supremacist terrorist attack on two mosques in Christchurch, the failure of the SIS and other NZ state agencies to pay adequate attention to the far right, and to detect the terrorist was strongly criticised. Green Party MPMarama Davidson andTuhoe activist and artistTame Iti, among others, suggested that the SIS and other state security and intelligence agencies had the wrong people under surveillance, including Muslim communities, Māori, and environmental activists.[10][48] The spokesperson for theIslamic Women's Council of New Zealand,Anjum Rahman, voiced frustration at the failure of the SIS to take Muslim community concerns about racist violence and the rise of the alt-right in New Zealand seriously.[49]
Prime MinisterJacinda Ardern announced that there would be an inquiry into the circumstances that led to the mosque attacks and what the relevant agencies (SIS, Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB), police, Customs and Immigration) knew about the individual and the accused's activities.[50] The officialRoyal Commission into the attacks was made public on 8 December 2020,[51] and found that intelligence agencies including the NZSIS and GCSB had placed excessive focus on Islamist terrorism, at the expense of detecting far-right and White supremacist threats.[52][53][54][55]
On 22 March 2021, the NZSIS released an internal review known as the "Arotake review" exploring its decision-making process prior to the Christchurch mosque shootings. The review had been conducted by a counter-terrorism expert from theFive Eyes.[56] In late March 2021, NZSIS Director-GeneralRebecca Kitteridge indicated that the NZSIS would be paying more attention to far right and white supremacist groups.[57][58]
On 16 September 2020, the NZSIS confirmed that it was evaluating the "potential risks and security concerns" of the Chinese intelligence firmZhenhua Data's "Overseas Key Individuals Database." The database had profiled 730 New Zealanders includingPrime MinisterJacinda Ardern's mother Laurell, father Ross, sister Louse, former Prime MinisterJohn Key's son Max, sportswoman Barbara Kendall,Māori leaders DameNaida Glavish, formerMinister of FinanceRuth Richardson, andChief CensorDavid Shanks. Zhenhua's database had been leaked to the American academic and China expert Professor Chris Balding, who passed the information to Australian cyber security firmInternet 2.0. The data leak was covered by several international media including theAustralian Financial Review, theWashington Post, theIndian Express, theGlobe and Mail, andIl Foglio.[59][60]
In late March 2021, the NZSIS's Director-General Rebecca Kitteridge confirmed that its agents had discovered a New Zealander who was gathering information for an unidentified foreign intelligence agency about individuals whom an unidentified foreign state regards as dissidents.University of Canterbury political scientistAnne-Marie Brady claimed that the spy had been working for China. In addition, the spy agency confirmed that, during the period between 2019 and 2020, it had disrupted the efforts of a person working for a foreign state to influence senior policy-makers, investigated the activities of individuals linked to several foreign states, and investigated foreign efforts to influence local and central government figures and New Zealand's academic sector.[61]
In late October 2021,Radio New Zealand reported that the NZSIS had designated a Chinese couple as a national security threat, promptingImmigration New Zealand to block the couple's residency applications. The NZSIS asserted that the husband and wife had assisted Chinese intelligence services and deliberately concealed the amount of contact they had maintained with them. The couple had migrated to New Zealand in 2016 under the entrepreneur work visa scheme and established a business. The husband's lawyer countered that the man had maintained legitimate contact with Chinese intelligence services while working at a private company in China because he had helped employees to obtain visas to enter China for business purposes.[62]
In November 2022 the SIS paid journalistNicky Hager $66,000 after unlawfully accessing his phone records.[63] The spying was in response to Hager's bookOther People's Wars, and attempted unsuccessfully to identify his sources. TheInspector-General of Intelligence and Security found that the SIS had no lawful power to investigate, and had not showed the kind of caution expected in a free and democratic society.[63]
In March 2023,Stuff reported that the NZSIS had questioned aChinese New Zealander named Yuan Zhao in October 2022 on the suspicion that Zhao had used his position as a senior government analyst for thePublic Service Commission (PSC) to spy for the Chinese Government and because of his "close personal relationships" with Chinese diplomats based in New Zealand. Zhao was subsequently suspended from his job at the Commission in late 2022. In March 2023, Zhao denied supplying the Chinese Government with information and claimed the NZSIS had no evidence to substantiate the information. In response, the NZSIS and PSC declined to comment on Zhao's case, citing security protocols.[64] Zhao subsequently complained to the intelligence agency's watchdog, theInspector-General of Intelligence and Security Brendan Horsley, who confirmed his office was investigating Zhao's complaint and would inform the public about the outcome. In response to media coverage, the Chinese Embassy issued a statement describing the espionage allegations against Zhao as "ill-founded" and motivated by an "ulterior motive to smear and attack China, which we firmly oppose."[65]
On 11 August 2023, the NZSIS published its first unclassified threat assessment which identified violent extremism, foreign interference and espionage as three major threats to New Zealand. For the first time, the NZSIS identified China, Iran, and Russia as the foreign governments most responsible for foreign interference in New Zealand. According to the report, Chinese intelligence services were actively targetingethnic Chinese communities in New Zealand while Russia was spreading disinformation among some New Zealanders through its international disinformation campaigns and seeking to acquire new technologies in order to circumvent international sanctions. The NZSIS also reported that Iranian state actors were monitoring and reporting on Iranian diaspora communities and dissident groups in New Zealand.[66][67]
In early September 2024, the NZSIS published its second threat assessment. The report concluded that a small number of foreign states conducted interference and espionage operations targeting New Zealand and New Zealanders; that public and private sector insiders were vulnerable to espionage and unauthorised disclosure of information; that the risk of terror threats in New Zealand were low but thatlone wolf attacks were the most likely scenarios; and that some individuals subscribed to violent extremist ideologies. The report noted that China uses professional social network websites such asLinkedIn for intelligence gathering.[68] The threat assessment also found that violent extremists expoused various views including anti-Māori sentiment,anti-Semitism, hostility towardsrainbow communities,Islamophobia andanti-immigrant sentiments.[69] Following the report's release, thePublic Service Association express concerns that job cuts at theDepartment of Internal Affairs could hurt New Zealand's response to online harm, foreign interference and digital espionage.[68]
On 21 August 2025, the NZSIS released its third threat assessment. The report said that New Zealand's security situation had deteriorated since 2024, and identified the most significant threats as foreign states and "young, vulnerable people supporting violent extremist ideologies." The NZSIS attributed the worsening security environment to theIndo-Pacific becoming a focal point for competition between major powers and China. NZSIS Director-General Andrew Hampton also expressed concern about the online radicalisation of young people and said they were being radicalised individually rather that being part of a "network terrorist organisation." Other contributing factors to radicalisation included socio-economic instability, poor mental health, developmental trauma and "low emotional maturity." The NZSIS report argued that lone wolf attacks were the most plausible violent extremist attack scenarios in New Zealand. The NZSIS also said that several states including China carried out "foreign interference" in New Zealand and described Chineseunited front activities as "regularly deceptive, coercive and corruptive." The NZSIS said that Chinese "foreign interference activities" included using co-optees or proxies to carry out online and physical surveillance activities such as monitoring social media, photographing individuals, collecting information and taking control of community organisations. The NZSIS report also warned local councils thatsister city relationships could be exploited for "foreign interference" activities.[70] In response, local Chinese community leaders including Richard Leung and New Zealand Chinese Association president Paul Chin welcomed the NZSIS report but warned that it should not be used to stigmatiseChinese New Zealanders. The Chinese Embassy denounced the report, claiming it was "rife with unfounded speculation, distortion of facts, and baseless accusations against China".University of Canterbury political scientist DrAnne-Marie Brady welcomed the report for highlighting the national and external security threats facing New Zealand.[71]
In late March 2024, NZSIS Director-General Andrew Hampton confirmed that seven formerNew Zealand Defence Force personnel had been recruited by the Test Flying Academy of South Africa to train thePeople's Liberation Army over the past 18 months. The former NZDF personnel had been supporting military and aviation training. These seven individuals had since left their roles at the Test Flying Academy.[72]
The New Zealand Security Intelligence Service to which this Act applies is hereby declared to be the same Service as the Service known as the New Zealand Security Service which was established on 28 November 1956.
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| National | |
| Other | |
