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Neo-Ba'athism is afar-left[1] variant ofBa'athism that became the state ideology ofBa'athist Syria, after theArab Socialist Ba'ath party's sixth national congress in September 1963. As a result of the1966 Syrian coup d'état launched by theneo-Ba'athist military committee led bySalah Jadid andHafez al-Assad, Ba'ath party'sSyrian regional branch was transformed into amilitarist organization that became completely independent of theNational Command of the originalBa'ath Party.
Neo-Ba'athism has been described as a divergence from Ba'athism proper that had gone beyond itspan-Arabist ideological basis by stressing the precedent of themilitary and purging the classical Ba'athist leadership of the old guard, includingMichel Aflaq andSalah al-Din al-Bitar.[2][3] Thefar-left[4] neo-Ba'athist regime in Syria, which was influenced by variousMarxist ideological schools, espoused radical leftist doctrines such asrevolutionary socialism[5] abandonedpan-Arabism, sought to strengthen ties with theSoviet Union, and came into conflict withArab nationalists such asNasserists and theIraqi Ba'athists, particularlySaddamists, with whom theymaintained a bitter rivalry.[6] From their seizure of power in theSyrian Arab Republic as a result of the1963 Syrian coup d'état, neo-Ba'athist officers purged traditional civilian elites to establish amilitary dictatorship operating alongtotalitarian lines.[7]
Neo-Ba'athism is primarily associated withAssadism, based on the policies of the successive governments of Hafez al-Assad and his sonBashar al-Assad. This system was largely characterized bynepotism andsectarianism, with Hafez al-Assad's seizure of power in the1970 Syrian coup d'état leading to the consolidation ofAlawiteminority dominance within the military and security forces.[8] State propaganda portrayed Assadism as a neo-Ba'athist current that evolved Ba'athist ideology with the needs of the modern era.[9] Neo-Ba'athism has been criticized by the founder of Ba'athist ideology, Michel Aflaq, for diverging from the original principles of Ba'athism.[10]
Aseries of revolutionary offensives launched by theMilitary Operations Command and allied militias in late 2024 led to thecollapse of the Assad regime in December 2024. Since then, remnants of the Ba'athist military apparatus andAssad family loyalists have engaged inviolent clashes across Alawite strongholds inLatakia,Tartus and parts of Western Syria.[11][12]
The pro-Marxist resolutions and declarations, such as the espousal of "class struggle" and "scientific socialism", adopted by the Ba'ath party during its 6th national congress set the ideological foundation of neo-Ba'athism. Between 1963 and 1966, neo-Ba'athists exercised thede-facto political power in Ba'athist Syria and were able to steer their ideological goals through the 1963 provisional Ba'athist constitution and its 1964 amendment. They also carried out purges within theSyrian Arab Armed Forces, as part of their efforts to subordinate the civilian old guard of theNational Command of the Ba'ath Party and create an "ideological army" that was loyal to neo-Ba'athist officers. In foreign policy, neo-Ba'athists favoured theSocialist Bloc and were proponents of establishing a close alliance with theSoviet Union. TheMaoist military concept of "people's war of liberation" played a central role in neo-Ba'athist ideology, and this was reflected in Ba'athist Syria's endorsement of socialist and left-wingPalestinian fedayeen groups in their guerrilla war against Israelis. In the economic sphere, neo-Ba'athists favoured the establishment of a socialistcommand economic system; and advocated the nationalization of private industries and radical land confiscation policies.[13]
Neo-Ba'athism advocated the creation of a "vanguard" ofleftist revolutionaries committed to build anegalitarian,socialist state in Syria and other Arab countries before making steps to achieve pan-Arab unity. The vanguard organisation in neo-Ba'athist ideology was the Arab Socialist Ba'ath party; which advocatedclass-struggle against the traditional Syrian economic elite classes; the big agriculturalists, industrialists, bourgeoisie and feudal landlords. By the 1970s, 85% of agricultural lands were distributed to landless peasant populations and tenant farmers. Banks, oil companies, power production and 90% of large-scale industries were nationalised. The neo-Ba'athists faction led bySalah Jadid concentrated on organizing the Syrian economy along socialist lines and exporting the doctrines of class-conflict and militantsocialist revolution to the neighbouring countries. This view was challenged by GeneralHafez al-Assad and his neo-Ba'ath faction; who were proponents of a military-centric approach and focused on a strategy of strengthening theSyrian military to defend thesocialist government against imperialist forces and their alleged internal collaborators. Assad favoured reconciliation of various leftist factions and pursued better relations with other Arab states. Although majority of the party members favoured Salah, Hafez was able to gain the upperhand following the events of the1970 coup dubbed the "Corrective Revolution" in official Syrian Ba'ath history. Assad's victory also marked the supersedure of the military over the Ba'ath party structures; making the armed forces a central centre of political power.[14][15][16][17]
The 6th National Congress of the Ba'ath party declared the party's ideological end-goal to be the socialist transformation of society through aLeninist strategy.Some Theoretical Propositions, a core ideological document adopted by the congress stated: "Socialism is the true goal of Arab unity. ... Arab unity is the obligatory basis for constructing a socialist society." Thus, neo-Ba'athists viewed pan-Arabism as a means to achieve their radical socialist objectives.[18]
Neo-Ba'athism viewsreligion as the "foremost symbol of reaction" preventing the birth of a modernsocialist society, and advocate strict state supervision over religious activities for sustaining what its ideologues regard as a healthy,secularist society. DuringSalah Jadid's reign in power, the Ba'ath postured itself as a stronglyanti-religious political entity; adhering to theMarxist–Leninist approach of top-down regimentation of the society throughliquidation of what it regarded as "reactionary" classes such as the traditionalulema. TheGrand Mufti's official status was downgraded by the Ba'athist government and the conventional role of religious clergy in state functioning was curtailed. While state ministers, officials, educators, etc. regularly preached about the "perils of religion"; party periodicals and magazines during the 1960s regularly made predictions about the "impending demise" of religion through thesocialist revolution.[19]
During the rule of Salah Jadid, neo-Ba'athist ideologues openly denounced religion as a source of what they considered as the backwardness of the Arabs.[20] Following popular revulsion at Jadid's blatant anti-religious policies, Hafez al-Assad began to tone down thesecularisation programme during the 1970s, by co-opting some pro-government clerics likeRamadan al-Bouti to counter the Islamic opposition and granted them a degree of autonomy from the regime. Simultaneously, the regime began the "nationalization" of religious discourse through a loyal clerical network, and condemned anyone deviating from the state-promoted "Ba'thist version of Islam" as a threat to the society.[21] The state-sponsored religious discourse during the rule of Hafez al-Assad promoted aleft-wing nationalist worldview that sought to anathematize Islamists and re-inforce loyalty towards the Alawite president.[22]
Salah al-Din al-Bitar, a member of the classical Ba'athist leadership, stated that the1966 Syrian coup d'état "marked the end of Ba'athist politics in Syria". Ba'ath party founderMichel Aflaq shared the sentiment by stating, "I no longer recognise my party!"[10]
According toJamal al-Atassi, co-founder of theArab Ba'ath Party, stated that "Assadism is a falsenationalism. It's the domination of a minority, and I'm not talking just of the Alawites, who control the society's nervous system. I include also the army and themukhabarat. [...] And despite itssocialist slogans, the state is run by a class who has made a fortune without contributing—anouvellebourgeoisie parasitaire."[23]
President of theUnited Arab Republic,Gamal Abdel Nasser, accused the neo-Ba'athists of Syria ofanti-religion andsectarianism.[24]

Following theseizure of power in 1963 by the neo-Ba'athist military committee, the Syrian regional branch of the Ba'ath party experienced severe factionalism and splintering, leading to a succession of governments and new constitutions.[25] One of the most consequential outcomes of the coup and subsequent purges was the dominance of Alawite commanders in the neo-Ba'athist officer corps, who assumed control of theBa'athist Syrian military forces.[26] The neo-Ba'athist radicals, who dominated the Syrian regional structures of theBa'ath party, initiated a power struggle against the party's old guard, culminating in the1966 neo-Ba'athist coup.[26][27]

The neo-Ba'athist military officers, through their increased political and military influence, began initiating purges across bureaucratic structures of the Syrian state and rapidly monopolized control over various organs of the Syrian Ba'ath party. Military Ba'athists also took control of theNational Council for the Revolutionary Command (NCRC), which exercised thede-facto power in the new Ba'athist regime in Syria. Civilian wing of the Ba'ath party, consisting of classical Ba'athists led byAflaq andBitar, had little influence over the ideological direction of the Syrian regional branch. During the sixth national congress of the Ba'ath party, officers of the Ba'athist military committee, in collaboration with radical leftists, formally gained ideological and political control of the Syrian regional branch of the Ba'ath party. The ideological programme and political platform adopted by the Syrian Ba'ath party during the 6th National Congress of the Ba'ath party in September 1963 became the official doctrine of the neo-Ba'ath and the state ideology of Ba'athist Syria. Subsequently, the Ba'athist regime began implementing its social, economic and political policies across Syria, which imposed the neo-Ba'athist agenda.[13][28][29]
Theneo-Ba'athist tendency gained control of the Syrian regional branch at the Ba'ath party's 6th National Congress of 1963, where hardliners from the dominant Syrian and Iraqi regional parties joined forces to impose a radical leftist line, which advocated the imposition of "socialist planning",[30] "collective farms run by peasants", "workers' democratic control of the means of production", a party based on workers and peasants, and other demands reflecting emulation ofSoviet-style socialism.[31] In a coded attack onMichel Aflaq, the congress also condemned "ideological notability", criticizing his middle-class background, within the party.[30] Aflaq, angry at this transformation of his party, retained a nominal leadership role, but theNational Command as a whole came under the control of the radicals.[32]

In line with their clandestine vanguardist nature, the neo-Ba'athists ignored efforts to gain popular support and moved to consolidate their control over the Ba'athist Syrian military apparatus.[33] Hundreds of Syrian military officers were purged, and neo-Ba'athist recruits were installed at senior positions of theSyrian Arab Armed Forces.[34] Most of the newly recruited Ba'athist officers came from the countryside or from a low social class.[34] The neo-Ba'athist officer corps had a predominantly rural background and many Ba'athist recruits were "the kinsmen of the leading minority officers".[34] The neo-Ba'athist movement had a minoritarian character and was dominated byAlawite,Druze, andIsma'ili rural recruits from the countryside. Its opponents were primarilySunni Muslims and non-Sunnis from urban backgrounds.[35]
After pushing out the Aflaqites during the 6th National Ba'ath Party Congress, theMilitary Committee and its supporters incorporated a new radicalized form of Ba'athism – a Ba'athism strongly influenced byMarxism–Leninism - as the official ideology of the Syrian regional branch of the Ba'ath party.[36] This new form of Ba'athism laid emphasis on "revolution in one country" rather than the classical Ba'athist goal of a Pan-Arab union.[36] At the same time, the 6th National Congress implemented a resolution which stressed the implementation of asocialist revolution in Syria.[36] Under thisform of socialism, neo-Ba'athists envisioned the establishment of a Soviet-stylecommand economic system, the nationalization of banks,foreign trade, large and medium industries, etc. as well as the replacement of private enterprise with state planning and investment.[36] They believed these policies would endexploitation of labour, thatcapitalism would disappear, and in agriculture they envisioned a plan were land was given "to he who works it".[36] These changes and more refashioned the Syrian Ba'ath Party into aLeninist organization.[37]
Syrian Ba'ath party's left-wing argued that thebourgeoisie could never be won over unless they were given total control over the economy.[37] It was this power struggle between the Aflaqites who dominated theNational Command of the Ba'ath Party and the radicals who dominated theSyrian Regional Command of the Ba'ath Party which led to the neo-Ba'athist coup d'état in 1966.[27] Between 1963 and 1966, neo-Ba'athist radicals, who controlled the Ba'athist Syrian military apparatus, steadily amassed power and influence within the Syrian regional wing of the Ba'ath party.[38]
According toMunif al-Razzaz, the last secretary general of theNational Command of the originalBa'ath Party, from 1961 onwards, there existed two Ba'ath parties – "themilitary Ba'ath Party and the Ba'ath Party, and real power lay with the former."[39] He also argued that the military Ba'ath was "little more than a military clique with civilian hangers-on; and that from the initial founding of the Military Committee by disgruntled Syrian officers exiled in Cairo in 1959, the chain of events and the total corruption of Ba'athism proceeded with intolerable logic."[39]

1966 neo-Ba'athist coup d'état marked the complete structural transformation of the Ba'ath party's Syrian regional branch into amilitarist neo-Ba'ath organization which became independent of theNational Command of the originalBa'ath party.[40] Following its violent seizure of power, which resulted in the killing of approximately 400 people,[41] the neo-Ba'athistmilitary committee purged the old guard Ba'athist leaders likeMichel Aflaq andSalah al-Din Bitar.[42] This coup led to a permanent schism between the Syrian andIraqi regional branches of the Ba'ath Party, and many Syrian Ba'athist leaders defected to Iraq.[43]
The ousting of Aflaq, Bitar, and the National Command became the deepest schism in the Ba'ath movement's history.[44] The 1966 coup brought a new generation of radical leftist leaders to power who had different ideological aims than their predecessors.[45] While Aflaq and Bitar still had supporters in Syria and in non-Syrian Regional Branches, they were hampered by the lack of financial means – the neo-Ba'athist Syrian Regional Branch of the Ba'ath party had funded them since 1963.[46] Jadid and his supporters now had the Ba'athist Syrian state under their formal political control. While neo-Ba'athists were theoretically able to establish new party organisations or coerce pro-Aflaq opinion, this failed to work since most of the regional branches of the Ba'ath party changed their allegiance to Baghdad.[47] Later in 1966, the first post-Aflaqite National Congress, officially designated the 9th, was held, and a new National Command was elected.[48] Following the 1966 neo-Ba'athist coup, the National Command became subservient in all but name to the Syrian Regional Command, and ceased to have an effective role in Arab or Syrian politics.[49]
Following the exile of the National Command, some of its members, including Hafiz, convened the 9th Ba'ath National Congress (to differentiate it from the Syrian "9th National Congress") and elected a new National Command, with Aflaq, who did not attend the congress, as the National Command's Secretary General.[50] For those like Bitar and Razzaz, the exile from Syria was too hard, and they left the party.[51]Michel Aflaq moved toBrazil, remaining there until 1968.[52]

When theNational Command of the Ba'ath party was toppled in 1966, the Iraqi Regional Branch of the Ba'ath party remained supportive of what it viewed as the "legitimate leadership" of Michel Aflaq.[53] When the Iraqi Ba'ath party gained power in 1968 in the17 July Revolution no attempts were made at a merger, to achieve their supposed goal ofArab unity, or reconciliation with the Syrian Ba'ath.[54] After the establishment of Ba'ath rule in Iraq, many members of the Syrian-dominated Ba'ath movement defected to its Iraqi-counterpart, few if any Iraqi-loyal Ba'athists attempted to change its allegiance to Damascus.[55] The reason for this was that those defecting from Damascus were loyal to the old, Aflaqite National Command.[56] Several older members such as Bitar, Hafiz,Shibli al-Aysami andElias Farah, either visited Iraq or sent a congratulatory message toAhmed Hassan al-Bakr, the Regional Secretary of theIraqi Regional Command.[57] Aflaq did not visit Iraq until 1969, but from late 1970, he would become a leading Iraqi Ba'ath official,[58] although he never acquired any decision-making power.[59]

From the beginning, the neo-Ba'athist regime in Damascus launched an overwhelmingly anti-Iraqi Ba'athist propaganda campaign, to which their counterparts in Baghdad responded.[60] TheSyrian Ba'ath party denounced Aflaq as a "thief" and claimed that he had stolen the Ba'athist ideology fromZaki al-Arsuzi and proclaimed it as his own,[61] with Assad hailing Arsuzi as the principal founder of Ba'athist thought.[62] The Iraqi Regional Branch, however, still proclaimed Aflaq as the founder of Ba'athism.[63] Assad referred to Arsuzi as the "greatest Syrian of his day" and claimed him to be the "first to conceive of the Ba'ath as a political movement."[64] Bitar was sentenced to death "in absentia" in 1969,[65][66] and Aflaq was condemned to deathin absentia in 1971 by Assad's regime.[67] The Syrian Regional Branch also erected a statue of Arsuzi not long after the 1966 coup.[68] Nevertheless, the majority of Ba'athists outside Syria continued to view Aflaq, not Arsuzi, as the principal founder of Ba'athism.[69]
When the Iraqi Ba'ath party seized power in 1968, the Syrian Ba'ath party responded by not mentioning in its press release that a Ba'athist organisation had taken power in Iraq.[70] For instance, it mentioned that Bakr became president of Iraq, but did not mention his party affiliation, and instead referred to the incident as a military coup.[71] While the Syrian Ba'ath denied giving any legitimacy to Iraqi Ba'ath, the Iraqi Ba'athists were more conciliatory.[72] The anti-Iraqi Ba'athist propaganda reached new heights withinBa'athist Syria at the same time that Assad was strengthening his position within the party and state.[73]
After the 1967Six-Day War, tensions betweenSalah Jadid andHafez al-Assad increased, and al-Assad and his associates were strengthened by their hold on the military. In late 1968,[74] Assadists began dismantling Jadid's support network, facing ineffectual resistance from the civilian branch of the party that remained under Jadid's control.[75]
The dual polarisation of power in Ba'athist Syria between Hafez al-Assad and Salah Jadid persisted until theAssadist coup of November 1970, when al-Assad ousted and imprisoned Atassi and Jadid.[76] He then set upon a project of rapid institution-building, reopened parliament and adopted a permanent constitution for the country, which had been ruled by military fiat and a provisional constitutional documents since 1963.[76]

Hafez al-Assad's reign was marked by the virtual abandonment ofPan-Arab ideology; replacing it with the doctrine of socialist transformation and giving overriding priority in constructingsocialist society within Syria.[77] Political participation was limited to theNational Progressive Front, the ruling coalition of Syrian Baath andMarxist–Leninist parties; entrenching itself firmly within theSoviet Bloc. The Party also began building apersonality cult around Assad and brought the elite of thearmed forces under Assad's grip and the officer corps were installed withAlawite loyalists, further alienating theSunni majority from the party.[78] When Hafez al-Assad came to power in 1971, the army began to modernize and change. In the first 10 years of Assad's rule, the army increased by 162%, and by 264% by 2000. In the early 1970s, 70% of the country's budget went only to the army. On 6 October 1973, Syria and Egypt initiated theYom Kippur War against Israel. TheIsrael Defense Forces, with difficulty, but successfully reversed the initial Syrian gains. In an attempt to reachDamascus, the Israeli army again invaded Syrian territory, but mounting casualties and theSyrian war of attrition forced them to abandon these plans.[79] The village ofQuneitra was largely destroyed by the Israeli army.[80]

Bitterness towards theAssadist regime and theAlawite elite in the neo-Ba'ath and armed forces became widespread amongst the Sunni majority, laying the beginnings of an Islamic resistance. Prominent leaders ofMuslim Brotherhood likeIssam al-Attar were imprisoned and exiled. A coalition of the traditional Syrian Sunniulema, Muslim Brotherhood revolutionaries andIslamist activists formed the Syrian Islamic Front in 1980 with objective of overthrowing Assad throughJihad and establishing anIslamic state. In the same year, Hafez officially supported Iran in itswar with Iraq and controversially began importing Iranian fighters and terror groups intoLebanon and Syria. This led to rising social tensions within the country which eventually became a full-fledgedIslamist rebellion in 1982; led by the Islamic Front. The regime responded byslaughtering the Sunni inhabitants in Hama and Aleppo and bombarding numerous mosques, killing around 20,000–40,000 civilians. The uprising was brutally crushed and Assad regarded the Muslim Brethren as demolished.[81]

Syria under Hafez al-Assad was a staunchSoviet ally and firmly aligned itself withSoviet Bloc during the height of theCold War.Soviet Union saw Syria as the lynchpin of its Middle-East strategy and signed theTreaty of Friendship and Co-operation in 1980; directly committing itself to Syria's defense and incorporating the Syrian armed forces into Soviet standards. For his part, Hafez committed himself to socialist economic and foreign policies; and was one of the few autocrats to openly support theSoviet invasion of Afghanistan. Theend of the Cold War andcollapse of the Soviet Union dealt a deep blow to Assad, who retained the nostalgia for the old Soviet-ledsocialist order.[82][83] Assad continued to rule Syria until his death in 2000, by centralizing powers in thestate presidency.[84]: 362

Syria was invited into Lebanon by its president,Suleiman Frangieh, in 1976, to intervene on the side of the Lebanese government againstPalestine Liberation Organization guerilla fighters and Lebanese Maronite forces amid theLebanese Civil War. TheArab Deterrent Force originally consisted of a Syrian core, up to 25,000 troops, with participation by some otherArab League states totaling only around 5,000 troops.[85][86][87] In late 1978, after the Arab League had extended the mandate of the Arab Deterrent Force, theSudanese, theSaudis and theUnited Arab Emirates announced intentions to withdraw troops from Lebanon, extending their stay into the early months of 1979 at the Lebanese government's request.[88] The Libyan troops were essentially abandoned and had to find their own way home, and the ADF thereby became a purely Syrian force, although it did include thePalestine Liberation Army.[89] A year afterIsrael invaded and occupiedSouthern Lebanon during the1982 Lebanon War, the Lebanese government failed to extend the ADF's mandate, thereby effectively ending its existence, although not the Syrian or Israeli military presence in Lebanon.[90] Eventually the Syrian presence became known as theSyrian occupation of Lebanon.

Syrian forces lingered in Lebanon throughout the civil war in Lebanon, eventually bringing most of the nation under Syrian control as part of a power struggle with Israel, which hadoccupied areas of southern Lebanon in 1978. In 1985, Israel began to withdraw from Lebanon, as a result of domestic opposition in Israel and international pressure.[91] In the aftermath of this withdrawal, theWar of the Camps broke out, with Syria fighting their former Palestinian allies. TheSyrian occupation of Lebanon continued until 2005.[92]

In a major shift in relations with both otherArab states and the Western world, Syria participated in the United States-ledGulf War againstSaddam Hussein. The country participated in the multilateralMadrid Conference of 1991, and during the 1990s engaged in negotiations with Israel along withPalestine andJordan. These negotiations failed, and there have been no further direct Syrian-Israeli talks since President Hafiz al-Assad's meeting with then PresidentBill Clinton inGeneva in 2000.[93]

Hafez al-Assaddied on 10 June 2000. His son,Bashar al-Assad, was elected president inan election in which he ran unopposed.[94] His election saw the birth of theDamascus Spring and hopes of reform, but by autumn 2001, the authorities had suppressed the movement, imprisoning some of its leading intellectuals.[95] Instead, reforms were limited to some market reforms.[96][97][98] In March 2004,Syrian Kurds and Arabsclashed in the northeastern city ofal-Qamishli. Signs of rioting were seen in the cities of Qamishli andHasakeh.[99] In 2005, Syria ended its military presence in Lebanon.[100]Assassination ofRafic Hariri in 2005 led to international condemnation and triggered a popularIntifada inLebanon, known as "the Cedar Revolution" which forced the Assad regime to withdraw its 20,000 Syrian soldiers in Lebanon and end its 29-year-longmilitary occupation of Lebanon.[101][92]

TheSyrian civil war began in 2011 as a part of the widerArab Spring, a wave of upheaval throughout theArab World. Public demonstrations across Syria began on 26 January 2011 and developed into a nationwide uprising. Protesters demanded the resignation of PresidentBashar al-Assad, the overthrow of his government, and an end to nearly five decades ofBa’ath Party rule. From spring 2011, theSyrian government deployed theSyrian Army to quell the uprising, and several cities were besieged,[102][103] though the unrest continued. According to some witnesses, soldiers, who refused to open fire on civilians, were summarily executed by the Syrian Army.[104]

On 27 November 2024, violence flared up once again. Rebel factions, led by the Islamist group HayatTahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Turkish-backedSyrian National Army (SNA), hadtaken control of Aleppo, prompting a retaliatory airstrike campaign by Syrian PresidentBashar al-Assad, supported by Russia. Therebel offensive, which had begun on 27 November 2024, continued itsadvance into Hama Province following their capture of Aleppo.[105][106][107] Thegovernment of Bashar al-Assadwas overthrown on 8 December 2024 after thecapture of Damascus by theSyrian opposition.[108] The Baath party suspended its activities in Syria after Islamist-led rebel forces toppled Assad's government.[109]
By late December 2024, aninsurgency by loyalists of the deposed Assad regime began in Western Syria against theSyrian transitional government.[110] On December 26, 2024,Mohammad Kanjo Hassan, the leader of the insurgency was arrested in the town ofKhirbet al-Ma'zah along with 20 of his loyalists.
TheMilitary Council for the Liberation of Syria is an armed opposition coalition formed in March 2025 by former officers and loyalists of the fallen Assad regime.[111]
Syria, headed by the radical leftist Baath Party overtly challenged Nasser's leadership credentials by highlighting his diminished revolutionary spirit.
The change has been particularly marked under Asad. He has created a fairly popular Presidential regime: radical left, the most advanced socialist regime in the Arab world, it is progressively widening the frame to include more peasants and labourers.
The ideology propounded by the Ba'ath changed completely. The accent on Arab nationalism was discarded as was moderate socialism. Their place was taken by Syrian nationalism and extreme left-wing ideas verging on communism.
radical left-wing Ba'ath party in Syria.
Syria, headed by the radical leftist Baath Party overtly challenged Nasser's leadership credentials by highlighting his diminished revolutionary spirit.
The change has been particularly marked under Asad. He has created a fairly popular Presidential regime: radical left, the most advanced socialist regime in the Arab world, it is progressively widening the frame to include more peasants and labourers.
The ideology propounded by the Ba'ath changed completely. The accent on Arab nationalism was discarded as was moderate socialism. Their place was taken by Syrian nationalism and extreme left-wing ideas verging on communism.
radical left-wing Ba'ath party in Syria.
The leadership now in control of Syria does not represent the gamut of the Ba'th party. It is composed mainly of extreme leftists vesting almost exclusive authority in the military wing of the party.
The period 1963 to 1970 when Asad finally succeeded was marked ideologically by uncertainty and even turbulence. It was a period of transition from the old nationalist politicians to the radical socialist Baathis ... struggle between 'moderates' and radicals was centred on the dispute whether to impose a radical left wing government and a social revolution on Syria or to follow a more moderate Arab unionist course which would possibly appease opponents of the Baath. The radicals largely held the upper hand and worked to strengthen the control of the party over the state.
In 1963 ... the socialist Ba'ath Party, seized power. The radical left wing of the party then launched an internal coup in 1966, initiating accelerated land reform
Syrian Baathist version of Arab nationalism and socialism offered plenty of points of contact with Soviet policy ... when the left-wing Baathist faction led by Nureddin Atasi came to power, accelerated Syria's rapprochement with the Soviet Union ... for the USSR Syria remained an uneasy ally whose actions were beyond control, often unpredictable and the cause of complications. The ultra-leftist slogans originating from Damascus (such as a 'people's war') were not received enthusiastically in Moscow. Mustafa Tlas, the new Syrian chief of staff, was a theoretician of guerrilla warfare and had even translated works by Che Guevara who was not particularly popular among the Soviet leaders.
influence of different views, came from the more radical left-wing nationalist groups. These groups included ... Syria's Ba'ath party which seized power in Damascus in 1963
yet another coup d'etat in Syria in February 1966 ousted the old guard of the Ba'th Party ... and gave a radical faction (subsequently dubbed the neo-Ba'th) undisputed power. Abandoning the traditional goal of Arab unity, the new leaders proclaimed a radical socialist platform at home and a commitment to violent revolutionary activity abroad..
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