Naval gunfire support (NGFS), also known asnaval surface fire support (NSFS),[1] orshore bombardment, is the use ofnaval artillery to providefire support foramphibious assault and other troops operating within their range. NGFS is one of several disciplines encompassed by the termnaval fires. Modern naval gunfire support is one of the three main components of amphibious warfare assault operations support, along withaircraft and ship-launchedland-attack missiles. Shipborne guns have been used against shore defences since medievalnaval warfare.
Naval gunfire support is classified into two types: direct fire, where the ship hasline of sight with the target (either visually or through the use ofradar), and indirect fire, which, to be accurate, requires anartillery observer to adjust fire.
When on thegun line, ships are particularly vulnerable to attack from aircraft coming from a landward direction and flying low to avoid radar detection, or from submarines because of a predictable and steady (non-evasive) course.
An early use of shorebombardment was during theSiege of Calais in 1347 whenEdward III of England deployed ships carryingbombards and other artillery.[2] An early type of vessel designed for the purpose of shore bombardment was thebomb vessel, which came into use during the 17th century. Theburning of Falmouth by theRoyal Navy was among thegrievances of the United States Declaration of Independence.[3] These were small ships whose main armament was one or two largemortars that fired explosive shells at a high angle. They were typically poor sailing craft that were of limited use outside their specialized role. However, small vessels armed with large mortars saw use as late as theAmerican Civil War, when theUnion Navy used them in several attacks on coastal fortifications.
During the 18th century, another special class of vessel known asfloating battery was devised for shore bombardment. An early use was by the French and Spanish during theGreat Siege of Gibraltar (1779–1782). During theNapoleonic Wars, theRoyal Navy commissioned several vessels of theMusquito class andFirm class. These carried eithernaval long guns orcarronades. Floating batteries were used by the French and British during theCrimean War and by both sides during the American Civil War.
DuringWorld War I, the principal practitioner of naval bombardment (the term used prior toWorld War II for what was later designated naval gunfire support (NGFS)) was Britain's Royal Navy (RN); and the main theatres in which RN ships fired against targets ashore were the Aegean—Dardanelles/Gallipoli, and later the Salonika front—and along the Belgian coast.
In theAegean the enemy coastal defences (forts, shore-batteries etc.) were fairly unsophisticated; however, on the Gallipoli peninsula these still proved to be difficult targets for the navy's low angle firing guns. Here, the fortress outlines tended to blend into the hillside making identification difficult, and the guns presented small targets. Mobile howitzers on the plateau presented even greater problems, since these were higher still, and being completely shielded from view proved almost impervious to naval bombardment.[4]
For RN ships bombarding German targets along the Belgian coast the situation was altogether different from the autumn of 1915 until the enemy withdrawal in October 1918. For this role, the Royal Navy frequently made use of specially designed vessels known asmonitors. They carried extremely heavy armament for their size, often a single turret from a decommissioned battleship. With a broad-beamedhull designed for stability and a shallowdraft to allow close approach to the shore, the vessels were slow and thus unsuitable for naval combat. TwoLord Clive-class monitors were fitted withBL 18-inch Mk I naval guns, the largest guns ever used by the Royal Navy.
TheGermans constructed an extensive, well-equipped and well-coordinated system of gun batteries to defend the coast—and especially the ports ofOstend andZeebrugge. Those ports, and the canals linking them toBruges, were of major importance to theU-boat campaign in theNorth Sea andEnglish Channel—and for that reason were frequently bombarded by RN monitors operating from Dover and Dunkirk.
The RN continually advanced their technology and techniques necessary to conduct effective bombardments in the face of the German defenders—firstly refining spotting/correction by aircraft (following initial efforts during the Dardanelles/Gallipoli campaign), then experimenting with night bombardment and moving on to adopt indirect fire (in which a ship can accurately engage an unseen target, which may be several miles inland) as the norm for day and night firings.
In the summer of 1918, monitors were equipped with gyro director training (GDT) gear—which effectively provided the director with a gyro-stabilised artificial line of sight, and thereby enabled a ship to carry out indirect bombardment while underway. This was a very significant advance which basically established a firm foundation for naval bombardment as practiced by the RN andUSN during the Second World War.
Between 1919–39 all RN battleships/battlecruisers and all new-construction cruisers were equipped with Admiralty Fire Control Tables and GDT gear, and from the early 1930s (probably earlier) were required to carry out "live" bombardment practice once in each commission. In 1939, therefore, the RN was quite well prepared for this particular aspect of joint warfare.
Indirect bombardment reached its zenith duringWorld War II, when the availability of man-portableradio systems and sophisticated relay networks allowed forward observers to transmit targeting information and provide almost instant accuracy reports once troops had landed.Battleships,cruisers (includingBobtail cruisers, designed to support amphibious operations),[5] anddestroyers would pound shore installations, sometimes for days, in the hope of reducing fortifications and weakening defending forces. Obsolete battleships unfit for combat against other ships were often used as floating gun platforms expressly for this purpose. However, given the relatively primitive nature of thefire control computers and radar of the era combined with the high velocity of naval gunfire, accuracy depended upon designated observer aircraft until troops landed and were able to radio back reports to the ship.[6]Observation seaplanes proved vulnerable to land-basedfighter aircraft during theinvasion of Sicily so gunfire observers flewSpitfires in support of theNormandy landings.[7]
The solution was to engage in longer bombardment periods—up to two weeks, in some cases—saturating target areas with fire until a lucky few shells had destroyed the intended targets. This alerted an enemy that a landing attack was imminent. In thePacific War this mattered less, where the isolated defenders of island strongholds expected to be invaded at some point and had already committed whatever combat resources were available. The Japanese used battleships only once for shore bombardment, when two battleships bombardedUnited States Marines atGuadalcanal'sHenderson Airfield in October 1942, inflicting minor damage.[8][9] Bombardment periods were usually shorter in the European theatre, where surprise was more often valued, overland reinforcement far more likely, and ships' guns were responding to the movements of mobile defenders, not whittling away at static fortifications.
Naval gunfire could reach as far as 20 miles (32 km) inland and was often used to supplement land-based artillery. Naval gunfire was used extensively throughoutNormandy, although initially the surprise nature of the landings precluded a drawn-out bombardment which could have reduced theAtlantic Wall defences sufficiently.
Naval gunfire support played a critical role in theKorean War; the conflict was ideal for this type of service, with much of the fighting taking place along the coast of the Korean Peninsula. The battleshipUSS New Jersey and light cruiserHMS Belfast provided heavy support, along with numerous light cruisers and destroyers. In particular were so-called "Trainbuster" patrols, working with spotter aircraft to destroy North Korean supply trains, as well as railway bridges and tunnels.
In 1961, theannexation of Goa by Indian naval gunfire support was provided by theIndian Navy's cruisers, destroyers, and frigates in support ofIndian Army operations.
During theVietnam War, Task Unit 70.8.9, the U.S. Naval Gunfire Support Unit, was made up of destroyers armed with 5-inch/38 caliber or 5-inch/54 caliber guns, and continuously patrolled the coast ofSouth Vietnam to provide NGFS at short notice. If greater firepower was required then larger gunnedcruisers were called in for reinforcements, along with the battleship USSNew Jersey for a single tour of duty. NGFS was controlled by the United States Marines Corps FirstAir Naval Gunfire Liaison Company which provided spotters, usually airborne in light aircraft but sometimes on foot, in all military regions.
During theFalklands War, naval gunfire support for theBritish Armed Forces of the British Task Force was utilized by British ships of the same British Task Force during numerous battles. These battles included, but were not limited to;Battle of Two Sisters (HMS Glamorgan (D19)'s twin 4.5-inch (114 mm) guns provided support) and theBattle of Mount Kent (naval gunfire support provided byHMS Yarmouth), both battles took place on the night of 11-12 June, 1982.
During theMultinational Force in Lebanon, naval gunfire support was provided on several occasions by destroyers, cruisers, andNew Jersey assigned to coastal patrol. They supported the US Marines as well as the Lebanese Army. In 1991, duringOperation Desert Storm the battleshipsUSS Missouri andUSS Wisconsin firedTomahawk cruise missiles along with their main battery guns against Iraqi targets in the Euphrates Delta. This was the last firing of battleship guns during war, as well as the first use ofdrone aircraft to observe targets and give targeting corrections. In the2003 invasion of Iraq, NGFS was used in support of operations on theAl-Faw peninsula in the early stages of the war by Royal Navy andRoyal Australian Navyfrigates.
As part ofOperation Enduring Freedom - Horn of Africa, on 1 June 2007, the American destroyerUSS Chafeeshelled jihadist positions at Bargal, Somalia.
Naval gunfire occurred multiple times during the First and Second Libyan Civil War. DuringOperation Unified Protector in 2011 in Libya, allied forces provided gun naval support to rebel forces. The French Navy fired approximately 3,000 76 and 100 mm (3.0 and 3.9 in) shells against military targets (the warshipsJean Bart,La Fayette,Forbin,Chevalier Paul). Also, during theBattle of Sirte in 2016, the destroyerUSS Carney conducted shore bombardments ofISIS positions as part ofOperation Odyssey Lightning.[11]
Naval gunfire is still used for many of its traditional purposes. In the Marine Corps, artillery units have severalnaval gunfire liaison officers (NGLO, pronounced "no-glow") in eachbattalion to maintain close contact with the Navy for amphibious operations. The NGLO is responsible for the Shore Fire Control Party and works in the Fire Control Center with other liaison officers to coordinate naval gunfire withclose air support,mortars, andhowitzers. The NGLO joins the others in the planning of fire missions in support of the Marine Infantry Regiment.
The Marine Corps maintains three active (1st, 2nd, & 5th) and three reserve (3rd, 4th & 6th)Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) units. ANGLICO members are temporarily assigned to combat units of the United States and foreign nations that lack inherent fire support capability, such as naval gunfire. The ships equipped with the large caliber guns of the early and middle of the 20th century have all been decommissioned. The last American battleship,USS Missouri, was decommissioned in 31 March 1992, which left no naval guns larger than 5 inches (127 mm) in service on any active warship in the United States Navy until the introduction of theZumwalt class with the 155 mm (6.1 inch)Advanced Gun System (however these larger guns are functionally inoperable because no ammunition was purchased for them). The aircraft carrier and sea to land missile have been used instead. The remaining naval artillery typically has more advanced targeting systems than the older large-caliber artillery.
Within the U.S. there was a longdebate over the role naval gunfire support should play in warfare. This took on a greater sense of urgency with the removal of the last two battleships from theNaval Vessel Register.
Despite the reduction in calibre size to 5-inch (127 mm) guns, even ground-basedNATO forces'artillery observers[citation needed] andForward Air Controllers[citation needed] are taught the rudiments of calling in and adjusting naval gunfire. With the exception of a few procedures, the controlling principles are quite similar in both land and naval bombardment. Shore fire control parties participate in field operations, often with a Marine artillery battery to provide simulated naval gunfire support. When available, Marine spotters will call the fire missions for naval ships undergoing their gunnery qualification tests, to provide both parties the opportunity to practice their skills. One use of naval gunfire in modern operations is to provideSuppression of Enemy Air Defenses for close air support. Well-timedsalvos provide covering fire for sorties and prevent enemy troops and batteries from effectively usinganti-aircraft weapons.
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