| National Revolutionary Army 國民革命軍 | |
|---|---|
 Flag of the National Revolutionary Army | |
| Active | 16 June 1924 – December 1947 |
| Country |  China |
| Allegiance |  Kuomintang |
| Branch | Ground Forces Military Police Air Force Air Defense Troops Naval Component (Limited) |
| Type | Standing Military |
| Role | Ground warfare andaerial warfare |
| Size | ~14,000,000 |
| Part of | Chinese Nationalist military |
| Engagements | |
| Commanders | |
| Notable commanders | |
| Insignia | |
| Insignia | _%25E2%2580%2593_Central_Government.svg) |
| Headquarters | Guangzhou (1924-1928) Nanjing (1928–1937, 1946–1947) Chongqing (1937–1946) |
| Ideology | |
| Political position | Right-wing[n 2] |
| Allies |  Soviet Union (1924-1927, 1937-1941, 1945) Nazi Germany (-1938) United States United Kingdom |
| Opponents |  East Turkestan |
| National Revolutionary Army | |||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Traditional Chinese | 國民革命軍 | ||||||||||||||
| Simplified Chinese | 国民革命军 | ||||||||||||||
| Hanyu Pinyin | Guómín Gémìng Jūn | ||||||||||||||
| |||||||||||||||
TheNational Revolutionary Army (NRA;國民革命軍) served as the military arm of theChinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, or KMT) from 1924 until 1947.
From 1928, it functioned as thede facto national armed forces of theRepublic of China during the period of Nationalist rule. Following the promulgation of the1947 Constitution — which establishedcivilian control over the military on a de jure basis — it was formally reorganised as theRepublic of China Armed Forces.
Initially formed frompro-nationalist faction troops after 1917, with assistance from theSoviet Union, the NRA was created as an instrument for the Nationalist government to unify China during theWarlord Era. It went on to fight major military conflicts, including theNorthern Expedition against the Beiyang warlords, theencirclement campaigns against theChinese Red Army, theSecond Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) againstImperial Japan, and theChinese Civil War against the Chinese Communist Party'sPeople's Liberation Army.
The nameNational Revolutionary Army was formally adopted by theChinese Nationalist Party (KMT) following the party's reorganization under Sun Yat-sen's leadership, emphasising its goal of national unification through revolution. Prior to 1928, the force was often referred to simply as theRevolutionary Army (革命軍), reflecting its role in theNorthern Expedition and other efforts to overthrow regional warlords.
After the formal unification of China under the Nationalist government in 1928, the termNational Army (國軍) became more common in official discourse, signifying its position as the regular armed forces of theRepublic of China.
In Western historiography, the force, particularly the ground arm, has been frequently referred to as theChinese Nationalist Army to distinguish it from communist military forces. Meanwhile, media and historical narratives originating from the People's Republic of China often describe it as theKuomintang Army (国民党军), underscoring its affiliation with the KMT rather than the state.
It is worth noting that, in traditional Chinese usage, the term "army" (軍) has often been applied more broadly to refer to the entire armed forces, encompassing the army, navy, and air force. This linguistic nuance is also reflected in the naming of theNational Revolutionary Army, which, despite its initial composition being primarily ground forces, gradually came to include the early development of the Nationalist government's air force, air defence units, and other military branches. It was not until the establishment of theRepublic of China Armed Forces in 1947 that the government formally adopted the Western, particularly American, convention of using the termArmed Forces to refer collectively to the three services.
It should also be noted that within the NRA, the ground forces—excluding specialised branches such as the military police and air defence troops—were indeed referred to in Chinese as theLand Forces (陸軍). However, there was no unified or independent General Command specifically overseeing the land force branch in the modern sense; operational command structures were often decentralised and campaign-based, rather than managed through a distinct army headquarters.
Before the outbreak of the war against Japan, the term "National Revolutionary Army" (NRA) primarily referred to the core, centrally controlled military units of theKuomintang, usually referred as the "Central government forces" (中央軍), especially those loyal toChiang Kai-shek. However, as the war escalated and the need for national unity grew, the title "NRA" was symbolically extended to include former warlords' armies and regional forces, colloquially known as "Regional forces" (地方軍), even though many of them remained semi-autonomous and only nominally under theMilitary Affairs Commission.[5]
In particular, during the Second Sino-Japanese War, the armed forces of theChinese Communist Party were nominally incorporated into the National Revolutionary Army (while retaining separate commands), forming theEighth Route Army and theNew Fourth Army, but they broke away to form thePeople's Liberation Army shortly after the end of the war.
With the promulgation of theConstitution of the Republic of China in 1947 and the de jure end of the KMT party-state, the National Revolutionary Army was renamed theRepublic of China Armed Forces, with the bulk of its forces forming theRepublic of China Army, whichretreated to the island ofTaiwan in 1949.
On 1 September 1917, theKuomintang, under the leadership ofSun Yat-sen, established theConstitutional Protection Junta in opposition to theBeiyang government, following the launch of theConstitutional Protection Movement on 17 July 1917.
The National Revolutionary Army (NRA) was officially formed in 1924 by the Kuomintang as its military arm, based on pro-Nationalist regional forces and supported by foreign assistance. Its primary mission was to reunify China, beginning with theNorthern Expedition.
With organisational support from theComintern and ideological guidance from Sun Yat-sen'sThree Principles of the People, the NRA developed as an extension of the party-state system, where the separation between political party, military, and government remained blurred. Many of the NRA's officer corps were graduates of the newly establishedWhampoa Military Academy, including its first commandant,Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang rose to become commander-in-chief in 1925 and subsequently led the NRA during the Northern Expedition.
The successful conclusion of the Northern Expedition in 1928 is widely considered to mark the end of theWarlord Era in China, although localised warlord activity continued in some regions for years afterwards. Prominent generals who later rose to distinction within the NRA includedTu Yü-ming andChen Cheng.
In 1927, after the collapse of theFirst United Front between the Kuomintang and theChinese Communist Party, the KMT leadership carried out a purge of its leftist members and significantly reduced Soviet influence within the party. Following this realignment, Chiang Kai-shek turned toGermany—then governed by theWeimar Republic—for assistance in reorganising and modernising the NRA.
Despite restrictions imposed by theTreaty of Versailles, which barred German military advisers from officially serving in combat roles abroad, the Weimar Republic did dispatch advisors to China. Chiang initially sought assistance from high-profile generals such asErich Ludendorff andAugust von Mackensen, but these requests were declined. German authorities feared that the involvement of such well-known figures would provoke backlash from the Allies and diminish national prestige, especially if they were seen acting in the capacity ofmercenaries.
The Northern Expedition was a military campaign launched by the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) in July 1926, with the goal of defeating the warlords of theBeiyang government and unifying China underNationalist control. The expedition was led by GeneralissimoChiang Kai-shek, who had risen to prominence after heading theWhampoa Military Academy.[6]
Initially supported by aunited front with theChinese Communist Party and Soviet advisers such asMikhail Borodin andVasily Blyukher,[7] the NRA advanced northward fromCanton, quickly defeating theZhili and Hunan warlords, includingWu Peifu andSun Chuanfang.[8]
However, internal divisions within the KMT soon emerged. In April 1927, Chiang ordered a purge of Communists in Shanghai—an event known as theShanghai Massacre—which marked the collapse of theFirst United Front and a formal split between left- and right-wing factions of the party.[9] Chiang temporarily stepped down, but resumed leadership in early 1928 and relaunched the campaign's second phase.
By mid-1928, the NRA—reinforced by allied warlords includingYan Xishan andFeng Yuxiang—defeated theBeiyang Army and approachedBeijing. As their forces closed in, the Manchurian warlordZhang Zuolin was assassinated in the Huanggutun incident by the JapaneseKwantung Army, and his sonZhang Xueliang soon declared allegiance to theNanjing government.[10]
The campaign ended in December 1928, when the Northeast officiallyaccepted Nationalist rule, effectively unifying China under the Nationalist regime and marking the beginning of the Nanjing Decade.[11]
Despite the nominal success, true centralisation remained elusive. Many former warlords retained regional power and autonomy, sowing the seeds for future internal conflict.[12]
Immediately following the conclusion of theNorthern Expedition, the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) was significantly overextended and required downsizing and demobilisation.Chiang Kai-shek famously remarked that "soldiers are like water—capable of both carrying the state and sinking it." Official troop figures at the time listed 1,502,000 soldiers under arms, though only 224,000 of these were directly under Chiang's control. In reality, Chiang later admitted to controlling over 500,000 troops, whileFeng Yuxiang, whose official number was 269,000, likely commanded closer to 600,000. Thus, the total NRA strength was probably nearer to two million men.[13]
During the course of the expedition, theChinese Nationalist Party (KMT) also established regional branch political councils. Though these councils were theoretically subordinate to the central political authority inNanjing, in practice they operated autonomously and maintained their own military forces.Feng Yuxiang controlled the Kaifeng council,Yan Xishan oversaw the Taiyuan council, and theGuangxi clique controlled two separate councils inWuhan andBeijing, led byLi Zongren andBai Chongxi, respectively.Li Jishen, another Guangxi-aligned figure, loosely oversaw the council in Canton, while a sixth council was underZhang Xueliang inShenyang.[14]
Confronted with the dilemma of how to manage these competing power centres, Chiang had two strategic options: to centralise authority gradually or to act swiftly and decisively. True to the spirit of the expedition's aim to eliminate warlordism and regionalism, he chose immediate centralisation. Using the pretext of demobilisation, Chiang began systematically reducing the military power of regional commanders while expanding and consolidating his own authority.[14]
In July 1928, financial conferences were convened to coordinate demobilisation efforts, and both military commanders and political officials echoed support for reducing troop numbers. Chiang formally called for the NRA to be downsized to 65 divisions and worked to build political consensus for abolishing the branch councils. This initiative alarmed regional leaders, andLi Zongren later remarked that Chiang's plan appeared deliberately designed to provoke a reaction—providing Chiang with the justification to neutralise his rivals.[15]
In February 1929, tensions escalated when theGuangxi clique dismissedLu Diping, the governor of Hunan, who subsequently defected to Chiang Kai-shek. The Guangxi forces invaded Hunan in retaliation. However, Chiang countered by bribing military units in Wuchang to defect, decisively routing the Guangxi army within two months. By March, the Kuomintang expelled key Guangxi leaders—Bai Chongxi,Li Jishen, andLi Zongren—and promoted their subordinates who supported Chiang, thereby sowing internal division within the clique.[16][17][18]
In May,Feng Yuxiang also entered the conflict, and he too was expelled from the party. Once again, Chiang used financial incentives to sway Feng's subordinates, includingHan Fuju andShi Yousan, to defect. Feng's armies were defeated, and he retreated toShanxi, announcing his retirement from politics. By July, Chiang's forces had occupiedLuoyang. Buoyed by his victories, Chiang pushed forward with a nationwide demobilisation plan and announced that the army would be reduced to 65 divisions by March 1930.[19] This move alarmed the regional leaders, as Chiang had already stripped revenue sources fromYan Xishan, leading him to join forces with Feng and the Guangxi clique.[20]
The anti-Chiang coalition amassed approximately 700,000 troops, while Chiang commanded around 300,000. The coalition planned to seize Shandong and contain Chiang south of the Longhai and Beijing–Wuhan railways. They aimed to advance along the railway lines, capturingXuzhou andWuhan, while southern forces moved north to establish a link-up.
The war involved more than one million soldiers, with roughly 300,000 casualties. Despite being outnumbered, Chiang's southern forces performed well, routing the Guangxi-aligned armies by July. However, his northern units suffered defeats, and Chiang narrowly escaped capture in June. The northern advance halted only after the southern forces were crushed.
Chiang used the ensuing lull to regroup and launch counteroffensives along key railway lines. With fighting inBengbu subsiding by September, Chiang began closing in again on Loyang. These developments, combined with strategic bribery, convincedZhang Xueliang to side with Chiang, bringing the war to an end.[21]
Following the conclusion of the Northern Expedition and the unification of China under the Nationalist government,Chiang Kai-shek turned his attention to eliminating the growing Communist presence in rural China. From 1929 to 1934, the Nationalist government launched a series of large-scale military operations, known as the encirclement campaigns, to crush Communist-controlled revolutionary base areas, most notably theJiangxi Soviet andEyuwan Soviet.[22]
The first wave of campaigns began as regional offensives targeting smaller Soviets, such as those inHonghu, Hunan–Jiangxi, and Hubei–Henan–Shaanxi. Early attempts were poorly coordinated and often relied on local warlord forces, resulting in repeated defeats by the more mobile and experienced Chinese Red Army.[23] In Honghu, Communist commanders such asHe Long andDuan Dechang successfully repelled multiple assaults in 1930 and 1931 despite being heavily outnumbered.[24]
The climax came with five major campaigns against the Jiangxi Soviet from 1930 to 1934. The first four were defeated by the Red Army underMao Zedong andZhu De using guerrilla warfare and mobile tactics. However, the fifth campaign, launched in 1933 under the guidance of German military advisors such asHans von Seeckt andAlexander von Falkenhausen, introduced blockhouse strategies and scorched-earth tactics.[25] With overwhelming numbers and fortified positions, the Nationalists eventually broke through, forcing the Communists to abandon their base in October 1934 and begin theLong March.[26]
TheEyuwan Soviet also endured five campaigns between 1930 and 1934. Though the Communists held out during the first three, they were eventually pushed out by Nationalist forces employing brutal scorched-earth tactics in the fourth and fifth offensives.[27] Despite these setbacks, small Red Army remnants like the 25th Army underXu Haidong continued guerrilla resistance and later linked up with main Communist forces during the Long March.[28]
Though the Nationalists ultimately succeeded in dismantling theSoviet base areas by 1934, their victories were temporary. The campaigns demonstrated both the vulnerability and resilience of Communist forces, who would return stronger in the following years.
TheSecond Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) marked the most significant military engagement of the National Revolutionary Army (NRA), which fought the invading forces of theEmpire of Japan across vast regions ofChina. Under the leadership of GeneralissimoChiang Kai-shek, the NRA bore the brunt of China's resistance, particularly during the early years when theCommunist forces were still comparatively minor.
The war began in earnest after theMarco Polo Bridge Incident nearBeiping in July 1937, which led to a full-scale Japanese invasion of northern China. Despite poor equipment and internal fragmentation, the NRA mounted tenacious resistance in major battles such as theBattle of Shanghai, theBattle of Nanking, and theBattle of Taierzhuang.[29] At Shanghai, elite NRA units, including German-trained divisions, engaged in months-long street fighting, attempting to impress foreign powers and gain diplomatic support.[30] The defence ofNanjing was ultimately overwhelmed, resulting in theNanjing Massacre, where Japanese troops committed extensive atrocities.[31]
After the fall of Nanking, the NRA re-established its headquarters inChongqing, which served as the wartime capital until 1945. While conventional engagements became increasingly difficult due to Japanese air superiority and mechanised mobility, the NRA retained control over much of western and interior China. It secured some critical victories, notably at Taierzhuang in 1938 and in defendingChangsha during multiple Japanese offensives.[32]
Women also contributed to the war effort through formal units such as theGuangxi Women's Battalion, encouraged bySoong Mei-ling, Chiang's wife.[33][34]
Despite internal political challenges, the NRA integrated multiple regional forces and provincial warlord armies into its ranks. As Japanese occupation expanded across coastal China, guerrilla and irregular operations were increasingly important in contested regions. However, logistical weaknesses, inadequate modern arms, and a fragmented command structure hampered sustained offensives. The lack of centralised discipline also led to issues such as corruption, press-ganging of rural populations, and logistical failure.[35]
From 1938 onward, foreign aid helped improve NRA capability. Initially, theSoviet Union supported the NRA with matériel, training, and volunteer aviators under theSino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact.[36] From 1941, theUnited States became the chief backer of the NRA viaLend-Lease, although this support was complicated by strained relationships between General Chiang and American commanders, particularly GeneralJoseph Stilwell.[37] While Stilwell was appointed as Chief of Staff to Chiang and oversaw training efforts for modernised NRA units (known as the "X Force"), he clashed frequently with Chinese leadership over strategy and control. The US government threatened to cut off aid to China unless they handed over command of all Chinese forces to the US. Chiang stalled on fulfilling the American demand as he claimed that that would be make him no different from the Japanese puppet authorities.[38] By the end of the war, US influence over the military affairs of China were greater than any foreign power in the last century, with American personnel appointed in every field, such as the Chief of Staff of the Chinese military, management of the Chinese War Production Board and Board of Transport. Sir George Sansom, British envoy to the US, reported that many US military officers saw US monopoly on Far Eastern trade as a rightful reward for fighting the Pacific war,[39] a sentiment echoed by US elected officials.[40]
During theBurma Campaign, NRA troops formed the core of theChinese Expeditionary Force (中國遠征軍) in India and northern Burma. Under the command of GeneralSun Li-jen, these forces succeeded in recapturing key territory and securing theLedo Road, a vital supply line into China.[35] The reoccupation of northern Burma and eventual linking up withYunnan–based forces under GeneralWei Lihuang restored overland logistics to Chongqing by late 1944.
One of the most ambitious and controversial NRA campaigns was the counteroffensive toOperation Ichi-Go in 1944–1945. Though the Japanese initially made gains, the NRA halted further advances by mid-1945 and began to reclaim territory inHunan andGuangxi.[41] Plans were underway for an American-assisted push to retake Canton and advance onShanghai before the Japanese surrender rendered these operations moot.
Throughout the conflict, the NRA suffered enormous losses, including an estimated 750,000 combat casualties.[41] Its sacrifices contributed significantly to tying down large portions of the Japanese Army, which in turn relieved pressure on Allied forces in the Pacific theatre. Nonetheless, internal dissent, fragmented authority, and post-war disillusionment set the stage for the resumed civil conflict with the Communists.
By the end of the war, under the 1947Constitution of the Republic of China, the National Revolutionary Army was formally disbanded and reorganised into specialised branches under the newly establishedRepublic of China Armed Forces.
The majority of NRA ground units were reconstituted as theRepublic of China Army (ROCA), while the former military police component became theRepublic of China Military Police. TheAir Force and Air Defense Troops were combined to form theRepublic of China Air Force. Together with theRepublic of China Navy, these services constituted the unified armed forces of the post-warRepublic of China.[42]
Over the course of its existence, the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) recruited approximately 4,300,000 regular soldiers. Its forces were organised into a total of 515divisions, which included:
However, many of these divisions were reconstituted from pre-existing units or renamed divisions that had previously been lost in combat. As a result, not all 515 divisions existed simultaneously, and the actual number of active divisions at any given time was significantly lower.
To compensate for battlefield losses, "New Divisions" were often created and assigned the same numerical designation as the destroyed unit they replaced. The average NRA division typically comprised 5,000–6,000 troops. In contrast, an NRA field army division—their larger operational formation—might field between 10,000 and 15,000 men, making it roughly equivalent in size to a Japanese division. Even the eliteGerman-trained divisions—considered the most disciplined and best equipped of NRA formations—rarely exceeded 10,000 personnel, and thus remained smaller than their German or Japanese counterparts.
At the apex of the NRA command hierarchy stood theNational Military Council, also known as the Military Affairs Commission. Chaired byChiang Kai-shek, the Council directed all military operations and strategic planning. From 1937 onward, the Council included high-ranking positions such as the Chief of the General Staff (held by GeneralHe Yingqin), the War Ministry, military regional commands, as well as the commands of theair andnaval forces, air defence, garrison units, and logistical and support services.
Between 1937 and 1945, approximately 14 million men were conscripted into NRA service.[43]
The United States Army's campaign brochure on the China Defensive campaign of 1942–45 said:[44][failed verification]
The NRA only had small number of armoured vehicles and mechanised troops. At the beginning of the war in 1937 the armour were organized in three Armoured Battalions, equipped with tanks and armoured cars from various countries. After these battalions were mostly destroyed in theBattle of Shanghai andBattle of Nanjing. The newly provided tanks, armoured cars, and trucks from theSoviet Union andItaly made it possible to create the only mechanized division in the army, the200th Division. This Division eventually ceased to be a mechanized unit after the June 1938 reorganization of Divisions. The armoured and artillery Regiments were placed under direct command of5th Corps and the 200th Division became a motorized Infantry Division within the same Corps. This Corps fought battles inGuangxi in 1939–1940 and in theBattle of Yunnan-Burma Road in 1942 reducing the armoured units due to losses and mechanical breakdown of the vehicles. On paper China had 3.8 million men under arms in 1941. They were organized into 246 "front-line" divisions, with another 70 divisions assigned to rear areas. Perhaps as many as forty Chinese divisions had been equipped with European-manufactured weapons and trained by foreign, particularly German and Soviet, advisers. The rest of the units were under strength and generally untrained. Overall, the Nationalist Army impressed most Western military observers as more reminiscent of a 19th- than a 20th-century army.
The National Revolutionary Army (NRA) also fielded armoured battalions during the war, equipped with vehicles such asSherman tanks, which supported ground operations against Japanese forces, particularly late in theBurma Campaign.
Among the most renowned forces within the NRA were the Muslim divisions commanded by theMa Clique—a group of Chinese Muslim warlords and military officers who had aligned with theKuomintang (KMT). Unlike the German-trained units that received mixed reviews from European observers, the Ma Clique's Muslim divisions, trained domestically in China without Western assistance, garnered astonishment and respect for their battlefield discipline and fierce combat capabilities. European travellers and observers such asSven Hedin andGeorg Vasel were reportedly awed by both the imposing appearance and martial effectiveness of these units. They were noted for enduring rigorous and brutal training regimes.[45][46][47][48]
The36th Division (National Revolutionary Army), composed entirely of Chinese Muslim soldiers and trained independently within China, famously inflicted heavy casualties on a Soviet invasion force during theSoviet Invasion of Xinjiang. Despite lacking in modern equipment and numerical strength, the division fought ferociously and badly damaged the Soviet forces in battle.
One of the most prominent Ma Clique leaders, GeneralMa Hung-kuei, was noted by Western observers for leading highly disciplined Muslim divisions. Despite suffering from diabetes, Ma personally participated in training exercises with his troops and was known to engage in sword fencing drills.[49]
As the KMT consolidated power, numerous provincial warlords and regional military leaders—including the Ma Clique—formally joined the central command structure. Upon their integration, their respective troops were reorganised into standard NRA divisions. For instance, when GeneralMa Qi joined the Kuomintang, hisNinghai Army was re-designated as the National Revolutionary Army's 26th Division.
The National Revolutionary Army (NRA) maintained a complex hierarchical structure throughout its existence. The following order of battle outlines the general unit organisation of the NRA. It is important to note that units were not always directly subordinate to the one immediately above; for instance, an Army Regiment might report directly to anArmy Group without an intervening Corps-level command.
The commander-in-chief of the NRA from 1925 to 1947 wasGeneralissimoChiang Kai-shek.
The National Revolutionary Army (NRA) adopted multiple divisional structures throughout its history in response to evolving threats and operational needs. The templates used varied by year and theatre of operation. The years referred to below use theMinguo calendar, which begins in 1911; therefore, the 22nd year corresponds to 1933 in the Gregorian calendar.
The following structure was implemented for divisions deployed inGuangxi during theFifth Encirclement Campaign against Communist strongholds.[51]
This organisation model was only implemented within divisions stationed inGuangxi during the Fifth Encirclement Campaign.[52]
In 1935, theMilitary Affairs Commission devised a new initiative to raise 60 modern divisions in phased six-month batches. Each division was to be raised from a corresponding divisional district, aiming to improve cohesion, streamline recruitment, and facilitate communication. However, to reduce regionalism and factionalism, officers were to be recruited on a national basis and assigned across divisions, breaking existing provincial affiliations.
The 24th Year (Year 1935) "New Type" division, introduced under this plan, was nearly equivalent to a Western-style infantry division—its primary shortcoming being the absence ofradio equipment. Planning began in December 1934, and in January 1935, a classified conference was convened with over 80 of the NRA's senior officers. A timetable was set out for implementation:
This new force was intended to be far better equipped and trained than the existingwarlord armies and would be directly accountable to theGeneralissimo, thereby strengthening his authority both politically and militarily.
However, the plan soon ran into major logistical challenges. China's domestic industry lacked the capacity to produce the volume ofartillery andinfantry support guns required for such a force.German military imports also failed to meet expectations. As a result,mortars were adopted as substitutes for both infantry guns and artillery. Compounding these difficulties was a shortage ofhorses, which were essential for artillery and transport roles. Many divisions resorted to usingmules,oxen, or evenwater buffalo as makeshift alternatives.
By the end of 1935, 10 divisions had been organised according to the new model, though they remained under-equipped. A further 20 divisions had been reorganised by the time of theMarco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937. However, due to continuing shortages in weaponry and logistical support, these divisions still fell short of achieving true modernisation comparable to their Western or Japanese counterparts.[53]
The total strength of a division equipped with a standard field artillery regiment was 10,012 men and 3,219 horses. When organised with a mountain artillery regiment instead, the total increased to 10,632 men and 3,237 horses.[54]
As the war progressed and the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) suffered massive losses in men and materiel, the original "60 Division Plan" was abandoned. Larger divisional formations became increasingly impractical, prompting theMilitary Affairs Commission to shift towards smaller, more mobile divisions that better reflected the operational reality of protracted conflict and resource shortages.
An initial reorganisation in 1937 introduced theType 89 grenade launcher, which greatly impressed the Chinese and was incorporated into the divisional structure. Despite maintaining a nominal strength of slightly under 11,000 men, the 1937 model division was critically under-armed—fewer than 4,000 frontline personnel were issued small arms such as rifles.[55]
A further reform took place in 1938, initiated by GeneralHe Yingqin at the direction ofChiang Kai-shek. He Yingqin's report proposed an integrated system of numbering and designation for units beginning at the regimental level, alongside a standardised financial and logistical framework and the appointment of politically loyal commanders. A new divisional structure—referred to as the "27th Year (1938) Division"—was introduced. This reorganisation abolished divisional artillery, which had largely existed only on paper due to chronic shortages, and centralised artillery support at the army level. Although the division's paper strength remained at around 11,000 personnel, in practice very few units adopted the template. Constant campaigning by the Central Army and resistance from regional warlords hindered implementation.[56]
Eventually, the traditional square division structure (consisting of two brigades each containing two infantry regiments) was replaced by the more flexible triangular division—consisting of a divisional headquarters and three infantry regiments. This triangular model became the most common NRA divisional structure until the end of the war, although further modifications were made. Sixteen divisions received dedicated anti-tank companies, while twenty were equipped with anti-aircraft companies. Nonetheless, artillery continued to be in critically short supply. Though the domestic production of 82mm mortars offered some relief, distribution remained inconsistent even by the end of the conflict.
A final major reorganisation occurred in 1942. Under this model, all non-combat units were removed from the division and reassigned to field army command. With the universal adoption of the triangular structure, the standard 1942 division had a significantly reduced strength of 6,794 officers and enlisted men—approximately 60% of the manpower of its 1938 predecessor.[57]
This reorganisation resulted in a total strength of 8,251 men per division. Notably, these formations entirely lacked divisional-levelanti-aircraft,anti-tank, orartillery support—highlighting the severe shortage of equipment faced by the Chinese forces at the time.[57]
The National Revolutionary Army (NRA) developed its armoured capabilities in the interwar years, beginning with the acquisition of French Renault FT tanks by warlord Zhang Zuolin in the late 1920s. However, the true foundation of China's armoured corps was laid in the early 1930s and expanded rapidly after the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937.
By that time, the NRA had organized three armoured battalions, equipped with a mix of imported tanks and armoured cars from France, Britain, Germany, and Italy. Early NRA armoured forces, includingSd.Kfz. 222 and 221 armour cars,Krupp Panzer I light tanks,Vickers 6-ton light tanks andVickers amphibious tanks, suffered devastating losses during the battles of Shanghai and Nanking.
In 1938, with German advisors withdrawn under Japanese pressure, China turned to the Soviet Union for aid. The Soviets supplied 82T-26 tanks and other vehicles, enabling the formation of China's first mechanized formation—the200th Division. This division played a critical role in the battles of Lanfeng, Kunlun Pass, and later in the Burma Campaign under General Joseph Stilwell.
Despite losses, further American aid during the war providedM2A4,M3A3 Stuart,M5A1 Stuart, andM4 Sherman tanks viaLend-Lease. These vehicles reinforced elite Nationalist units, helping to repel Japanese offensives in the later stages of the war.
During theXinhai Revolution and throughout theWarlord Era of the Republic of China, Chinese armies frequently employed specialised shock troops known asDare to Die Corps (simplified Chinese:敢死队; traditional Chinese:敢死隊; pinyin:gǎnsǐduì). These units were composed of volunteers willing to undertake extremely high-risk or suicidal missions, often intended to break enemy lines or resist overwhelming assaults. The concept remained in use during theSecond Sino-Japanese War, when such units were deployed against Japanese forces.
Warlords and regional military leaders commonly used "Dare to Die" troops in suicide assaults.[58] TheKuomintang (KMT) also continued this practice. One such corps was deployed to suppress an insurrection in Canton under orders fromChiang Kai-shek.[59]
Both men and women served in these units, often motivated by ideals of martyrdom or national salvation.[60][61]
One notable deployment of such a unit occurred during theBattle of Taierzhuang, where a Dare to Die Corps was used with devastating effect against Japanese forces.[62][63][64][65][66][67] These troops frequently wielded traditional weapons such as swords.[68][69]
Forms ofsuicide bombing were also employed. At theDefense of Sihang Warehouse, a Chinese soldier reportedly detonated a grenade vest, killing 20 Japanese troops.[70]
Chinese troops also strapped explosives such as grenade bundles ordynamite to their bodies and launched themselves under Japanesetanks in suicide attacks. This tactic was notably used during theBattle of Shanghai, where a suicide bomber halted a tank column by detonating himself beneath the lead vehicle.[71]
AtTaierzhuang, Chinese suicide troops again employed this method, charging at tanks with explosives strapped to their bodies.[72][73][74]
In one such incident, Chinese soldiers destroyed four Japanese tanks using hand grenade bundles, sacrificing their own lives in the process.[75][76]
Within the centralised, core branches of the National Revolutionary Army — particularly the Central Army (中央軍), the Military Police, the Air Defense troops, and the Air Force — conscription and recruitment were far more structured and professional than often portrayed in popular accounts.
Personnel for these units were often selected based onphysical fitness,educational background, ortechnical aptitude, with many drawn from military academies, provincial high schools, and specialised training institutions. Entry into these elite branches was considered prestigious, and recruitment often attracted volunteers. These units, directly under the control ofMilitary Affairs Commission, maintained more regularised induction, training, and discipline procedures.
For example:
These units represented the most professionalised portion of the NRA and had far more controlled and less abusive conscription practices, especially in central regions under Nationalist administrative control andwartime rear areas.
In contrast, the broader expansion of the NRA during the Second Sino-Japanese War — especially through the incorporation of the other former warlords' regional forces (地方軍) and local levies[5] — led to widespread reliance on violent and inhumane conscription methods, particularly in areas far from government control.
In many rural places, military forces employedpress-gangs,kidnappings, andmass roundups to meet numerical quotas. Young men and even elderly villagers were seized indiscriminately, often beaten or shackled, and marched long distances to conscription centers with minimal food, water, or rest. Mortality during transit was often high, and training camps were poorly equipped, with disease and malnutrition rampant. In some extreme cases,less than half of conscriptssurvived to complete basic training.
These harsh practices were especially prevalent among units not directly controlled by the central government, and among rapidly raised local militias and civil defense groups. The Nationalist Government was often powerless or politically constrained from intervening in how these regional forces filled their ranks.
These are described byRudolph Rummel as:
This was a deadly affair in which men were kidnapped for the army, rounded up indiscriminately by press-gangs or army units among those on the roads or in the towns and villages, or otherwise gathered together. Many men, some the very young and old, were killed resisting or trying to escape. Once collected, they would be roped or chained together and marched, with little food or water, long distances to camp. They often died or were killed along the way, sometimes less than 50 percent reaching camp alive. Then recruit camp was no better, with hospitals resembling Nazi concentration camps like Buchenwald.[77]
During theChinese Civil War the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) was known to have used penal battalions from 1945 to 1949. A unit made up of deserters and those accused of cowardice, the penal battalion was giving such tasks as scouting ahead of the main forces to check for ambushes, crossing rivers and torrents to see whether they were fordable, and walking across unmapped minefields.[78]
Established in 1934, theCentral Air Defense College (中央防空學校) was the first dedicated military air defense institution in the history of China. Its responsibilities encompassed both the training of foundational air defense officers and the command and instruction of air defense forces.
Before the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Central Air Defense College organised nine anti-aircraft artillery regiments, which are independent entities in the National Revolutionary Army:[79]
In 1943, the Air Defense Troops were reorganised under an Area Command structure:
After the drafting and implementation of theConstitution of the Republic of China in 1947, the Air Defense Troops were transformed into the air defence branch of theRepublic of China Air Force, and later merged as theROCAF Anti-Aircraft Artillery Command (空軍高射砲兵司令部) in 1949.
As a subordinate body of theMilitary Affairs Commission, theAviation Affairs Commission (航空委員會) assumed control of theAir Force (空軍).
Although the Air Force was technically part of the National Revolutionary Army (NRA), it was, in practice, largely independent from its ground forces counterpart within the military command structure of the Nationalist regime.
Throughout its existence, the Air Force maintained a distinctive institutional identity, with uniforms clearly different from those of the NRA's ground forces and a separate administrative system. In terms of pay and provisions, Air Force personnel—including not only aviation professionals but also infantry units assigned to air base defense—enjoyed treatment on par with the NRA's most trusted ground units, and far superior to that received by the majority of other NRA formations at the time.
As a result, historians typically do not associate the Air Force directly with the National Revolutionary Army, but rather regard it as an independent air service of Nationalist China, commonly referring to it as theChinese Nationalist Air Force. Following the drafting and implementation of theConstitution of the Republic of China in 1947, the Air Force was formally established as a fully independent branch of the military and given the official title of theRepublic of China Air Force (ROCAF).
TheSubmarine and Motor Torpedo Boat College(電雷學校), abbreviated as theS.M.C., was established in 1932 by theMilitary Affairs Commission of the Nationalist government. Uniquely, the institution was not under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Navy, but was instead directly subordinate to the General Staff Headquarters of the National Revolutionary Army (NRA). The majority of its personnel were transferred from theWhampoa Military Academy, and the school came to refer to itself—as did others—as the "Whampoa of the Navy". Graduates of the S.M.C. were commonly known as members of the "SMC System" (電雷系). The college would later become the forerunner of theRepublic of China Naval Academy.
According to prewar planning prior to the outbreak of the Second Sino–Japanese War, the S.M.C. was intended to operate not only motor torpedo boats, but also submarines. Although the Republic of China Navy did not field an operational submarine force until the 1960s, the Chinese Nationalist government had purchased five submarines from theThird Reich—oneType VII U-boat and fourType IIB U-boats—under theSino-German military cooperation program. However, none of these submarines were ever delivered, and the agreement was cancelled following the end of Sino-German cooperation. The funds were later refunded by the Third Reich. Uniquely, this arrangement meant that had the Nationalist China acquired a submarine force before World War II, it would have been operated by the Army rather than the Navy—an organizational anomaly almost without precedent in modern military history.
In the early phase of the war, the S.M.C. operated a small fleet of motor torpedo boats, effectively functioning as an army-operated torpedo boat flotilla, which existed in parallel with the navy's own torpedo boat squadrons.
In 1938, the S.M.C. and the remaining torpedo boat forces were incorporated into the Navy Command Headquarters under the Military Affairs Commission, effectively ending the chapter of Army-managed naval operations.
The National Revolutionary Army had its own military police force.
The rank insignia ofcommissioned officers.
| Rank group | General officers | Senior commissioned officers | Junior commissioned officers | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Early 1929[80] | .png) | .png) | .png) | .png) | .png) | .png) | .png) | .png) | .png) | .png) | ||
| 1929-1936[80] | .png) | .png) | .png) | .png) | .png) | .png) | .png) | .png) | .png) | .png) | ||
| 1936-1946[81][82] | .svg) | .svg) | .svg) | .svg) | .svg) | .svg) | .svg) | .svg) | .svg) | .svg) | .svg) | |
| Title | 特級上將 Tèjí shàngjiàng | 一級上將 Yījí shàngjiàng | 二級上將 Èrjí shàngjiàng | 中將 Zhōngjiàng | 少將 Shàojiàng | 上校 Shàngxiào | 中校 Zhōngxiào | 少校 Shàoxiào | 上尉 Shàngwèi | 中尉 Zhōngwèi | 少尉 Shàowèi | 准尉 Zhǔnwèi |
The rank insignia ofnon-commissioned officers andenlisted personnel.
| Rank group | Non-commissioned officers | Soldiers | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Early 1929[80] | .png) | .png) | .png) | .png) | .png) | .png) |
| 1929-1936[80] | .png) | .png) | .png) | .png) | .png) | .png) |
| 1936-1946[82] | .svg) | .svg) | .svg) | .svg) | .svg) | .svg) |
| Title | 上士 Shàngshì | 中士 Zhōngshì | 下士 Xiàshì | 上等兵 Shàngděngbīng | 一等兵 Yīděngbīng | 二等兵 Èrděngbīng |
At the behest ofChiang Kai-shek,T. V. Soong negotiated American sponsorship for the creation of 30 modern Chinese divisions, which were to be designated as assault divisions following the fall ofBurma. This initiative was implemented concurrently with the formation ofY Force, the Chinese expeditionary force in Burma.[83]
The structure of Y-Force divisions was largely based on the 1942 NRA division template but included several enhancements. These included expanded staff—particularly in communications—as well as an anti-tank rifle squad equipped with two rifles, standard issueradios, andBren light machine guns. The number of mortars per division was increased from 36 to 54 to compensate for the limited availability of heavy artillery. Requests by the ChineseMilitary Affairs Commission for additional support personnel and divisional artillery were denied by American authorities, and the concept of grouping the 30 divisions into a unified Y-Force command was never realised.
Command of the Y-Force was divided among three leaders: GeneralChen Cheng led the largest contingent of 15 divisions,Long Yun commanded 5, and 9 divisions remained under Chiang Kai-shek's direct control.[83] Prior to theSalween offensive, each division was allocated 36bazookas, although actual distribution fell short due to shortages in rocket supply.[84]
| Army | Old Strength | New Strength | Actual Strength | Reinforcements en route |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chinese Expeditionary Force (Chen Cheng) | ||||
| XI Group Army | 107,200 | 124,300 | 55,550 | 49,000 |
| XX Group Army | 56,400 | 61,100 | 30,600 | 15,000 |
| Subtotal | 163,600 | 185,400 | 86,100 | 64,000 |
| Yunnan–Indochina Force (Long Yun) | ||||
| I Group Army | 20,400 | 20,400 | 15,650 | 4,650 |
| IX Group Army | 56,400 | 71,400 | 18,400 | 9,290 |
| Subtotal | 66,800 | 91,800 | 34,050 | 13,940 |
| Reserve Army (Chiang Kai-shek) | ||||
| V Group Army | 125,200 | 131,220 | 86,785 | 37,269 |
| Grand Total | 355,600 | 408,420 | 206,935 | 115,209 |
Due to the ongoing intensity of combat operations, Chinese divisions were severely under-strength. Although Chiang pledged to dispatch over 110,000 reinforcements, additional troops were not delivered in sufficient numbers. Nonetheless, Y-Force eventually expanded to over 300,000 troops, with sufficient stocks of rifles, mortars, and machine guns.[84]
A typical Y-Force division had an authorised strength of 10,790 personnel, equipped with:
This represented a major improvement over the earlier 1942 division model, especially in terms of equipment. Some divisions were also equipped with dedicated anti-tank companies armed with guns ranging from 20mm to 47mm calibre.
Army-level support elements included over 3,000 horses and mules, 16 trucks, 8,404 additional personnel, 21 extra machine guns, one artillery battalion (12 guns), and one anti-tank battalion (4 guns). However, due to logistical difficulties in airlifting heavy equipment overThe Hump, many artillery and anti-tank weapons did not arrive until late 1943 or early 1944.[85]
GeneralJoseph Stilwell envisioned the creation of a 90-division Chinese regular army. The initial 30 divisions were those of Y-Force, tasked with re-opening theBurma Road. This would in turn enable the training and supply of another 30 divisions via direct logistics delivery. The remaining 30 divisions were to be lighter garrison units. The remainder of the Chinese Army would be gradually demobilised or used to fill gaps and serve as reinforcements, reducing the overall demand for resources and equipment.
In July 1943, the United States War Department agreed to equip the initial 30 divisions and an additional 10% of the next batch, designated as "Z-Force". Stilwell proposed reallocating existing forces in eastern China into this 90-division structure but faced resistance from Chinese authorities, who preferred that AmericanLend-Lease aid be used to bolster existing units. He reiterated the plan, adding a proposal for one or twoarmoured divisions, all to be activated by January 1945, contingent on the opening of the Burma Road.
However, following theCairo Conference, American and British forces failed to agree on an amphibious landing in Burma. As a result, with the Japanese still controlling the region, the Burma Road remained closed, and Stilwell's plan was ultimately shelved.[86]
| Army (3 Divisions Each) | Strength | % Equipped | Combat Efficiency | Location |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| New 1st Army | 43,231 | 100% | Excellent | Gaoling, Guangxi |
| 2nd Army | 23,545 | 100% | Satisfactory | Baoshan, Yunnan |
| 5th Army | 35,528 | 88% | Satisfactory | Kunming, Yunnan |
| New 6th Army | 43,519 | 100% | Excellent | Zhijiang, Hubei |
| 8th Army | 34,942 | 93% | Satisfactory | Bose, Guangxi |
| 13th Army | 30,677 | 88% | Satisfactory | Lipu, Guangxi |
| 18th Army | 30,106 | 99% | Very Satisfactory | Yuanling, Hunan |
| 53rd Army | 34,465 | 30% | Unknown | Midu, Yunnan |
| 54th Army | 31,285 | 100% | Satisfactory | Wunming, Guangxi |
| 71st Army | 30,547 | 96% | Very Satisfactory | Liuzhou, Guangxi |
| 73rd Army | 28,963 | 100% | Satisfactory | Xinhua, Hunan |
| 74th Army | 32,166 | 100% | Very Satisfactory | Shanshuwan, Sichuan |
| 94th Army | 37,531 | 79% | Very Satisfactory | Guilin, Guangxi |
| Total | 436,505 | — | — | — |
| Province | Central Government Troops | Warlord Troops | Provincial Troops | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Zhili (excluding the East Hebei Autonomous Government) | 51,000 | 39,800 | 12,000 | 102,800 |
| Chahar | — | 17,000 | — | 17,000 |
| Shanxi | 17,000 | 43,800 | 9,000 | 69,800 |
| Shandong | — | 55,500 | 8,000 | 63,500 |
| Suiyuan | 20,500 | 30,700 | — | 61,200 |
| Shaanxi | 100,000 | 39,000 | 8,000 | 147,000 |
| Gansu | 63,000 | — | — | 63,000 |
| Ninghsia | 27,000 | — | — | 27,000 |
| Tsinghai | 12,000 | — | 11,000 | 23,000 |
| Xinjiang | — | — | 24,800 | 24,800 |
| Zhejiang | 52,000 | — | 8,800 | 60,800 |
| Jiangxi | 49,000 | — | — | 49,000 |
| Henan | 113,300 | 16,000 | — | 129,300 |
| Anhui | 54,000 | 16,000 | 3,000 | 73,000 |
| Hubei | 72,000 | — | 10,000 | 82,000 |
| Jiangsu | 109,400 | 9,000 | — | 118,400 |
| Hunan | 68,000 | — | — | 68,000 |
| Sichuan | 26,000 | 126,600 | — | 152,600 |
| Sikang | — | 16,000 | — | 16,000 |
| Guizhou | 36,000 | — | — | 36,000 |
| Fujian | 60,000 | 12,000 | — | 72,000 |
| Guangdong | 42,000 | 51,000 | — | 93,000 |
| Guangxi | — | 54,000 | — | 54,000 |
| Yunnan | — | 21,900 | — | 21,900 |
| Total: China | 972,200 | 519,700 | 94,600 | 1,586,500 |
(FormerNortheastern Army troops are included under the "Central Government" column, following the arrest ofZhang Xueliang after theXi'an Incident.)
The categorisation above reflects administrative alignment as recorded at the time and does not necessarily indicate actual loyalty or operational control.
An alternative breakdown, provided by Field—a U.S. military analyst—in July 1937 (figures in brackets were given by Bin Shih):[88]
| Formations* | Chiang's Army | Loyal to Chiang | Semi-autonomous Provincial Troops under Chiang | Conditionally Loyal (Anti-Japanese Only) | Useless or Disloyal Troops | CCP Forces and Manchurian Partisans |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Armies / Route Armies | 1st, 2nd, 5th, 6th, 13th, 16th, 25th | 4th, 7th, 11th, 15th, 17th, 26th | 3rd, 19th, 33rd, 34th, 35th | 29th, 32nd, 33rd, 53rd, 63rd | 10th Route Army (21,900) | — |
| Divisions | 1st–4th, 9th, Nanjing divisions | — | — | 16 divisions of theNortheastern Army | — | — |
| Unassigned Troops | — | — | 100,000 Guangdong troops | — | 60,000–90,000 Guangxi regulars and irregulars; 250,000 Sichuan troops | 150,000 CCP troops; 150,000 Manchurian partisans (likely overstated) |
| Total Strengths | 380,000 | 520,000 | 300,000 | 278,100 | 421,900 | 300,000 |
*Note: Not all formations had clearly defined loyalties; therefore, this list does not represent a comprehensive enumeration of NRA units.
The following arsenals were established prior to the outbreak of theSecond Sino-Japanese War.[90]
Established in 1915 inHenan, the arsenal was taken over by the Central Government in 1930, with full-scale production resuming in 1931. By that time, it employed 2,400 workers and was producing 1,800 rifles, 12Maxim guns, and 20,000 grenades per month. By 1934, rifle production had increased to 3,200 per month.
Originally established in 1865 inShanghai, the arsenal came under Central Government control in 1927. In 1931, monthly output included eight 75mm mountain guns, 31 Type Triple-Ten machine guns, three million cartridges, and 600 pounds of smokeless powder. However, following the demilitarisation of Shanghai after theJanuary 28 Incident in 1932, the arsenal ceased full operation. Light machinery was relocated, while heavier equipment remained until 1937.
Founded in 1895 inHubei, this arsenal was brought under Central Government authority in 1926. Between 1895 and 1938, it produced a total of 876,316Type 88 rifles. In 1934 alone, it also manufactured 240 Type Triple-Ten machine guns and four 75mm field guns.
Established in 1898 inShanxi, this arsenal was later expanded byYan Xishan. By 1930, monthly production included 500 pistols, 1,500 rifles, 50 machine guns, and 300 mortars. Although theoretically capable of producing 30 mountain guns per month, none were actually in production. Due to a decline in quality, the Central Government seized the machinery in 1937 for redistribution to other arsenals.
Located inNanjing and founded in 1865, this facility came under Central Government control in 1927. By 1936, after renewed investment, it was producing 610 machine guns, 3.6 million cartridges, 480 mortars, 204,000 mortar shells, and 34,000 gas masks annually.
Established in 1874, its output in 1917 included 600 rifles, 500,000 cartridges, and six machine guns. However, by 1935, quality control had deteriorated, and an inspection revealed that only 10% of cartridges met inspection standards. The arsenal was taken over by the Central Government following the defection ofYu Hanmou to Nanjing during the Liangguang incident.
First established in 1878 inSichuan, this arsenal produced 15,000 rifles, 7.5 million cartridges, and 45,000 pounds of smokeless powder annually by 1913. Owing to ongoing regional conflict, it was relocated toChongqing in 1932. In 1933, it produced 6,000KE7 light machine guns.
Situated inShandong, this arsenal was, by the mid-1930s, producing 3 million cartridges and 60,000 grenades each month.
In the regular provincial divisions, the standard-issue rifle was theHanyang 88—a Chinese-produced variant of the GermanGewehr 88. Divisions under the Central Government were typically equipped with theChiang Kai-shek rifle and otherMauser-pattern rifles imported fromGermany,Belgium, and theCzechoslovak Republic. The primarylight machine gun in service was either imported or domestically produced and modelled on the CzechBrnoZB vz. 26, chambered in the standard7.92 mm cartridge.
Other types of machine guns were sourced fromBelgium,France, and through theSoviet Aid Programme. Typically, each infantry company fielded between six and nine light machine guns, with a monthly ammunition allocation of roughly 5,000 rounds—sufficient for around five days of combat operations.
Heavy machine guns were mainly of the locally produced Type 24Maxim gun—a water-cooled variant of the GermanMG08—and the Type Triple-Ten, a version of theM1917 Browning machine gun chambered for the 8 mm Mauser round. On average, each Central Armybattalion had a machine gun company equipped with five or six heavy machine guns and received a monthly supply of 20,000 rounds.
The standard sidearm for officers and non-commissioned officers was the7.63 mmMauser C96semi-automatic pistol.Submachine guns were not officially included in the tables of organisation and equipment, but were nonetheless present—either locally produced or acquired from disbandedwarlord armies. These were often carried by bodyguards assigned to divisional or corps commanders and in special service platoons or companies. Elite formations such as theX Force in theBurma theatre were equipped with modernLend-Lease arms from the United States.
Most provincial divisions lacked artillery entirely. However, some Central Army divisions were furnished with 37 mmPaK 35/36anti-tank guns, as well asanti-aircraft weapons fromOerlikon,Madsen, andSolothurn. Ideally, each division was equipped with six FrenchBrandt 81 mm mortars and sixSolothurn 20 mm autocannons.
Independent brigades and artillery regiments were sometimes armed withKrupp75 mm L/29 field guns, Krupp75 mm L/14, orBofors75 mm L/20 mountain guns. Additionally, 24Rheinmetall 150 mmL/32 sFH 18howitzers (purchased in 1934) and 24Krupp 150 mmL/30 sFH 18 howitzers (acquired in 1936) were in service.
At the outset of hostilities, the National Revolutionary Army and theTax Police Regiment maintained three tank battalions equipped with GermanPanzer I light tanks and ItalianCV-35 tankettes. After their defeat in theBattle of Shanghai, the remaining tanks—along with several hundred Soviet-suppliedT-26 andBT-5 tanks—were consolidated into the newly formed200th Division.
Infantry uniforms were modified versions of theZhongshan suit.Puttees were worn by both soldiers and officers, reflecting the infantry's primarily foot-mobile nature. Each soldier was issued a field cap, while helmets were the most distinctive piece of kit. Between 1935 and 1936, the NRA imported 315,000 GermanM35 Stahlhelms, often adorned with theBlue Sky with a White Sun emblem of theRepublic of China. These helmets were used by both German-trained and regular Central Army divisions.
Other helmets in use included the FrenchAdrian helmet, the BritishBrodie helmet, and later, the AmericanM1 helmet. Footwear included straw shoes for provincial troops, cloth shoes for Central Army soldiers, and leather boots for officers. Standard kit for every soldier included ammunition pouches or harnesses, awater flask,bayonet, ration bag, and agas mask.
By late 1926, the GMD leadership had split into Jiang's right-wing faction, which controlled the National Revolutionary Army (NRA), and the GMD left wing, which was allied with the Communists.
Although China has a one-party Government, the Kuomintang is actually a catch-all of coalition groups ranging from the diehard Right to the pink Left. On the Right are such men as Gen. Ho Ying-chin and Minister of Organization Chen Li-fu; on the Left are such men as Dr. Sun Fo and Shao Li-tze, Secretary General of the People's Political Council.
The right wing of the Kuomintang controlled the national revolutionary army it was organising.
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