Most of Nagorno-Karabakh was governed byethnic Armenians under the breakawayRepublic of Artsakh – also known as the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) – from the end of thefirst Nagorno-Karabakh War betweenArmenia and Azerbaijan in 1994 to the announcement of the dissolution of the republic in September 2023. Representatives from the two sides held numerous inconclusive peace talks mediated by theOSCE Minsk Group regarding the region's disputed status, with its majority-Armenian population over time variously advocating either for Artsakh's independence from both states or for its integration into Armenia.[4]
The region is usually equated with the administrative borders of the formerNagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, comprising 4,400 square kilometres (1,700 sq mi); however, the region's historical extent encompasses approximately 8,223 square kilometres (3,175 sq mi).[5][6]
On 27 September 2020, theSecond Nagorno-Karabakh War broke out with an Azerbaijani offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories.[7] Azerbaijan made significant gains during the war, regaining all of theoccupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh and capturing one-third of Nagorno-Karabakh, includingShusha andHadrut.[8][9][10][11] The war ended on 10 November 2020 whena trilateral ceasefire agreement was signed between Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Russia, under which all the remaining occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh were formally returned to Azerbaijani control. The Republic of Artsakh became an isolatedrump state connected with Armenia only by a narrowRussian-controlled corridor.
On 19 September 2023, aftera blockade lasting several months, Azerbaijan launched a fresh large-scalemilitary offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh.[12][13][14][15][16] The Artsakh forces collapsed rapidly, resulting in an Azerbaijani victory, the dissolution of the Republic of Artsakh,[17] theexodus of almost the entire Armenian population from the region,[18] and the entry of Azerbaijani security forces into the former Artsakh capital ofStepanakert, known as Khankendi by Azerbaijan.[19] On 1 January 2024, the Republic of Artsakh was formally dissolved,[20][17] marking the end of a millennia-old Armenian presence in Nagorno-Karabakh.[21][22][23][24] Various political analysts, along with residents of Nagorno-Karabakh, accused Azerbaijan of committingethnic cleansing.[25][26][27][28]
June 2001 NASA photograph of the snow-covered Lesser Caucasus to the south of the Greater Caucasus. Around the year 1800, theKarabakh Khanate was based in the southeast corner of the Lesser Caucasus. It extended east into the lowlands, hence the nameNagorno- or "Highland-" Karabakh for the western part.
The prefixNagorno- derives from the Russianattributive adjectivenagorny (нагорный), which means "highland". TheAzerbaijani names of the region include the similar adjectivesdağlıq (mountainous) oryuxarı (upper). Such words are not used in theArmenian name, but appeared in the region's official name during theSoviet era asNagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. Other languages apply their own wording formountainous,upper, orhighland; for example, the official name used for theNagorno-Karabakh Republic in French isHaut-Karabakh, meaning "Upper Karabakh".
The names for the region in the various local languages all translate to "mountainous Karabakh", or "mountainous black garden":
Armenians living in the area often call Nagorno-KarabakhArtsakh (Armenian:Արցախ), the name of the 10th province of the ancientKingdom of Armenia.Urartian inscriptions (9th–7th centuries BC) use the nameUrtekhini for the region.Ancient Greek sources called the areaOrkhistene.[29]
Nagorno-Karabakh falls within the lands occupied by peoples known to modern archaeologists as theKura-Araxes culture who lived between the two riversKura andAraxes.[32]
The ancient population of the region consisted of variousautochthonous local and migrant tribes who were mostly non-Indo-Europeans.[33] According to the prevailing western theory, these natives intermarried with Armenians who came to the region after its inclusion into Armenia in the 2nd (or possibly earlier, the 4th) century BC.[34] Other scholars suggest that the Armenians settled in the region as early as the 7th century BC.[35]
Around 180 BC, Artsakh became one of the 15 provinces of theArmenian Kingdom and remained so until the 4th century.[36] While formally having the status of a province (nahang), Artsakh possibly formed aprincipality on its own – like Armenia's province of Syunik. Other theories suggest that Artsakh was aroyal land, belonging directly to the king of Armenia.[37] KingTigran the Great of Armenia (who ruled from 95 to 55 BC) founded in Artsakh one of four cities named Tigranakert after himself.[38] The ruins of the ancientTigranakert, located 50 km (30 mi) north-east ofStepanakert, are being studied by a group of international scholars.
In 387 AD, after the partition of Armenia between the Roman Empire andSassanid Persia, two Armenian provinces – Artsakh andUtik – became part of the Sassanidsatrapy of Caucasian Albania, which in turn came under strong Armenian religious and cultural influence.[39][40] At the time the population of Artsakh and Utik consisted of Armenians and several Armenized tribes.[33]
Armenian culture and civilization flourished in the early medieval Nagorno-Karabakh. In the 5th century, the first-ever Armenian school was opened on the territory of modern Nagorno-Karabakh atAmaras Monastery through the efforts of St.Mesrop Mashtots, the inventor of theArmenian alphabet.[41] St. Mesrop was very active in preaching the Gospel in Artsakh and Utik. Overall, Mesrop Mashtots made three trips to Artsakh and Utik, ultimately reaching pagan territories at the foothills of theGreater Caucasus.[42][edition needed] The 7th-century Armenian linguist and grammarian Stephanos Syunetsi stated in his work that Armenians of Artsakh had their own dialect, and encouraged his readers to learn it.[43]
Around the mid 7th century, the region was conquered by the invading Muslim Arabs through theMuslim conquest of Persia. Subsequently, it was ruled by local governors endorsed by theCaliphate. According to some sources, in 821 the Armenian[44] princeSahl Smbatian revolted in Artsakh and established theHouse of Khachen, which ruled Artsakh as aprincipality until the early 19th century.[45] According to other sources, Sahl Smbatian "was of the Zamirhakan family of kings", and in the year 837–838 he acquired sovereignty over Armenia, Georgia, and Albania.[46][47] The name "Khachen" originated from Armenian wordkhach, which means "cross".[48] By 1000 the House of Khachen proclaimed theKingdom of Artsakh withJohn Senecherib as its first ruler.[49] InitiallyDizak in southern Artsakh also formed a kingdom ruled by the ancientHouse of Aranshahik, descended from the earliest Kings of Caucasian Albania. In 1261, after the daughter of the last king of Dizak married the king of Artsakh, Armenian[50] princeHasan Jalal Dola, the two states merged into one[45] Armenian[51]Principality of Khachen. Subsequently, Artsakh continued to exist as a de facto independent principality.
In the 15th century, the territory of Karabakh was part of the states ruled subsequently by theKara Koyunlu andAk KoyunluTurkic tribal confederations. According toAbu Bakr Tihrani, during the period ofJahan Shah (1438–1468), the ruler of Kara Koyunlu, Piri bey Karamanli held the governorship of Karabakh.[54] However, according toRobert H. Hewsen, theTurkoman lordJahan Shah (1437–1467) assigned the governorship of upper Karabakh to local Armenian princes, allowing a native Armenian leadership to emerge consisting of five noble families led by princes who held the titles ofmeliks.[45] These dynasties represented the branches of the earlier House of Khachen and were the descendants of the medieval kings of Artsakh. Their lands were often referred to as the Country ofKhamsa ('five' in Arabic). In a Charter (2 June 1799) of the EmperorPaul I titled "About their admission to Russian suzerainty, land allocation, rights and privileges", it was noted that the Christian heritage of the Karabakh region and all their people were admitted to the Russian suzerainty.[55] However, according toRobert Hewsen, theRussian Empire recognized thesovereign status of the five princes in their domains by the charter of Emperor Paul I dated 2 June 1799.[56]
The Armenian meliks were granted supreme command over neighbouring Armenian principalities and Muslim khans in the Caucasus by the Iranian kingNader Shah, in return for the meliks' victories over the invadingOttoman Turks in the 1720s.[57] These five principalities[58] in Karabakh were ruled by Armenian families who had received the title Melik (prince) and were the following:
Principality ofGulistan – under the leadership of the Melik-Beglarian family
Principality ofJraberd – under the leadership of the Melik-Israelian family
Principality ofVaranda – under the leadership of the Melik-Shahnazarian family
Principality ofDizak – under the leadership of the Melik-Avanian family
From 1501 to 1736, during the existence of theSafavid Empire, the province of Karabakh was governed by theZiyadoghlu Qajar dynasty, untilNader Shah took over Karabakh from their rule.[59] The Armenian meliks maintained full control over the region until the mid-18th century.[citation needed] In the early 18th century, Iran's Nader Shah took Karabakh out of control of the Ganja khans in punishment for their support of theSafavids, and placed it under his own control[60][61] In the mid-18th century, as internal conflicts between the meliks led to their weakening, the Karabakh Khanate was formed. TheKarabakh khanate, one of the largestkhanates underIranian suzerainty,[62] was headed byPanah-Ali khan Javanshir. For the reinforcement of the power of Karabakh khanate, Khan of Karabakh, Panah-Ali khan Javanshir, built up "the fortress of Panahabad (today Shusha)" in 1751. During that time, Otuziki,Javanshir, Kebirli, and other Turkic tribes constituted the majority of the overall population.
Modern era
Palace of the former ruler (khan) ofShusha. Taken from a postcard from the late 19th–early 20th century.Aftermath of theShusha massacre: Armenian half of Shusha destroyed by Azerbaijani armed forces in 1920, with the defiledArmenian Cathedral of the Holy Savior in the background.
In 1822, 9 years after it passed from Iranian to Russian control, the Karabakh Khanate was dissolved and the area became part of theElizavetpol Governorate within the Russian Empire. In 1823 the five districts corresponding roughly to modern-day Nagorno-Karabakh were 90.8% Armenian-populated.[70][71]
In July 1918, the First Armenian Assembly of Nagorno-Karabakh declared the region self-governing and created a National Council and government.[74] Later, Ottoman troops entered Karabakh, meeting armed resistance by Armenians.
After the defeat of theOttoman Empire in World War I, British troops occupied Karabakh. The British command provisionally affirmedKhosrov bey Sultanov (appointed by the Azerbaijani government) as the governor-general of Karabakh andZangezur, pending a final decision by theParis Peace Conference.[75] The decision was opposed by Karabakh Armenians. In February 1920, the Karabakh National Council preliminarily agreed to Azerbaijani jurisdiction, while Armenians elsewhere in Karabakh continued guerrilla fighting, never accepting the agreement.[74] The agreement itself was soon annulled by the Ninth Karabagh Assembly, which declared union with Armenia in April.[74][76]
In April 1920, while the Azerbaijani army was locked in Karabakh fighting local Armenian forces, Azerbaijan wastaken over byBolsheviks. On 10 August 1920, Armenia signed a preliminary agreement with the Bolsheviks, agreeing to a temporary Bolshevik occupation of these areas until final settlement would be reached.[77] In 1921,Armenia andGeorgia were also taken over by the Bolsheviks. After theSovietization of Armenia and Azerbaijan, theKavbiuro (Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of theRussian Communist Party (Bolshevik)) decided that Karabakh would remain withinAzerbaijan SSR with broad regional autonomy, with the administrative centre in the city ofShusha (the administrative center was later moved toStepanakert).[78] The oblast's borders were drawn to include Armenian villages and to exclude as much as possible Azerbaijani villages.[79] The resulting district ensured an Armenian majority.
With the Soviet Union firmly in control of the region, theconflict over the region died down for several decades until the beginning of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the question of Nagorno-Karabakh re-emerged. Accusing the Azerbaijani SSR government of conducting forced Azerification of the region, the majority Armenian population, with ideological and material support from theArmenian SSR, started a movement to have the autonomous oblast transferred to the Armenian SSR.[80] In August 1987, Karabakh Armenians sent a petition for union with Armenia with tens of thousands of signatures to Moscow.[81]
A restored ArmenianT-72, knocked out of commission while attacking Azeri positions inAskeran District, serves as a war memorial on the outskirts of Stepanakert.
On 13 February 1988, Karabakh Armenians began demonstrating inStepanakert, in favour of unification with the Armenian republic. Six days later they were joined by mass marches inYerevan. On 20 February, the Soviet of People's Deputies in Karabakh voted 110 to 17 to request the transfer of the region to Armenia. This unprecedented action by a regional Soviet brought out tens of thousands of demonstrations both in Stepanakert and Yerevan, but Moscow rejected the Armenians' demands. The confrontation between the Azeris and the police near Askeran degenerated into theAskeran clash, which left two Azeris dead, one of them allegedly killed by an Azeri police officer. Fifty Armenian villagers and an unknown number of Azeris and police officers were injured.[82][83][84] Large numbers of refugees left Armenia and Azerbaijan as violence began against the minority populations of the respective republics.[85] On 7 July 1988, the European Parliament passed a resolution that condemned the violence employed against Armenian demonstrators in Azerbaijan, and supported the demand of the Armenians for reunification with the Soviet Republic of Armenia.[86]
On 29 November 1989, direct rule in Nagorno-Karabakh was ended and the region was returned to Azerbaijani administration.[87] The Soviet policy backfired, however, when a joint session of the ArmenianSupreme Soviet and the National Council, the legislative body of Nagorno-Karabakh, proclaimed the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia.[citation needed] On 26 November 1991 Azerbaijanabolished the status of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, rearranging theadministrative division and bringing the territory under direct control of Azerbaijan.[88]
On 10 December 1991, in a referendum boycotted by local Azerbaijanis,[84] Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh approved the creation of an independent state. A Soviet proposal for enhanced autonomy for Nagorno-Karabakh within Azerbaijan satisfied neither side anda full-scale war subsequently erupted between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh, with the latter receiving support from Armenia.[89][90][91][92] According to Armenia's former president,Levon Ter-Petrossian, the Karabakh leadership approach was maximalist and "they thought they could get more."[93][94][95]
The struggle over Nagorno-Karabakh escalated after both Armenia and Azerbaijan attained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. In the post-Sovietpower vacuum, military action between Azerbaijan and Armenia was heavily influenced by theRussian military. Furthermore, both the Armenian and Azerbaijani military employed a large number of mercenaries fromUkraine and Russia.[96] Between fifteen and twenty-five hundredAfghanmujahideen, along with fighters fromChechnya, participated in the fighting on Azerbaijan's side.[84] Russia provided Armenia with heavy artillery and tanks.[84] Many survivors from the Azerbaijani side found shelter in 12 emergency camps set up in other parts of Azerbaijan to cope with the growing number of internally displaced people due to the first Nagorno-Karabakh war.[97]
By the end of 1993, the conflict had caused about 30,000 casualties[98] and created hundreds of thousands of refugees on both sides.[citation needed] By May 1994, the Armenians were in control of 14% of the territory of Azerbaijan.[99] At that stage, for the first time during the conflict, the Azerbaijani government recognized Nagorno-Karabakh as a third party in the war and started direct negotiations with the Karabakh authorities. As a result, aceasefire was reached on 12 May 1994 through Russian mediation.
Despite the ceasefire, fatalities due to armed conflicts between Armenian and Azerbaijani soldiers continued.[100] On 25 January 2005, theParliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adoptedPACE Resolution 1416, which condemned ethnic cleansing against Azerbaijanis.[101][102] On 15–17 May 2007 the 34th session of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of theOrganization of Islamic Conference adopted resolution No. 7/34-P, considering the occupation of Azerbaijani territory as the aggression of Armenia against Azerbaijan and recognizing the actions against Azerbaijani civilians as acrime against humanity, and condemning the destruction of archaeological, cultural and religious monuments in the occupied territories.[103] The 11th session of the summit of theOrganization of the Islamic Conference held on 13–14 March 2008 inDakar adopted resolution No. 10/11-P (IS). In the resolution, OIC member states condemned the occupation of Azerbaijani lands by Armenian forces and Armenian aggression against Azerbaijan, ethnic cleansing against the Azeri population, and charged Armenia with the "destruction of cultural monuments in the occupied Azerbaijani territories".[104] On 14 March of the same year theUN General Assembly adoptedResolution No. 62/243 which "demands the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of all Armenian forces from all occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan".[105] On 18–20 May 2010, the 37th session of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Organization of Islamic Conference inDushanbe adopted another resolution condemning the aggression of Armenia against Azerbaijan, recognizing the actions against Azerbaijani civilians as a crime against humanity and condemning the destruction of archaeological, cultural, and religious monuments in occupied territories.[106] On 20 May of the same year, theEuropean Parliament inStrasbourg adopted the resolution on "The need for an EU Strategy for the South Caucasus" on the basis of the report byEvgeni Kirilov, the Bulgarian member of the Parliament.[107][108] The resolution states in particular that "the occupied Azerbaijani regions around Nagorno-Karabakh must be cleared as soon as possible".[109] On 26 January 2016, theParliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adoptedResolution 2085, which deplored the fact that the occupation by Armenia of Nagorno-Karabakh and other adjacent areas of Azerbaijan creates humanitarian and environmental problems for the citizens of Azerbaijan, condemned ethnic cleansing against Azerbaijanis and Assembly requested immediate withdrawal of Armenian armed forces from the region concerned.[110][111][112]
Several[quantify] worldleaders have met with the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan over the years, but efforts to maintain the ceasefire have failed.[113]
On 2 April 2016 Azerbaijani and Armenian forces again clashed in the region.[citation needed] TheArmenian Defense Ministry alleged that Azerbaijan launched an offensive to seize territory in the region. At least 30 soldiers were killed during the fighting and aMil Mi-24 helicopter and tank were also destroyed, with 12 of the fallen soldiers belonging to the Azerbaijani forces and the other 18 belonging to the Armenian forces, as well as an additional 35 Armenian soldiers reportedly wounded.[114][115]
On 27 September 2020, anew war erupted in Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories.[7] The United Nations strongly condemned the conflict and called on both sides to deescalate tensions and resume meaningful negotiations without delay.[116]
In December 2022, Azerbaijanis claiming to be environmental activists blocked theLachin corridor, the sole road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia and the outside world.[119] On 23 April 2023, Azerbaijani forces installed a checkpoint on the Lachin corridor.[120] The blockade led to a humanitarian crisis for the population in Artsakh and imports of essential goods were blocked, as well as humanitarian convoys of the Red Cross and the Russian peacekeepers, trapping the 120,000 residents of the region.[121][122][123][124][125] Limited traffic had been conducted by Russian peacekeepers and theInternational Committee of the Red Cross to transport patients in need of medical care and provide humanitarian supplies.[126][127] However, starting on 15 June 2023, Azerbaijan intensified the blockade, blocking all passage of food, fuel, and medicine from the Red Cross and the Russian peacekeepers through the Lachin corridor.[128][129][130] On 19 September, Azerbaijanlaunched a military operation.
On 19 September 2023, Azerbaijanlaunched a military offensive on Nagorno-Karabakh.[12][13][14][15][16] One day after the offensive started, on 20 September, an agreement on establishing a complete cessation of hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh was reached at the mediation of theRussian peacekeeping command in Nagorno-Karabakh.[131][132] Azerbaijan held a meeting with representatives of the Artsakh Armenian community on 21 September inYevlakh to start the process of re-integrating the region into Azerbaijan.[133][134] Ceasefire violations by Azerbaijan were nonetheless reported by both Artsakh and local residents inStepanakert on 21 September.[135][136] In the aftermath of the offensive, anexodus of Armenians from the region started.[18] On 28 September 2023, the Republic of Artsakh agreed to dissolve itself by 1 January 2024.[17]
Geography
TheSarsang ReservoirA view of the forested mountains of Nagorno-Karabakh
Nagorno-Karabakh has a total area of 4,400 square kilometres (1,699 sq mi).[137] Approximately half of Nagorno-Karabakh terrain is over 950 metres (3,120 ft)above sea level.[138] The borders of Nagorno-Karabakh resemble a kidney bean with the indentation on the east side. It has tall mountain ridges along the northern edge and along the west and mountainous south. The part near the indentation of the kidney bean itself is a relatively flat valley, with the two edges of the bean, the districts ofMartakert andMartuni, having flatlands as well. Other flatter valleys exist around theSarsang reservoir,Hadrut, and the south. The entire region lies, on average, 1,100 metres (3,600 ft)above sea level.[138] Notable peaks include the border mountainMurovdag and theGreat Kirs mountain chain in the junction ofShusha and Hadrut districts. The territory of modern Nagorno-Karabakh forms a portion of the historic region of Karabakh, which lies between the riversKura andAraxes, and the modern Armenia-Azerbaijan border. Nagorno-Karabakh in its modern borders is part of the larger region of Upper Karabakh.
The major cities of the region areStepanakert, which once served as the capital of the unrecognised Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, andShusha, which lies partially in ruins. Vineyards, orchards, and mulberry groves for silkworms are developed in the valleys.[139]
Ethnic groups of the region in 1995, after the deportations of Armenians and Azerbaijanis.(See entire map)
Antiquity – 1918
Historically, the inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh — then part of theprovince of Artsakh — were confirmed byAncient Greek andRoman sources "long before our era" to be Armenian.[141][better source needed] In the early 15th century, German travellerJohann Schiltberger after visiting the region stated that "although theMuslims had taken possession of Karabagh, there were still Armenian villages in the region".[142] HistorianVictor Schnirelmann writes that "In the mid-18th century, …Turkic tribes … gained access to the highland territories [of Karabakh] and began to settle in Shusha … by the end of the 18th century, a substantial number of its former Armenian inhabitants had left Nagorny Karabagh. Just at the turn of the 19th century, the Turkic population significantly outnumbered the local Armenians, but this only lasted … [until the] end of the 1820s, [when] the Armenians began to come back to Karabagh, and they accounted for the majority of its population by the mid-19th century".[143]Edmund Herzig and Marina Kurkchiyan present an alternative view that "Armenians had already been a majority in some areas such as mountainous Karabagh", compared to theYerevan province which had "regained an Armenian majority for the first time in several hundred years."[144]
According to an 1823Russian survey published in Tiflis (present-dayTbilisi) in 1866,[142] Armenians made up 97 percent of the population in thefive districts (mahals) of Nagorno-Karabakh,[145] thus proving, contrary to claims inAzerbaijani historiography, that Armenians formed an overwhelming majority of Nagorno-Karabakh prior to 1828. HistorianGeorge Bournoutian writes that Russian statistics from 1810 show that Armenians made up 21 percent of the Karabakh region's population; In 1823, the Armenian population of Karabakh had increased by 30 percent "after the return of those who had fled the region", and by 1832, the Armenian population had increased to one-third of Karabakh. Moreover, the "one-third" of the population of Karabakh composed of Armenians resided in one-third of the territory of Karabakh, the mountainous territory (i.e. Nagorno-Karabakh), where they "constituted an overwhelming majority of the population."[142]
1918–1920
According to Armenian sources, the "historical Nagorno-Karabakh" region had a population of 300,000–330,000 in 1918–1920, rising to 700,000–800,000 by 1988. As a result of "Turkish-Azerbaijani aggression", the region's population declined by 20 percent in 1918–1920.[146] In this period,Azerbaijani forces carried out massacres against Armenians inGhaibalishen, Jamilli, Karkijahan, and Pahlul (600–700 dead[147]),Stepanakert (several hundred dead[148]), andShusha (several hundred[149] to 12,000 dead[150]). As a result of the Shusha massacre, 5,000–6,000 Armenians were displaced to the regions ofVaranda andDizak.[151] By 11 April 1920, some thirty villages in Nagorno-Karabakh had been "devastated" by Azerbaijani forces as a result of the uprising, leaving 25,000 homeless (including nearly 6,000 refugees from Shusha).[152]
1921–1987
1923 statistics indicate that the NKAO was 94.8 percent Armenian, numbering 149,600, whilst the Azerbaijani population numbered 7,700. Historian Cory Welt writes of a "discrepancy" of the Armenian population jumping by over 25,000 individuals between the 1921 and 1923 censuses, also pointing out that the Armenian population declined to 111,700 in 1926, thus indicating an "unexplained drop" of 38,000 individuals.[153] In the 1920s, the NKAO had a population of 131,500 people, 94.4 percent (124,136) of whom were ethnic Armenians and only 5.6 percent (7,364) of whom were ethnic Azerbaijanis.[144] In 1933, Nagorno-Karabakh had a population of 147,308, 10,751 (7.3 percent) of whom were urban dwellers, and 136,557 (92.7 percent) of whom were rural residents.[154] On 1 January 1973, the oblast had a population of 153,000.[155]
Discrimination and stagnation
Whilst the region was a part of the Azerbaijan SSR, the Armenian share of the population dropped from 94.7 to 76.9 percent, whilst the Azerbaijani share of the population quadrupled from 5.1 to 21.5 percent[144] as a result of "migratory influx"[146] — indicative of the socio-economic difficulties local Armenians experienced under Soviet Azerbaijani leadership which led them to emigrate from Karabakh.[144] Emeritus professor of lawM. Cherif Bassiouni writes of the stagnation of the Armenian population "due to the discriminatory policies of Azerbaijani authorities that compelled Armenians to emigrate"; also adding that 600,000 Armenians from Karabakh reside in Armenia and the countries of theCIS.[146] According to historian Deon Geldenhuys, "[t]his was due to Baku's deliberate promotion of Azerbaijani settlement in Karabagh as part of a policy of 'cultural de-Armenization' of the region"; further adding that Azerbaijan "neglected the economic needs of the territory".[156] Stuart J. Kaufman, a professor of political science and international relations,[157] writes of the difficulties of Karabakh Armenians:
… Armenian-language education was not easily available, Armenian history was not taught at all, and those who went to Armenia for training were discriminated against in competing for jobs in the province, … Underinvestment in the region—also blamed on Baku—meant less economic development and poor infrastructure even by Soviet standards, and therefore fewer jobs overall, especially for Armenians. Cultural ties with Armenia were strangled in red tape in Baku, and a decision to make Armenian-language television available in the region was left unimplemented. One result of these policies was a continuing exodus of Armenians from Karabagh in search of greener pastures.[158]
1988–present
Following theSumgait pogrom and the exodus ofAzerbaijanis from Armenia, Azerbaijanis in Stepanakert and Armenians in Shusha wereexpelled in September 1988. Aslocal Armenian forces gained possession of Nagorno-Karabakh andsurrounding districts (amounting to 14 percent of the internationally recognised territory of Azerbaijan) during theFirst Nagorno-Karabakh war, hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis were expelled from their lands.[84] During theSecond Nagorno-Karabakh War, Azerbaijan regained control over the surrounding districts and southern parts of the former NKAO, thus displacing approximately 70,000 Armenians.[159]
Historical ethnic composition of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast in 1921–1989
In the post-Soviet era, Stepanakert Airport, the region's only airport, has not seen scheduled flights.[168]
Rail
During the rule of the Soviet Union, theYevlakh–Aghdam–Stepanakert railway line connected the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region with the main part of Azerbaijan. In 1993, After the Nagorno-Karabakh war and the abandonment of Aghdam, the line's service was cut back to service only between Yevlax andKətəlparaq, without any section in Nagorno-Karabakh. Services were restored in August 2025.[169] The former line between Kətəlparaq and Stepanakert has been almost completely destroyed.
In land controlled by the former Republic of Artsakh, the (Tbilisi–Gyumri–)Yerevan–Nakhchivan–Horadiz–Shirvan(–Baku) main railway was also dismantled betweenOrdubad andHoradiz, as well as a branch-line fromMincivan to the Armenian city ofKapan. Currently, the Azerbaijani trains only travel to Horadiz. The railway at theNakhchivan Autonomous Republic still operates, but it is separated from the main Azerbaijani lines, and only has a connection toIran. Construction of a new Horadiz-Agbend line began in 2023, with the first section completed in September 2025.[170][171]
^ab"Violence and Politics in Armenia-Azerbaijan Relations".Baku Research Institute. 14 October 2022.Archived from the original on 8 June 2023. Retrieved27 June 2023.As a result of the 2020 war, however, Azerbaijan received all territories around Soviet-era Nagorno Karabakh that were occupied by Armenian forces during the first Karabakh war, plus the two regions of Nagorno Karabakh proper: Shushi/Shusha and Hadrut.
^abLynch, Ian J. (18 November 2020)."A cold winter for peace in Nagorno-Karabakh?".Ahval.Archived from the original on 2 December 2020. Retrieved27 June 2023.The new agreement allows Azerbaijan to keep the territory it took by force, including Shusha and Hadrut, within the historic boundaries of Nagorno-Karabakh. It also requires Armenian forces to turn over other territories they have occupied for the last 26 years, including the so-called Lachin corridor, which is Nagorno-Karabakh's primary link to Armenia proper.
^Champion, Marc (12 December 2023)."And the Winner from Putin's War on Ukraine Is ... Azerbaijan".Bloomberg News.Archived from the original on 13 December 2023. Retrieved13 December 2023.The US, similarly, sees Azerbaijan's geopolitical value rising the worse Washington's relations with Moscow and Tehran become, despite misgivings over Karabakh's ethnic cleansing.
^Galitsky, Alex; Ghoreishi, Shahed (18 December 2023)."Washington Must End Its Support for Azerbaijan's War Crimes".Jacobin.Archived from the original on 19 December 2023. Retrieved19 December 2023.The US has long offered unconditional military assistance to Azerbaijan even as it carries out ethnic cleansing in Nagorno-Karabakh.
^Strabo (ed. H.C. Hamilton, Esq., W. Falconer, M.A.) .GeographyArchived 23 September 2023 at theWayback Machine. The Perseus Digital Library. 11.14.4. Retrieved 21 November 2007.
^Viviano, Frank (March 2004). "The Rebirth of Armenia".National Geographic Magazine.
^Noble, John; Kohn, Michael; Systermans, Danielle (1 May 2008).Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan (3rd ed.). Lonely Planet. p. 307.
^Edens, Christoper (August–November 1995). "Transcaucasia at the End of the Early Bronze Age".Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research. 299/300 (The Archaeology of Empire in Ancient Anatolia). The American Schools of Oriental Research: 53–64 [56].doi:10.2307/1357345.ISSN0003-097X.JSTOR1357345.S2CID163585471.
^abHewsen, Robert H. (1982). "Ethno-History and the Armenian Influence upon the Caucasian Albanians". In Samuelian, Thomas J. (ed.).Classical Armenian Culture. Influences and Creativity. Chicago: Scholars Press. pp. 27–40.ISBN0-89130-565-3.
^Hewsen, Robert H. (2001).Armenia: a Historical Atlas. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press. pp. 32–33, map 19 (shows the territory of modern Nagorno-Karabakh as part of theOrontids' Kingdom of Armenia).
^Hewsen, Robert H. (1983). "The Kingdom of Artsakh". In Samuelian, T.; Stone, M. (eds.).Medieval Armenian Culture. Chico, California.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
^Viviano, Frank (March 2004). "The Rebirth of Armenia".National Geographic. p. 18.
^Kalankatuatsi, Movses.History of the Land of Aluank. Book I, chapters 27, 28 and 29; Book II, chapter 3.
^Adontz, N. (1915).Дионисий Фракийский и армянские толкователи [Dionysius of Thrace and his Armenian interpreters]. Petrograd: Printing House of the Imperial Academy of Sciences. pp. 181–219.
^The Cambridge History of Iran. Vol. 4.Cambridge University Press. 1975. p. 506.ISBN978-0-521-20093-6. Archived fromthe original on 23 September 2023.He was handed to Afshin's troops by Sahl b. Sunbadh, an Armenian prince in 222/836–7 [AH/CE], and executed in Samarra (223/837) while his brother and assistant 'Abd-Allah was delivered to the prince of Tabaristan, Ibn Sharvin, who had him put to death in Baghdad.
^abcHewsen, Robert H. (2001).Armenia: A Historical Atlas. The University of Chicago Press. pp. 119, 155, 163,264–65.
^Kaghankatvatsi, Movses. Ter-Grigoryan, T. I. (ed.).Истории Албанской страны [History of the Albanian Region] (in Russian). Vol. 1386. Archive of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the Azerbaijan SSR. p. 18.
^Walker, Christopher (1995). "The Armenian presence in Mountainous Karabakh". In Wright, John F. R.; et al. (eds.).Transcaucasian Boundaries. SOAS/GRC Geopolitics. p. 93.
^Robert H., Hewsen (1983). "The Kingdom of Artsakh". In Samuelian, T.; Stone, M. (eds.).Medieval Armenian Culture. Chico, California: Scholars Press.
^Jackson, P. (17 May 2012)."Arḡūn Āqā".Encyclopædia Iranica. Archived fromthe original on 17 May 2012.It can only have caused resentment among the Muslims, and the Christian author Kirakos, in stark contrast with Jovaynī, has nothing favorable to say concerning Arḡūn's exactions: his harsh treatment of certain Armenian princes, such as Jalāl of Ḵačen, whom he had executed in 659/1261, made him especially hateful.
^Hewsen, Robert H. (1984). "Russian–Armenian relations, 1700–1828".Occasional Papers (4): 37.
^George A. Bournoutian (1994).A History of Qarabagh: An Annotated Translation of Mirza Jamal Javanshir Qarabaghi's Tarikh-e Qarabagh. Mazda Publishers.ISBN1-56859-011-3.
^Полное Собрание Законов Российской Империи c 1649 года [Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire since 1649] (in Russian). Vol. XXV: 1798–1799. Saint Petersburg: Printing House of the II Branch of His Imperial Majesty's Own Office. 1830. No. 18.990, pp. 674–675.
^Hewsen, Robert H. (1984). "Russian–Armenian relations, 1700–1828".Occasional Papers (4): 37.
^Walker, Christopher J. (1990).Armenia: Survival of a Nation. London: Routledge. p. 40.ISBN0-415-04684-X.
^Raffi (2010) [1906].The Five Melikdoms of KarabaghԽամսայի մելիքութիւններ (in Armenian). Translated by Melkonian, Ara Stepan. London: Garod.ISBN978-1-903656-57-0.
^Isfahani, Muhammad-Masuma (1993).Хуласат ас-сийар.Хроника времен Сефевидов (in Russian). Translated by Pavlova, I. K. Moscow: Nauka. pp. 59–61.
^(in Russian)"Abbas-gulu Aga Bakikhanov. Golestan-i Iram".Archived 20 February 2007 at theWayback Machine. According to an 18th-century local Turkic-Muslim writer Mirza Adigezal bey, Nadir shah placed Karabakh under his own control, while a 19th-century local Turkic Muslim writer Abbas-gulu Aga Bakikhanov states that the shah placed Karabakh under the control of the governor of Tabriz.
^Bournoutian, George A. (2016).The 1820 Russian Survey of the Khanate of Shirvan: A Primary Source on the Demography and Economy of an Iranian Province prior to its Annexation by Russia. Gibb Memorial Trust. p. xvii.ISBN978-1-909724-80-8.Serious historians and geographers agree that after the fall of the Safavids, and especially from the mid-eighteenth century, the territory of the South Caucasus was composed of the khanates of Ganja, Kuba, Shirvan, Baku, Talesh, Sheki, Karabagh, Nakhchivan and Yerevan, all of which were under Iranian suzerainty.
^Atkin, Muriel (Winter–Spring 1979). "The Strange Death of Ibrahim Khalil Khan of Qarabagh".Iranian Studies.12 (1/2):79–107.doi:10.1080/00210867908701551.
^George A. Bournoutian.A History of Qarabagh: An Annotated Translation of Mirza Jamal Javanshir Qarabaghi's Tarikh-e Qarabagh. Mazda Publishers, 1994.ISBN1-56859-011-3, 978-1-568-59011-0
^Description of the Karabakh province prepared in 1823 according to the order of the governor in Georgia Yermolov by state advisor Mogilevsky and colonel Yermolov 2nd (Russian:Opisaniye Karabakhskoy provincii sostavlennoye v 1823 g po rasporyazheniyu glavnoupravlyayushego v Gruzii Yermolova deystvitelnim statskim sovetnikom Mogilevskim i polkovnikom Yermolovim 2-m), Tbilisi, 1866.
^Bournoutian, George A.A History of Qarabagh: An Annotated Translation of Mirza Jamal Javanshir Qarabaghi's Tarikh-E Qarabagh. Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 1994, page 18
^"Q&A with Arsène Saparov: No Evidence that Stalin "gave" Karabakh to Azerbaijan".armenian.usc.edu. 10 December 2018.Archived from the original on 15 December 2020. Retrieved31 October 2020.Of all the documents I have seen, there is no direct evidence of Stalin doing or saying something in those 12 days in the summer of 1921 that [resulted in this decision on Karabakh]. A lot of people just assume that since Stalin was an evil person, it would be typical of someone evil to take a decision like that.
^Potier, Tim (2001).Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, A Legal Appraisal. The Hague, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International. p. 5.ISBN90-411-1477-7.
^Audrey L. Altstadt.The Azerbaijani Turks: power and identity under Russian rule. Hoover Press, 1992.ISBN0-8179-9182-4, 9780817991821
^Human Rights Watch.Playing the "Communal Card". Communal Violence and Human RightsArchived 11 October 2012 at theWayback Machine: "By early 1992 full-scale fighting broke out between Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and Azerbaijani authorities." / "...Karabakh Armenian forces—often with the support of forces from the Republic of Armenia—conducted large-scale operations..." / "Because 1993 witnessed unrelenting Karabakh Armenian offensives against the Azerbaijani provinces surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh..." / "Since late 1993, the conflict has also clearly become internationalized: in addition to Azerbaijani and Karabakh Armenian forces, troops from the Republic of Armenia participate on the Karabakh side in fighting inside Azerbaijan and in Nagorno-Karabakh."
^United States Institute of Peace.Sovereignty after Empire. Self-Determination Movements in the Former Soviet Union. Hopes and Disappointments: Case StudiesArchived 1 December 2008 at theWayback Machine "Meanwhile, the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh was gradually transforming into a full-scale war between Azeri and Karabakh irregulars, the latter receiving support from Armenia." / "Azerbaijan's objective advantage in terms of human and economic potential has so far been offset by the superior fighting skills and discipline of Nagorno-Karabakh's forces. After a series of offensives, retreats, and counteroffensives, Nagorno-Karabakh now controls a sizable portion of Azerbaijan proper ... including the Lachin corridor."
^Human Rights Watch.Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. December 1994, p. xiii,ISBN1-56432-142-8, citing: Natsional'nyi Sostav Naseleniya SSSR, po dannym Vsesoyuznyi Perepisi Naseleniya 1989 g., Moskva, "Finansy i Statistika"
^Loe, Catherine (27 April 2023)."Azerbaijan sets up checkpoints on the Lachin corridor".Economist Intelligence Unit.Archived from the original on 2 August 2023. Retrieved3 May 2023.The move [installation of a checkpoint] has increased the blockade of Nagorny Karabakh...A checkpoint on the border would give Azerbaijan the ability to stop any cars travelling between Armenia and Nagorny Karabakh.
^Hauer, Neil (31 July 2023)."Karabakh blockade reaches critical point as food supplies run low".www.intellinews.com.Archived from the original on 14 August 2023. Retrieved1 August 2023.Occasional ICRC and Russian traffic continued to pass until June 15, at which point Azerbaijan halted all humanitarian deliveries. No food, medicine or fuel has entered Nagorno-Karabakh since.
^"New Troubles in Nagorno-Karabakh: Understanding the Lachin Corridor Crisis".www.crisisgroup.org. 22 May 2023.Archived from the original on 16 August 2023. Retrieved23 May 2023.While travellers were already few due to the blockade, the ICRC reports that its ability to get people across has been curtailed [since the installation of the checkpoint], leaving only the Russian peacekeepers to facilitate trips to Armenia for medical care.
^"June Alerts and May Trends 2023".www.crisisgroup.org. 31 May 2023.Archived from the original on 22 June 2023. Retrieved19 June 2023.Checkpoint on Lachin corridor faced fierce opposition amid humanitarian crisis....Azerbaijani military consolidated [the] blockade, however, leading to even fewer crossings and reduced transportation of goods.
^Shahverdyan, Lilit (12 January 2023)."Blackouts and food rationing as Karabakh blockade enters second month".Eurasianet.Archived from the original on 23 April 2023. Retrieved17 January 2023.But the supplies are meager compared to the pre-blockade delivery of 12,000 tons of goods monthly, and barely meet the needs of the local population, which Armenian sources estimate at around 120,000.
^abZürcher, Christoph (2007).The post-Soviet wars: rebellion, ethnic conflict, and nationhood in the Caucasus. NYU Press. p. 184.ISBN978-0-8147-9709-9.
^abcdHerzig, Edmund; Kurkchiyan, Marina (2005).The Armenians: Past and Present in the Making of National Identity. London: RoutledgeCurzon. pp. 66 & 121.ISBN0-203-00493-0.OCLC229988654.
^abcBassiouni, M. Cherif, ed. (2010).The Pursuit of International Criminal Justice A World Study on Conflicts, Victimization, and Post-conflict Justice. Vol. 2. Antwerp: Intersentia. p. 839.ISBN978-94-000-0017-9.OCLC497573622.
^"Шушинская резня 1920 года" [Shusha massacre of 1920].lazarevsky.club. 13 March 2020.Archived from the original on 14 November 2022. Retrieved15 November 2022.
^Bagdasaryan, Gegam (March 2015)."Три нераскрытых обстоятельства резни армян в Шуши" [Three unsolved circumstances of the massacre of Armenians in Shushi].theanalyticon.com (in Russian). Stepanakert.Archived from the original on 14 November 2022. Retrieved15 November 2022.
^Kaufman, Stuart J. (2001).Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. pp. 58–59.ISBN978-1-5017-0199-3.OCLC1160511946.
Torres, Ricardo Juan (2022). "The role of Nagorno-Karabakh in the shaping of Armenian and Azeri identity".Consejo Argentino Para las Relaciones Internacionales.12 (164): e60644.doi:10.12957/rmi.2021.60466 (inactive 20 August 2025).JSTORresrep40027.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: DOI inactive as of August 2025 (link)
.jpg)
.png)
