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Battle of Mine Run
Part of theAmerican Civil War
Artillery bombardment with Warren's troops awaiting attack (fromHarper's Weekly)
Date November 27, 1863 (1863-11-27) – December 2, 1863 (1863-12-2) Location Orange County, Virginia Result Inconclusive
Belligerents
United States (Union)	CSA (Confederacy)
Commanders and leaders
George G. Meade	Robert E. Lee
Units involved
Army of the Potomac	Army of Northern Virginia
Strength
81,000[1]	48,000[1]
Casualties and losses
1,653	629

TheBattle of Mine Run, also known asPayne's Farm, orNew Hope Church, or theMine Run campaign (November 27 – December 2, 1863), was conducted inOrange County, Virginia, in theAmerican Civil War.

An unsuccessful attempt of theUnionArmy of the Potomac to defeat theConfederateArmy of Northern Virginia, it was marked by false starts and low casualties and ended hostilities in theEastern Theater for the year.

After theBattle of Gettysburg in July, ConfederateGen.Robert E. Lee and his commandretreated back across thePotomac River intoVirginia. Union commanderMaj. Gen.George G. Meade was widely criticized for failing to pursue aggressively and defeat Lee's army. Meade planned new offensives in Virginia for the fall. His first attempt was a series of inconclusive duels and maneuvers in October and November known as theBristoe campaign.

In late November, Meade attempted to steal a march through the Wilderness of Spotsylvania and strike the right flank of the Confederate Army south of theRapidan River. Meade had intelligence reports that Lee's army, half the size of Meade's Army of the Potomac (actually 48,000 to Meade's 81,000), was split in two, separated by Clark's Mountain, with the two flanks anchored at Mine Run and Liberty Mills, over thirty miles apart. His plan was to cross the Rapidan at points beyondMaj. Gen.J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry screen, overwhelm the right flank (Lt. Gen.Richard S. Ewell'sSecond Corps) and then follow up with the remainder (Lt. Gen.A.P. Hill'sThird Corps).^[2]

Unlike Maj. Gen.Joseph Hooker's plan in theChancellorsville campaign earlier that year on essentially the same ground, Meade planned no diversions; he intended a lightning strike with his entire army. The army marched on November 25 and got off to a good start, aided by fog on Clark's Mountain, which screened his movements from Confederate lookouts. However, Maj. Gen.William H. French'sIII Corps got mired in fording the river at Jacob's Ford, causing traffic jams when they moved their artillery to Germanna Ford, where other units were attempting to cross.

Speed had escaped Meade, who was furious with French, and this allowed Lee time to react. Lee ordered Maj. Gen.Jubal A. Early, in temporary command of Ewell's Second Corps, to march east on the Orange Turnpike to Locust Grove, where Early's men began skirmishing with advance Union elements. Maj. Gen.Edward "Allegheny" Johnson's division was marching along the Raccoon Ford Road to join Early when the head of Gen. French's III Corps made contact in the heavy wooded terrain along the Widow Morris Road. Johnson turned his division about and ordered what can only be described as a reckless double-envelopment assault against a mostly unseen enemy of unknown strength, throwing his 5,500 men against French and John Sedgwick's VI Corps (a combined 32,000). It was about 3:45 - 4:00 p.m. Johnson's assault fell apart quickly on the left, where Steuart lost control of his brigade, and quickly bogged down in the middle (Stonewall Brigade) and on the right (Stafford and Jones), but was strong enough to slow down the Union advance until nightfall, when Johnson left the field on his own accord, retreating with the rest of the army west behind the Mine Run Creek. The actual fighting consumed less than two and one-half hours and the losses were heavy. Johnson lost nearly 550 men (or 10% of his strength) and French's corps about 950 from all causes. The Battle of Payne's Farm was short, bloody, and important. Johnson's attack put French and his III Corps back on its heels, slowed the advance, and saved Lee's army. If Johnson had cleared the Widow Morris Road before the arrival of French and Sedgwick, or had been driven away in defeat, the 32,000 Federals could have marched behind Lee's left flank and into his rear.

After dark, Lee withdrew to prepared fieldfortifications along Mine Run. The next day the Union Army closed on the Confederate position. Meade planned a heavyartillery bombardment followed by Maj. Gen.Gouverneur K. Warren'sII Corps attack in the south, then Maj. Gen.John Sedgwick'sVI Corps in the north an hour later. Lee planned an assault for December 2 that would have exploited the dangling left flank of the Union line, discovered the previous day by Maj. Gen.Wade Hampton's cavalry. Although the Union bombardment began on schedule, the major attack did not materialize; Meade concluded that the Confederate line was too strong to attack (although Warren is credited with getting the attack canceled) and retired during the night of December 1–2, ending the fall campaign. Lee was chagrined to find he had no one left in his front to attack.^[2]

The Army of the Potomac went into winter quarters atBrandy Station, Virginia. Mine Run had been Meade's final opportunity to plan a strategic offensive before the arrival ofUlysses S. Grant as general-in-chief the following spring. Lee also regretted the inconclusive results. He was quoted as saying, "I am too old to command this army. We never should have permitted those people to get away." Confederate hopes of repeating their Chancellorsville triumph had been dashed.The Mine Run Campaign was Meade's last and failed attempt in 1863 to destroy Lee's Army of Northern Virginia before winter halted military operations.^[3] In the spring of 1864, Grant re-initiated battle with Lee in theOverland campaign.

Henry Wadsworth Longfellow wrote the 1863 poem "Christmas Bells", which became the carol "I Heard the Bells on Christmas Day", in response to learning of his son Charles Appleton Longfellow being severely wounded in the battle.

Attorney, historian, and publisherTheodore P. Savas, who obtained the official records and other primary sources, was convinced that the few articles written on Payne's Farm had incorrectly located the fighting area and axis of the troops involved and was determined to test his theory. He contacted his friend Paul Sacra in Richmond, and the pair set out to locate and map the Payne's Farm battlefield in the late 1980s. Armed with extensive primary sources and battle reports, he and Sacra located what they believed was the field and, with the permission from several landowners, used metal detectors to prove it. Within a couple days Savas and Sacra had unearthed hundreds of artifacts, including bullets, a ramrod, bayonet socket, a partial harmonica behind the Louisiana position in the farm lane, belt buckles, buttons, and much more. Savas drew maps of the field and the general location of the artifacts and delivered them to The Association for the Preservation of Civil War Sites (or APCWS), and its director, A. Wilson Greene, in Fredericksburg, Virginia. Greene, who had no idea the field was in such pristine condition, was excited by the find and affirmed its importance.

Saving the land was a slow process for a variety of reasons, including the fact that the majority landowner wanted to develop the land. At that point Savas and Sacra presented him with proof that the land contained at least two mass graves (which they had not detected or recovered anything from), and that to develop the land for homes would be a travesty. TheCivil War Trust (a division of theAmerican Battlefield Trust) and its partners later acquired and preserved 690 acres (2.8 km²) of the battlefield.^[4] The battlefield today features a wooded, 1.5-mile interpretive trail with historical wayside markers. It is located on Virginia highway 611 across from the Zoar Baptist Church about two miles north of Locust Grove.^[5]

• Eicher, David J.The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001.ISBN 0-684-84944-5.
• Esposito, Vincent J.West Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959.OCLC 5890637. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at theWest Point website.
• Salmon, John S.The Official Virginia Civil War Battlefield Guide. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001.ISBN 0-8117-2868-4.
• National Park Service battle description

• Gottfried, Bradley M.The Maps of the Bristoe Station and Mine Run Campaigns: An Atlas of the Battles and Movements in the Eastern Theater after Gettysburg, Including Rappahannock Station, Kelly's Ford, and Morton's Ford, July 1863 - February 1864.Savas Beatie, 2013.
• Graham, Martin F., and George F. Skoch.Mine Run: A Campaign of Lost Opportunities, October 21, 1863–May 1, 1864. Lynchburg, VA: H. E. Howard, 1987.ISBN 978-0-930919-48-1.
• Mackowski, Chris.The Great Battle Never Fought: The Mine Run Campaign, November 26–December 2, 1863. Emerging Civil War Series. El Dorado Hills, CA:Savas Beatie, 2018.ISBN 978-1-61121-407-9.

• Mine Run Campaign inEncyclopedia Virginia

38°20′16″N77°49′07″W / 38.3379°N 77.8187°W /38.3379; -77.8187

• 1863 in Virginia
• Mine Run Campaign
• Battles of the Eastern Theater of the American Civil War
• Inconclusive battles of the American Civil War
• Orange County, Virginia
• Battles of the American Civil War in Virginia
• Conflicts in 1863
• November 1863
• December 1863

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