| Militsiya Міліція | |
|---|---|
 Patch | |
 Emblem | |
| Agency overview | |
| Formed | February 9, 1919; 106 years ago (1919-02-09)[1] |
| Preceding agency | |
| Dissolved | November 7, 2015; 10 years ago (2015-11-07)[2] |
| Employees | 152,000(October 2015)[3] |
| Jurisdictional structure | |
| National agency | Ukraine |
| Operations jurisdiction | Ukraine |
| Size | 603,500 km² |
| Population | 44 million (approx.) |
| Governing body | Government of Ukraine |
| General nature | |
| Operational structure | |
| Headquarters | Kyiv, Ukraine |
| Parent agency | Ministry of Internal Affairs |
TheMilitsiya (Ukrainian:міліція,pronounced[miˈl⁽ʲ⁾its⁽ʲ⁾ijɐ]ⓘ) was a type of domesticlaw enforcement agency (militsiya) that existed in various forms inUkraine from 1919[1] until 2015. The Militsiya was originally formed while Ukraine was governed by theUkrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, part of theSoviet Union, and it continued to serve as a nationalpolice service inpost-Soviet Ukraine until it was replaced by theNational Police of Ukraine on 7 November 2015.[2][nb 1]
The Militsiya was under the direct control of theMinistry of Internal Affairs (known by theUkrainian acronym MVS and by theRussian acronym MVD), and it was widely seen as corrupt and inconsiderable to the demands of the Ukrainian public.[4] DuringEuromaidan, the Militsiya was accused of brutality against protestors as well as kidnappingAutomaidan activists,[5] leading to the reputation of the Militsiya being irreversibly damaged. This resulted in its replacement under the post-MaidanPoroshenko presidency.
The contemporaryMinistry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine originates from theSovietNKVD's branch inUkrainian SSR - the "NKVD of the UkrSSR", which was later reformed into the "Ministry of Internal Affairs of UkrSSR" (Ministerstvo vnutrishnikh sprav Ukrayins'koyi SSR). Both agencies were merely a regional branch of the all-Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs, and essentially amilitsiya force since the late 1950s.[6]
Despite some operational autonomy, all regulations and standards of policing were established by the central Ministry; Moscow was directly co-ordinating important operations in Ukraine (such as anti-corruption investigations regarding statesmen of higher levels or other politics-related issues), including deployment of detective brigades from central offices in case of need. TheMilitsiya of the Ukrainian SSR used the same ranks, insignia and vehicle liveries as the rest of the Sovietmilitsiya.
Like all the Soviet Ministries of Internal Affairs, the Ukrainian SSR MVS included not only themilitsiya, but also the republican branch of non-police services, such as:
MVS of the Ukrainian SSR has been directly involved in Soviet political repressions in Ukraine at all stages. Since the splitting of the NKVD and detachment of thesecret police to the MGB-KGB, themilitsiya became a secondary instrument of repression in the hands of the KGB, fulfilling such tasks as:
After independence in 1991, and before the 2004 Constitutional Reform, Ukraine's Minister of Internal Affairs was directly subordinate to thePresident of Ukraine (appointed by the President unilaterally), also a formal member ofUkraine's Cabinet of Ministers. Before theOrange Revolution, only Generals of themilitsiya (not civil statesmen), were appointed Ministers.
During its existence, the Ukrainianmilitsiya, particularly the post-independence form of themilitsiya, had a significant record of law violation and human rights abuse. One of the most notorious cases of human rights abuse, before the agency’s later involvement inEuromaidan in 2013-2014, was the agency's involvement in the murder of journalistGeorgiy Gongadze in 2000. Soon after Gongadze's disappearance, recordings of aMajor Melnychenko were revealed.
A fragment of the recorded conversations portrayed MVS MinisterKravchenko promising PresidentKuchma to "take care" of the oppositional journalist. According to the recordings, Kravchenko told Kuchma that he controls a special group of high-classdetectives "without any morals, and ready to do anything".
The decapitated and disfigured body of Gongadze was found later in a forest, and a long-lasting investigation started. In 2005, soon after theOrange Revolution, the first results of the case appeared. Three members of the MVS detective squad were charged with the abduction and murder of Gongadze. An international warrant was issued for their chief, General Oleksiy Pukach, who was supposedly hiding abroad.[8]
In March 2005, ex-Minister Kravchenko, the main participant of the case, was found shot in the head (supposedly by his own hand). Later, in September 2010, Ukraine's Office of the Prosecutor General issued a statement stating that prosecutors had concluded that Kravchenko had ordered Pukach to carry out the murder, and stating that Pukach had confessed to the murder.[8]
In the Melnychen recordings, the hitmen group was called "orly” (Ukrainian:орли, literally "eagles",Russian: орлы) by the Minister. (Note: Orly here it is not a proper name, but a traditionalRussiancommon name for brave and skilful soldiers). Since then, the phrase "Orly of Kravchenko", became a symbol of lawlessness and brutality inUkrainian law enforcement.
In 2000-2001, the MVS was trying to tackle theUkraine without Kuchma (Ukrainian and Russian abbreviation:UBK) mass protest campaign againstPresidentLeonid Kuchma, using various methods: from direct attacks to the infiltration of provocateurs. The final confrontation took place on 9 March 2001 on the central streets ofKyiv, including clashes between protesters and anti-riot units, and mass arrests of youngsters in the city.
During the2004 election and theOrange Revolution, the MVS did not confront the opposition protests, although media sources claim that respective orders were given to itsanti-riot units by senior commanders and leaders of the country. Minor clashes between protesters and theBerkut happened in the city ofChernihiv, but both sides agreed that they were incidental and provoked by unknown forces. The opposition also accused themilitsiya of involvement in attemptedelectoral fraud that occurred atpolling stations.
In February 2005, after the revolution, as part of the post-election democratic changes,PresidentViktor Yushchenko appointedYuriy Lutsenko as the new Minister of Internal Affairs. Unlike his predecessors, Lutsenko was a career politician and had never served in themilitsiya or any other law enforcement agency. Moreover, as one of the main figures in theSocialist Party of Ukraine, Lutsenko participated in several protest campaigns and conflicts with themilitsiya. The new minister demanded resignations from those officers involved inracketeering. Thus, taking a significant step towards the establishment ofcivil control over the Ukrainian militia.
In January 2006, Minister Lutsenko admitted that the MVS is in possession of the evidence that would allow them to question and charge ex-PresidentLeonid Kuchma in aprivatisation wrongdoing case, if only the MVS had the authority for starting such a case autonomously. Later, according to2004 constitutional amendments that took effect after the 2006 parliamentary elections, the minister is now nominated by thePrime Minister and appointed by theVerkhovna Rada (parliament), without formal influence of the President. Thus Yuriy Lutsenko, the Minister at the time, who was previously appointed under the old procedure, was reappointed, thereby becoming the first-ever MVS Minister to be agreed upon by the parliamentarycoalition and appointed by parliament.
On 1 December 2006, Verkhovna Rada dismissed Lutsenko and appointedVasyl Tsushko of theSocialist Party as the new Minister. Like his predecessor, Tsushko was also a civil politician (and previously avineyard manager), not connected to themilitsiya before his appointment. Additionally, Tsushko was the first-ever MVS Minister not subordinated to the President.
However, in 2007 Lutsenko returned to the post of minister and remained there until the elections which broughtViktor Yanukovich to power in 2010. After Yanukovich's election,Anatolii Mohyliov was appointed to the minister's position; he is a career militia officer and currently holds the rank of Colonel General of the militsiya.Vitaliy Zakharchenko succeeded him in November 2011.
In May 2007, the ongoing political crisis in Ukraine lead to ajurisdiction dispute over the country'sInternal Troops. Following minor political clashes involving themilitsiya and presidential security forces, PresidentViktor Yuschenko issued a decree re-subordinating Internal Troops from the Ministry of Internal Affairs directly to the President. The MVS criticised both the decree and the subsequent troop movements.
Both sides in the political crisis managed to avoid further clashes between law enforcers. Now the Internal Troops, as well as allmilitsiya units, returned to their routine tasks and re-established practical co-ordination. However, the legal dispute over Internal Troops remains unsolved. The Troops command declares its subordination to the President - according to the decree which is currently being appealed in court by theCabinet of Ministers.
On 10 October 2008 officers from theSecurity Service of Ukraine detained deputy platoon commander of theKharkiv city division patrol and inspection service regiment of the Main Interior Affairs Ministry Directorate in Kharkiv region on suspicion of pushing narcotic drugs.[9]
According to head of the trade union of attested employees oflaw enforcement agencies Anatolii Onyschuk, sociologic research shows that 3.9% of the Ukrainian militiamen trust the state, while 67.7% distrusted the state.[9]
Following reforms initiated by Ukrainian presidentPetro Poroshenko in the aftermath of the2014 Ukrainian revolution, on 3 July 2015 theNational Police of Ukraine started to replace militsiya.[4] Officially the National Police replaced the militsiya on 7 November 2015.[2] On that day the remaining militsiya officers were assigned as "temporarilyacting" National Police officers.[2] They were eligible for recruitment as National Police officers if they met the age criteria and went through training again and after "integrity" checks.[2][10]
The following were the constituent departments of the militsiya:
| Branch | Criminal | Traffic | Public Order | State Security Service |
| Insignia | |  | |  |
| Cadet Officers | Private Officers | Non-commissioned Officers | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Shoulder insignia for every day uniform |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Rank | Cadet of militsiya | Private of militsiya | Junior sergeant of militsiya | Sergeant of militsiya | Senior sergeant of militsiya | Starshina of militsiya | Praporshchik of militsiya | Senior praporshchik of militsiya |
| Junior Commissioned Officers | Senior Commissioned Officers | General Officers | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Shoulder insignia for every day uniform |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |
| Rank | Junior lieutenant of militsiya | Lieutenant of militsiya | Senior lieutenant of militsiya | Captain of militsiya | Major of militsiya | Lieutenant colonel of militsiya | Colonel of militsiya | Major General of militsiya | Lieutenant General of militsiya | Colonel General of militsiya | |
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The militsiya used many different forms of transport, which ranged greatly in age and technical specification.
Patrol cars[edit] | Vans[edit] | SUVs[edit] |
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Deployments in various UN missions prior to disbandment in 2015:
Democratic Republic of the Congo: (MONUC) - 3 policemen[11]
Cyprus: (UNFICYP) - 1 policeman[11]
Kosovo: (UNMIK) - 1 policeman[11]
Liberia: (UNMIL) - 19 policemen[11]
Sudan: (UNMIS) - 19 policemen[11]
East Timor: (UNMIT) - 10 policemen[11]
Côte d'Ivoire: (UNOCI) - 4 policemen[11]According toAmnesty International, torture and ill-treatment by the militsiya was widespread inUkraine.[12][13] This allegation was confirmed byPresidentViktor Yanukovych in December 2011.[14] Several militia officers were arrested in 2010 for allegedly torturing detainees.[15]
Some militsiya in Ukraine worked asracketeers and debt collectors.[16]
Overall the level of trust in the militsiya and other law enforcement bodies was low.[17] In a 2012 poll, the police were positively assessed by 26%, and negatively by 64%.[17][nb 2]
In 2013, the militsiya received the highest percentage among Ukrainians of having given abribe to with 49%.[19] Simultaneously they considered (with 64%) its police as the second mostcorrupt sphere in the country.[19]
Media related toMilitsiya of Ukraine at Wikimedia Commons