Martin van Creveld | |
|---|---|
מרטין לוי ון קרפלד | |
 | |
| Born | (1946-03-05)5 March 1946 (age 79) Rotterdam, Netherlands |
| Alma mater | London School of EconomicsHebrew University of Jerusalem |
| Scientific career | |
| Fields | Military historyMilitary theory |
| Thesis | Greece and Yugoslavia in Hitler's strategy, 1940–1941 (1971) |
| Website | www |
Martin Levi van Creveld (Hebrew:מרטין לוי ון קרפלד,pronounced[ˈmaʁtinleˈvivanˈkʁefeld]; born 5 March 1946) is an Israelimilitary historian and theorist.
Van Creveld was born in the Dutch city ofRotterdam to aJewish family. His parents, Leon and Margaret, were staunchZionists who had managed to evade theGestapo duringWorld War II.[citation needed]
In 1950, his familyimmigrated to Israel, and Creveld grew up inRamat Gan. From 1964 to 1969, he studied history at theHebrew University of Jerusalem and earned anM.A. From 1969 to 1971, he studied history at theLondon School of Economics and received aPhD.[1] His thesis was titledGreece and Yugoslavia in Hitler's strategy, 1940–1941.[2]
Van Creveld's doctoral dissertation on Hitler's strategy in the Balkans during the early years of World War II was published as a book in 1973: "Hitler's Strategy, 1940–41. The Balkan Clue." After completing his PhD in 1971, van Creveld returned to Israel and began teaching at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He became a professor in 1988. In 2007, he retired from teaching at Hebrew University, and began teaching atTel Aviv University's Security Studies Program.[3]
Van Creveld has been married twice and has three children. He lives inMevaseret Zion.[1]
Van Creveld is the author of thirty-three books on military history, strategy, and other topics, of whichCommand in War (1985),Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (1977, 2nd edition 2004),The Transformation of War (1991),The Sword and the Olive (1998) andThe Rise and Decline of the State (1999) are among the best known. Van Creveld has lectured or taught at numerous civilian and military institutes of higher learning all over the world.[citation needed]
Of particular significance was his 1991 bookThe Transformation of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict Since Clausewitz (UK:On Future War), which was translated into French, German (including a new German edition in 2004), Russian, and Spanish. In this treatise on military theory, van Creveld develops what he calls hisnon-trinitarian theory of warfare, which he juxtaposes to the famous work byClausewitz,Vom Kriege (On War).[4] Van Creveld argued that Clausewitz's famous "trinity of people, army, and government"[5] was an obsolete socio-political construct centered exclusively on the state, which was rapidly passing from the scene as the key player in war. Clausewitz's entire approach to warfare was thus inapplicable to the study of the new variety of conflicts that face the modern analyst, which typically involve one or more non-state actors. Claiming that he had therefore constructed a new "non-Clausewitzian" model for modern warfare, van Creveld proposed that there were five key issues in any war:
In making this argument, van Creveld joined a trinity of his own, comprising van Creveld, British political scientistMary Kaldor, and British military historianJohn Keegan, often collectively referred to as the leadership of the "New Wars" scholars. Central to the "New Wars" model were several additional criticisms of Clausewitz.They suggested that Clausewitz's best-known aphorism, that war is a continuation of politics by other means, is not only irrelevant today but also inapplicable historically.[6]
Concerning the "trinitarian" issues, historian Daniel Moran replied that 'The most egregious misrepresentation of Clausewitz's famous metaphor must be that of Martin van Creveld, who has declared Clausewitz to be an apostle of Trinitarian War, by which he means, incomprehensibly, a war of 'state against state and army against army,' from which the influence of the people is entirely excluded."[7] That is, Moran was pointing out that van Creveld had excluded "the people" from Clausewitz's thinking even while alleging that "the people" constituted one-third of the trinitarian concept he was refuting. In his paper 'Tiptoe Through the Trinity, or, The Strange Persistence of Trinitarian Warfare,' Christopher Bassford demonstrated that the actual components of Clausewitz's trinity are:
1) primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force;
2) the play of chance and probability, within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and
3) its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to rational calculation (or, as in a later version of the paper, "mere intellect").
Continuing his critique, Bassford noted that
"One need onlyread the paragraph in which Clausewitz defined his Trinity to see that the words 'people,' 'army,' and 'government' appear nowhere at all in the list of the Trinity's components.... Creveld's and Keegan's assault on Clausewitz's trinity is not only a classic 'blow into the air,' i.e., an assault on a position Clausewitz doesn't occupy. It is also a pointless attack on a concept that is quite useful in its own right. In any case, their failure to read the actual wording of the theory they so vociferously attack, and to grasp its deep relevance to the phenomena they describe, is hard to credit."[8]
For a broader critique of the "New Wars" writers' treatment of Clausewitz, see Bart Schuurman (University of Utrecht),Clausewitz and the 'New Wars' Scholars,Parameters, Spring 2010, pp.89-100. See also the sixteen essays presented inClausewitz in the Twenty-First Century edited byHew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe.[9]
The "New Wars" literature proved useful in identifying some of the general characteristics of wars in the post-WWII and especially the immediate post-Cold War eras. Van Creveld noted that many of the wars fought after 1945 werelow-intensity conflicts (LICs) which powerful states ended up losing. The book argued that we are seeing a decline of the nation-state, without a comparable decline in organized violence. Moreover, in his view, armies consistently train and equip to fight a conventional war, rather than the LICs they are most likely to face. Consequently, it is imperative that nation-states change the training of their armed forces and rethink their weapon procurement programs.[citation needed] In a commander's quest for certainty in battlefield information, van Creveld popularized the term "directed telescope" to describe the use of specially selected and trusted officers as special agents or observers for the commander".[10][11]
The book's contemporary influence is attested to by the fact that, until the middle of 2008, it was included on the list of required reading forUnited States Army officers, and (withSun Tzu and Clausewitz) the third non-American entry on the list.[12] After the counter-blast from actual scholars of Clausewitz, however, the "New Wars" critique of his work and its influence largely disintegrated. The idea that states were no longer key players became increasingly irrelevant in the face of renewed competition among the Great Powers after the rise of China and growing international hostility to what was widely seen as Chinese economic warfare against the West.
In addition to his books on military history, van Creveld has written several books on other issues. The most prominent of these is perhaps his polemicThe Privileged Sex (2013). In the book, van Creveld argues that the systematical oppression of women (as claimed byfeminists) is a myth unsupported by any serious data and that across modern cultures women tend to enjoy more social protections and privileges than men do, more than offsetting any disadvantages women faced.[13]
In addition to writing on military history, van Creveld also comments on contemporary politics.
In a TV interview in 2002, he expressed doubts as to the ability of the Israeli army to defeat the Palestinians during theSecond Intifada:
They [Israeli soldiers] are very brave people... they are idealists... they want to serve their country and they want to prove themselves. The problem is that you cannot prove yourself against someone who is much weaker than yourself. They are in a lose-lose situation. If you are strong and fighting the weak, then if you kill your opponent then you are a scoundrel... if you let him kill you, then you are an idiot. So here is a dilemma which others have suffered before us, and for which as far as I can see there is simply no escape. Now the Israeli army has not by any means been the worst of the lot. It has not done what for instance the Americans did in Vietnam... it did not use napalm, it did not kill millions of people. So everything is relative, but by definition, to return to what I said earlier if you are strong and you are fighting the weak, then anything you do is criminal.[14]
Van Creveld viewed theSecond Lebanon War as a strategic success for Israel and a Hezbollah defeat. He was also highly critical of theWinograd Commission's report for its failure to note the many successes brought about by Israel's military campaign. He noted that Hezbollah "had the fight knocked out of it," lost hundreds of its members and that the organization was "thrown out of South Lebanon," replaced by "a fairly robust United Nations peacekeeping force." He also noted that as a result of the war, Israel is experiencing a level of calm on its Lebanon border not seen since the mid-1960s.[15] More recently, in an article published inInfinity Journal in June 2011, titled "The Second Lebanon War: A Reassessment", Martin van Creveld argued that contrary to the common view, and despite "clumsy, heavy-handed, and slow" ground operations, the Second Lebanon War was a great victory for Israel. He states that as a result of the war, "since the middle of August 2006, all over southern Lebanon hardly a shot has been fired."[16]
In an opinion piece published inThe Jewish Daily Forward in 2010, van Creveld argued that theWest Bank, far from being vital to Israel's security, is a territory "that Israel can easily afford to give up." Van Creveld contended that the West Bank offers no defense against ballistic missiles from Israel's two chief enemies, Iran and Syria. Furthermore, provided that it would be demilitarized in any future peace settlement with the Palestinians, the West Bank would act as a natural barrier impeding the advance of any army endeavoring to invade Israel by land from the east. Lastly, Israel could defend itself against terrorism from the West Bank by means of a wall coupled with offensive campaigns the likes ofOperation Cast Lead andthe Second Lebanon War, which successfully restored Israel'sdeterrence factor when the level of terrorism exceeded what Israel was willing to tolerate.[17]
In 2005, van Creveld made headlines when he said in an interview that the2003 invasion of Iraq was "the most foolish war since EmperorAugustus in 9 BC [sic] sent his legions intoGermany and lost them", a reference to theBattle of the Teutoburg Forest. His analysis included harsh criticism of theBush administration, comparing the war to the Vietnam war. Moreover, he said that "Bush deserves to beimpeached and, once he has been removed from office, put on trial."[12]
In 2007, van Creveld commented that
Iran is the real victor in Iraq, and the world must now learn to live with a nuclear Iran the way we learned to live with the nuclear Soviet Union and a nuclear China.... We Israelis have what it takes to deter an Iranian attack. We are in no danger at all of having an Iranian nuclear weapon dropped on us.... thanks to the Iranian threat, we are getting weapons from the U.S. and Germany.[18]
In a September 2003 interview inElsevier, a Dutch weekly, onIsrael and the dangers it faces fromIran, the Palestinians and world opinion van Creveld stated, referring to theSamson Option:
We possess several hundred atomic warheads and rockets and can launch them at targets in all directions, perhaps even atRome. Most European capitals are targets for our air force…. We have the capability to take the world down with us. And I can assure you that that will happen before Israel goes under.[19]
On 21 August 2004 edition of theInternational Herald Tribune van Creveld wrote, "Had the Iranians not tried to build nuclear weapons, they would be crazy."[20]
Van Creveld has stated that the Israeli government has "vastly exaggerated the threat that a nuclear Iran poses to its security, as well as Israel's capacity to halt it."[21]
In an article co-authored with aCambridge researcher of Middle Eastern history,[22]Jason Pack, addressing the2011 Libyan civil war, van Creveld challenged the media's tendency to portray the circumstances in Libya as being largely equivalent to those that formed the backdrop to the overthrow ofben-Ali in Tunisia andMubarak in Egypt earlier in the year. "The remarkable spread of the 2011 Arab revolts across the face of North Africa causes many journalists to portray the current Libyan uprising as fueled by similar factors to those at play in neighboring Tunisia and Egypt. There are more differences than similarities." Van Creveld noted that Tunisia and Egypt "have been coherent nation-states for well over a century," while Libyan society is still pervasivelytribalist. He also observed that whereas the armies of Tunisia and Egypt could mediate the transitions between the old regimes and the new, "Libya lacks a professional, non-tribal army" that could function in such a role. Van Creveld blamed Gaddafi's sonSaif al-Islam Gaddafi for squandering a crucial opportunity to restore order to the country and confidence – both domestic and international – in the Gaddafi regime.[23]
In 2016, in a commentary for the German magazineFocus, Creveld advocated an alliance with the Assad regime. "If the West wants to win the war against the caliphate of terror, they cannot be picky about their allies". The regional conflict was not about a despot, but about a novel form of terrorism aiming at the dissolution of all state order and territorial boundaries in the whole region. Only the Alawite soldiers of the Assad regime were willing to die fighting the terrorists, whereas the European and American attempts to avoid bloodshed concentrating on airstrikes, were useless against Guerrilla troops as history had shown. Losing the war against IS and Al Nusra would have incalculable consequences for the Middle East and for Europe. In comparison, Assad would appear as the "lesser devil".[24]
As early as 2013, again in the magazineFocus, he regarded support for Assad as important to avoid the destabilization of the Middle East as a whole. Assad would continue the war only to prevent a still larger carnage, the annihilation of the 1.2 millionAlawites. "Instead of complaining about humanitarian concerns and arguing about arms deliveries to the rebels, the West should join Russia and press for a negotiation solution. If necessary, the West should help the rebels and allow Assad to stay on his post: he is the only person who can hold the country together." Van Creveld quoted Bismarck: "Politics is the choice between the bad and the worse."[25] In a lecture at the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Brandenburg he pleaded to follow a "pragmatic path" in Syria.[26]
In 2011, looking back at Bashar's father, he analyzed the strategy of Hafez Al-Assad against the town of Hama in 1982, then the center of theMuslim Brothers. Without this action, seen as extremely brutal and as a war crime by Creveld, Assad's regime would probably have been overthrown. Assad himself and many members of the Alawite community would have been killed. After Assad's removal, perhaps a stable regime would have been established by non-Alawite Muslims, or – the more likely variant in Martin van Creveld's view – there would have been no stable government at all. In this case, there would have been a war of everyone against everyone. "Judging from the experience in neighboring Beirut, such a civil war could have cost hundreds of thousands of people. And, according to what happened in Lebanon and Afghanistan, Syria could have developed into a place teeming with international terrorists of every direction."[27]
Books
Selected articles
Notes
TipToe was invoked but never defined (see thehelp page)....is what the military historian Martin van Creveld calls "a directed telescope": people in various parts of the chain [of command], and elsewhere, to give you instant information from the battlefield."
Arguably, the decisive event that forever modified the dynamics was a speech by Qaddafi's son, Saif al-Islam Qaddafi, broadcast late on Feb. 21 on Libyan national TV. Mr. Islam might have rolled out new reforms, blamed the reactionary conservatives like Prime Minister Baghdadi al-Mahmudi for the situation in the country, and promised that he would use his weight with his father to stop the violence against the protesters. Instead, he played the Mubarak card – if you don't stick with me, you'll get Islamism, separatism, Western intervention, and total chaos.
