TheMadhyamakālaṃkāra (lit. 'Ornament of theMiddle Way') is an 8th-centuryBuddhist text, believed to have been originally composed inSanskrit byŚāntarakṣita (725–788),[1] which is extant inTibetan. The Tibetan text was translated from the Sanskrit bySurendrabodhi (Wylie:lha dbang byang chub) andJñānasūtra.
In the short-verse text of theMadhyamakālaṃkāra, Śāntarakṣita details hisphilosophical synthesis of the conventional truth ofYogacara with the ultimate truth of theMadhyamaka, assisted byBuddhist logic with a lengthy discussion of the "neither one nor many" argument.
Though somewhat lyrical, it is a summary and a key to his encyclopedicTattvasamgraha. It has the fullness of theSutrayana andMahayana traditions' development in its place of origin before the Buddhist tradition of India was transposed by the cultures of theFar East (such as China and Japan) and elsewhere (such asCeylon andKashmir), where Buddhism was already flourishing in culturally specific forms. The text refutes challenges of Buddhist systems and tenets from within the tradition, and is a pedagogical discourse on the development of theyana; the philosophical challenges posed by the non-Buddhistreligions and non-Dharmic traditions of India, and crystallizes a dialectical sophistication ofIndian logic and the clarity of debate expected of aKhenpo ofNalandaVihara. The text was seminal in the tradition ofSamye which became known as aNyingma institution in contrast to the emergentSarma traditions ofAtisha's (980-1054) translation phase. It documents the Nyingmaview of theTwo Truths, making it a canonical work. Although the text was marginalized due to the rise of thePrasaṅgika subschool ofMādhyamaka, it was revived byJu Mipham's (1846–1912) 1876Commentary.[2]
TheMadhyamakālaṃkāra and its tradition survived the destruction ofNalandaVihara and the ascendancy of theMuslim empire in India during the 13th-century eclipse of Buddhism through its transplantation to theTibetan Plateau by Śāntarakṣita at the request ofTrisong Detsen. It was taught at theSamye Monastery, which was safeguarded by theHimalayas.
Kennard Lipman (1979) published a study of theMadhyamakālaṃkāra in English.[3] The text and Ju Mipham's commentary are available in studies by Thomas Doctor (2004) and thePadmakara Translation Group (2005). James Blumenthal (2004) also provides a version of theMadhyamālaṃkāra with commentary byGyaltsab Je (1364–1432).[4]
According to Doctor (2004: p.ix), theMadhyamakālaṃkāra
... is renowned as the principal scripture of the Yogācāramadhyamaka. Although masters such asĀrya Vimuktisena (6th century CE) are said to have set forth their presentations of the Madhyamaka in a way that employs the assertions specific to theVijñānavāda, Śāntarakṣita was the one to found an actual system in which the ultimate freedom from constructs (Sanskritniṣprapañca, Tibetanspros bral)[5] is realized through insight into the non-existence of any external matter (bāhyārtha,phyi don).[6] This synthesis of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka, the two great currents of Mahāyāna philosophy, the principles of the vast and the profound as originally set forth byAsaṇga (fl. 4th century) andNāgārjuna (possibly 150-250 CE) respectively, is also characterized by its use of thepramāṇa methods ofDignāga (5th-6th century) andDharmakīrti (6th-7th century) as integral steps towards the realization of the ultimate.[7]
Alexander Berzin (2006) translates the title into English asA Filigree of the Middle Way (dBu-ma rgyan, Skt. Madhyamaka-alamkara).[8]
Indian logic is primarily a study of inferences and their patterns. Apramana is a means of knowledge.[9] Indian logic was influenced by grammar, and Greek (or classical) logic was influenced by mathematics.[10] Vidyabhusana (1921), Randle (1930) andFyodor Shcherbatskoy (1930) used the terms "Indian logic" and "Buddhist logic".[10]
ThePadmakara Translation Group (2005: p. 157) rendered Mipham's advice that Buddhist logic is required to engage the text:
In general, it is important to be familiar with the teachings on probative signs and reasoning and, within that context, the notions of other-elimination, the three conditions of the correct sign, and all the methods of proof or refutation.
According to the doctrine ofapoha (gshan-sel-wa in Tibetan), an entity is defined as the negation of its opposite; a cow is not a non-cow.
Dignaga formulatedthree conditions (Sanskrit:trairūpya; Wylie: tshul-gsum) which a logical sign or mark (linga) must fulfill:
When alinga is identified, there are three possibilities; the sign may be present in all, some or none of thesapakṣas orvipakṣas. Identifying a sign assumes that it is present in thepakṣa, and the first condition is met. Dignaga combined these in hisHetucakra.[11]
TheCommentary on Difficult Points (Sanskrit: Madhyamālaṃkāra-panjika, Wylie: dbu ma rgyan gyi dka' 'grel) was written byKamalaśīla (fl. 713–763) Another commentary,Remembering The Ornament of the Middle Way (Wylie: dbu ma rgyan gyi brjed byang), was written byGyaltsab Je (1364–1432). Lobzang Dongak Chökyi Gyatso (Wylie: blo bzang mdo sngags chos kyi rgya mtsho, 1903–1957), also known as Tulku Sungrap, wrote the commentary translated into English asThe Sword to Cut Through False Views (Wylie: dbu ma rgyan gyi mchan 'grel nyung ngu lta ngan gcod pa'i ral gri).[12]
The title of Ju Mipham'sCommentary (Wylie: dbu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad 'jam dbyangs bla ma dgyes pa'i zhal lung) conveys Mipham'sprecepts in honouring the dictate of his guru (rtsa ba'i bla ma),Jamyang Khyentse Wangpo (1820–1892), who charged him with the commentary.Manjushri is used as a term of respect for the scholarship and understanding beyond letters and words of hisRimé teacher.Suchness is the revelation of Mipham'svajrayana from the Padmakara Translation Group'scolophon (2005: p. 382):
Seeing that there are many reasons for expounding the Madhyamakalankara, Jamyang Khyentse Wangpo, our incomparable guide, unbounded in his kindness, whose very name I hardly dare to pronounce, who is the very personification of the compassion of the abbot Bodhisattva, of the master Padmasambhava, and of King Trisongdetsen, who is the sovereign among the learned and accomplished, who is supreme Manjushri appearing in the form of a monk in saffron robes, and whose renown fills the world, gave to me the Indian and Tibetan commentaries on the Madhyamakalankara, asking me to study them well and to compose a commentary. And as his diamondlike injunction came down upon my head, I earnestly gave myself to the task.[13]
Ringu Tulkuet al. (2006: pp. 193–194), in their survey of the Rimé movement, convey the importance of Mipham'sCommentary to theNyingmapa and their view of theTwo Truths doctrine in light of the Svatantrika Madhyamaka ("those who assert the ultimate is the illusory nature") view and itsShentong Madhyamaka refinement as qualifying thePrasangika Madhyamaka ("those who make no assertions"):
Then, for the ultimate truth, there are two schools of Madhyamaka: those who assert the ultimate is the illusory nature, and those who make no assertions. To explain further, the first says that the illusory nature is established when the perceiver of an object experiences a perception of that object as being unreal. This view was put forth by Kamalashila, Shantarakshita, and other proponents of the Svatantrika Madhyamaka school. Their view is clearly explained in Mipham Jamyang Gyatso's commentary on Shantarakshita's 'Ornament of the Middle Way.' This commentary by Mipham Rinpoche is often considered the most important philosophical text of the Nyingma lineage in Tibet, particularly for those who follow Mipham Rinpoche's understanding of the Shentong Madhyamaka view.[14]
Themindstream ofsentient beings is one application of the argument,neither one nor many. 'Neither one nor many' is an application of the third function of thecatuṣkoṭi of Indian logic.Hopkins and Napper (1983, 1996: p. 160), inMeditation on Emptiness, discussed whether or not a series may be considered a unit:
When a continuum of a lifetime is sought in the individual moments of the continuum, it cannot be found. The continuum is not the individual moments nor their composite; if a continuum were a composite of the moments, either each moment would be a continuum or there would be no separate moments.[15]
In the ninthshloka of theMadhyamālaṃkāra, Śāntarakṣita refutes personal singularity; "person" is conveyed a continuum understood as "neither one nor many". ThePadmakara Translation Group qualifies the word "person" (Wylie: gang zag), extending it to allsentient beings.[16] The shloka is translated by the group[16] and Doctor.[17] Ju Mipham's commentary on the verse is likewise translated by both sources.[a][b]
Ju Mipham made five assertions not unique to Śāntarakṣita's view:[18]
In the first assertion, Śāntarakṣita makes theSautrantika distinction that objects of cognition are of two kinds: abstract, theoretical mental objects (including generalities, like classes of objects and their names) and actual things, defined as things which function. Although the Sautantrika made that distinction for conventional and ultimate truth, Śāntarakṣita discards theoretical or general objects and discusses actual things as conventional truth. He incorporates Dharmakirti's cognition which analyzes conventionalities, connecting that with cognition which analyzes for ultimacy.[19]
In the second assertion, a self-reflective awareness (svasaṃvedana) exists; consciousness can be aware of objects of cognition. This position was later critiqued byJe Tsongkhapa as implying that a self-reflective awareness is separate from objects of cognition. Ju Mipham later qualified its meaning; cognition is self-aware, not a separate material thing.[20]
In the third assertion, theconsciousness-only view of conventional appearances is the best way to progress. Still affirming the supremacy of theMadhyamaka school when students analyze for ultimacy, when relating to conventionalities the mind-only position is recommended.[21]
The fourth assertion distinguishes between the ultimate way of abiding established by the Madhyamaka method (the non-enumerated ultimate) and an approximate (enumerated) ultimate: a lesser, conventional understanding of the ultimate which leads to the non-enumerated ultimate.[22] As part of his explanation of why this is useful, Mipham quotesGorampa (who references thefour conceptual extremes) (Wylie: mtha' bzhi; Sanskrit: caturanta):
The intellect of ordinary people, which investigates ultimate reality, cannot refute in a single stroke all four conceptual extremes. But by refuting these four extremes one after the other and by meditating properly, one reaches thepath of seeing. This is called the view that sees the dharmadatu.
To analyze the extremes of existence and non-existence, Ju Mipham advises students to contemplate and establish the lack of inherent existence and then contemplate the extreme of non-existence. In contemplating step by step and enumerating the conceptual extremes, a student progresses toward the ultimate. When all extremes have been analyzed, they reach the non-enumerative (true) ultimate.[22]
In the fifth assertion, analysis of objects with respect to approximate (enumerated) ultimates does not create a problem of true establishment. A distinction can be made when analyzing for each case, including the two approaches to cognition (one for the conventional domain and the other to analyze for ultimacy) which are his additions to thePramana tradition of valid cognition. Mipham uses this demonstration in his commentary to point out a problem with Je Tsongkhapa's approach of negating the predicate of "true establishment" instead of the object of perception, which is avoided in Śāntarakṣita's approach. Mipham also notes that manyPrasaṅgika writers (similar to theirSvatantrika counterparts) made positive assertions to move students closer to the ultimate view, pointing out that the distinction between Prasangika and Svatantrika lies in how students are taught about conventionalities and not in the consideration of ultimate truth. He concludes that Je Tsongkhapa, in making a distinction based on true establishment, proposes a Svatantrika rather than a Prasangika approach.[23]
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