Movatterモバイル変換


[0]ホーム

URL:


Jump to content
WikipediaThe Free Encyclopedia
Search

LightBasin

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Cyber espionage group
This article has multiple issues. Please helpimprove it or discuss these issues on thetalk page.(Learn how and when to remove these messages)
icon
This article'slead sectionmay be too short to adequatelysummarize the key points. Please consider expanding the lead toprovide an accessible overview of all important aspects of the article.(April 2022)
This article'sfactual accuracy may be compromised due to out-of-date information. The reason given is:The article should be updated after CrowdStrike updated their findings to say that the intrusions they said were by LightBasin are now attributed to Liminal Panda. Please help update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information.(August 2025)
This articlemay beconfusing or unclear to readers. In particular, the article does not explain what a LightBasin is to a non-technical reader who is not a computer security specialist in persistent threats. Please helpclarify the article. There might be a discussion about this onthe talk page.(April 2022) (Learn how and when to remove this message)
(Learn how and when to remove this message)

LightBasin, also calledUNC1945 byMandiant, is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has been described as anadvanced persistent threat that has been linked to multiple cyberattacks on telecommunications companies.[1][2] As an advanced persistent threat, they seek to gain unauthorized access to a computer network and remain undetected for an extended period. They have been linked to attacks targetingLinux andSolaris systems.[1][2]

History

[edit]

The LightBasin cyber espionage group has operated since 2016.[1][2][3] CrowdStrike says that they are based inChina, though their exact location is unknown.[1] They have targeted 13 telecoms operators.[2]

Targets

[edit]

CrowdStrike says that the group is unusual in targeting protocols and technology oftelecoms operators.[1] According to CrowdStrike's investigation of one such breach, LightBasin leveraged externalDomain Name System (eDNS) servers — which are part of theGeneral Packet Radio Service (GPRS) network and play a role in roaming between different mobile operators — to connect directly to and from other compromised telecommunication companies’ GPRS networks viaSecure Shell and through previously established implants. Many of their tools are written for them rather than being off the shelf.[1]

After compromising a system, they then installed abackdoor, known as SLAPSTICK, for the Solarispluggable authentication module.[2] They utilizeTinyShell, which is acommand shell used to control and execute commands throughHTTP requests to aweb shell,[4] to communicate with the attackers' IP addresses. The scripts are tunneled through anSGSN emulator, which CrowdStrike says is to maintainOPSEC. Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN) is a main component of the GPRS network, which handles all packet switched data within the network, e.g. the mobility management and authentication of the users.[5] Utilizing this form of tunneling makes it less likely to be restricted or inspected by network security solutions.[1]

CrowdStrike recommends thatfirewalls dealing with GPRS traffic be configured to limit access to DNS or GPRS tunneling protocol traffic.[1]

(As of October 2025, CrowdStrike has updated their findings and revealed the intrusions were from Liminal Panda, not LightBasin)

Associated group

[edit]

Mandiant says that the groupUNC2891 is associated with LightBasin.[6]

Indonesian bank attack

[edit]

UNC2891 attached aRaspberry Pi with a4G wireless modem to anetwork switch owned by an Indonesian bank.[6] This granted the group internal access to the banks' network.[6][7]Group-IB said the attack took place early in 2024.[6][7] Some money was withdrawn from an ATM by the group, though Group-IB didn't say how much.[6][7]

The group deployed theTinyShellbackdoor to connect tocommand and controlservers.[6][7] The copy of TinyShell on the Raspberry Pi could access the bank mail server which was connected directly to the Internet, giving the group access to the network even when the Raspberry Pi wasn't able to connect to the 4G network.[6][7]

Another backdoor disguised itself as theLightDMdisplay manager.[6][7]

The banks' defenders managed to prevent the group from applying theCaketaprootkit, which they believed would have been used to issue fake commands to allow further withdrawal of money.[6][7]

References

[edit]
  1. ^abcdefghNichols, Shaun (2021-10-20)."'LightBasin' hackers spent 5 years hiding on telco networks".TechTarget.Archived from the original on 2023-11-29. Retrieved2022-04-08.
  2. ^abcdeIlascu, Ionut (2021-10-19)."LightBasin hacking group breaches 13 global telecoms in two years".Bleeping Computer.Archived from the original on 2023-07-24. Retrieved2022-04-08.
  3. ^Küfeoğlu, Sinan; Akgün, Abdullah Talip (2024).Cyber Resilience in Critical Infrastructure. Abingdon, Oxon:CRC Press.ISBN 978-1-0009-8368-5. Retrieved2025-08-09 – viaGoogle Books.
  4. ^"Day 27: Tiny SHell (SSH-like backdoor with full-pty terminal)".Medium. 26 January 2019.
  5. ^"SGSN".Telecom ABC.Archived from the original on 2022-05-17. Retrieved2022-05-11.
  6. ^abcdefghiJones, Connor (2025-08-01)."Cybercrooks attached Raspberry Pi to bank network and drained ATM cash".The Register. Retrieved2025-08-13.
  7. ^abcdefgPhuong, Nam Le (2025-07-30)."UNC2891 Bank Heist: Physical ATM Backdoor & Linux Forensic Evasion Evasion".Group-IB.
Hacking in the 2020s
← 2010s
2030s →
Major incidents
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
2026
Groups
Individuals
Majorvulnerabilities
publiclydisclosed
Malware
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
2025
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=LightBasin&oldid=1314875498"
Categories:
Hidden categories:

[8]ページ先頭

©2009-2026 Movatter.jp