This article is about the sub-national federal region in the Republic of Iraq. For the wider geographical area in Iraq inhabited by Kurdish people, seeIraqi Kurdistan. For the entire Middle Eastern region inhabited by Kurdish people, seeKurdistan.
Throughout the 20th century,Iraqi Kurds oscillated between fighting for autonomy and for full independence. Under theBa'athist regime, the Kurds experiencedArabization and genocidal campaigns at the hands of the federal government in Baghdad.[17] However, when theUnited States, theUnited Kingdom, andFrance established theIraqi no-fly zones, which restricted the federal government's power in the country's northern and southern areas following the Gulf War, the Kurds were given a chance to experiment with self-governance and the autonomous region wasde facto established.[18] The Iraqi government only recognized the Kurdistan Region in 2005 (as a 'federal region'), after the American-led2003 invasion of Iraq overthrewSaddam Hussein.[19] In September 2017, the KRI passed a non-bindingindependence referendum, inviting mixed reactions internationally. The KRI largely escaped the privations that afflicted other parts of Iraq in the last years of Saddam Hussein's rule as well as the chaos that followed his ousting during theIraq War (2003–2011), and built a parliamentary democracy with a growing economy.[20] In 2014, when theSyria-basedIslamic Stateinvaded the north of the county, theIraqi Armed Forces retreated from most of the disputed territories. The KRI'sPeshmerga then entered and took control of them for the duration of theWar in Iraq (2013–2017). In October 2017, following the defeat of the Islamic State, the Iraqi Armed Forces attacked the Peshmerga andreasserted control over the disputed territories.[21]
Before Iraq became an independent state in 1923, theIraqi Kurds had already begun their independence struggle from the BritishMandatory Iraq with theMahmud Barzanji revolts, which were subsequently crushed by theUnited Kingdom after a bombing campaign against Kurdish civilians by theRoyal Air Force.[22][23] Nonetheless, the Kurdish struggle persisted and theBarzani tribe had by the early 1920s gained momentum for theKurdish nationalist cause and would become pivotal in theKurdish-Iraqi wars throughout the 20th century. In 1943, the Barzani chiefMustafa Barzani began[24] raiding Iraqi police stations inKurdistan, which led the Baghdad government to deploy 30,000 troops to the region. The Iraqi Kurdish leadership fled toIran in 1945. There, Mustafa Barzani founded theKurdistan Democratic Party, and Iran and theSoviet Union began assisting the Kurdish rebels with arms.[25]Israel began assisting the Kurdish rebels in the early 1960s.[26]
From 1961 to 1970, the Kurds fought the Iraqi government in theFirst Iraqi–Kurdish War, which resulted in theIraqi–Kurdish Autonomy Agreement. But simultaneously with its promise of Kurdish autonomy, the Iraqi government beganethnic cleansing Kurdish-populated areas, to reduce the size of the autonomous entity which acensus would determine.[17] This mistrust provoked theSecond Iraqi–Kurdish War between 1974 and 1975, which resulted in a serious defeat for the Iraqi Kurds (seeAlgiers Accord) and forced all of the rebels to flee once more to Iran.
The Kurdistan Region became politically divided with two administrations (the 50:50 system) with KDP controlling the Erbil and Duhok Governorates, while PUK took control of Sulaymaniyah Governorate to the east.The region uses theIraqi flag in official ceremonies alongside the Flag of Kurdistan despite reluctance.[27][28]
Insurgency and first elections (1975–1992)
ThePatriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) was founded in 1975 byJalal Talabani while the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) was slowly recovering from their defeat. The PUK was more popular among left-wingSorani speakers, while the KDP was more popular among right-wingKurmanji speakers. The PUK leadership adhered to theQadiri sect while the KDP leadership adhered to theNaqshbandi.[29] The Kurdish insurgency became entangled in theIran–Iraq War from 1980 onwards. During the first years of the war in the early 1980s, the Iraqi government tried to accommodate the Kurds in order to focus on the war against Iran. In 1983, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan agreed to cooperate with Baghdad, but the Kurdistan Democratic Party remained opposed.[30] In 1983,Saddam Hussein signed an autonomy agreement withJalal Talabani of the PUK, though Saddam later reneged on the agreement.
By 1985, the PUK and KDP had joined forces, and Iraqi Kurdistan saw widespread guerrilla warfare up to the end of the war.[31] On 15 March 1988, PUK forces captured the town ofHalabja near the Iranian border and inflicted heavy losses among Iraqi soldiers. The Iraqis retaliated the following day bychemically bombing the town, killing about 5,000 civilians.[32] This led the Americans and the Europeans to implement theIraqi no-fly zones in March 1991 to protect the Kurds, thereby facilitating Kurdish autonomy amid the vacuum and the first Kurdish elections were consequently held in May 1992, wherein the Kurdistan Democratic Party secured 45.3% of the vote and a majority of seats.
Nascent autonomy, war and political turmoil (1992–2009)
The two parties agreed to form the first Kurdish cabinet led byPUK politicianFuad Masum as Prime Minister in July 1992 and the main focus of the new cabinet was to mitigate the effect of the American-led sanctions on Iraq and to prevent internal Kurdish skirmishes. Nonetheless, the cabinet broke down due to plagues of embattlement andtechnocracy which disenfranchised the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and a new more partisan cabinet was formed and led by PUK politicianKosrat Rasul Ali in April 1993.[33] The KDP-PUK relations quickly deteriorated and the first clashes in the civil war took place in May 1994 when PUK captured the towns ofShaqlawa andChamchamal from KDP, which in turn pushed PUK out of Salahaddin (near Erbil). In September 1998, theUnited States mediated a ceasefire and the two warring parties signed the Washington Agreement deal, where in it was stipulated that the two parties would agree on revenue-sharing, power-sharing and security arrangements.[34]
The anarchy in Kurdistan during the war created an opportunity for theKurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which created bases in the northern mountainous areas of the Kurdistan Region,[35][36] which still operates in the Region in the 2010s with frequent calls for withdrawal.[37]
In advance of theIraq war in 2003, the two parties united in the negotiations with the Arab opposition toSaddam Hussein and succeeded in harvesting political, economic, and security gains and the Arab opposition agreed to recognize Kurdish autonomy in the case that Saddam Hussein was removed from power.[38] America and Kurdistan also jointly rooted out the IslamistAnsar al-Islam group in Halabja area as Kurdistan hosted thousands of soldiers.[39][40] The Kurdish autonomy which had existed since 1992 was formally recognized by the new Iraqi government in 2005 in the new Iraqi constitution and the KDP- and PUK-administered areas reunified in 2006, making the Kurdistan Region into one single administration. This reunification prompted Kurdish leaders and the Kurdish PresidentMasoud Barzani to focus on bringing the Kurdish areas outside of the Kurdistan Region into the region and building healthy institutions.[38]
In 2009, Kurdistan saw the birth of a new major party, theGorran Movement, which was founded because of tensions in PUK and would subsequently weaken the party profoundly. The second most important political PUK figure,Nawshirwan Mustafa, was the founder of Gorran, who took advantage of sentiments among many PUK politicians critical of the cooperation with the KDP.[38] Gorran would subsequently win 25 seats (or 23.7% of the votes) in the2009 parliamentary elections to the detriment of theKurdistan List.[41] In the aftermath of the elections, Gorran failed at its attempts to persuade theKurdistan Islamic Group andKurdistan Islamic Union to leave the Kurdistan List, provoking both KDP and PUK. Gorran also attempted to create goodwill with the Iraqi Prime MinisterNouri al-Maliki, which only aggravated the situation in Kurdistan, and the KDP and PUK chose to boycott Gorran from politics.[38]
Conflict with the Islamic State and Iraq (2014–)
This section needs to beupdated. The reason given is: No information about purported reproachment as of 2019. Please help update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information.(November 2025)
In the period leading up to theIslamic State invasion of Iraq in June 2014, the Iraqi-Kurdish relations were in a decline that the war against theIslamic State only worsened. When Iraqi forces withdrew from the Syrian-Iraqi border and away from the disputed areas, the Kurdistan Region consequently had a 1,000 km front with the Islamic State, which put the region into an economic stalemate. However, Kurdistan did not compromise on their stance regarding financial independence from Baghdad.[42] Due to the Iraqi withdrawal, KurdishPeshmerga took control ofmost disputed areas, includingKirkuk,Khanaqin,Jalawla,Bashiqa,Sinjar andMakhmur. The strategically importantMosul Dam was also captured by Kurdish forces.[43] However, the control was only temporary as, following the2017 Kurdistan Region independence referendum, the2017 Iraqi–Kurdish conflict and decisiveBattle of Kirkuk resulted in the central government regaining most of the disputed areas in October 2017.[44]
As of 2019, the Kurdistan Region and the Federal Government in Baghdad are negotiating joint control over the disputed areas as their relations have become more cordial in the aftermath of the Islamic State's defeat.[45][46]
Geography
A valley in the north of the region, through which theGreat Zab flows
The Kurdistan region of Iraq is an autonomous region in northernIraq. It bordersIran in the east,Turkey in the north, andSyria in the west. The region encompasses most ofIraqi Kurdistan, which is the southern part of the greater geographical region ofKurdistan. The region lies between latitudes34° and38°N, and longitudes41° and47°E. Most of the northern and northeastern parts of the region are mountainous, especially those bordering Turkey and Iran. The region has several high mountains and mountain ranges. Other areas of the region are hills and plains, which make up the central and most southern parts of the region.[47]
Most of the precipitation there falls as rain or snow between November and April, annual precipitation ranges from about 375 to 724 mm. From ancient times this has made cultivation of winter crops (and vegetables and fruit in the summer) and the raising of livestock possible.[48]
Kurdish villagers working in a field
Around 1,368,388 hectares (33%) of the land is rainfed arable agricultural land and 328,428 hectares (8%) is Irrigated arable agricultural land.[49]
Climate
The climate of the Kurdistan Region issemi-arid continental; hot and dry in summer, and cold and wet in winter. The region is cooler compared to the central and southern parts of Iraq.[50]
Summers are hot and dry, with high average temperatures ranging from 35 °C (95 °F) in the cooler northernmost areas to blistering 40 °C (104 °F) in the southwest, with lows around 21 °C (70 °F) to 24 °C (75 °F). Winter is dramatically cooler than the rest of Iraq, with highs averaging between 9 °C (48 °F) and 11 °C (52 °F) and with lows hovering around 3 °C (37 °F) in some areas and freezing in others, dipping to −2 °C (28 °F) and 0 °C (32 °F) on average.
The Kurdistan region of Iraq enjoys more stability, economic development, and political pluralism than the rest of the country. And public opinion under the Kurdistan Regional Government demands rule-of-law-based governance. But power is concentrated in the hands of the ruling parties and families, who perpetuate a nondemocratic, sultanistic system. These dynamics could foster instability in Kurdistan and its neighborhood, but could also provide a rare window of opportunity for democratization.
Present territory controlled by the Kurdistan Region in the context of theIraqi conflict
The Committee for implementing article 140 defines the disputed territories as those areas Arabised and whose border modified between 17 July 1968 and 9 April 2003. Those areas include parts of fourgovernorates of pre-1968 borders.[64]
Disputed internal Kurdish–Iraqi boundaries have been a core concern for Arabs and Kurds, especially since US invasion and political restructuring in 2003. Kurds gained territory to the south of Iraqi Kurdistan after theUS-led invasion in 2003 to regain what land they considered historically theirs.[65]
The Kurdistan Region is divided into four governorates (Kurdish:پارێزگا,Parêzga): the governorates ofErbil,Sulaymaniyah,Duhok, andHalabja. Each of these governorates is divided into districts, for a total of 26 districts. Each district is also divided into sub-districts. Each governorate has a capital city, while districts and sub-districts have 'district centers'.[67]
The Kurdistan Region has the lowest poverty rates in Iraq[69] and the stronger economy of the Kurdistan Region attracted around 20,000 workers from other parts of Iraq between 2003 and 2005.[70] The number of millionaires in the city of Sulaymaniyah grew from 12 to 2,000 in 2003, reflecting the economic growth.[71] According to some estimates, the debt of the Kurdish government reached $18 billion by January 2016.[72] In 2022 theInternational Labour Organization published a report called the Iraqi Labour Force Survey, according to which the unemployment rates in Kurdistan Region's three governorates: Erbil, Sulaymaniyah (including Halabjah), and Duhok stood at 17.7%, 11.9% and 24.1%, respectively.[73] According to news reports citing official statistics, the unemployment rate in Kurdistan Region surged to over 24% in 2024.[74][75]
The economy of Kurdistan is dominated by theoil industry.[76] However, Kurdish officials have since the late 2010s attempted to diversify the economy to mitigate a new economic crisis like the one which hit the region during the fight against ISIL.[68] In 2015, major oil export partners includedIsrael,Italy,France andGreece.[77]
Petroleum and mineral resources
KRG-controlled parts of Iraqi Kurdistan contain 4 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. However, the KRG has estimated that the region contains around 45 billion barrels (7.2×10^9 m3) of unproven oil resource.[78][79][80][81] Extraction of these reserves began in 2007.
In November 2011, Exxon challenged the Iraqi central government's authority with the signing of oil and gas contracts for exploration rights to six parcels of land in Kurdistan, including one contract in the disputed territories, just east of theKirkuk mega-field.[82] This act caused Baghdad to threaten to revoke Exxon's contract in its southern fields, most notably the West-Qurna Phase 1 project.[83] Exxon responded by announcing its intention to leave the West-Qurna project.[84]
Other mineral resources that exist in significant quantities in the region includecoal,copper,gold,iron,limestone (which is used to producecement),marble, andzinc. The world's largest deposit of rock sulfur is located just southwest ofErbil.[87]
In July 2012, Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government signed an agreement by which Turkey would supply the KRG with refined petroleum products in exchange for crude oil.[88]
Cessation of oil exports
In March 2023 theInternational Chamber of Commerce ruled that the oil export agreement between KRI and Turkey was illegal. According to the verdict, only the Iraqi central government can sign international trade agreements regarding oil exports, and Turkey was found guilty of violating the Iraq–Turkey Pipeline Agreement of 1973, causing the pumping of petroleum products through theKirkuk–Ceyhan Oil Pipeline between the Kurdistan Region and Turkey to cease.[89] The closure of the pipeline left much of the Kurdistan Region's petroleum output with no legal outlet, causing a rise in illegal smuggling of oil to Iran via tanker trucks.[90]
Resumption of oil exports by SOMO
On 25 September 2025, the Iraqi federal government announced that it had reached a multilateral deal with the Kurdistan Regional Government and international oil companies (IOCs) operating in the KRI wherein precise technical guidelines and conditions of payment for crude oil production and transportation are set out. The deal is in line with the 2023-2025 Federal Budget Law approved by the Iraqi Council of Representatives.
Under the deal, the Federal Government will receive at least 230 000 barrels per day of oil produced in KRI and delivered directly to the IraqiState Organization for Marketing of Oil (SOMO), which will in turn independently conduct the sale of these barrels through the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline. Conditional on SOMO receiving at least 230 000 barrels daily, the Federal Ministry of Finance will in turn pay the KRG its annual share of the federal budget according to the Federal Budget Law. The IOCs on the other hand, will be reimbursed for production and transportation costs of the amount received by SOMO (USD 14$ per barrel) paid through an escrow account directly.
The deal stipulates that KRG and IOCs will be completely excluded from the export process, and won’t directly receive revenues from exports of oil barrels produced in KRI. Instead, the Iraqi government will allocate the revenues gained from independently exporting at least 230 000 barrels per day produced in the KRI to the central government budget, from which the KRG will receive its share proportional to its population, a mechanism identical to that used with other Iraqi oil-producing governorates, such as Basrah. Of the amount produced by the international oil companies —that is, at least 280 000 barrels per day— an amount no more than 50 000 barrels will be allocated for KRI domestic consumption. The IOCs will be allowed to sell this amount to domestic buyers and receive the revenues of this amount only.[91][92]
The Iraqi Ministry of Oil reiterated its "firm commitment to managing oil resources in accordance with the principle of national sovereignty and the supreme interest of the state, in order to ensure a fair distribution of wealth among all the Iraqi people, in accordance with the constitution".[93] The Iraqi minister of oil, Hayan Abdul-Ghani stated that the deal guarantees that the Iraqi government controls all revenues of the country.[94]
Due to the lack of a propercensus, the exact population and demographics of Kurdistan Region are unknown, but the government has started to publish more detailed figures. The population of the region is notoriously difficult to ascertain, as the Iraqi government has historically sought to minimize the importance of the Kurdish minority while Kurdish groups have had a tendency to exaggerate the numbers.[95] Based on available data, Kurdistan has a young population with an estimated 36% of the population being under the age of 15.[96]
Kurdistan has a religiously diverse population. The dominant religion isIslam, which is professed by the majority of Kurdistan Region's inhabitants. These include Kurds, Iraqi Turkmen, and Arabs, belonging mostly to theShafi'i school ofSunni Islam. There is also a small number ofShiaFeyli Kurds.[98]
In 2015, the Kurdistan Regional Government enacted a law to formally protect religious minorities.Christianity is professed byAssyrians andArmenians.
Yazidis make up a significant minority, with some 650,000 in 2005,[99] or 560,000 as of 2013,[98] TheYarsan (Ahl-e Haqq or Kakai) religion numbers around 200,000 adherents respectively.[98] In 2020, it was reported that 60 Zoroastrian families live in Iraqi Kurdistan.[100] The first Zoroastrian temple was opened in the city ofSulaymaniyah (Silêmanî) in September 2016.[101]
A tiny ethno-religious community ofMandaeans also exists within the semi-autonomous region. The National Association of Jews from Kurdistan in Israel stated there is a small number of expatriate Jews in the Kurdistan Region, but no Jews remaining from original Jewish communities.[102][103]
Widespread economic activity between the Kurdistan Region and Turkey has given the opportunity forKurds in Turkey to seek jobs in the Kurdistan Region. A Kurdish newspaper based in the Kurdish capital estimates that around 50,000 Kurds from Turkey are now living in the Kurdistan Region.[104]
The Kurdistan Region is hosting 1.2 million displaced Iraqis who have been displaced by the ISIS war, as of early December 2017. There were about 335,000 in the area prior to 2014 with the rest arriving in 2014 as a result of unrest in Syria and attacks by theIslamic State.[105]
Before the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government, primary and secondary education was almost entirely taught in Arabic. Higher education was always taught in Arabic. This however changed with the establishment of the Kurdistan Autonomous Region. The first international school, theInternational School of Choueifat opened its branch in the Kurdistan Region in 2006. Other international schools have opened andBritish International Schools in Kurdistan is the latest with a planned opening in Suleimaniah in September 2011.
The Kurdistan Region's official universities are listed below, followed by their English acronym (if commonly used), internet domain, establishment date and latest data about the number of students.
Iraqi Kurdistan has been investing in the growth of its human capital in general.[108] Public sector employees are often enrolled in local training programmes or sent overseas to participate in training courses, technical classes, and professional development programmes.[109] However, factors such as the lack of a practical and formal HRD framework specific to the KRG's public sector, the absence of evaluation process, inadequate civil service training institutions, and corruption have hampered effective and efficient professional development and training in the public sector.[109] Therefore, an assessment of such programmes and their outcomes is needed to identify any misuse of public funds, as well as to assist in the reducing of administrative and political corruption and to make policy recommendations. The government's policies for the public sector have also had an impact on the private sector. However, the government has played a much smaller role in the private sector.[110] In Iraqi Kurdistan, theMinistry of Planning has primarily concentrated on activating training in the public sector, with the goal of expanding opportunities and improving the efficiency of the training process.[109] In the long run, this will have an effect on private sector training and growth.
According to the 2024 nationwide population census conducted by the Iraqi Ministry of Planning, Kurdistan Region's illiteracy rate was 16.23%, higher than the rest of Iraq (15.31%).[111][112]
Human rights
In 2010Human Rights Watch reported that journalists in the Kurdistan Region who criticize the regional government have faced substantial violence, threats, and lawsuits, and some have fled the country.[113] Some journalists faced trial and threats of imprisonment for their reports about corruption in the region.[113]
In 2009 Human Rights Watch found that some health providers in Iraqi Kurdistan had been involved in both performing and promoting misinformation about the practice of female genital mutilation. Girls and women receive conflicting and inaccurate messages from media campaigns and medical personnel on its consequences.[114] The Kurdistan parliament in 2008 passed a draft law outlawing the practice, but the ministerial decree necessary to implement it, expected in February 2009, was cancelled.[115] As reported to the Centre for Islamic Pluralism by the non-governmental organization, called as Stop FGM in Kurdistan, the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq, on 25 November, officially admitted the wide prevalence in the territory of female genital mutilation (FGM). Recognition by the KRG of the frequency of this custom among Kurds came during a conference program commemorating the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women.[116] On 27 November 2010, the Kurdish government officially admitted to violence against women in Kurdistan and began taking serious measures.[117] 21 June 2011 The Family Violence Bill was approved by the Kurdistan Parliament, it includes several provisions criminalizing the practice.[118] A 2011 Kurdish law criminalized FGM practice in Iraqi Kurdistan and law was accepted four years later.[119][120][121] The studies have shown that there is a trend of general decline of FGM.[122]
British lawmakerRobert Halfon sees the Kurdistan Region as a more progressive Muslim region than the other Muslim countries in the Middle East.[123]
Although the Kurdish regional parliament has officially recognized ethnic minorities such asAssyrians,Turkmen,Arabs,Armenians,Mandaeans,Shabaks andYazidis, there have been accusations of Kurdish discrimination against those groups. The Assyrians have reported Kurdish officials' reluctance in rebuilding Assyrian villages in their region while constructing more settlements for the Kurds affected during theAnfal campaign.[124] After his visit to the region, Dutch politicianJoël Voordewind noted that the positions reserved for minorities in the Kurdish parliament were appointed by Kurds as the Assyrians for example had no possibility to nominate their own candidates.[125]
The Kurdish regional government has also been accused of trying toKurdify other regions such as theNineveh Plains andKirkuk by providing financial support for Kurds who want to settle in those areas.[126][127]
While Kurdish forces held the city ofKirkuk, Kurdish authorities attempted to Kurdify the city. Turkmen and Arab residents in Kirkuk experienced intimidation, harassment and were forced to leave their homes, in order to increase the Kurdish demographic in Kirkuk and bolster their claims to the city. MultipleHuman Rights Watch reports detail the confiscation of Turkmen and Arab families' documents, preventing them from voting, buying property and travelling. Turkmen residents of Kirkuk were detained by Kurdish forces and compelled to leave the city. Kurdish authorities expelled hundreds of Arab families from the city, demolishing their homes in the process.[128][129][130]
United Nations reports since 2006 have documented that Kurdish authorities and Peshmerga militia forces were illegally policing Kirkuk and other disputed areas, and that these militia have abducted Turkmen and Arabs, subjecting them to torture.[131]
In April 2016,Human Rights Watch wrote that the Kurdish security force of KRG, theAsayish, blocked the roads toErbil to preventAssyrians from holding a protest. According to demonstrators, the reason for the blocked protest was that Kurds in theNahla Valley, mainly populated by Assyrians, encroached onland owned by Assyrians, without any action by courts or officials to remove the structures the Kurds built there.[132]
In February 2017, Human Rights Watch saidKurdistan Regional Government (KRG) forces are detaining men and boys who have fled the fighting inMosul even after they have passed security checks. Detainees were held for up to four months without any communication with their families. Relatives of these men and boys said that KRG andIraqi forces didn't inform them of the places of their detained relatives and didn't facilitate any contact with them.[133]
Human Rights Watch reported thatKurdistan Regional Government security forces and local police detained 32 unarmed protesters in Erbil on March 4, 2017, at apeaceful demonstration against recent clashes inSinjar. 23 of them were released at the same day and 3 more within four days, but 6, all foreign nationals, are still being held. A police chief ordered one protester who was released to permanently leaveErbil, where he was living. While in detention, protesters were not allowed to contact with anyone or have access to alawyer.[134]
In 2017, Assyrian activistsJuliana Taimoorazy and Matthew Joseph accused the Kurdistan Regional Government of issuing threats of violence against Assyrians living in the area who protested its independence referendum. These accusations were later confirmed when the KDP-controlled provincial council ofAlqosh issued a statement warning residents that they would face consequences for protesting the referendum.[135]
In 2010, it was reported that passing of a new law in Iraqi Kurdistan, guaranteeing “gender equality”, has deeply outraged some local religious community, including the minister of endowments and religious affairs and prominent imams, who interpreted the phrase as "legitimizing homosexuality in Kurdistan".[136] Kamil Haji Ali, the minister of endowments and religious affairs, said in this regard that the new law would “spread immorality” and “distort” Kurdish society.[136] Following an outrage of religious movements, the KRG held a press conference, where the public were assured that gender equality did not include giving marriage rights to homosexuals, whose existence is effectively invisible in Iraq due to restrictive traditional rules.[136]
In thedisputed areas ofSinjar and theNineveh Plains, the Kurdistan Regional Government has been accused by the native Assyrian[137] and Yazidi[138][139] inhabitants of forcefully disarming them with the guarantee of protection in order to justify the Peshmerga's presence in those regions.[138] In 2014, when the Islamic State invaded Northern Iraq, the Peshmerga abandoned their posts in these areas without notifying the locals.[139]
Infrastructure and transportation
Infrastructure
Due to the devastation of the campaigns of the Iraqi army under Saddam Hussein and other former Iraqi regimes, the Kurdistan Region's infrastructure was never able to modernize. After the 1991 safe haven was established, the Kurdistan Regional Government began projects to reconstruct the Kurdistan Region. Since then, of all the 4,500 villages that were destroyed by Saddam Husseins' regime, 65% have been reconstructed by the KRG.[140]
Transportation
Airports of Sulaimaniyah and Erbil
Iraqi Kurdistan can be reached by land and air. By land, Iraqi Kurdistan can be reached most easily by Turkey through theHabur Border Gate which is the only border gate between Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey. This border gate can be reached by bus or taxi from airports in Turkey as close as theMardin orDiyarbakir airports, as well as fromIstanbul orAnkara. Iraqi Kurdistan has two border gates with Iran, theHaji Omaran border gate and theBashmeg border gate near the city ofSulaymaniyah. Iraqi Kurdistan has also a border gate with Syria known as theFaysh Khabur border gate.[141] From within Iraq, the Kurdistan Region can be reached by land from multiple roads.
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