Parts of northern Syria are known asWestern Kurdistan,[d] or simply Rojava[e] among Kurds,[35][13][36] one of the four parts ofGreater Kurdistan.[37] The name "Rojava" was thus associated with a Kurdish identity of the administration. As the region expanded and increasingly included areas dominated by non-Kurdish groups, mostly Arabs, "Rojava" was used less and less by the administration in hopes of deethnicising its appearance and making it more acceptable to other ethnicities.[38] Regardless, the polity continued to be called "Rojava" by locals and international observers,[15][39][40] with journalist Metin Gurcan noting that "the concept of Rojava [had become] a brand gaining global recognition" by 2019.[39]
The territory around Jazira province of northeastern Syria is calledGozarto,[f] part of the historicalAssyrian homeland, by Syriac-Assyrians.[41] The first name of the local government for the Kurdish-dominated areas inAfrin District,Ayn al-Arab District (Kobanî), and northernal-Hasakah Governorate was "Interim Transitional Administration", adopted in 2013.[13] After the three autonomous cantons were proclaimed in 2014 together with a writtenSocial Contract,[42][43] PYD-governed territories were also nicknamed "the Autonomous Regions"[13] or "Democratic Autonomous Administration".[44] On 17 March 2016, northern Syria's administration self-declared the establishment of afederal system of government as theDemocratic Federation of Rojava – Northern Syria;[g] sometimes abbreviated as NSR).[13][45][46][47][48]
The updated December 2016 constitution of the polity[49] uses the nameDemocratic Federation of Northern Syria (DFNS).[h][50][51][52][53] On 6 September 2018, theSyrian Democratic Council adopted a new name for the region, naming it theAutonomous Administration of North and East Syria (NES or AANES)[i] also sometimes translated into English as theSelf-Administration of North and East Syria (SANES), encompassing the Euphrates and Jazira regions as well as the local civil councils in the regions of Raqqa, Tabqa, and Deir ez-Zor.[54][4][55] In December 2023, the region adopted a newconstitution, with a new name for the region, theDemocratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES).[j][6] The YPG/PYD have at times used the namesFederal Northern Syria and theDemocratic Confederalist Autonomous Areas of Northern Syria.[13][56]
Having been part of theFertile Crescent, Northern Syria has several Neolithic sites such asTell Halaf.Ruins of the "Red House" of the Assyrian siteDur-Katlimmu exposed by excavations (6th century AD)
Northern Syria is part of theFertile Crescent, and includes archaeological sites dating to the Neolithic, such asTell Halaf. In antiquity, the area was part of theMitanni kingdom, its centre being the Khabur river valley in modern-day Jazira Region. It was then part ofAssyria, with the last surviving Assyrian imperial records, from between 604 BC and 599 BC, being found in and around the Assyrian city ofDūr-Katlimmu.[57] Later, it was ruled by different dynasties and empires – theAchaemenids ofIran, theHellenistic empires who succeededAlexander the Great, theArtaxiads ofArmenia,[58]Rome, the IranianParthians and[59]Sasanians,[60] then by theByzantines and successive Arab Islamic caliphates. In course of these regimes, different groups settled in northern Syria, often contributing to population shifts. Arab tribes have been present in the area for millennia.[61] Under the HellenisticSeleucid Empire (312–63 BC), different tribal groups and mercenaries were settled in northern Syria as military colonists; these included Arabs[62] and possibly Kurds.[63][k] Jan Retso argued that Abai, an Arab settlement where the Seleucid kingAntiochus VI Dionysus was raised, was located in northern Syria.[62] By the 3rd century, the Arab tribe of the Fahmids lived in northern Syria.[65]
By the 9th century, northern Syria was inhabited by a mixed population of Arabs, Assyrians, Kurds,Turkic groups, and others. Kurdish tribes in the area often operated as soldiers for hire,[64] and were still placed in specific military settlements in the northern Syrian mountains.[66] There existed a Kurdish elite of whichSaladin,[67] the founder of theAyyubid dynasty and the Emir ofMasyaf in the 12th century were part of.[68] Under Saladin's rule, northern Syria experienced a mass immigration of Turkic groups who came into conflict with Kurdish tribes, resulting in clashes that wiped out several Kurdish communities.[69]
During theOttoman Empire (1516–1922), largeKurdish-speaking tribal groups both settled in and were deported to areas of northern Syria fromAnatolia.[70][71] By the 18th century, five Kurdish tribes existed in northeastern Syria.[66] The demographics of this area underwent a huge shift in the early part of the 20th century. SomeCircassian, Kurdish andChechen tribes cooperated with the Ottoman (Turkish) authorities in the massacres ofArmenian andAssyrian Christians inUpper Mesopotamia, between 1914 and 1920, with further attacks on unarmed fleeing civilians conducted by local Arab militias.[70][72][71][73] Many Assyrians fled to Syria during the genocide and settled mainly in the Jazira area.[71][74] Starting in 1926, the region saw another immigration of Kurds following the failure of theSheikh Said rebellion against theTurkish authorities.[75] While many of the Kurds in Syria have been there for centuries,[76][68][77] waves of Kurds fled their homes in Turkey and settled in SyrianAl-Jazira Province, where they were granted citizenship by theFrench Mandate authorities.[78] The number of Turkish Kurds settled in al-Jazira province during the 1920s was estimated at 20,000 people, out of 100,000 inhabitants, with the remainder of the population being Christians (Syriac, Armenian, Assyrian) and Arabs.[79]: 458
FollowingSyria's independence, policies ofArab nationalism and attempts at forcedArabization became widespread in the country's north, to a large part directed against the Kurdish population.[80][81] The region received little investment or development from the central government and laws discriminated against Kurds owning property, driving cars, working in certain professions and forming political parties.[82] Property was routinely confiscated by government loansharks. After theBa'ath Party seized power in the1963 Syrian coup d'état, non-Arab languages were forbidden at Syrian public schools. This compromised the education of students belonging to minorities like Kurds, Turkmen, and Assyrians.[83][84] Some groups like Armenians, Circassians, and Assyrians were able to compensate by establishing private schools, but Kurdish private schools were also banned.[81][85] Northern Syrian hospitals lacked equipment for advanced treatment and instead patients had to be transferred outside the region. Numerous place names were arabized in the 1960s and 1970s.[84] In his report for the 12th session of the UNHuman Rights Council titledPersecution and Discrimination against Kurdish Citizens in Syria, theUnited Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights held that "Successive Syrian governments continued to adopt a policy of ethnic discrimination and national persecution against Kurds, completely depriving them of their national, democratic and human rights – an integral part of human existence. The government imposed ethnically-based programs, regulations and exclusionary measures on various aspects of Kurds' lives – political, economic, social and cultural."[86] Kurdish cultural festivals likeNewroz were effectively banned.[87]
Kurds celebratingNewroz in Girê Tertebê, near Qamishli, in 1997
In many instances, the Syrian government arbitrarily deprived ethnic Kurdish citizens of their citizenship. The largest such instance was a consequence of a census in 1962, which was conducted for exactly this purpose. 120,000 ethnic Kurdish citizens saw their citizenship arbitrarily taken away and becamestateless.[81][87][88] This status was passed to the children of a "stateless" Kurdish father.[81] In 2010, theHuman Rights Watch (HRW) estimated the number of such "stateless" Kurdish people in Syria at 300,000.[89][90] In 1973, the Syrian authorities confiscated 750 square kilometres (290 square miles) of fertile agricultural land inAl-Hasakah Governorate, which was owned and cultivated by tens of thousands of Kurdish citizens, and gave it to Arab families brought in from other provinces.[86][85] In 2007, in the Al-Hasakah Governorate, 600 square kilometres (230 square miles) aroundAl-Malikiyah were granted to Arab families, while tens of thousands of Kurdish inhabitants of the villages concerned were evicted.[86] These and other expropriations was part of the so-called "Arab Belt initiative" which aimed to change the demographic fabric of the resource-rich region.[81] Accordingly, relations between the Syrian government and the Syrian Kurdish population were tense.[91]
The response of northern Syrian parties and movements to the policies ofHafez al-Assad's Ba'athist government varied greatly. Some parties opted for resistance, whereas others such as theKurdish Democratic Progressive Party[92] and theAssyrian Democratic Party[93] attempted to work within the system, hoping to bring about changes through soft pressure.[94] In general, parties that openly represented certain ethnic and religious minorities were not allowed to participate in elections, but their politicians were occasionally allowed to run as Independents.[95] Some Kurdish politicians won seats during theSyrian elections in 1990.[96] The government also recruited Kurdish officials, in particular as mayors, to ease ethnic relations. Regardless, northern Syrian ethnic groups remained deliberately underrepresented in the bureaucracy, and many Kurdish majority areas were run by Arab officials from other parts of the country.[95] Security and intelligence agencies worked hard to suppress dissidents, and most Kurdish parties remained underground movements. The government monitored, though generally allowed this "sub-state activity" because the northern minorities including the Kurds rarely caused unrest with the exception of the2004 Qamishli massacre.[95] The situation improved after the death of Hafez al-Assad and the election of his son,Bashar al-Assad, under whom the number of Kurdish officials grew.[97]
Despite theBa'athist internal policies which officially suppressed a Kurdish identity, the Syrian government allowed theKurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) to set up training camps from 1980. The PKK was a militant Kurdish group led byAbdullah Öcalan which waswaging an insurgency against Turkey. Syria and Turkey were hostile toward each other at the time, resulting in the use of the PKK as proxy group.[95][39] The party began to deeply influence the Syrian Kurdish population in theAfrin andAyn al-Arab Districts, where it promoted Kurdish identity through music, clothing, popular culture, and social activities. In contrast, the PKK remained much less popular among Kurds inal-Hasakah Governorate, where other Kurdish parties maintained more influence. Many Syrian Kurds developed a long-lasting sympathy for the PKK, and a large number, possibly more than 10,000, joined its insurgency in Turkey.[95] A rapprochement between Syria and Turkey brought an end to this phase in 1998, when Öcalan and the PKK were formally expelled from northern Syria. Regardless, the PKK maintained a clandestine presence in the region.[95][39]
In 2002, the PKK and allied groups organized theKurdistan Communities Union (KCK) to implement Öcalan's ideas in various Middle Eastern countries. A KCK branch was also set up in Syria, led by Sofi Nureddin and known as "KCK-Rojava". In an attempt to outwardly distance the Syrian branch from the PKK,[39] theDemocratic Union Party (PYD) was established asde facto Syrian "successor" of the PKK in 2003.[95] The "People's Defense Units" (YPG), a paramilitary wing of the PYD, was also founded during this time, but remained dormant.[98]
Establishment of de facto autonomy and war against ISIL
In 2011, acivil uprising erupted in Syria, prompting hasty government reforms. One of the issues addressed during this time was the status of Syria's stateless Kurds, as President Bashar al-Assad granted about 220,000 Kurds citizenship.[97] In course of the next months, the crisis in Syriaescalated into a civil war. The armedSyrian opposition seized control of several regions, while security forces were overstretched. In mid-2012 the government responded to this development by withdrawing its military from three mainly Kurdish areas[99][100] and leaving control to local militias. This has been described as an attempt by the Assad regime to keep the Kurdish population out of the initial civil uprising and civil war.[99]
Map of the territory of the region over time
Map of the changing territory controlled by the region in February 2014, June 2015, October 2016, April 2018, and March 2020
Existing underground Kurdish political parties, namely the PYD and theKurdish National Council (KNC), joined to form theKurdish Supreme Committee (KSC). The People's Protection Units (YPG) militia was reestablished to defend Kurdish-inhabited areas in northern Syria. In July 2012, the YPG established control in the towns ofKobanî,Amuda andAfrin, and the Kurdish Supreme Committee established a joint leadership council to administer the towns. Soon YPG also gained control of the cities ofAl-Malikiyah,Ras al-Ayn,al-Darbasiyah, andal-Muabbada and parts ofHasakah andQamishli.[101][102][103] Doing so, the YPG and its female wing, theWomen's Protection Units (YPJ), mostly battled factions of theFree Syrian Army, and Islamist militias like theal-Nusra Front andJabhat Ghuraba al-Sham. It also eclipsed rival Kurdish militias,[104][99] and absorbed some government loyalist groups.[105] According to researcher Charles R. Lister, the government's withdrawal and concurrent rise of the PYD "raised many eyebrows", as the relationship between the two entities was "highly contentious" at the time. The PYD was known to oppose certain government policies, but had also strongly criticised the Syrian opposition.[103]
Military situation in December 2015, the SDF would be successful in pushing ISIS out of northern Syria
Following a deadly PYD repression of opposition demonstrations in Amuda, the Kurdish National Council withdrew from the Kurdish Supreme Committee. Unopposed, the PYD's political coalition,Movement for a Democratic Society (TEV-DEM), controlled the Kurdish Supreme Committee until the latter was dissolved by the cantonal Democratic Autonomous Administration.[106] On 19 July 2013, the PYD announced that it had written a constitution for an "autonomous Syrian Kurdish region", and planned to hold referendum to approve the constitution in October 2013. Qamishli served as firstde facto capital of the PYD-led governing body,[12] which was official called the "Interim Transitional Administration".[13] The announcement was widely denounced by both moderate as well as Islamist factions of the Syrian opposition.[12] In January 2014, three areas declared their autonomy as cantons (laterAfrin Region,Jazira Region andEuphrates Region) and an interimconstitution (also known associal contract) was approved.[107] The Syrian opposition and the Kurdish parties belonging to the KNC condemned this move, regarding the canton system as illegal, authoritarian, and supportive of the Syrian government.[43] The PYD countered that the constitution was open to review and amendment, and that the KNC had been consulted on its drafting beforehand.[108] From September 2014 to spring 2015, the YPG forces in Kobanî Canton, supported by some Free Syrian Army militias and leftist international andKurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) volunteers, fought and finally repelled an assault by theIslamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) during theSiege of Kobanî,[109] and in the YPG'sTell Abyad offensive of summer of 2015, the regions of Jazira and Kobanî were connected.[110]
After the YPG victory over ISIL in Kobanî in March 2015, an alliance between YPG and the United States was formed, which greatly worried Turkey, because Turkey stated the YPG was a clone of theKurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) which Turkey (and the U.S. and the E.U.) designate asterrorists.[99] In December 2015, theSyrian Democratic Council was created. On 17 March 2016, at a TEV-DEM-organized conference inRmelan the establishment theDemocratic Federation of Rojava – Northern Syria was declared in the areas they controlled in Northern Syria.[111] The declaration was quickly denounced by both the Syrian government and theNational Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces.[45]
In March 2016,Hediya Yousef andMansur Selum were elected co-chairpersons for the executive committee to organise a constitution for the region, to replace the 2014 constitution.[8] Yousef said the decision to set up a federal government was in large part driven by the expansion of territories captured from Islamic State: "Now, after the liberation of many areas, it requires us to go to a wider and more comprehensive system that can embrace all the developments in the area, that will also give rights to all the groups to represent themselves and to form their own administrations".[112] In July 2016, a draft for the new constitution was presented, based on the principles of the 2014 constitution, mentioning all ethnic groups living in Northern Syria and addressing their cultural, political and linguistic rights.[113][114] The main political opposition to the constitution have beenKurdish nationalists, in particular the KNC, who have different ideological aspirations than the TEV-DEM coalition.[115] On 28 December 2016, after a meeting of the 151-member Syrian Democratic Council inRmelan, a new constitution was resolved; despite objections by 12 Kurdish parties, the region was renamed the "Democratic Federation of Northern Syria", removing the name "Rojava".[116]
AYPG sniper in defense of Northern Syria from Turkey,Afrin
Since 2012, when the first YPG pockets appeared, Turkey had been alarmed by the presence of PKK-related forces at its southern border and grew concerned when the YPG entered into an alliance with the US to oppose ISIS forces in the region.[117] The Turkish government refused to allow aid to be sent to the YPG during the Siege of Kobanî. This led to theKurdish riots, the breakdown of the2013–2015 peace process in July 2015 and the renewal ofarmed conflict between the PKK and Turkish forces. According to the Turkish pro-government newspaperDaily Sabah, the YPG's parent organisation, the PYD, provided the PKK with militants, explosives, arms and ammunition.[118]
In August 2016, Turkey launchedOperation Euphrates Shield to prevent the YPG-ledSyrian Democratic Forces (SDF) from linking Afrin Canton (now Afrin Region) with the rest of Rojava and to captureManbij from the SDF. Turkish and Turkish-backed Syrian rebel forces prevented the linking of Rojava's cantons and captured all settlements inJarabulus previously under SDF control.[119] The SDF handed over part of the region to the Syrian government to act as a buffer zone against Turkey.[120] Manbij remained under SDF control.
In early 2018, Turkey launchedOperation Olive Branch alongside the Turkish-backedSyrian National Army to capture the Kurdish-majorityAfrin and oust the YPG/SDF from the region.[121]Afrin Canton, a subdivision of the region, was occupied and over 100,000 civilians were displaced and relocated to Afrin Region'sShahba Canton which remained under SDF, then joint SDF-Syrian Arab Army (SAA) control. The remaining SDF forces later launched anongoing insurgency against the Turkish and Turkish-backed Syrian rebel forces.[122]
In 2019, Turkey launchedOperation Peace Spring against the SDF. On 9 October, theTurkish Air Force launched airstrikes on border towns.[123] On 6 OctoberPresident of the United StatesDonald Trump had ordered United States troops to withdraw from northeastern Syria where they had beenproviding support to the SDF.[124] Journalists called the withdrawal "a serious betrayal to the Kurds" and "a catastrophic blow to US credibility as an ally and Washington's standing on the world stage"; one journalist stated that "this was one of the worst US foreign policy disasters since theIraq War".[125][126][127][128] Turkish and Turkish-backed Syrian rebel forces captured 68 settlements, includingRas al-Ayn,Tell Abyad,Suluk,Mabrouka andManajir during the 9-day operation before a 120-hour ceasefire was announced.[129][130][131][132][133] The operation was condemned by the international community,[134] and human rights violations by Turkish forces were reported.[135] Media outlets labelled the attack "no surprise" because Turkish presidentRecep Tayyip Erdoğan had for months warned that the presence of the YPG on the Turkish-Syrian border despite theNorthern Syria Buffer Zone was unacceptable.[99] An unintended consequence of the attack was that it raised the worldwide popularity and legitimacy of the northeastern Syrian administration, and several PYD and YPG representatives became internationally known to an unprecedented degree. However, these events caused tensions within the KCK, as differences emerged between the PKK and PYD leadership. The PYD was determined to maintain the regional autonomy and hoped for a continued alliance with the United States. In contrast, the PKK central command was now willing to restart negotiations with Turkey, distrusted the United States, and emphasized the international success of its leftist ideology over the survival of Rojava as administrative entity.[39]
Fall of the Assad regime
This section needs to beupdated. Please help update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information.(March 2025)
Geopolitical changes during the opposition offensives, rebels in green and DAANES in yellow
Despite the collapse of the Assad regime, Turkey and Turkish-backedSNA fighters in northern Syria launched anoffensive against SDF forces.[140][141] On 9 December, SNA fighters captured the city ofManbij.[142] The Turkish/SNA offensive continued with the2024 Kobani clashes[143] which ended in a victory for the SDF. This came following a US mediated truce[144] and an SNA failure to capture Tishrin Dam and Qara-Qowzak Bridge.[145] This was followed by a counter-offensive in theEast Aleppo offensive (2024–2025).
The political system of the region is based on its adopted constitution, officially titled "Charter of the Social Contract".[155][176] The first version of the constitution was ratified on 9 January 2014 and provides that all residents of the region shall enjoy fundamental rights such asgender equality andfreedom of religion.[155] It also provides forproperty rights.[177] The region's system of community government hasdirect democratic aspirations.[178]
For a former diplomat like me, I found it confusing: I kept looking for a hierarchy, the singular leader, or signs of a government line, when, in fact, there was none; there were just groups. There was none of that stifling obedience to the party, or the obsequious deference to the "big man"—a form of government all too evident just across the borders, in Turkey to the north, and the Kurdish regional government of Iraq to the south. The confident assertiveness of young people was striking.
The politics of the region has been described as having "libertarian transnational aspirations" influenced by the PKK's shift towardanarchism, but also includes various "tribal, ethno-sectarian, capitalist and patriarchal structures".[177] The region has a "co-governance" policy in which each position at each level of government in the region includes a "female equivalent of equal authority" to a male.[185] Similarly, there are aspirations for equal political representation of all ethno-religious components – Arabs, Kurds and Assyrians being the most sizeable ones. This has been compared this to theLebaneseconfessionalist system, which is based on that country's major religions.[177][186][187][188]
The PYD-led rule triggered protests in various areas since they first captured territory. In 2019, residents of tens of villages in the easternDeir ez-Zor Governorate demonstrated for two weeks, regarding the new regional leadership as Kurdish-dominated and non-inclusive, citing arrests of suspected ISIL members, looting of oil, lack of infrastructure as well as forced conscription into the SDF as reasons. The protests resulted in deaths and injuries.[189] In 2016, researcher Kheder Khaddour stated that leaders of local councils inRaqqa Governorate had been chosen by the SDF in a top-down way, and that the vetting process for identifying ISIL members placed obstacles for the return of refugees. He stated that there was dissent about the new structures as well as a lack of trust between the SDF and some demographic components of the local population.[190]
Qamishli initially served as thede facto capital of the administration,[12][113] but the area's governing body later relocated toAyn Issa.[4]
Separation of powers
During 2018–2019,separation of powers in the political structure included three major components: theSyrian Democratic Council as a representative body of political parties and organisations; AANES itself; and TEV-DEM as a representative body of trade unions and civil society associations.[146]: 17 AANES itself is approximately structured in theMontesquieu model, having theExecutive Council with executive oversight responsibilities via offices and commissions; the General Council which coordinates legislation and aims to promote legal unification between regions; and the Justice Council that aims to coordinate the justice systems of the regions.[146]: 20, 30
In the 2023 constitution, thePeople's Democratic Council has legislative power under Article 92, and the Law Council "develops laws and regulations based on ethics and democratic principles of rights" under Article 103.[6]
Communes are intended to be the core political body, with a succession of higher level (neighbourhood, sub-district, district, canton, region) councils. Decisions are expected to be made according to thesubsidiarity principle – at the most local level appropriate for the decision.[146]: 23, 24 Under the 2018–2019 structure, councils and committees have agender quota requiring minima of 40% women and 40% men.[146]: 21
Regions of the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria
Article 8 of the 2014 constitution stipulates that "All Cantons in the autonomous regions are founded on the principle of local self-government. Cantons may freely elect their representatives and representative bodies, and may pursue their rights insofar as it does not contravene the articles of the Charter."[176] The cantons were later reorganized into regions with subordinate cantons/provinces, areas, districts and communes. On 6 September 2018, during a meeting of theSyrian Democratic Council inAyn Issa, a new name for the region was adopted, the "Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria", encompassing the Euphrates, Afrin, and Jazira regions as well as the local civil councils in the regions of Raqqa, Manbij, Tabqa, and Deir ez-Zor. During the meeting, a 70-member "General Council for the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria" was formed.[54][4][55]
The SDF withdrew from theAfrin region in 2018[191] and from the Manbij region in 2024.[192]
In December 2015, during a meeting of the region's representatives inAl-Malikiyah, theSyrian Democratic Council (SDC) was established to serve as the political representative of theSyrian Democratic Forces.[193] The co-leaders selected to lead the SDC at its founding were prominent human rights activistHaytham Manna andTEV-DEM Executive Board member Îlham Ehmed.[194][195] The SDC appoints an Executive Council which deal with the economy, agriculture, natural resources, and foreign affairs.[196] General elections were planned for 2014 and 2018,[196] but this was postponed due to fighting.
Elections
Method
Per the 2023Constitution of AANES, three fifths of municipal representatives are elected by the general population and two fifths are representatives chosen by demographic components. The AANES-level Democratic Council of People of the North and East Syria is required to have fifty percent women.[197]
The municipal governing bodies are referred to as city councils, town councils and for the smallest units, communes. As of July 2025, there were 36 city councils, 152 town councils and 3950 communes.[197]
Commune elections were held on 22 September 2017. 12,421 candidates competed for around 3,700 communal positions during the elections, which were organized by the High Electoral Commission.[199]
Elections for the city and town councils of the Jazira Region, Euphrates Region and Afrin Regionwere held in December 2017.[19] Most of Afrin Region was occupied by Turkish-led forces in early 2018, though the administrative division continued to operate fromTell Rifaat under joint YPG-Syrian Army control.[54][200][201]
Under the rule of theBa'ath Party, school education consisted of onlyArabic language public schools, supplemented by Assyrian private confessional schools.[203] In 2015, the region's administration introduced primary education in thenative language (eitherKurdish or Arabic) and mandatorybilingual education (Kurdish and Arabic) for public schools,[204][205][206] with English as a mandatory third language.[207] There are ongoing disagreements and negotiations over curriculums with the Syrian central government,[208][209] which generally still pays the teachers in public schools.[204][210][211][212]
High school students in Tev-Cand in a classroom, dancing during a class on Syrian culture
In August 2016, the Ourhi Centre was founded by the Assyrian community in the city of Qamishli, to educate teachers in order to makeSyriac-Aramaic an additional language in public schools in Jazira Region,[213] which then started in the 2016/17 academic year.[209] According to the region's Education Committee, in 2016/2017 "three curriculums have replaced the old one, to include teaching in three languages: Kurdish, Arabic and Syriac."[214] In August 2017 Galenos Yousef Issa of the Ourhi Centre announced that the Syriac curriculum would be expanded to grade 6, which earlier had been limited to grade 3, with teachers being assigned to Syriac schools inAl-Hasakah,Al-Qahtaniyah andAl-Malikiyah.[215][216] At the start of the academic year 2018–2019, the curricula in Kurdish and Arabic had been expanded to grades 1–12 and Syriac to grades 1–9. "Jineology" classes had also been introduced.[217] In general, schools are encouraged to teach the administration's "uptopian doctrine" which promotes diversity, democracy, and the ideas ofAbdullah Öcalan.[152][218] Local reactions to the changes to the school system and curriculum were mixed. While many praised the new system because it encouraged tolerance and allowed Kurds and other minorities to be taught in their own languages,[152] others have criticised it asde facto compulsory indoctrination.[219]
The federal, regional and local administrations in the region put much emphasis on promoting libraries and educational centers, to facilitate learning and social and artistic activities. Examples are the Nahawand Center for Developing Children's Talents inAmuda (est. 2015) and the Rodî û Perwîn Library inKobani (May 2016).[220]
For Assyrian private confessional schools there had at first been no changes.[209][221] However, in August 2018 it was reported that the region's authorities was trying to implement its own Syriac curriculum in private Christian schools that have been continuing to use an Arabic curriculum with limited Syriac classes approved by the Assad regime and originally developed by Syrian Education Ministry in cooperation with Christian clergy in the 1950s. The threatening of the closure of schools not complying with this resulted in protests erupting in Qamishli.[222][223][224] A deal was later reached in September 2018 between the region's authorities and the local Syriac Orthodox archbishopric, where the two first grades in these schools would learn the region's Syriac curriculum and grades three to six would continue to learn the Damascus approved curriculum.[225][226]
While there was no institution of tertiary education on the territory of the region at the onset of the Syrian Civil War, an increasing number of such institutions have been established by the regional administrations in the region since.
In September 2014, theMesopotamian Social Sciences Academy in Qamishli started classes.[155] More such academies designed under a non-traditional academic philosophy and concept are in the process of founding or planning.[229]
In August 2015, the traditionally-designedUniversity of Afrin in Afrin started teaching, with initial programs in literature, engineering and economics, including institutes for medicine, topographic engineering, music and theater, business administration and the Kurdish language.[230] After the Turkish army invaded Afrin in 2018, several of it students were transferred to theUniversity of Rojava in Qamishli.[231]
In July 2016, Jazira Canton Board of Education started the University of Rojava in Qamishli, with faculties for Medicine, Engineering, Sciences, and Arts and Humanities. Programs taught include health, computer and agricultural engineering; physics, chemistry, history, psychology, geography, mathematics and primary school teaching and Kurdish literature.[220][232] There is an additional Faculty for Petroleum and Pharmacology inRmelan.[231] Its language of instruction is Kurdish, and with an agreement withParis 8 University in France for cooperation, the university opened registration for students in the academic year 2016–2017.[233]
In August 2016Jazira Canton police forcestook control of the remaining parts ofHasakah city, which included the Hasakah campus of the Arabic-languageAl-Furat University, and with mutual agreement the institution continues to be operated under the authority of the Damascus government's Ministry of Higher Education.
Incorporating theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights, theInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, theInternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as other internationally recognized human rights conventions, the 2014Constitution of North and East Syria guaranteesfreedom of speech andfreedom of the press. As a result, a diverse media landscape has developed in the region,[234][235] in each of theKurdish,Arabic,Syriac-Aramaic andTurkish languages of the land, as well as in English, and media outlets frequently use more than one language. Among the most prominent media in the region areHawar News Agency andARA News agencies and websites as well as TV outlets Rojava Kurdistan TV,Ronahî TV, and the bimonthly magazineNudem. A landscape of local newspapers and radio stations has developed. However, media agencies often face economic pressure, as was demonstrated by the closure of news websiteWelati in May 2016.[236] In addition, the autonomous regions have imposed some limits on press freedom, for example forcing the press to get work permits. These can be cancelled, thereby curtailing the ability of certain press agencies to operate. However, the extent of these restrictions differed greatly from area to area. By 2016, Kobani Canton was the least restrictive, followed by Jazira Canton which closely monitored and occasionally regulated press activity.[237] Afrin Canton was the most restrictive, and many local reporters operated anonymously.[238]
Political extremism in the context of the Syrian Civil War can put media outlets under pressure; for example in April 2016 the premises ofArta FM ("the first, and only, independent radio station staffed and broadcast by Syrians inside Syria") inAmuda was threatened and burned down by unidentified assailants.[239][240] In December 2018 the Rojava Information Center was established.[241] During theTurkish military operation in Afrin, theKDP-affiliated Iraqi KurdishRudaw Media Network was also banned from reporting in the region.[242] On 2 September 2019, theIraqi Kurdistan-basedKurdistan 24 network had its license to work in the region withdrawn and had its offices confiscated by Rojava authorities.[243] International media and journalists operate with few restrictions in the region, one of the only regions in Syria where they can operate with some degree of freedom.[235] Internet connections in the region are often slow due to inadequate infrastructure. Internet lines are operated bySyrian Telecom, which as of January 2017 is working on a major extension of the fibre optic cable network in southern Jazira Region.[244]
After the establishment of the de facto autonomous region, the Center of Art and Democratic Culture, located in Jazira Region, has become a venue for aspiring artists who showcase their work.[245][246] Among major cultural events in the region is the annualFestival of Theater in March/April as well as theRojava Short Story Festival in June, both in the city of Qamishli, and theAfrin Short Film Festival in April.[247]
The Jazira Region is a major wheat and cotton producer and has a considerable oil industry. The Euphrates Region suffered most destruction of the three regions and has huge challenges in reconstruction, and has recently seen somegreenhouse agriculture construction.Price controls are managed by local committees, which can set the price of basic goods such as food and medical goods.[248]
It has been theorized that the Assad government had deliberately underdeveloped parts of Northern Syria in order to Arabize the region and make secession attempts less likely.[249] During the Syrian Civil War, the infrastructure of the region on average experienced less destruction than other parts of Syria. In May 2016, Ahmed Yousef, head of the Economic Body and chairman of Afrin University, stated that at the time, the economic output of the region (including agriculture, industry and oil) accounted for about 55% of Syria's gross domestic product.[250] In 2014, the Syrian government was still paying some state employees,[251] but fewer than before.[252] However, the administration of the region stated that "none of our projects are financed by the regime".[253]
At first, there were nodirect orindirect taxes on people or businesses in the region; instead, the administration raised money mainly throughtariffs and selling oil and other natural resources.[254][248] However, in July 2017, it was reported that the administration in the Jazira Region had started to collectincome tax to provide for public services in the region.[255] In May 2016, TheWall Street Journal reported that traders in Syria experience the region as "the one place where they aren't forced to pay bribes."[256] The highest amount of energy is produced by theTabqa Dam on theEuphrates river, Syria's largest.[257]
The main sources of revenue for the autonomous region have been presented as: 1. Public properties such as grain silos and oil and gas in the Jazira Region, 2. Local taxation and customs fees taken at the border crossings, 3. Service delivery, 4. Remittances from Iraq and Turkey, and 5. Local donations. In 2015, the autonomous administration shared information about the region's finances where its 2014 revenue was about LS 3 billion (≈US$5.8 million) of which 50% was spent on "self-defense and protection", 18% for the Jazira Canton (now Jazira Region), 8.5% for the Kobani Canton (now Euphrates Region), 8.5% for the Afrin Canton (later Afrin Region), 15% for the "Internal Committee" and any remainder was a reserve for the next year.[44] In 2021, the DAANES has by far the highest averagesalaries andstandard of living throughout Syria, with salaries being twice as large as in regime-controlled Syria, following the collapse of theSyrian pound the DAANES doubled salaries to maintaininflation, and allow for good wages.[258] The DAANES still faced challenges with distribution,food security, andhealthcare.[259][260]
Oil and food production is substantial,[196] so they are important exports. Agricultural products include sheep, grain and cotton. Important imports are consumer goods and auto parts.[261] Trade with Turkey and access to humanitarian and military aid is difficult due to a blockade by Turkey.[262] Turkey does not allow business people or goods to cross its border.[263] The blockade from adjacent territories held by Turkey and ISIL, and partially also the KRG, temporarily caused heavy distortions of relative prices in Jazira Region and Euphrates Region (while separate, Afrin Region borders government-controlled territory since February 2016); for example in Jazira Region and Euphrates Region, through 2016 petrol cost only half as much as bottled water.[264]
TheSemalka Border Crossing withIraqi Kurdistan had been intermittently closed by theKurdistan Regional Government (KRG), but has been open permanently since June 2016,[265][266] and along with the establishment of a corridor to Syrian government controlled territory in April 2017,[267] economic exchange has increasingly normalized. Further, in May 2017 in northern Iraq, thePopular Mobilization Forces fighting ISIL cleared a corridor connecting the autonomous region and Iraqi government-controlled territory.[268][269][270]
The autonomous administration is supporting efforts for workers to form cooperatives, such as this sewing cooperative in Derik.
The autonomous region is ruled by a coalition which have been described as pursuing a model of economy that blends co-operative and private enterprise.[271] In 2012, the PYD launched what it called the "Social Economy Plan", later renamed the "People's Economy Plan" (PEP).[272]Private property and entrepreneurship are protected under the principle of "ownership by use". Dr. Dara Kurdaxi, a regional official, has stated: "The method in Rojava is not so much against private property, but rather has the goal of putting private property in the service of all the peoples who live in Rojava."[273] Communes and co-operatives have been established to provide essentials.[274] Co-operatives account for a large proportion of agricultural production and are active in construction, factories, energy production, livestock, pistachio and roasted seeds, and public markets.[271] Several hundred instances ofcollective farming occurred across towns and villages in the region, with communes consisting of approximately 20–35 people.[275] According to the region's "Ministry of Economics", approximately three-quarters of all property has been placed under community ownership and a third of production has been transferred to direct management byworkers' councils.[276]
Syrian civil laws are valid in the region if they do not conflict with the Constitution of the autonomous region. One example for amendment is personal status law, which in Syria is based onSharia[277] and applied bySharia Courts,[278] while thesecular autonomous region proclaims absolute equality of women under the law, allowingcivil marriage and banningforced marriage,polygamy[279][280] and underage marriage.[281][282]
A new criminal justice approach was implemented that emphasizesrestoration over retribution.[283] The death penalty was abolished.[284] Prisons house mostly people charged with terrorist activity related to ISIL and other extremist groups.[285] A September 2015 report ofAmnesty International stated that 400 people were incarcerated by the region's authorities and criticized deficiencies indue process of the judicial system of the region.[286][155][287]
At the local level, citizens createPeace and Consensus Committees, which make group decisions on minor criminal cases and disputes as well as in separate committees resolve issues of specific concern to women's rights like domestic violence and marriage. At the regional level, citizens (who need not be trained jurists) are elected by the regionalPeople's Councils to serve on seven-memberPeople's Courts. At the next level are fourAppeals Courts, composed of trained jurists. The court of last resort is theRegional Court, which serves the region as a whole. Separate from this system, theConstitutional Court renders decisions on compatibility of acts of government and legal proceedings with the constitution of the region (called the Social Contract).[284]
Policing in the region is performed by theAsayish armed formation. Asayish was established on 25 July 2013 to fill the gap of security when the Syrian security forces withdrew.[288] Under theConstitution of North and East Syria, policing is a competence of the regions. The Asayish forces of the regions are composed of 26 official bureaus that aim to provide security and solutions to social problems. The six main units of Asayish are Checkpoints Administration, Anti-Terror Forces Command (HAT), Intelligence Directorate, Organized Crime Directorate, Traffic Directorate and Treasury Directorate. 218 Asayish centers were established and 385 checkpoints with 10 Asayish members in each checkpoint were set up. 105 Asayish offices provide security against ISIL on the frontlines across Northern Syria. Larger cities have general directorates responsible for all aspects of security including road controls. Each region has a HAT command, and each Asayish center organizes itself autonomously.[288]
Throughout the region, the municipal Civilian Defense Forces (HPC)[289] and the regionalSelf-Defense Forces (HXP)[290] also serve local-level security. In Jazira Region, the Asayish are further complemented by the AssyrianSutoro police force, which is organized in every area with Assyrian population, provides security and solutions to social problems in collaboration with other Asayish units.[288] TheKhabour Guards andNattoreh, though not police units, also have a presence in the area, providing security in towns along theKhabur River. TheBethnahrain Women's Protection Forces also maintain a police branch. In the areas taken from ISIL during theRaqqa campaign, theRaqqa Internal Security Forces and Manbij Internal Security Forces operated as police forces. Deir ez-Zor also maintain an Internal Security Forces unit.
Satellite images of the village ofHusseiniya in 2014 and 2015, reportedly leveled by the YPG.
In the course of the Syrian Civil War, including the years 2014 and 2015, reports byHuman Rights Watch (HRW) andAmnesty International stated thatmilitias associated with the autonomous region were committing war crimes, in particular members of thePeople's Protection Units (YPG).[293][294] The reports from 2014 include reports of arbitrary arrests and torture, other reports include the use ofchild soldiers.[295][296][297] After the report, the YPG publicly accepted the deficiencies[295] and in October 2015 the YPG demobilized 21 minors from the military service in its ranks.[298] Reports have been comprehensively debated and contested by both the YPG and other human rights organizations.[299][300] In 2018, HRW again accused the YPG of recruiting minors. The YPG responded that if 16- and 17-year-olds are hired, the relatives are notified, but do not have to consent, and the minors are kept away from combat zones.[301] Since September 2015, the YPG have received human rights training fromGeneva Call and other international organizations.[302] A September 2020 article fromSyria Direct found that the SDF was continuing to recruit child soldiers, despite signing an action plan on July 1, 2019, with theUnited Nations to "end and prevent the recruitment and use of child soldiers."[303]
SDFYazidis praying in a Yazidi temple, with a mural of the holyMelek Taus, in DAANES following the expulsion ofISIS
The region's civil government has been hailed in international media for human rights advancement in particularin the legal system, concerningwomen's rights,ethnic minority rights,freedom of Speech and Press and forhosting inbound refugees.[304][283][305][306] The political agenda of "trying to break the honor-based religious and tribal rules that confine women" is controversial in conservative quarters of society.[281] Conscription into theSelf-Defence Forces (HXP) has been called a human rights violation by those who call the region's institutions illegitimate, whilst extra-legal abduction into military service has been reported, such as in 2014 when a 15-year-old girl was kidnapped and recruited into theYPJ.[307][308]
Some persistent issues in the region concernethnic minority rights. One issue of contention is the consequence ofBaathist Syrian government's expropriation of land from Kurdish owners and settling of tribal Arabs there in 1973 and 2007.[86][81][85] There have been calls to expel the settlers and return the land to its previous owners, which has led the political leadership of the region to press the Syrian government for a comprehensive solution.[309]
During the ongoing Syrian Civil War, organizations such as the Turkish government,[310] Amnesty International[311] and the Middle East Observer[312][313] have stated that SDF was forcibly displacing inhabitants of captured areas with predominantly Arab population such as Tell Abyad. These displacements were considered attempts atethnic cleansing.[314] However, the head of theSyrian Observatory for Human Rights rebutted these reports[315] and the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry find no evidence of YPG or SDF forces committing ethnic cleansing in order to change the demographic composition of territories under their control.[165]
AYPJ member next to a largereservoir in Northern Syria
The demographics of the region have historically been highly diverse, with several major shifts in regard to which groups form majorities or minorities in the last centuries.[p] TheAl-Hasakah Governorate historically been the domain of nomad and sedentary Arabs.[320] Most of the Kurdish population in the area have immigrated from Turkey during the 20th century.[321] One major shift in modern times was in the early part of the 20th century due to theAssyrian andArmenian genocides, when many Assyrians and Armenians fled to Syria from Turkey. In the 1920s after the failedKurdish rebellions inKemalist Turkey, there was a large influx of Kurds to Syria's northeast, called "Jazira province" at the time. It is estimated that 25,000 Kurds fled at this time to Syria, underFrench Mandate authorities, who encouraged their immigration,[322] and granted them Syrian citizenship.[323] Consequently, the French official reports show the existence of at most 45 Kurdish villages in Jazira prior to 1927. A new wave of refugees arrived in 1929.[324] The mandatory authorities continued to encourage Kurdish immigration into Syria, and by 1939, the villages numbered between 700 and 800.[324] Another account by Sir John Hope Simpson estimated the number of Kurds in Jazira province at 20,000 out of 100,000 people at the end of 1930.[79]: 556 The number of Kurds continued to grow and the French geographers Fevret and Gibert estimated that in 1953 out of the total 146,000 inhabitants of Jazira, agriculturalist Kurds made up 60,000 (41%), nomad Arabs 50,000 (34%), and a quarter of the population were Christians.[320]
Under the French Mandate of Syria, newly arriving Kurds were granted citizenship byFrench Mandate authorities[78] and enjoyed considerable rights as the French Mandate authority encouraged minority autonomy as part of adivide and rule strategy and recruited heavily from the Kurds and other minority groups, such asAlawite andDruze, for its local armed forces.[325] The last significant wave of Kurdish incoming migration from Turkey happened between 1945 and 1961 which strongly contributed to the growth of al-Hasakah Governorate's population from 240,000 to 305,000 between 1954 and 1961.[326] In addition to the demographic changes brought about by the Kurdish immigration from Turkey, the Syrian government initiated Arabization policy. Therefore, 4000 Arab families from areas flooded by the Tabqa Dam in Raqqa and Aleppo were resettled in new village in al-Hasakah Governorate.[80][81]
Another shift in modern times was the Baath policy of settling additional Arab population in northern Syria, while displacing local Kurds.[80][81] Most recently, during the Syrian Civil War, many refugees have fled to the north of the country. Some ethnic Arab citizens from Iraq have fled to northern Syria as well.[306][327][328] However, as of January 2018, only two million people are estimated to remain in the area under the region's administration with estimates of around half a million people emigrating since the beginning of the civil war, to a large degree because of the economic hardships the region has faced during the war.[329] As a result of the civil war, estimates as to the ethnic composition of northern Syria vary widely, ranging from claims about a Kurdish majority and Arab minority to claims about Kurds being a small minority;[330]Al Jazeera stated in October 2019 that just 10 percent of the 4.5 million inhabitants of northern and northeastern Syria were Kurds.[331]
Kurds are anethnic group[341] living in northeastern and northwestern Syria, culturally and linguistically classified among theIranian peoples.[342][343] Many Kurds consider themselves descended from the ancient Iranian people of theMedes,[344] using a calendar dating from 612 BC, when theAssyrian capital ofNineveh was conquered by the Medes.[345] Kurds formed 55% of the 2010 population of what now is both Jazira Region and Euphrates Region.[249]
Two ethnic groups have a significant presence in certain regions of Northern Syria:
The streets of Qamishli during Christmas
Assyrians are anethnic group.[346] Their presence in Syria is in theJazira Region of the autonomous region, particularly in the urban areas (Qamishli,al-Hasakah,Ras al-Ayn,Al-Malikiyah,Al-Qahtaniyah), in the northeastern corner and in villages along theKhabur River in theTell Tamer area. They traditionally speak varieties ofNortheastern Neo-Aramaic, a Semitic language.[347] There are many Assyrians among recent refugees to Northern Syria, fleeing Islamist violence elsewhere in Syria back to their traditional lands.[348] In the secular polyethnic political climate of the region, theDawronoye modernization movement has a growing influence on Assyrian identity in the 21st century.[149]
Turkmen are anethnic group with a major presence in the area between Afrin Region and Euphrates Region, where they form regional majorities in the countryside fromAzaz andMare' toJarabulus, and a minor presence in Afrin Region and Euphrates Region.
Regarding the status of different languages in the autonomous region, its "Social Contract" stipulates that "all languages in Northern Syria are equal in all areas of life, including social, educational, cultural, and administrative dealings. Every people shall organize its life and manage its affairs using its mother tongue."[349] In practice, Arabic and Kurmanji are predominantly used across all areas and for most official documents, with Syriac being mainly used in the Jazira Region with some usage across all areas.
The four main languages spoken in Northern Syria are the following, and are from three different language families:
This list includes all cities and towns in the region with more than 10,000 inhabitants. The population figures are given according to the 2004 Syrian census.[354]
The relations of the region to theBa'athist government were determined within the context of theSyrian civil war. The2012 constitution of Syria and theConstitution of the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria were legally incompatible with respect to legislative and executive authority. In the military realm, combat between thePeople's Defense Units (YPG) and Syrian government forces were rare, in the most instances some of the territory still controlled by the Syrian government in Qamishli and al-Hasakah has been lost to the YPG. In some military campaigns, in particular in northern Aleppo governate and in al-Hasakah, YPG and Syrian government forces have tacitly cooperated against Islamist forces, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and others.[23]
In March 2015, the Syrian Information Minister announced that his government considered recognizing the Kurdish autonomy "within the law and constitution".[362] While the region's administration is not invited to theGeneva III peace talks on Syria,[363] or any of the earlier talks, Russia in particular calls for the region's inclusion and does to some degree carry the region's positions into the talks, as documented in Russia's May 2016 draft for a new constitution for Syria.[364] In October 2016, there were reports of a Russian initiative for federalization with a focus on northern Syria, which at its core called to turn the existing institutions of the region into legitimate institutions of Syria; also reported was its rejection for the time being by the Syrian government.[309] The Damascus ruling elite is split over the question whether the new model in the region can work in parallel and converge with the Syrian government, for the benefit of both, or if the agenda should be to centralize again all power at the end of the civil war, necessitating preparation for ultimate confrontation with the region's institutions.[365]
An analysis released in June 2017 described the region's "relationship with the regime fraught but functional" and a "semi-cooperative dynamic".[366] In late September 2017, Syria's Foreign Minister said that Damascus would consider granting Kurds more autonomy in the region once ISIL is defeated.[367]
On 13 October 2019, the SDF announced that it had reached an agreement with the Syrian Army which allowed the latter to enter the SDF-held cities of Manbij and Kobani in order to dissuade a Turkish attack on those cities as part of the cross-border offensive by Turkish and Turkish-backed Syrian rebels.[368] The Syrian Army also deployed in the north of Syria together with the SDF along the Syrian-Turkish border and entered into several SDF-held cities such as Ayn Issa and Tell Tamer.[369][370] Following the creation of theSecond Northern Syria Buffer Zone the SDF stated that it was ready to merge with the Syrian Army if or when a political settlement between the Syrian government and the SDF is achieved.[371]
With the 2024fall of the Assad regime, the autonomous administration was initially in an uncertain position between the ascendant rebel government and the Turkish government, who have been amicable and hostile towards the administration, respectively.[372] On 10 March 2025, anagreement was signed to integrate the SDF into the structures of the transitional government.[373]
Kurdish-inhabited areas in 1992 according to theCIA
The region's dominant political party, theDemocratic Union Party (PYD), is a member organisation of theKurdistan Communities Union (KCK) organization; however, the other KCK member organisations in the neighbouring states (Turkey, Iran and Iraq) with Kurdish minorities are either outlawed (Turkish Kurdistan,Iranian Kurdistan) or politically marginal with respect to other Kurdish parties (Iraq). Expressions of sympathy for Syrian Kurds have been numerous amongKurds in Turkey.[374] During theSiege of Kobanî, some ethnic Kurdish citizens of Turkey crossed the border and volunteered in the defense of the town.[375][376]
The region's relationship with theKurdistan Regional Government in Iraq is complicated. One context is that the governing party there, theKurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), views itself and its affiliated Kurdish parties in other countries as a more conservative and nationalist alternative and competitor to the KCK political agenda and blueprint in general.[158] The political system of Iraqi Kurdistan[377] stands in stark contrast to the region's system. Like the KCK umbrella organization, the PYD has some anti-nationalist ideological leanings while having Kurdish nationalist factions as well.[378] They have traditionally been opposed by the Iraqi-Kurdish KDP-sponsoredKurdish National Council in Syria with more clear Kurdish nationalist leanings.[379]
Aside of the representation offices DAANES has established in France, Sweden, Germany and Switzerland[380] the region's role in the international arena is comprehensive military cooperation of its militias under theSyrian Democratic Forces (SDF) umbrella with the United States and theinternational (US-led) coalition against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.[381][382] In a public statement in March 2016, the day after the declaration of the regions autonomy, U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter praised thePeople's Protection Units (YPG) militia as having "proven to be excellent partners of ours on the ground in fighting ISIL. We are grateful for that, and we intend to continue to do that, recognizing the complexities of their regional role."[383] Late October 2016, U.S. Army Lt. Gen.Stephen Townsend, the commander of the international Anti-ISIL-coalition, said that the SDF would lead the impendingassault on Raqqa, ISIL's stronghold and capital, and that SDF commanders would plan the operation with advice from American and coalition troops.[384] At various times, the U.S. deployed U.S. troops embedded with the SDF to the border between the region and Turkey, in order to deter Turkish aggressions against the SDF.[385][386][387][388][389] In February 2018, theUnited States Department of Defense released a budget blueprint for 2019 with respect to the region, which included $300 million for theSyrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and $250 million for border security.[390] In April 2018, the President ofFrance,Emmanuel Macron dispatched troops toManbij andRmelan in a bid to assistSyrian Democratic Forces (SDF) militias and in order to defuse tensions with Turkey.[391]
In the diplomatic field, the de facto autonomous region lacks any formal recognition. While there is comprehensive activity of reception of the region's representatives[392][393][394][395] and appreciation[396] with a broad range of countries, onlyRussia has on occasion openly supported the region's political ambition offederalization of Syria in the international arena,[309][364] while the U.S. does not.[397][398] After peace talks between Syrian civil war parties in Astana in January 2017, Russia offered a draft for a future constitution of Syria, which would, among other things, change the "Syrian Arab Republic" into the "Republic of Syria", introduce decentralized authorities as well as elements offederalism like "association areas", strengthen the parliament at the cost of the presidency, and realizesecularism by abolishing Islamic jurisprudence as a source of legislation.[399][400][401][402] The region opened official representation offices inMoscow during 2016,[403]Stockholm,[404]Berlin,[405]Paris,[406] andThe Hague.[407] A broad range of public voices in the U.S. and Europe have called for more formal recognition of the region.[305][306][408][409] International cooperation has been in the field of educational and cultural institutions, like the cooperation agreement ofParis 8 University with the newly foundedUniversity of Rojava inQamishli,[233] or planning for aFrench cultural centre inAmuda.[410][411][412]
Cemetery in Kobani
NeighbouringTurkey is consistently hostile, which has been attributed to a perceived threat from the region's emergence, in that it would encourage activism for autonomy amongKurds in Turkey in theKurdish–Turkish conflict. In this context, in particular the region's leadingDemocratic Union Party (PYD) and the YPG militia being members of theKurdistan Communities Union (KCK) network of organisations, which also includes both political and military Kurdish organizations in Turkey itself, including theKurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Turkey's policy towards the region is based on an economic blockade,[305] persistent attempts of international isolation,[413] opposition to the cooperation between the American-led anti-ISIL coalition and the Syrian Democratic Forces,[414] and support ofIslamist opposition fighters hostile to the autonomous region,[415][416][417] with some reports even including ISIL among these.[418][419][420] Turkey has on several occasions militarily attacked the region's territory and defence forces.[421][422][423] This has resulted in some expressions of international solidarity with the region.[q]
On 9 October 2019, Turkey launched anattack on northern Syria "to destroy the terror corridor" on the Turkish southern border, as president Erdogan put it, after US President Donald Trump abandoned his support. Subsequent media reports have speculated that the offensive would lead to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people.[427]
In December 2019, an international conference hosted by the International Alliance for the Defence of Rights and Freedoms (AIDL) was held at the European Parliament which condemned the Turkish invasion of northeastern Syria, and called for the self-declared Autonomous Administration of North East Syria to be recognized and to be included in UN-led Constitutional Committee tasked to draft a new constitution for Syria. The official position of the European Union remained the same however, that the Autonomous Administration should be "respected" and included in talks while rejecting "any recognition in the national sense of the word" and that "the territorial integrity of Syria is fundamental".[428][429]
Accusations of human rights violations, war crimes andethnic cleansing have been made against the YPG since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, such as in the take-over of the border town of Tal Abyad from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and other operations.[27] Some of the accusations have come from Turkey and Turkish-backed Syrian militias and opposition groups in the region, while others have come from numerous human rights organizations, as well as Western and regional journalists.[430][431][432][433]Amnesty International have gone on fact-finding missions, stating that:
"By deliberately demolishing civilian homes, in some cases razing and burning entire villages, displacing their inhabitants with no justifiable military grounds, the Autonomous Administration is abusing its authority and brazenly flouting international humanitarian law, in attacks that amount to war crimes."
and:
"In its fight against IS, the Autonomous Administration appears to be trampling all over the rights of civilians who are caught in the middle. We saw extensive displacement and destruction that did not occur as a result of fighting. This report uncovers clear evidence of a deliberate, co-ordinated campaign of collective punishment of civilians in villages previously captured by IS, or where a small minority were suspected of supporting the group."[434]
In March 2017 the "United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria" was unable to find evidence to substantiate claims about ethnic cleansing, stating:
"Though allegations of 'ethnic cleansing' continued to be received during the period under review, the Commission found no evidence to substantiate claims that YPG or SDF forces ever targeted Arab communities on the basis of ethnicity, nor that YPG cantonal authorities systematically sought to change the demographic composition of territories under their control through the commission of violations directed against any particular ethnic group,"[435][436][437]
The region has also been criticized extensively by various partisan and non-partisan sides over politicalauthoritarianism.[108] A KDP-S politician accused the PYD of delivering him to the Assad regime.[438]
It has also been criticized for banning journalists, media outlets and political parties that are critical of the YPG narrative in areas under its control.[439][440]
^The name "Rojava" ("Western Kurdistan") was initially used by the region'sPYD-led government, before its usage was officially dropped in 2016.[12][13][14] Locals and international observers continued to use the term Rojava.[15]
^Kurdish:Federaliya Demokratîk a Rojava – Bakurê Sûriyê Arabic:الفدرالية الديمقراطية لروج آفا – شمال سوريا,romanized: al-Fidirāliyya al-Dīmuqrāṭiyya li-Rūj ʾĀvā – Šamāl Suriyā Classical Syriac:ܦܕܪܐܠܝܘܬ݂ܐ ܕܝܡܩܪܐܛܝܬܐ ܠܓܙܪܬܐ ܒܓܪܒܝܐ ܕܣܘܪܝܐ,romanized: Federaloyotho Demoqraṭoyto l'Gozarto b'Garbyo d'Suriya
^Kurdish:Federaliya Demokratîk a Bakûrê Sûriyê Arabic:الفدرالية الديمقراطية لشمال سوريا,romanized: al-Fidirāliyya al-Dīmuqrāṭiyya li-Šamāl Suriyā Classical Syriac:ܦܕܪܐܠܝܘܬ݂ܐ ܕܝܡܩܪܐܛܝܬܐ ܕܓܪܒܝ ܣܘܪܝܐ,romanized: Federaloyotho Demoqraṭoyto d'Garbay Suriya
^Kurdish:Rêveberiya Xweser a Bakur û Rojhilatê Sûriyeyê Arabic:الإدارة الذاتية لشمال وشرق سوريا Classical Syriac:ܡܕܰܒܪܳܢܘܬ݂ܳܐ ܝܳܬ݂ܰܝܬܳܐ ܠܓܰܪܒܝܳܐ ܘܡܰܕܢܚܳܐ ܕܣܘܪܝܰܐ,romanized: Mdabronuṯo Yoṯayto l-Garbyo w-Madnḥyo d-Suriya Turkish:Kuzey ve Doğu Suriye Özerk Yönetimi
^Kurdish:Rêveberiya Xweseriya Demokratîk a Herêma Bakur û Rojhilatê Sûriyê Arabic:الإدارة الذاتية الديمقراطية لإقليم شمال وشرق سوريا Classical Syriac:ܡܕܒܪܢܘܬ݂ܳܐ ܝܬ݂ܝܬܳܐ ܕܝܡܩܪܐܛܝܬܳܐ ܠܩܠܝܡܳܐ ܕܓܪܒܝܳܐ ܘ ܡܕܢܚܳܐ ܕܣܘܪܝܰܐ,romanized: Mdabronuṯo Yoṯayto Demoqraṭoyto l-Qlimo d-Garbyo w-Madnḥyo d-Suriya Turkish:Kuzey ve Doğu Suriye Demokratik Özerk Yönetimi Bölgesi
^It is difficult to properly define early Kurds, as "Kurdish" was often used as a catch-all word for nomadic tribal groups west of Iran during antiquity and medieval times.[64]
^Since at least the early Middle Ages, northern Syria has been settled by a mixed population of Arabs,[65][69] Turkmen,[69] Kurds,[69][316][64] and Christian ethnoreligious groups includingAssyrian people.[317] Arab nomads came to dominate the region after theIkhshidid dynasty's decline in the 10th century.[64] During theOttoman Empire (1516–1922), largeKurdish-speaking tribal groups both settled in and were deported to areas of northern Syria fromAnatolia.[318] In addition, Cherkessians farmers migrated to northern Syria in the 19th century.[319]
^Concerns over Turkish actions were expressed by US, Russian, and German officials.[389][424][425][426]
^Lister 2015, p. 154: "On 19 July the PYD formally announced that it had written a constitution for an autonomous Syrian Kurdish region to be known as West Kurdistan."
^Assyria 1995: Proceedings of the 10th Anniversary Symposium of the Neo-Assyrian Text Corpus Project / Helsinki, 7–11 September 1995.
^Crook, JA; et al. (1985).The Cambridge Ancient History Volume 9: The Last Age of the Roman Republic, 146–43 BC. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 603.ISBN978-1139054379.
^Andrea, Alfred J.; Overfield, James H. (2015).The Human Record: Sources of Global History, Volume I: To 1500 (8 ed.). Cengage Learning. p. 133.ISBN978-1305537460.
^abTravis, Hannibal.Genocide in the Middle East: The Ottoman Empire, Iraq, and Sudan. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2010, 2007, pp. 237–77, 293–294.
^Gold, Danny (31 October 2012)."Meet the YPG, the Kurdish militia that doesn't want help from anyone".VICE.Archived from the original on 13 April 2016. Retrieved9 October 2014.A member of YPG's central command ... said that the YPG formed in 2004 shortly after the Qamishlo riots, when a number of Kurdish youth realized that they needed to be able to defend themselves more efficiently. They did not officially declare themselves until the revolution started in 2011.
^Gerber, Damian; Brincat, Shannon (2018). "When Öcalan met Bookchin: The Kurdish Freedom Movement and the Political Theory of Democratic Confederalism".Geopolitics.26 (4):1–25.doi:10.1080/14650045.2018.1508016.S2CID150297675.
^"YPG attacks FSA-controlled Azaz province".Daily Sabah. 18 September 2019.Archived from the original on 20 October 2019. Retrieved20 October 2019.The eastern part of Syria's Afrin region is comprised of two districts: Tel Rifaat, currently occupied by the terrorist group [i.e. YPG], and Azaz, which remains under the control of Syrian opposition forces.
^Sabri, Baraa (17 July 2019)."The Fate of Tel Rifaat Hangs in the Balance".Washington Institute.Archived from the original on 20 October 2019. Retrieved20 October 2019.Whereas before the greater Afrin region was under Kurdish occupation with both Arab majorities and Kurdish majorities, the situation reversed into a complete Turkish occupation of entirely Kurdish areas as well as the initially disputed Arab majority areas. Meanwhile, Tel Rifaat and Menagh remained under YPG control with semi-official Russian protection. [...] The Kurdish battalions that remained in the Tel Rifaat area and guarded the camps of displaced Kurds from Afrin have lived in a tense environment, well within reach of the Turkish pincers.
^A Small Key Can Open a Large Door: The Rojava Revolution (1st ed.). Strangers in a Tangled Wilderness. 4 March 2015.According to Dr. Ahmad Yousef, an economic co-minister, three-quarters of traditional private property is being used as commons and one quarter is still being owned by use of individuals...According to the Ministry of Economics, worker councils have only been set up for about one third of the enterprises in Rojava so far.
^"Syria". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. p. 13.Archived from the original on 18 January 2006. Retrieved16 November 2016.
^Perry, Tom; Malla, Naline (10 September 2015)."Western states train Kurdish force in Syria, force's leader says".Reuters.Archived from the original on 9 September 2021. Retrieved5 July 2021.Amnesty International this month faulted the Kurdish administration for arbitrary detentions and unfair trials.... [Ciwan] Ibrahim said ... efforts were underway to improve its human rights record.... The Geneva Call ... promotes good treatment of civilians in war zones...
^"Turkey accuses Kurdish forces of 'ethnic cleansing' in Syria". Agence France-Presse. 16 June 2015.Archived from the original on 5 November 2018. Retrieved27 August 2018.President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Sunday said he was troubled by the advance of Kurdish forces, saying they could in the future create a structure to threaten Turkey.
^Vanly (1992), p. 116: "To the east of Kurd-Dagh and separated from it by the Afrin valley lies the western and mountainous part of the Syrian district of Azaz which is also inhabited by Kurds, and a Kurdish minority lives in the northern counties of Idlib and Jerablos. There is reason to believe that the establishment of Kurds in these areas, a defensive site commanding the path to Antioch, goes back to theSeleucid era."
^Yildiz, Kerim (2005).The Kurds in Syria : the forgotten people (1. publ. ed.). London [etc.]: Pluto Press, in association with Kurdish Human Rights Project. p. 25.ISBN0745324991.
^McDowall, David. Modern History of the Kurds, I. B. Tauris & Company, Limited, 2004. pp. 473–474.
^Killing of Iraq Kurds 'genocide' ,BBC, "The Dutch court said it considered "legally and convincingly proven that the Kurdish population meets requirement under Genocide Conventions as an ethnic group"."
^"Kurds".The Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th ed. Encyclopedia.com. 2014.Archived from the original on 27 September 2008. Retrieved29 December 2014.
^Bois, T.; Minorsky, V.; MacKenzie, D.N. (2009). "Kurds, Kurdistan". In Bearman, P.; Bianquis, T.; Bosworth, C. E.; van Donzel, E.; Heinrichs, W. P. (eds.).Encyclopaedia Islamica. Brill.The Kurds, an Iranian people of the Near East, live at the junction of more or less laicised Turkey. ... We thus find that about the period of the Arab conquest a single ethnic termKurd (plur.Akrād) was beginning to be applied to an amalgamation of Iranian or iranicised tribes. ... The classification of the Kurds among the Iranian nations is based mainly on linguistic and historical data and does not prejudice the fact there is a complexity of ethnical elements incorporated in them.
^For Assyrians as indigenous to the Middle East, see
Mordechai Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, p. 180
Carl Skutsch, Encyclopedia of the World's Minorities, p. 149
Steven L. Danver, Native Peoples of the World: An Encyclopedia of Groups, Cultures and Contemporary Issues, p. 517
UNPO Assyria
Richard T. Schaefer, Encyclopedia of Race, Ethnicity, and Society, p. 107
^For Assyrians speaking a Neo-Aramaic language, see
The British Survey, By British Society for International Understanding, 1968, p. 3
Carl Skutsch, Encyclopedia of the World's Minorities, p. 149
Farzad Sharifian, René Dirven, Ning Yu, Susanne Niemeier, Culture, Body, and Language: Conceptualizations of Internal Body Organs across Cultures and Languages, p. 268
Holmes, Amy Austin (2024).Statelet of Survivors: The Making of a Semi-Autonomous Region in Northeast Syria. Oxford University Press.ISBN978-0-19-762103-5.
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