| Kunz v. New York | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Argued October 17, 1950 Decided January 15, 1951 | |
| Full case name | Kunz v. New York |
| Citations | 340U.S.290 (more) 71 S. Ct. 312; 95L. Ed. 2d 280; 1951U.S. LEXIS 2248 |
| Court membership | |
| |
| Case opinions | |
| Majority | Vinson, joined by Reed, Douglas, Burton, Clark, Minton |
| Concurrence | Black |
| Concurrence | Frankfurter |
| Dissent | Jackson |
| Laws applied | |
| U.S. Const. amends I | |
Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951), was a landmarkUnited States Supreme Court case that held a requirement mandating a permit to speak on religious issues in public was unconstitutional. The case was argued on October 17, 1950, and decided on January 15, 1951, with an 8–1 decision.Chief Justice Vinson delivered the opinion for the Court.Justice Black andJustice Frankfurter concurred in the result only.Justice Jackson dissented.
Kunz helped establish the principle that government restrictions on speech must be narrowly tailored to avoid improperly limiting expression protected by theFirst Amendment. In this case, the Court held that laws granting public officials broad discretion to restrain speech about religious issues in advance constitute an invalidprior restraint, violating the First Amendment. The Court reversed the 1948 conviction ofBaptist minister Carl J. Kunz, who was found guilty of violating aNew York Cityordinance required a permit from thepolice commissioner to hold religious services on public streets. Although the ordinance did not specify grounds for refusing permission, Kunz was denied permits in 1947 and 1948 after being accused of making “scurrilous attacks” on Catholics and Jews under a previous permit. He was subsequently arrested for speaking without a permit inColumbus Circle.
Kunz's conviction for violating the ordinance was upheld by the Appellate Part of the Court of Special Sessions and by theNew York Court of Appeals. However, the Supreme Court ultimately ruled that New York's ordinance was overly broad because it failed to provide any standards for administrators to determine who should receive permits to speak about religious issues.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Robert Jackson argued that Kunz had used “fighting words” that were not protected by the First Amendment (see unprotected speech). He also criticized the Court for striking down the permit scheme citing the recent case ofFeiner v. New York (1951), in which the Court had allowed local officials the discretion to arrest volatile speakers during their presentations.
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