Kumārila Bhaṭṭa | |
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| Born | est. 700 AD |
| Philosophical work | |
| Era | HinduIndian philosophy |
| Main interests | Mimamsa |
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Kumarila Bhatta (IAST: Kumārila Bhaṭṭa;fl. roughly 7th century CE) was aHindu philosopher and a scholar ofMimamsa school of philosophy from earlymedieval India. He is famous for many of his various theses on Mimamsa, such asMimamsaslokavarttika. Bhaṭṭa was a staunch believer in the supreme validity of Vedic injunction, a champion of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā and a confirmed ritualist.[1] TheVarttika is mainly written as a subcommentary of Sabara's commentary on Jaimini'sPurva Mimamsa Sutras. His philosophy is classified by some scholars as existential realism.[2]
Kumārila is also credited with the logical formulation of the Mimamsic belief that the Vedas are unauthored (apauruṣeyā). In particular, he is known for his defense of Vedic ritualism against medievalBuddhist idealism.[3] His work strongly influenced other schools of Indian philosophy,[4] with the exception that while Mimamsa considers the Upanishads to be subservient to the Vedas, the Vedanta school does not think so.
The birthplace of Kumārila Bhatta is uncertain. According to the 16th-century Buddhist scholarTaranatha, Kumārila was a native ofSouth India. However, Anandagiri'sShankara-Vijaya states that Kumarila came from "the North" (udagdeśāt), and debated the Buddhists and the Jains in the South.[5]
Another theory is that he came from eastern India, specificallyKamarupa (present-dayAssam). Sesa'sSarvasiddhanta-rahasya uses the eastern titleBhattacharya for him. His writings indicate that he was familiar with the production ofsilk, which was common in present-day Assam.[6] Yet another theory is that he comes fromMithila, which has similar culture to Assam, and produced another scholar on the subjectMandana Misra. According to legend in Mithila, theKumarila Bhatta Dih atBhatsimar orBhatpura in theMithila region is believed to be the birthplace of Kumarila Bhatta.[7][8][9][10]
Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and his followers in the Mīmāṃsā tradition known asBhāṭṭas argued for a stronglyCompositional view of semantics calledabhihitānvaya or "designation of what has been denoted." In this view, the meaning of a sentence was understood only after understanding first the meanings of individual words. Word referents were independent, complete objects, a view that is close to theFodorian view of language, according to philosopher Daniel Arnold.[11] He also used severalTamil words in his works, including one of the earliest mention of the nameDravida in North Indian sources, found in hisTantravārttika.[12]
The above-mentioned view of sentence meaning was debated over some seven or eight centuries by the followers of thePrabhākara school within Mīmāṃsā, who argued that words do not directly designate meaning. Rather, word meanings are understood as already connected with other words (anvitābhidhāna, anvita = connected; abhidhāna = denotation). This view was influenced by theholistic arguments ofBhartṛhari'ssphoṭa theory.[13] Essentially the Prābhākaras argued that sentence meanings are grasped directly, from perceptual and contextual cues, skipping the stage of grasping singly the individual word meanings,[14] similar to the modern view of linguisticunderspecification, which relates to the dynamic turn in semantics, that also opposes purely compositional approaches to sentence meaning.
Kumārila's advocates for the doctrine of intrinsic validity, also known assvatah pramanya.[15] In this view, all cognitions are valid at the moment of apprehension unless and until proved otherwise. John Taber argues that this is distinct fromcoherence theories of truth.[15]
In his text Slokavarttika, Kumārila Bhatta argues that cognitions are intrinsically valid (svatah pramanya):[13]
It should be understood that all pramanas' have the property of being pramanas intrinsically; for a capacity not already existing by itself (svatah) cannot be produced by anything else.
Kumārila argues against the need for second-order justification before accepting cognitions as valid.[13]
Whilst taking anāstika position, that is, a position in which the supremacy of theVeda is upheld, Kumārila, in line with theMimamsa tradition, rejects the notion of a supreme deity or God.[16] Within his commentaries Kumārila provides various kinds of arguments to reject the notion of a God. One such argument is his skepticism towards acosmological argument in favour of a divine transcendent creator.[17] In hisSlokavarttika, Kumārila argues that it is implausible to accept both that the world had a divine creator and that the world had any kind of 'beginning' to begin with.[17] Following from this Kumārila considers two options, either the deity that created the world has a created body or an uncreated body. If the deity has a created body then there would be aninfinite regress, since we would then need to ask, who created the body of the creator? If the deity has an uncreated body, a body that has always existed, why can we not say the same for our own?[17]
Manikka Vachakar, on the other hand, argues that Kumārila deviates from the traditional Mimamsa position and advocates for the existence God, in particular,saguna Brahman.[18]
Kumārila Bhaṭṭa is known for his defense of Vedic ritualism against medievalBuddhist idealism.[3] With the aim to prove the superiority of Vedic scripture, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa presented several novel arguments:
1."Buddhist (or Jain) scripture could not be correct because it had several grammatical lapses." He specifically takes the Buddhist verse: 'ime samkhada dhamma sambhavanti sakarana akarana vinassanti' (These phenomena arise when the cause is present and perish when the cause is absent). Thus he presents his argument:[19]
The scriptures of Buddhists and Jains are composed in overwhelmingly incorrect (asadhu) language, words of the Magadha or Dakshinatya languages, or even their dialects (tadopabhramsa). Therefore false compositions (asannibandhana), they cannot possibly be true knowledge (shastra) ... By contrast, the very form itself (the well-assembled language) of the Veda proves its authority to be independent and absolute.
2. Every extant school held some scripture to be correct. To show that the Veda was the only correct scripture, Kumārila said that"the absence of an author would safeguard the Veda against all reproach" (apaurusheya).[20] There was"no way to prove any of the contents of Buddhist scriptures directly as wrong in spirit...", unless one challenges the legitimacy and eternal nature of the scripture itself. It is well known that thePali Canon was composed after theBuddha'sparinirvana. Further, even if they were the Buddha's words, they were not eternal or unauthored like the Vedas.
3. TheSautrantika Buddhist school believed that the universe was momentary (kshanika). Kumārila said that this was absurd, given that the universe does not disappear every moment. No matter how small one would define the duration of a moment, one could divide the moment into infinitely further parts. Kumārila argues:"if the universe does not exist between moments, then in which of these moments does it exist?" Because a moment could be infinitesimally small, Bhaṭṭa argued that the Buddhist was claiming that the universe was non-existent.
4. The Determination of perception (pratyaksha pariccheda).[21]
Some scholars believe that Kumārila's understanding ofBuddhist philosophy was far greater than that of any other non-Buddhist philosopher of his time.[22] However, see Taber 2010 for an alternate view.[23]
According toButon Rinchen Drub, Kumārila spoke abusively towards his nephew,Dharmakīrti, as he was taking his brahminical garments. This drove Dharmakīrti away, and resolving to vanquish all non-Buddhist heretics he took the robes of the Buddhist order instead.[24]
According to legend, Kumārila went to studyBuddhism atNalanda (the largest 4th-century university in the world), with the aim of refuting Buddhist doctrine in favour ofVedic religion.[25] He was expelled from the university when he protested against his teacher (Dharmakirti) ridiculing the Vedic rituals. Legend has it that even though he was thrown off of the university's tower, he survived with an eye injury by claiming "if the Vedas are the ultimate then I will be spared from Death."
TheMadhaviya Sankara Digvijayam, a 14th-century hagiographic work on the life ofSankara, claims that Sankara challenged Bhaṭṭa to a debate on his deathbed.[26] Kumārila Bhaṭṭa could not debate Sankara as he was punishing himself to have disrespected his Buddhist teacher by defeating him in a debate using the Vedas by self-immolation at the banks ofGanga at Prayagraj[citation needed] and instead directed him to argue with his studentMandana Misra inMahiṣmati. He said:
You will find a home at whose gates there are a number of caged parrots discussing abstract topics like — 'Do the Vedas have self-validity or do they depend on some external authority for their validity? Are karmas capable of yielding their fruits directly, or do they require the intervention of God to do so? Is the world eternal, or is it a mere appearance?' Where you find the caged parrots discussing such abstruse philosophical problems, you will know that you have reached Maṇḍana's place.
Kumarila's importance in the history of Indian philosophy comes to light in view of how his work has been extensively quoted.[27]
Buddhist philosophy as presented in Mimamsa Sloka Vartika.
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