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Korean nationalism[a] can be viewed in two different contexts. One encompasses various movements throughout history to maintain aKorean cultural identity, history, and ethnicity (or "race"). This ethnic nationalism was mainly forged in opposition to foreign incursion and rule. The second context encompasses how Korean nationalism changed after thepartition in 1945, with bothNorth andSouth Korea espousing their own distinct variations of a national identity. Today, the former tends to predominate.[5]
Korean nationalism (Korean: 민족주의;Hanja: 民族主義;MR: minjokchuŭi) emphasizesminjok as a key part of Korean identity. A number of scholars argue that it exists in both North and South Korea.[6][7][8] It is centered on the notion of theminjok (민족;民族), a term that had beencoined inImperial Japan ("minzoku") in the earlyMeiji period.Minjok has a similar meaning to the German "volk", officially translated as "nation", "people", and "ethnic group",[9][4] or "race".[6][10][11][12] A number of scholars have argued that this concept has influenced Korean society and politics,[13] and has influencedKorean reunification sentiment.[14]
Unlike pan-Korean nationalism,state-aligned nationalism (Korean: 국가주의;Hanja: 國家主義;MR: kukkajuŭi),state nationalism,statism is anation building based on 'state/country' (국가) identity; it appears in South Korea as nationalism emphasizing the "Republic of Korea" identity and in North Korea as nationalism emphasizing the "Democratic People's Republic of Korea" identity.[citation needed]
Historically, Korean nationalism, or its earliest concept can be found as early asSilla, who expressed its unification as a unification ofSamhan. Other examples of this would beGoryeo, whose name signifies that it is a direct descendant ofGoguryeo, as they took its exact name as its own. The same goes forJoseon, who took its name fromGojoseon.[15]
However, the current concept of Korean nationalism came to be emphasized in order to resist Japanese influence duringJapanese Occupation. The central objectives of Korea's nationalist movement were the advancement and protection of Korea's ancient culture and national identity from foreign influence, and the fostering of the independence movement duringJapanese rule.[16] In order to obtain political and cultural autonomy, it first had to promote Korea's cultural dependency. For this reason, the nationalist movement demanded the restoration and preservation of Korea's traditional culture. TheDonghak (Eastern Learning) peasant movement, also known as theDonghak Peasant Revolution, that began in the 1870s, could be seen as an early form of what would become the Korean nationalist resistance movement against foreign influences. It was succeeded by theRighteous Army movement and later a series of Korean resistance movements that led, in part, to the current status of the two Korean nations.
In the colonial period, the Imperial Japanese's assimilation policy claimed that Koreans and Japanese were of common origin but the former always subordinate. The pure blood theory was used to justify colonialist policies and to replace Korean cultural traditions with Japanese ones in order to supposedly eliminate all distinctions and achieve equality between Koreans and Japanese.[17] As was previously done with theAinu andRyukyuans, Japan's extensive policy ofcultural genocide includedchanging Korean names into Japanese, exclusive use of Japanese language, school instruction in the Japanese "ethical system", andShinto worship.[17] This policy was an attempt of forced assimilation, in which Korean language, culture, and history were suppressed.[18] Around the 1920s, the term "white-clothed people" (백의민족;paegŭiminjok) developed as an ethnonationalist term for Korean people. The term was a reference to thehistoric Korean practice of wearing white clothing. It also arose in response to unsuccessful Japanese attempts to end the practice.[19][20]
Nationalism in late 19th century Korea was a form of resistance movements, but with significant differences between the north and south. Since the intrusion by foreign powers in the late 19th century, Koreans have had to construct their identity in ways that pitted them against foreigners. They have witnessed and participated in a wide range of nationalist actions over the past century, but all of them have been some form of resistance against foreign influences. During thecolonial period, the Korean nationalists carried on the struggle for independence, fighting againstImperial Japan in Korea, China particularly Manchuria and China proper and Far East Russia. They formed 'governments in exile', armies, and secret groups to fight the imperial Japanese wherever they are.
Shin Chae-ho (1880–1936), the founder of the nationalistic historiography of modern Korea and aKorean independence movement activist, published his influential book of reconstructed historyChosŏn sanggosa (The Early History of Joseon) from 1924 to 1922. In it, he proclaimed that Koreans are descendants ofDangun, the legendary ancestor of Korean people, who merged with Buyo ofManchuria to form theGoguryeo people.[21] Dangun nationalism (단군 민족주의;檀君民族主義) is based around this principle.[22] In theMarch First Movement, theKorean Declaration of Independence marked the date of declaration asDangun-era [ko], and the identity of the Koreanminjok and the subject of independence were set as 'the descendants of Dangun'.[23]
Korea was divided at the38th parallel between north and south by the Allied powers in 1945 as part of the disarmament ofImperial Japan, and the division persists to this day. The split is perpetuated by rival regimes, opposingideologies, and globalpolitics; it is further deepened by a differing sense of national identity derived from the unique histories, polities, class systems, and gender roles experienced by Koreans on different sides of the border. As a result, Korean nationalism in the late 20th century has been permeated by the split between North and South. Each regime espouses its own distinctive form of nationalism, different from the opposing side's, that nonetheless seeks to encompass the entireKorean Peninsula in its scope. Despite the split between North and South Korea, neither side disputed the ethnic homogeneity of the Korean nation based on a firm conviction that they are purest descendant of a legendary progenitor and half-god figure called Dangun who foundedGojoseon in 2333 BCE based on the description of theTongguk t'onggam (1485).[17] A holiday marking the mythological formation of the "Korean ethnicity", a concept shared and celebrated in both Koreas (as can be seen with the presence of theMausoleum of Tangun in North Korea), in 2333 BC can be seen commemorated with a national holiday (National Foundation Day) in South Korea each October.[citation needed]
Korean reunification refers to the hypothetical future reunification ofNorth andSouth Korea under a single government. South Korea had adopted asunshine policy towards the North that was based on the hope that one day, the two countries would be re-united in the 1990s. The process towards this was started by the historicJune 15th North–South Joint Declaration in August 2000, where the two countries agreed to work towards a peaceful reunification in the future. However, there are a number of hurdles in this process due to the large political and economic differences between the two countries and other state actors such as China, Russia, and the United States. Short-term problems such as a large number ofrefugees that would migrate from the North into the South and initial economic and political instability would need to be overcome.
From 1945 until 1950,minjok nationalism was a factor in Korean reunification sentiment, especially among political centrists. This has been dubbed "centrist [minjok] nationalism" (중도파 민족주의). For example, centre-rightKim Kyu-sik formed theNational Independence Federation (centered around theminjok) and opposed the construction of a South Korean independent government promoted by Syngman Rhee; centre-leftLyuh Woon-hyung also opposed far-leftproletarian internationalism and argued that "Koreanminjok'" interests were more important. Centrist nationalists tried to prevent the division of the Korean Peninsula through theLeft-Right Coalition Movement.[24] In 2024, North Korea officially abandoned peaceful reunification as a goal.[25]
In North Korea, ethnic nationalism was incorporated as part of the state-sponsored ideology ofJuche.[citation needed] Korea scholar Brian Reynolds Myers argues in his 2010 bookThe Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why It Matters that the North Korean ideology of a purest race arose from 20th centuryJapanese fascism. Japanese collaborators are said to have introduced the notion of racial unity in an effort to assert that Japanese and Koreans came from the same racial stock. After Japan relinquished control of Korea, Myers argues, the theory was subsequently adjusted to promote the idea of a pure Korean ethnicity.[26] Myers said in 2011 that North Koreans generally believe that their (North Korean) state and the "Korean ethnicity" (English:민족,minjok) are analogous due to the work of propaganda.
Thanks in part to decades of skillful propaganda, North Koreans generally equate the race with their state, so that ethno-nationalism and state-loyalty are mutually enforcing. In this respect North Korea enjoys an important advantage over its rival, for in the Republic of Korea ethnonationalism militates against support for a state that is perceived as having betrayed the race.
— Brian Reynolds Myers,North Korea's state-loyalty advantage (2011)[27]
Seoul-basedDaily NK reported that since 2024, after North Korea abandoned its policy of peaceful reunification, the country was moving towards "de-ethnification", de-emphasizing ethnic ties with South Korea.[28] It reported that the Institute of Enemy State Studies determined the "disinterest in reunification is rapidly spreading among South Korean youth and the very concept of ethnic unity is collapsing" and started emphasizing "cultural and genetic differences" between North Koreans and South Koreans, whileKim Jong Un said South Korean youth was "foreign youth who are no longer the same people as us and who can never be on our side".Daily NK also reported some researchers developed an approach of describing young South Koreans as "biologically foreigners who mimic the Korean language but have completely different identities".[29]
South Korea is a highly homogenous society, but has in recent decades become home to a number of foreign residents (4.9%), whereas North Korea has not experienced this trend. A number of its foreign residents areethnic Koreans ("Overseas Koreans") with foreign citizenship. Many residents fromChina,post-Soviet states, theUnited States andJapan are who may meet criteria for expedited acquisition ofSouth Korean citizenship.[30][31] In recent decades, discussions have continued to be held both abroad and in Korea on the topics of race and multi-culturalism.[32][31]
According to Korea scholarBrian Reynolds Myers, a professor atDongseo University, South Koreans tend to see the "Korean ethnicity" and their (South Korean) state differently. He says:
Anglophones tend to use the words nation and state more or less interchangeably, but when one nation is divided into two states, it's important to stick to the [South] Koreans' own practice of distinguishing clearly between nationalism (minjokjuŭi) and patriotism / state spirit (aeguksim,kukka chŏngsin,kukkajuŭi, etc). Historians do this even in English when discussing the Weimar Republic, where nationalism undermined support for the state — and for liberal democracy — just as it does in South Korea today.
— Brian Reynolds Myers, "On Experts and Exegetes" (September 6, 2017),Sthele Press[33]
According to Myers, the South Korean flag is often seen by South Koreans as representing the "Korean ethnicity" rather than merely South Korea itself.[34][35] The prioritization of ethno nationalism was also reflected in the pre-2011 South Koreanmilitary oath and pre-2007 pledge of allegiance, both of which pledged allegiance to the "Koreanminjok".[36][6][7]
One South Korean scholar argued that ethnic nationalism served as a useful tool for the South Korean government to make its people obedient and easy to govern when the country was embroiled in ideological turmoil, especially during the presidencies ofSyngman Rhee andPark Chung Hee, when nationalism was incorporated into anti-communism.[37] Today, state nationalism is advocated by someconservative forces, including theNew Right Movement, while left-leaning forces are more inclined to anti-imperialistic ethnic nationalism.[38][39][40] Examples of ethno nationalism can be seen in Korean history, such as the anti-Japanese resistance independence movement in Japanese colonial era and the anti-American/anti-dictatorship democracy movement in the 1980s.[41] However, an example of state nationalism can also be seen in South Korea, such asPark Chung Hee's authoritarian politics, which was similar to the JapaneseShōwa statism[42]
Emma Campbell from theAustralian National University argues that the conceptions of South Korean nationalism are evolving among young people and that a new form is emerging that has globalised cultural characteristics.[43] According to Campbell's study, for which she interviewed 150 South Koreans in their twenties, the desire for reunification is declining. However, these who are in favor of aKorean unification state reasons different from ethnic nationalism. The respondents stated that they only wanted unification if it would not disrupt life in the South or if North Korea achieves economic parity with the South. A small number of respondents further mentioned that they support a "unification on the condition that it did not take place in their lifetime."[43] Campbell argued that her interviews showed that many young South Koreans have no problems to accepting foreigners as part ofuri nara.[43]: 492
The South Korean nationality law is based onjus sanguinis[17] instead ofjus solis, which is a territorial principle that takes into account the place of birth when bestowing nationality. In this context, most South Koreans have stronger attachment to South Koreans residing in foreign countries and foreigners of South Korean descent, than to naturalized South Korean citizens and expatriates residing in South Korea.[17][needs update] In 2005, the oppositionGrand National Party suggested a revision of the current South Korean nationality law to allow South Korean nationality to be bestowed to people who are born in South Korea regardless of the nationalities of their parents but it was discarded due to unfavorable public opinion against such a measure.[31]
A poll by theAsan Institute for Policy Studies in 2015 found that only 5.4% of South Koreans in their twenties saw North Koreans as people sharing the same bloodline with them. The poll also found that only 11% of South Koreans associated North Korea with Koreans, with most people associating them with words like military, war or nuclear weapons. It also found that most South Koreans expressed deeper feelings of "closeness" withAmericans andChinese than with North Koreans.[44] According to a December 2017 survey released by theKorea Institute for National Unification, 72.1% of South Koreans in their 20s believe reunification is unnecessary.[45] At the same time, Steven Denney from theUniversity of Toronto said that, "Younger South Koreans feel closer to North Korean migrants than, say, foreign workers, but they will feel closer to a native born child of non-Korean ethnicity than a former resident of North Korea."[46]
Due to collective memory of the Korean society of cruelty brought upon them in the era ofImperial Japanese rule, anti-Japanese sentiments have resided and still persists in Koreans through public education, although personal level interactions have proven to improve perceptions towards Japanese people.[47][48] Contemporary Korean nationalism, at least in South Korea, often incorporatesanti-Japanese sentiment as a core component of its ideology.[49]
The legacy of the colonial period of Korean history continues to fuel recriminations and demands for restitution in both Koreas. North and South Korea have both lodged severe protests against visits by Japanese officials to theYasukuni Shrine, which is seen as glorifying the Class Awar criminals whose remains are held there. South Koreans claim that a number of Korean women who worked near Japanese military bases ascomfort women were forced to serve as sex slaves against their will for Japanese soldiers duringWorld War II which had been a persistent thorn in the side of Japan-South Korea relations from the 1990s to the 2010s. Disagreements over demands for reparations and a formal apology still remain unresolved despite the previous agreement and compensation in 1965, South Koreans started peaceful vigils in 1992 held by survivors on a weekly basis. RecentJapanese history textbook controversies have emerged as a result of what some see as an attempt at historical negationism with the aim of whitewashing or ignoring Japan's war crimes duringWorld War II. These issues continue to separate the two countries diplomatically, and provide fuel for nationalism in both Koreas as well as anti-Japanese sentiment.
According toRobert E. Kelly, a professor atPusan National University, anti-Japanese sentiment in South Korea stems not just from Japanese atrocities during the occupation period, but also from the Korean Peninsula's division.[7] Theoretical explanation for the link between Korean division and persistent anti-Japanese sentiment has been offered in scholarship utilizing anontological security framework.[50]
TheLiancourt Rocks dispute—concerning the islands known as Dokdo or Tokto (독도/獨島, literally "solitary island") in Korean and Takeshima in Japanese—has remained unresolved since the early post-World War II period. In the 1951Treaty of San Francisco, the United States did not include the islands in the territories relinquished by Japan to South Korea, a decision South Korea contested, particularly in light of a U.S. diplomatic note (theRusk documents) favoring Japanese sovereignty. South Korea has exercised effective control over the islands since the mid-1950s, establishing a permanent coast guard presence in 1954, while Japan has maintained its claim through administrative measures, such as incorporating the islands intoShimane Prefecture in 1905 and periodic diplomatic protests against what it views as an unlawful occupation.
Both sides base their claims on historical records stretching back centuries, with interpretations often diverging due to ambiguities in ancient texts and maps. South Korea asserts ancient sovereignty, citing records from theThree Kingdoms of Korea period, such as theSamguk Sagi (1145, recording events from 512 CE), which describes the conquest of Usan-guk—an entity including Ulleungdo and what Koreans identify as Dokdo—by theSilla kingdom. Medieval sources, including the geography section of theSejong sillok (part of theVeritable Records of the Joseon Dynasty), note that Usando (Dokdo) and Mureungdo (Ulleungdo) are visible from each other on clear days, affirming their proximity and Korean administration underGangwon-do.[51] In the 17th century, Korean officialAn Yong-bok's voyages (1693–1696) reportedly secured acknowledgments from Japanese authorities that both Ulleungdo (Takeshima) and Dokdo (Matsushima) belonged to Korea, as documented in theSukjong sillok (Annals of King Sukjong).[52] 16th-century geographies, such as theSinjŭng Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam (1530, revised 1531), depict Usando as part of Korean territory.[53] Later maps like theHaejwa Jeondo (c. 1822) also include depictions interpreted by Korea as showing the rocks.[54] In 1900, Imperial Ordinance No. 41 of theKorean Empire explicitly included Seokdo (a phonetic rendering of Dokdo) under the administration of Uldo County (Ulleungdo).[55]
Japan, conversely, argues that the rocks were historically terra nullius (unclaimed land) until their formal incorporation in 1905. Japanese interpretations suggest that early Korean references to Usan-do likely refer to Jukdo (a small islet near Ulleungdo) or a non-existent island, rather than the Liancourt Rocks, due to inconsistencies in described visibility and location. In the Edo period, documents like the 1667 *Inshu Shicho Goki* mention Matsushima but do not assert sovereignty. Japan points to the 1695 inquiry by the Tokugawa shogunate to the Tottori clan, which confirmed that neither Takeshima (Ulleungdo) nor Matsushima (Liancourt Rocks) belonged to Japanese provinces, leading to the revocation of fishing licenses in 1696 as they were foreign territory.[56] An 1877 directive from theDaijō-kan (Japan's early Meiji government) excluded Takeshima and "another island" (interpreted by Japan as not referring to Liancourt) from Japanese land registries.[57] Japan emphasizes its 1905 Cabinet decision to annex the uninhabited rocks amid fishing interests and theRusso-Japanese War, following a petition by fisherman Nakai Yozaburo, with no prior effective Korean occupation documented.[citation needed]
The dispute is intertwined with nationalist sentiments in both countries, though the expressions and underlying motivations differ due to historical asymmetries. In South Korea, the islands hold profound symbolic significance as a representation of reclaimed sovereignty after Japan's colonial rule over Korea from 1910 to 1945. Many Koreans perceive Dokdo as the initial territory seized during Japan's imperial expansion—incorporated amid fishing interests and theRusso-Japanese War—and thus emblematic of overcoming historical humiliation and affirming post-colonial independence.[58] This emotional attachment elevates the issue beyond material value, linking it to broader grievances like forced labor, comfort women, and history textbook disputes, and making concessions politically sensitive as they could be seen as undermining national dignity.[59]
South Korean governments have at times leveraged this symbolism in response to diplomatic tensions or for domestic political purposes. For instance, during a 2006 flare-up involving Japanese maritime surveys and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) claims, PresidentRoh Moo-hyun framed the issue in a speech as tied to historical rectification, stating:
"Dokdo for us is not merely a matter pertaining to territorial rights over tiny islets but is emblematic of bringing closure to an unjust chapter in our history with Japan and of the full consolidation of Korea's sovereignty."[60]
Roh connected it to other controversies, such asYasukuni Shrine visits and textbook distortions, emphasizing that it would be addressed in the context of safeguarding Korea's sovereignty and independence, with no room for compromise under those circumstances.[61][62] Such rhetoric has contributed to public mobilization, where the islands serve as a rallying point for national pride and resistance to perceived Japanese revisionism.[citation needed]
Nationalist mobilization, however, is mutual. In Japan, conservative politicians, Shimane Prefecture officials—who have observed "Takeshima Day" annually since 2005—and civic groups portray the islands as inherent territory from historical times, unlawfully occupied by South Korea post-war. This framing often ties into narratives of defending Japan's territorial integrity against what is seen as Korean overreach or politicization of history. Public opinion in both nations reflects strong majorities supporting their respective claims, with protests and media attention more pronounced in South Korea, but Japanese educational materials and diplomatic statements reinforcing the claim.[citation needed]
Scholars highlight that while identity-based and emotional factors complicate resolution, the impasse is also driven by diverging historical interpretations, legal ambiguities in post-war treaties, strategic interests in fishing rights and EEZs, and domestic political incentives to avoid appearing conciliatory.[63] As French theoristErnest Renan noted, "Where national memories are concerned, griefs are of more value than triumphs, for they impose duties, and require a common effort,"[64] a dynamic evident in territorial narratives on both sides.[citation needed]
Despite these challenges, periods of improved bilateral relations—such as through economic partnerships or summits—have seen de-escalation in rhetoric, indicating that nationalism, while influential, is modulated by broader political contexts rather than an insurmountable barrier.[citation needed]
Expressions of Korean interest in Manchuria (nowNortheast China) can be traced to the lateJoseon dynasty, when writings frequently evoked nostalgia for the "old lands of Goguryeo" as part of a broader cultural and historical memory of northern territories once associated with ancient kingdoms. In the early 20th century, nationalist historians such asShin Chaeho advocated for the unification of the Korean Peninsula with Manchuria, framing it as the restoration of the "ancient lands ofDangun" and emphasizing shared ethnic and historical heritage.[65]
In modern times, some nationalist Korean historians and fringe groups have put forward irredentistF claims asserting that parts of Manchuria—particularly theGando region (known in China as Jiandao and encompassing theYanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture bordering China, North Korea, and Russia)—should belong to Korea. These arguments are based on the historical control or influence of ancient entities such asGojoseon,Goguryeo (37 BCE–668 CE), andBalhae (698–926 CE) over much of what is now Northeast China, which Korean historiography regards as foundational proto-Korean states.[66] The term "Greater Korea" occasionally appears in such nationalist literature to describe an expanded historical territory that includes these regions.[citation needed]
Claims to Gando tend to be more focused than broader Manchurian irredentism. Supporters point to Balhae's continued presence in the area after Goguryeo's fall, the significant ethnic Korean population in Yanbian (approximately one-third of residents), and the 1909Gando Convention, which many Koreans view as having illegitimately ceded the region to Chinese control under Japanese colonial coercion.[67]
From the Chinese perspective, Goguryeo and Balhae are framed as integral components of China's multi-ethnic historical narrative. Chinese historiography typically describes them as "local regimes" or "minority states" founded by ethnic groups (such as the Yemaek or Mohe) that operated on the northeastern frontier, interacted with and often paid tribute to successive Chinese dynasties (Han, Sui, Tang, etc.), and were eventually absorbed into Chinese imperial territory.[68] This framing presents the kingdoms as part of the continuous, multi-ethnic evolution of what became modern China, rather than as exclusively Korean polities.[citation needed]
The differing framings of Goguryeo and Balhae reflect nationalist sensitivities on both sides. Korean interpretations often emphasize the kingdoms as core elements of Korean ethnic identity and lost northern homelands, while Chinese interpretations stress historical unity, frontier interactions, and multi-ethnicity to reinforce territorial integrity and national cohesion in border regions.[69]
These issues came to the forefront in South Korea during the 2004Goguryeo controversies, sparked by China'sNortheast Project (2002–2007), a state-sponsored research effort that reclassified Goguryeo and Balhae as part of Chinese history. Many Koreans perceived this as an attempt to appropriate shared heritage and preempt potential irredentist claims. In response, 59 South Korean lawmakers introduced a bill declaring the 1909 Gando Convention "null and void" and asserting Korean territorial rights over Gando. The proposal did not become law and remained a fringe position without official government endorsement.[citation needed]
Later in 2004, the governments of South Korea and China reached a verbal understanding to refrain from official involvement in historical controversies, agreeing to leave such debates to academic historians. Scholars from various backgrounds note that these disputes largely stem from the anachronistic application of modern national identities to ancient, multi-ethnic polities that did not correspond neatly to contemporary borders or ethnic categories.[70]
While irredentist claims concerning Manchuria or Gando have remained marginal and unofficial in South Korea, and China continues to administer the region while maintaining its historical framing of the kingdoms, the episode illustrates how competing interpretations of ancient history can intersect with modern national identity and bilateral relations. Since the 2004 agreement, both countries have generally managed the issue through dialogue rather than politicization, allowing economic and diplomatic cooperation to take precedence.[citation needed]
르낭은 "공동체 삶을 지속하려는 욕구, 각자가 받은 유산을 발전시키고자 하는 의지가 중요하고, 이런 것이 존중될 때 '열린민족주의'가 된다"고 강조했다.
'nation'과 'nationalism'의 번역어는 국민과 국민주의, 국가와 국가주의, 민족과 민족주의 등 다양할 수 있는데 이 중에서 민족과 민족주의가 지배적 번역어로 채택된 사정은 한국의 식민화 과정과 밀접하게 관련되는 것이었다.[The translations of 'nation' or 'nationalism' can be diverse, including 국가 or 국가주의, 국민 or 국민주의, and 민족 or 민족주의, the situation in which 민족 or 민족주의 were adopted as the dominant translation language was closely related to the colonization process of Korea.]
nationalism
Breen rates ethnicity, and more specifically "the belief in a unique bloodline", as the first standout characteristic of Korea's special brand of nationalism...
people; ethnic group
As noted earlier, the wordminjok (read asminzoku in Japanese) was a neologism created in Meiji Japan. When Korean (and Chinese and Japanese) nationalists wrote in English in the first half of the twentieth century, the English word they generally utilized for minjok was 'race.'
The wordminjok (민족,民族) translates as race.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)Koreans' beloved trope of tanil minjok—'the single ethnic nation'— would soon come into its own (see Shin 1998). The centrality of "blood" has been revived in more current times as well.
[T]he South Korean flag continues to function, at least in South Korea, not as a symbol of the state but as a symbol of the race.
When people wave the South Korean flag, in other words, they wave the flag not of a country but of a people.
The military has decided to omit the word 'minjok,' which refers to the Korean race, from the oath of enlistment for officers and soldiers, and replace it with 'the citizen.' The measure reflects the growing number of foreigners who gain Korean citizenship and of children from mixed marriages entering military service.
The booklet titled An Alternative Textbook of Modern and Contemporary Korean History (Daean Gyogwaseo Hanguk Geun-Hyeondae Sa) demonstrates something about that civil war. The publication adopts in full the historical interpretations of the book "Looking Again at History Around the Time of Liberation" ("Haebang Jeonju Sa-ui Jae Insik"), published two years ago by "New Right" scholars and received with much fanfare by conservative newspapers. The authors of these two publications reject minjok, the Korean people, and believe in gukga, the state.
Korean ethnic nationalism which tended to be against authoritarian regimes and foreign powers
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)Because [South] Korean nationalism is anti-Japanism, difficulties in the relationship remain prevalent despite seemingly compelling material forces for less friction ...
Quotations related toKorean nationalism at Wikiquote