Sir Kenneth Strong | |
|---|---|
 Major General Kenneth Strong | |
| Born | (1900-09-09)9 September 1900 Montrose, Angus, Scotland |
| Died | 11 January 1982(1982-01-11) (aged 81) Eastbourne,East Sussex, England |
| Allegiance | United Kingdom |
| Branch | British Army |
| Service years | 1920–1947 |
| Rank | Major-general |
| Service number | 6897 |
| Unit | Royal Scots Fusiliers |
| Commands | Political Warfare Executive 4th/5th BattalionRoyal Scots Fusiliers |
| Conflicts | |
| Awards | Knight Commander of the Order of the British Empire Companion of the Order of the Bath Mentioned in Despatches Legion of Honour (France) Croix de guerre (France) Army Distinguished Service Medal (US) Legion of Merit (US) Order of the Red Banner (USSR) |
| Other work | Director General of Intelligence,Ministry of Defence |
Major-GeneralSir Kenneth William Dobson Strong,KBE, CB (9 September 1900 – 11 January 1982) was a seniorofficer of theBritish Army who served in theSecond World War, rising to becomeDirector General of Intelligence. A graduate of theRoyal Military College, Sandhurst, Strong wascommissioned into the 1st Battalion,Royal Scots Fusiliers in 1920. After service as anIntelligence Officer with his battalion inIreland from 1920 to 1922 during theIrish War of Independence, he volunteered for service as aninterpreter and was posted to Germany with theBritish Army of the Rhine. In 1935 he returned to Germany as a member of the International Force supervising theSaarlandplebiscite. Afterwards, he joined the German Intelligence Section at theWar Office. In 1937 he became AssistantMilitary attaché inBerlin.
Strong became Head of the German Section atMI14 in August 1939, shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War. He commanded the 4th/5th Battalion, Royal Scots Fusiliers in 1941, before becoming Brigadier General Staff (BGS) forIntelligence atHome Forces in 1942. In March 1943, Strong was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G-2) atGeneralDwight D. Eisenhower'sAllied Force Headquarters (AFHQ). He attended theItalian peace negotiations. In May 1944 he joined Eisenhower'sSupreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), and played a leading part in the negotiations for theunconditional surrender of Germany in 1945.
In August 1945, Strong became deputy director of thePolitical Warfare Executive, succeeding SirBruce Lockhart as its head a month later. He retired from the Army with the rank of major general in 1947 to become acivil servant. He was initially appointed director general of the Political Intelligence Department of theForeign Office. He was the first director of the Joint Intelligence Bureau at theMinistry of Defence from 1948 until 1964, when he became the first director general of Intelligence at the Ministry of Defence. He retired from the civil service in 1966.
Kenneth William Dobson Strong was born inMontrose, Angus,Scotland, on 9 September 1900, the only son amongst four children, toJohn Strong, therector ofMontrose Academy and his wife Ethel May née Dobson. He was educated atMontrose Academy,Glenalmond College and theRoyal Military College, Sandhurst.[1][2]
Strong wascommissioned into the 1st BattalionRoyal Scots Fusiliers in 1920.[1] He served as anintelligence officer with his battalion inIreland from 1920 to 1922 during theIrish War of Independence. In 1922 he volunteered for service with theBritish Army of the Rhine. He was trained as aninterpreter and posted to Germany from 1926 until theOccupation of the Rhineland ended in 1929.[3] He then served as a Defence Security Officer inMalta andGibraltar.[1]
In 1935 he returned to Germany as a member of the International Force supervising theSaarlandplebiscite. Afterwards, he joined the German Intelligence Section at theWar Office. In 1937 he became assistantmilitary attaché inBerlin toNoel Mason-Macfarlane. As such, Strong got to know many senior German military officers personally, includingWilhelm Keitel. Like Mason-Macfarlane, he became convinced that war with Germany was imminent and inevitable.[3]
Strong was appointed Head of theGerman Section atMI14 in August 1939.[4] He liaised with French intelligence until theFall of France in June 1940. Thereafter, his section was concerned with the prospect of a Germaninvasion. In April 1941, he assumed command of the 4th/5th Battalion Royal Scots Fusiliers, part of the52nd (Lowland) Division. In March 1942, he became Brigadier General Staff (BGS) forIntelligence at GHQHome Forces.[5] For his services, Strong was appointed anOfficer of the Order of the British Empire.[1]
In March 1943, Strong was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G-2) atGeneralDwight Eisenhower'sAllied Force Headquarters (AFHQ), replacing Brigadier Eric Mockler-Ferryman, whose over-reliance onUltra sources had led to a misinterpretation of the enemy's intentions leading up to the disastrousBattle of the Kasserine Pass.[6] Strong got on well with Eisenhower and his chief of staff,Major GeneralBedell Smith in particular, and Americans in general.Stephen Ambrose wrote,
Strong had an explosive laugh, an appreciation of the wisecrack, and an easy acceptance of the West Pointers' rough language and casual manner rare in British officers. In his memoirs he endeared himself to all those from the New World side of the Atlantic Ocean who had been put off by British stuffiness and snobbery when he remarked "The best time in a man's life is when he gets to like Americans."[7]
In August 1943, Smith and Strong flew toLisbon viaGibraltar in civilian clothes, where they met withGenerale di BrigataGiuseppe Castellano at the British embassy. Castellano had hoped to arrange terms for Italy to join theUnited Nations, Smith was empowered to draw up anarmistice between Italy and Allied armed forces, but was unable to negotiate political matters.[8] Smith and Strong subsequently negotiated for the Allies with Castellano inSicily over the terms over Italian surrender. On 3 September 1943, Smith and Castellano signed the agreed text on behalf of Eisenhower andPietro Badoglio respectively at Cassibile, Sicily.[9] For his work at AFHQ, Strong was promoted to major general on 11 January 1944,[10] and awarded theLegion of Merit by the United States in March 1944.[11]
When Eisenhower was appointedSupreme Allied Commander in December 1943,[12] he naturally wished to take key members of his AFHQ staff, including Strong, with him to his new assignment.[13] On New Year's Eve, Smith met with Alan Brooke, nowChief of the Imperial General Staff, to discuss the transfer of key British staff from AFHQ toSupreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF).[14] Brooke made some concessions but refused to transfer Strong, who he believed could not be spared from the Mediterranean. A heated exchange resulted, with Smith demanding Brooke explain howOperation Overlord could be a success if the British Army withheld its best talent. Later Brooke complained to Eisenhower about Smith's behaviour.[15] Accordingly, another AFHQ hand, BrigadierJohn Whiteley, became G-2 at SHAEF. However Eisenhower and Smith eventually had their way, going over Brooke's head toPrime MinisterWinston Churchill, and Strong assumed the post on 25 May 1944, with Brigadier General Thomas J. Betts as his deputy.[16]
As it turned out, the relationship between SHAEF andField Marshal SirBernard Montgomery's21st Army Group was far from cordial, with the Deputy Supreme Commander,Air Chief Marshal SirArthur Tedder, and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Lieutenant GeneralFrederick Morgan, both frequently critical of Montgomery.[17] In September 1944 an intelligence crisis similar to Kasserine arose, when thecryptanalysts atBletchley Park did not locate the9th SS Panzer DivisionHohenstaufen and10th SS Panzer DivisionFrundsberg in theArnhem area, but information from theDutch resistance and a consequentphoto reconnaissance ordered by MajorBrian Urquhart, the intelligence officer atI Airborne Corps, confirmed the German presence. Strong and Smith then flew toBrussels to warn Montgomery. However, Montgomery decided to accept the risk rather than alter the plans forOperation Market Garden.[18]
Heavy opposition from the two SSpanzer divisions in the area proved to be a critical factor not only in preventing the British1st Airborne Division from holding theRhine Bridge atArnhem, but also imposed serious delays on the capture of the bridges atNijmegen by the U.S.82nd Airborne Division and the advance of the armoured units of the BritishXXX Corps. For SHAEF, the outcome meant that attention had to turn to theBattle of the Scheldt to open the approaches toAntwerp and to building up resources for an invasion of Germany in 1945.[19]
In December 1944, Strong identified a large German reserve. The Germans devised an elaborate deception plan, and because the troops were being assembled inside Germany, they relied on secure phone and teleprinter lines rather than radio. Ultra and signal intelligence therefore dried up. Ultra detected German hoarding of fuel, but this was misinterpreted as a response to a critical shortage rather than building up a reserve. However, the withdrawal of armoured units from the front line was duly noted, and by 20 November, using agents, aircraft and prisoner interrogations, SHAEF had located and enumerated the divisions of theFifthPanzer Army east ofAachen and theSixthPanzer Army east of theRoer River. Strong informed Smith that the German armoured reserves might be sent to theEastern Front, or used for a counterattack against an Allied penetration of the front, but might also be used for a counterattack during a period of bad weather. In early December, SHAEF detected tank movements in theBitburg area, and Strong became worried about a possible counterattack against the Allied lines in theArdennes or theVosges. Smith sent Strong to warnLieutenant GeneralOmar Bradley, the commander of the12th Army Group, of the danger. Bradley's response was succinct: "Let them come."[20]
The magnitude and ferocity of the GermanArdennes Offensive came as a shock and Strong was criticised for failing to predict it.[17] However Smith defended Strong against criticism for failing to sound the alarm, feeling that Strong had given ample warning, which had been discounted or disregarded by himself and others.[21] By 19 December, Strong had become concerned that the Germans were going to split Bradley's armies, and he and Whiteley – who had already received Monty's opinion on the matter – went to Smith, recommending that the armies north of the Ardennes be transferred from Bradley to Montgomery's command. Smith realised the military and political implications of this, and knew that such a recommendation had to come from an American officer. On 20 December, Smith spoke to Eisenhower, who deferred judgement until the morning staff meeting. Eisenhower then phoned Bradley and Montgomery and ordered it. The decision was greatly resented by many Americans, particularly at 12th Army Group.[22][23]
On 15 April 1945, Nazi governor ('Reichskommissar') of theNetherlands,Arthur Seyss-Inquart,offered to openAmsterdam to food and coal shipments to ease the suffering of the civilian population. Smith and Strong, representing SHAEF, along with Major GeneralIvan Susloparov, representing theUSSR,Prince Bernhard of Lippe-Biesterfeld, representing the Dutch government, and Major General SirFrancis de Guingand, from 21st Army Group, met with Seyss-Inquart in the Dutch village ofAchterveld on 30 April. They successfully negotiated for the provision of food to the starving Dutch civilian population in the cities in the west of the country, and opened discussions for the peaceful and complete German capitulation in the Netherlands that would follow on 5 May.[24]
Another set of negotiations, that of the surrender of German armed forces, were conducted in May 1945. Smith and Strong met with the representatives of theOberkommando der Wehrmacht,GeneraloberstAlfred Jodl andGeneraladmiralHans-Georg von Friedeburg. Once again, Strong acted as translator. Strong was present when, on 7 May, Smith signed the surrender document, along with Suslaparov and the French representative, Major GeneralFrançois Sevez.[25]
For his services at SHAEF, Strong wasmentioned in despatches,[26] appointed aCompanion of the Order of the Bath,[27] and awarded the United StatesDistinguished Service Medal,[28] and other foreign awards, including the FrenchCroix de Guerre andLégion d'honneur, and theOrder of the Red Banner from theUSSR.[1]
In August 1945, Strong became deputy director of thePolitical Warfare Executive, succeeding SirBruce Lockhart as its head a month later. With the elevation of Montgomery to Chief of the Imperial General Staff in 1946, the career prospects of officers who had served at SHAEF, like Morgan,Gale, Whiteley and Strong, became dim,[29] andStrong retired from the Army with the rank of major general on 9 May 1947 to become acivil servant.[30]
He was initially appointed Director General of the Political Intelligence Department of theForeign Office. He was the first Director of the Joint Intelligence Bureau at theMinistry of Defence from 1948 until 1964, when he became the firstDirector General of Intelligence at the Ministry of Defence.[4] He was knighted on 1 January 1952,[31] and became aKnight Commander of the Order of the British Empire in 1966. He retired on 9 May 1966.[1]
Strong became a director ofEagle Star Insurance and other companies. He wrote two books, his memoir,Intelligence at the Top (1970), andMen of Intelligence (1970). Unfortunately, both were written before the Ultra secret was revealed in 1974. In 1979 he married a widow, Brita Charlota Horridge. Their marriage produced no children. Strong died at his home inEastbourne,East Sussex on 11 January 1982.[1] His papers are in theLiddell Hart Centre for Military Archives.[4]
| Government offices | ||
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| New post | Director-General Intelligence 1964−1966 | Succeeded by |
| International | |
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| National | |
| People | |
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