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Kazakhstan | Russia |
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| Diplomatic mission | |
| Embassy of Kazakhstan, Moscow | Embassy of Russia, Astana |
Kazakhstan–Russia relations are thebilateralforeign relations betweenKazakhstan and theRussian Federation. Kazakhstan has anembassy in Moscow, a consulate-general inSaint Petersburg,Astrakhan, andOmsk. Russia has anembassy in Astana and consulates inAlmaty andOral.

TheRussian government considers Kazakhstan a reliable ally and strategic partner.[1]
Kazakhstan and Russia are both founding members of theShanghai Cooperation Organisation, theCollective Security Treaty Organization, and are additionally part of theEuro-Atlantic Partnership Council and theCommonwealth of Independent States. Both also founded theEurasian Economic Union withBelarus. Following the collapse of the USSR, the issue of nuclear weapons was central to diplomatic relations between Kazakhstan and Russia, the West, and the broader international community.[2]
In recent years, Kazakhstan has attempted to balance ties between both sides by selling petroleum and natural gas to its northern neighbor at artificially low prices, allowing heavy investment from Russian businesses, and concluding an agreement over theBaikonur Cosmodrome, while simultaneously assisting the West in thewar on terror.[3]
According to a survey conducted by the Central Asia Barometer between 2017 and 2019, 87% of Kazakhs have a favorable view of Russia, with 8% holding an unfavorable view. The survey also found that 88% support closer relations with Russia, compared to 6% who do not.[4]
As a result of theRussian invasion of Ukraine, public opinion in Kazakhstan has turned against Russia. According to a poll conducted by Demoscope, in November 2022, 22% of respondents expressed support for Ukraine and 13% of respondents expressed support for Russia, down from 39% in March 2022.[5]
In 2023, a poll found that 15% of Kazakhs thought Russia may invade Kazakhstan, up from 8.3% in a previous poll.[6]
During the reign ofKasym Khan from 1511 to 1521, theTsardom of Russia became the first major state to establish diplomatic relations with theKazakh Khanate.[7] In the first half of the 18th century, theRussian Empire constructed theIrtysh line [ru], a series of forty-six forts, includingOmsk (1716),Semipalatinsk (1718),Pavlodar (1720),Orenburg (1743) andPetropavlovsk (1752),[8] to prevent Kazakh andDzungar nomads from raiding Russian territory.[9]
WithRussian expansion to the south and east, it came under Russian influence and thethree hordes of the khanate submitted to the Russians in the 18th century.[10] After the final destruction of the rule of the Kazakh khans,Russian Turkestan was established in 1868, which encompassed most of present-day Kazakhstan. The Russian government settled numerous Russians and Ukrainians in the area, who were allocated land belonging to the indigenous nomadic tribes. A series of uprisings against foreign rule and Russian colonisation were put down by theTsar.

In 1906, theTrans-Aral Railway betweenOrenburg andTashkent was completed, further facilitating Russian colonisation of the fertile lands of theZhetysu region. Between 1906 and 1912, many Russian farms were established as part of Russian Interior MinisterPyotr Stolypin's reforms, which put massive pressure on the traditional Kazakh way of life through the utilisation of pastureland and scarce water resources. Out of hunger and because of the expulsions from their land, many Kazakhs joined theCentral Asian revolt of 1916 against conscription into theRussian imperial army, which the Tsar ordered in July 1916 as part of the war against theCentral Powers in theFirst World War. At the end of 1916, the Russian armed forces brutally crushed the armed resistance against the seizure of land and the conscription of the Central Asians.[11] Thousands of Kazakhs were killed and many more fled to China and Mongolia. The Russian defeat in the First World War enabled the Kazakhs to establish the autonomous region ofAlash Orda from 1917 to 1920, which became a theatre of theRussian Civil War, which the Communists were able to win. The effects of the civil war led to afamine in Kazakhstan, which killed between a fifth and a third of the population.[12][13]

TheKirghiz Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic, founded in 1920, was renamed the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1925, when the Soviet government officially distinguished the Kazakhs from theKyrgyz. Although the Russian Empire recognised the ethnic difference between the two groups, it called them both "Kyrgyz" to avoid confusion between the terms "Kazakhs" and "Cossacks". At the end of the 1920s, the Soviet dictatorJosef Stalin had the Kazakh ruling class executed or deported togulags. The Soviets launched a programme of forcedsedentarisation and expropriation of the nomadic population as part ofdekulakisation and deprived the nomads of the livestock they needed to survive.Theresulting famine cost around 1.3 to 1.5 million lives between 1929 and 1933.[14] In the 21st century, this catastrophe led to discussions in Kazakhstan as to whether the famine constitutedgenocide. The famine and the fact that Stalin had numerous groups classified as politically unreliable deported to Kazakhstan (such as theKazakhstan Germans) changed the demographic composition of the country permanently. The proportion of ethnic Kazakhs fell from 58.5% in 1926 to 37.8% in 1939.[15] Another demographic shock came with theSecond World War, when another tenth of the population died.
After the end of the war, nuclear weapons tests were carried out at theSemipalatinsk test site from 1949 onwards.[16] TheKazakh SSR was the second largest union republic within the USSR and had a comparably high level of economic development thanks to its large deposits of raw materials (including oil, coal, natural gas and uranium). Kazakhstan also played an important role in theSoviet space program thanks to theBaikonur Cosmodrome. However, most of the profits from the raw material deposits flowed to other republics of the Union. The Kazakhs remained a minority in Kazakhstan and most of the higher economic and technical positions were held by Russians. WhenMikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985, Kazakh nationalism increased and theSheltoksan protests broke out in 1986. In March 1991, 95% of the population voted in the1991 Soviet Union referendum in favour of the Kazakh SSR remaining part of the USSR and the adoption of a new union constitution, which would have granted autonomy to the Soviet republics. After the failedAugust coup in Moscow, the Soviet Union collapsed and the Kazakh SSR was the last union republic to declare its independence in December 1991.[17]
When theUSSR dissolved in 1991, it left aSoviet biological weapons program and a Soviet nuclear weapons program,Semipalatinsk Test Site, inRussia,Kazakhstan,Uzbekistan,Georgia,Azerbaijan, and Ukraine. Seeing a largepeace dividend, theBush administration passed such legislation as theSoviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 and over the next 15 years spent more than $400 million on theNunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction andBiological Threat Reduction program,[18][page needed] of which theStepnogorsk Scientific and Technical Institute for Microbiology was a large recipient.
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Following thedissolution of the Soviet Union, the legacy ofSoviet-era space activity in Kazakhstan had long-lasting implications for Kazakh-Russian relations. A notable example was the 1972 launch of theVenus-bound Soviet space probe Cosmos 482 from theBaikonur Cosmodrome, located in what was then theKazakh Soviet Socialist Republic. Due to a malfunction, the probe failed to escape Earth orbit and remained in a decaying elliptical trajectory for over five decades. In May 2025 it was expected to re-enter Earth's atmosphere, with some components potentially surviving reentry due to its durabletitanium shell designed for the harsh conditions of Venus.[19]

In January 2005President of RussiaVladimir Putin and Kazakh PresidentNursultan Nazarbayev signed an agreement approving an official map of theborder. On 23 May 2009, the two countries placed their first boundary marker on the 7,591 km (4,717 mi) border between Kazakhstan's Atyrau and Russia's Astrakhan provinces. The demarcation is expected to take 10 to 15 years to complete.[20][needs update]
In 2013, President Vladimir Putin raised controversy when he claimed that “Kazakhs had never had statehood”, in what seemed to be an apparent response to growing nationalism among Kazakhstanis.[21][22][23][24][25][26] Putin's remarks on the matter led to a severe response from President Nazarbayev, who announced that the country would celebrate the 550th anniversary of theKazakh Khanate, which effectively refutes Putin's claim that a Kazakh nation has never existed. He also threatened to withdraw from theEurasian Economic Union, saying that the independence of the country is his "most precious treasure" and that Kazakhs "will never surrender" their independence.[27][28][29]
In December 2020, Putin's derogatory comments were repeated by at least two Russian lawmakers.[30]
At the request ofTokayev government, Russia participated in theCSTO Peacekeeping Force effort to quell theanti-government protests on 6 January 2022.[31][32][33] The Russian forces included units of the Airborne Troops and the air transport of the Russian Aerospace Forces.[32] On 13 January the CSTO forces began to withdraw.[34] On 19 January the withdrawal was complete.[35][36] There are roughly 1,000 Russian troops in Kazakhstan according to Ukraine's Main Directorate of Intelligence of Ukraine's Ministry of Defense.[37]

Kazakhstan–Russia relations deteriorated greatly upon theRussian invasion of Ukraine. Kazakh leadership including Kazakh Foreign MinisterMukhtar Tleuberdi did not condemn the Russian invasion and abstained on the UN vote to condemn it, but at the same time they refused to recognize the Russian states ofDonetsk People's Republic andLuhansk People's Republic.[38]
In addition to sending humanitarian aid to Ukraine, the Kazakh military increased spending and training.[39] Although Russia never showed any particular interest forNorthern Kazakhstan, a region with a sizeable Russian minority, there is still the fear the same arguments used in Ukraine can be used to bolster Russianirredentism in the North.
Russia suspended shipments of Kazakh oil afterTokayev’s statements at theSt. Petersburg International Economic Forum, where he stated that Kazakhstan considered the DPR and LPR as “quasi-state entities” and would not recognize them.[40] On the other hand, in spite of some tensions, Kazakhstan's relations with Russia remain strong and mostly friendly, as shown by Tokayev's visit to Moscow in November 2022.[41]
Following the2022 Russian mobilization, Kazakhstan received a large influx of Russians leaving to avoidbeing conscripted to fight in Ukraine. President Tokayev promised that his government would help Russians who were leaving "because of the current hopeless situation", and that it was "a political and a humanitarian issue."[42]

In 2022, Kazakhstan agreed to share the personal data ofexiled anti-war Russians with the Russian government. In September 2022, Kazakh authorities detained a Russian journalist who was wanted on charges of"discrediting" the Russian military.[43] In December 2022, Kazakhstan deported a Russian citizen who fled mobilization.[44] In January 2023, Kazakhstan announced they were tightening visa rules, a move that is expected to make it more difficult for Russians to remain in the country.[45][46]
In September 2023, Kazakhstani PresidentKassym-Jomart Tokayev stated that Kazakhstan would follow the sanctions regime against Russia.[47]
In January 2024, the head of theKazakh diaspora in Moscow, Polat Dzhamalov, was charged by Russian authorities withspreading "false information" about the Russian armed forces after he shared a senior Russian official's alleged estimate ofRussian military deaths in a Facebook post.[48]

Commemorative diplomacy has remained a key feature of Kazakh-Russian relations in thepost-Soviet era, particularly surrounding shared memories ofWorld War II. Since the early 2000s, Kazakhstan and otherCentral Asian nations have regularly participated inMoscow’s annualVictory Day parade, marking the defeat ofNazi Germany. 9 May May 2025,Kazakhstan's President was expected to join other leaders of theCommonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Moscow to mark the 80th anniversary of theAllied victory, reaffirming regional solidarity rooted inSoviet history.[49]
While such attendance is traditional, it has gained increased international attention in recent years, as Russia has used the event to emphasize diplomatic ties amid growing Western isolation following its actions in Ukraine. Despite this, Central Asian nations, including Kazakhstan, maintain their own commemorations. In 2025, Kazakhstan scheduled a military parade inAstana for 7 May, continuing a pattern of national observance that complements, rather than replaces, regional participation in Moscow.[49]
Overall money flow in trade between Kazakhstan–Russia in 2018 was $18,219,255,476, which is more than 2017's numbers by 5.68%. Export to Kazakhstan was: $12,923,333,532 which is more than 2017's numbers by 4.86%. Export to Russia was: $5,295,921,944 which is more than 2017's numbers by 7.71%.[50]
The main products of trade are machinery, mineral products, metal, chemicals, agricultural supplies, and shoes.[50] The influx of Russian direct investment in the Republic of Kazakhstan for the period 2005–2014. amounted to 9.1 billion US dollars, and Kazakhstan in Russia – 2.9 billion US dollars.[51]
One of the most active and large-scale relations is in the fuel sphere. The transit of Kazakh oil through Russia is also carried out within the framework of theCaspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). At 50 percent, CPC is owned by the governments of Russia and Kazakhstan, and by 50 percent – by mining companies that financed the commissioning of the first phase of the project.[51]
Big Russian companies likeLukoil ($5 billion),Gazprom ($1 billion),INTER RAO UES ($0.2 billion)Rusal ($0.4 billion),Rosatom State Corporation,Rosneft OJSC,Bank VTB OJSC,VEB,Mechel OJSC,Severstal OJSC invest in Kazakhstan's economy.[51]
In July 2024, Kazakhstan banned wheat imports from Russia through the end of the year in order to "protect the domestic market".[52] In October 2024, Russia began to restrict food imports from Kazakhstan, with the Russian government agencyRosselkhoznadzor citing the need to "preserve the phytosanitary well-being of Russia".[53] Russia's ban was implemented five days after Kazakhstan said it didn't have plans to joinBRICS in the near future, but it is unclear if these two events are related.[54]
In March 2025, Russia expressed dissatisfaction with Kazakhstan's commercial banks, accusing them of excessive caution in processing payments and extending loans to Russian businesses. The concern stemmed from Kazakh banks demanding "letters of guarantee" and imposing stringent due diligence, fearing secondary sanctions and disconnection from theSWIFT system. The Kazakh National Bank, underTimur Suleimenov, refused to pressure banks to ease these rules, citing legitimate concerns over potential sanctions. This caution followed accusations in 2023 that Kazakhstan had served as a conduit for Russia's war efforts, despite Kazakhstan's official adherence toUS andEU sanctions.[55]
In April 2025, theCaspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), a key oil export route from Kazakhstan via Russia'sBlack Sea port ofNovorossiysk, resumed partial operations after Russian authorities lifted restrictions tied to a December 2024 oil spill. The CPC, which handles about 80% of Kazakhstan's oil exports and includes Western shareholders likeChevron andExxonMobil, restored activity at two of its three moorings. Although operations remain strained due to the continued closure of the third mooring (SPM-2), the move helped avert a sharp drop in Kazakh exports. The disruption had followed regional instability, including drone attacks on infrastructure in southern Russia, and came amid tensions withinOPEC+ over Kazakhstan exceeding its production quotas, largely due to output from theTengiz field.[56]

Almost 3.4 million ethnicRussians lived in Kazakhstan in 2023, making Russians just under 18% of the population.[57] However, the proportion of Russians in Kazakhstan is declining significantly due to lower birth rates and emigration to Russia; in 1970 Russians constituted 42% of the population.Russian is still widely spoken as alingua franca in Kazakhstan. After independence from the Soviet Union, the Kazakh government pursued a policy of developingKazakh as thestate language in order to emphasise the Kazakh character of the country and promote the Kazakh language and culture. One aspect of this policy was the government's decision to define Kazakhstan as a Kazakh nation-state in the country's first constitution in 1993 and the second constitution in 1995.[58] Thisindigenization policy, combined with a lack of economic prospects, fuelled the decline of the Russian population in the country, as many ethnic Russians decided to emigrate. Russians continue to form the majority of the population innorthern Kazakhstan. Kazakh has been written in theCyrillic alphabet since Russian rule, before the introduction of theLatin alphabet was announced in 2021, which is due to be completed by 2031.[59]
Both countries have concluded numerous cultural, technical and scientific agreements. Cooperation in education and research is very intensive. Almost 60,000 Kazakhs study in Russia and Russia supports Kazakh students abroad with scholarships. Kazakhstan and Russia also jointly manage the spaceport in Baikonur.[60]
In March 2023, Kazakhstan canceled a music festival where pro-Kremlin Russian singers, includingGrigory Leps, were scheduled to perform. In June 2023, Leps' concert in theAlmaty Region was canceled following pressure from the Kazakh public and activists over his support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[61]
In June 2023, a Kazakh official warned that Russian-ownedTelegram enabled easy drug purchases for minors.[62]
In January 2024, pro-Kremlin television presenterTina Kandelaki was banned from entering Kazakhstan over her online comments alleging that the Russian language was being discriminated against in the Central Asian country.[63]
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