TheKalam cosmological argument is a modern formulation of thecosmological argument for theexistence of God. It is named after theKalam (medievalIslamicscholasticism) from which many of its key ideas originated.^[1] Philosopher and theologianWilliam Lane Craig was principally responsible for revitalising these ideas for modern academic discourse through his bookThe Kalām Cosmological Argument (1979), as well as other publications.

The argument's central thesis is themetaphysical impossibility of atemporally past-infiniteuniverse and ofactual infinities existing in thereal world, traced by Craig to 11th-century Persian Muslim scholastic philosopherAl-Ghazali. This feature distinguishes it from other cosmological arguments, such asAquinas'sSecond Way, which rests on the impossibility of acausally orderedinfinite regress, and those ofLeibniz andSamuel Clarke, which refer to theprinciple of sufficient reason.^[2]

Since Craig's original publication, the Kalam cosmological argument has elicited public debate between Craig andGraham Oppy,Adolf Grünbaum,J. L. Mackie andQuentin Smith, and has been used inChristian apologetics.^[3][2] According toMichael Martin, the cosmological arguments presented by Craig, Bruce Reichenbach, andRichard Swinburne are "among the most sophisticated and well-argued incontemporarytheological philosophy".^[4]

The most prominent form of the Kalam cosmological argument, as defended by William Lane Craig, is expressed in two parts, as an initialsyllogism followed by further philosophical analysis.^[5]

The Kalam cosmological argument is adeductive argument. Therefore, if itspremises are true, the conclusion followsnecessarily.

Craig argues that the cause of the universenecessarily embodies specific properties, in being:^[6]

• Uncaused, otherwise aninfinite regress of causes would arise.
• Timeless (therefore changeless), spaceless, immaterial and enormously powerful, in creatingspacetime and its contentsex nihilo.
• Personal, possessingnon-deterministicagency, in creating the universe from a timeless state (without prior determining conditions).
• Singular, perOccam's razor, in the absence of good reasons to believe in the existence of more than one uncaused cause.

Based upon this analysis, he appends a further premise and conclusion:^[6]

Craig appraises thetheological significance of the final conclusion:^[8]

"... our whole universe was caused to exist by something beyond it and greater than it. For it is no secret that one of the most important conceptions of what theists mean by 'God' is Creator of heaven and earth."

The origins of thecosmological argument can be traced toclassical antiquity, rooted in the concept of theprime mover, introduced byAristotle. In the 6th century,Syriac Christian theologianJohn Philoponus (c. 490–c. 570) presented the first known version of the argument based on the impossibility of aninfinite temporal regress, postulating that time itself must have had a beginning.^[9]

Like other early Christian commentators, Philoponus disputed theGreek doctrine of theeternity of matter, noting that this was inconsistent with theJudeo-Christian doctrine ofcreatio ex nihilo. Furthermore, he examined the contradiction between Greek conceptions of past eternity and Aristotle's repudiation of the existence ofactual infinities.^[10] In 529, he presented his critique,On the Eternity of the World Against Proclus, categorising arguments for thefinitude of the past, which underpinned his arguments for the existence of God.^[9]

Philoponus's ideas would be developed substantially within the proceedings ofmedievalIslamicscholasticism—orkalam—through the 9th and 12th centuries,^[10] refined in the 11th century byAl-Ghazali and in the 12th byIbn Rushd.^[11] In his landmark thesis,The Incoherence of the Philosophers, Persian Muslim theologian Al-Ghazali characterised the absurdity of a beginningless universe and of the existence of actual infinities, articulating a prototypical formulation of the modern Kalam cosmological argument:^[12]

"Every being which begins has a cause for its beginning; now the world is a being which begins;

therefore, it possesses a cause for its beginning."

In the 13th century, the cosmological argument was introduced to medieval Christian theology, wherein it would be examined bySt. Bonaventure as well asThomas Aquinas in hisSumma Theologica (I, q.2, a.3) andSumma Contra Gentiles (I, 13).^[13][14][15] Conceptions oftemporal finitism that had been substantiated in Philoponus's—and later, Al-Ghazali's—writings inspired energetic debate between Aquinas and Bonaventure, as well as further generations of scholars up until the 18th century. Craig writes:^[16]

"It finally sputtered to something of an inconclusive end in the thought of the great German philosopherImmanuel Kant in the 18th century. Kant held, ironically, that there are rationally compelling arguments for both [the finitude and infinitude of the past], so that the problem is insoluble and exposes the bankruptcy of reason itself."

According toQuentin Smith:^[14]

"A count of the articles in the philosophy journals shows that more articles have been published about Craig's defense of the Kalam argument than have been published about any other philosopher's contemporary formulation of an argument for God's existence."

The Kalam cosmological argument has received criticism from philosophers such asJ. L. Mackie,Graham Oppy,Adolf Grunbaum,Michael Martin,Quentin Smith, Wes Morriston and Alex Malpass as well as physicistsSean M. Carroll,Lawrence Krauss andVictor Stenger.^[17]

Modern discourse encompasses the fields of both philosophy and science (e.g. the fields ofquantum physics andcosmology), which Bruce Reichenbach summarises as:^[18]

"... whether there needs to be a cause of the first natural existent, whether something like the universe can be finite and yet not have a beginning, and the nature of infinities and their connection with reality".

Since the temporal ordering of events is central, the Kalam argument also brings issues of the nature of time into the discussion.^[19]

Craig and James Sinclair offer three reasons to support the first premise, proposing that it is more plausibly true than its negation:^[20]

1. Rational intuition: The first premise isself-evidently true, originating in themetaphysical intuition that "something cannot come into being from nothing" (Latin:ex nihilo nihil fit)—characterised inParmenidean philosophy.
2. Reductio ad absurdum: If false, it would be inexplicable why anything and everything does not randomly come into existence without a cause. To come into being without any cause is to come into being from nothing, which Craig claims is surely absurd.
3. Inductive reasoning from both common experience and scientific evidence, which constantly verifies and never falsifies its truth.

Graham Oppy,J. L. Mackie and Wes Morriston have objected to the intuitiveness of the first premise.^[21][22][23] Oppy states:

"Mackie, [Adolf] Grunbaum, [Quentin] Smith and I—among many others—have taken issue with the first premise: why should it be supposed that absolutely everything which begins to exist has a cause for its beginning to exist?"

Mackie affirms that there is no good reason to assumea priori that an uncaused beginning of all things is impossible. Moreover, that the Causal Principle cannot be extrapolated to the universe from inductive experience. He appeals toDavid Hume's thesis (An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding) that effects without causes can be conceived in the mind, and that what is conceivable in the mind is possible in the real world.^[24] This argument has been criticised by Bruce Reichenbach andG.E.M. Anscombe, who point out thephenomenological and logical problems in inferring factual possibility from conceivability.^[25][26] Craig notes:^[27][28]

"Hume himself clearly believed in the causal principle. He presupposes throughout the Enquiry that events have causes, and in 1754 he wrote to John Stewart, 'But allow me to tell you that I never asserted so absurd a Proposition as that anything might arise without a cause'."

Morriston asserts that causal laws are physical processes for which we have intuitive knowledge in the context of events within time and space, but that such intuitions do not hold true for the beginning of time itself. He states:^[29]

"We have no experience of the origin of worlds to tell us that worlds don't come into existence like that. We don't even have experience of the coming into being of anything remotely analogous to the 'initial singularity' that figures in theBig Bang theory of the origin of the universe."

Craig responds that causal laws are unrestrictedmetaphysical truths that are "notcontingent upon the properties, causal powers, anddispositions of the natural kinds of substances which happen to exist", remarking:^[30]

"The history of twentieth century astrophysical cosmology belies Morriston's claim that people have no strong intuitions about the need of a causal explanation of the origin of time and the universe."

Paul Davies is unconvinced that the Causal Principle can be defined consistently in fundamental physics, proposing that the phenomenon ofquantum indeterminacy contradicts adeterministic model ofcause and effect.^[31] Craig concedes that quantum indeterminism contradicts the proposition thatevery event has a cause. Nonetheless, he maintains it is consistent with the causal premise that "everything that begins to exist has a cause", encompassing the more modest view that objects cannot come into existence entirely devoid of causal conditions.^[32] Even if quantum events arise withoutsufficient prior conditions, he affirms at least somenecessary conditions are present:^[33]

"The appearance of a particle in a quantum vacuum may thus be said to be spontaneous, but cannot properly be said to be absolutely uncaused, since it has many physically necessary conditions. To be uncaused in the relevant sense of an absolute beginning, an existent must lack any non-logical necessary or sufficient conditions whatsoever."

Wes Morriston inquires whether necessary conditions alone are adequate in defining causation, suggesting further substantiation is necessary when contemplating the causal origin of the universe.^[29] For Bruce Reichenbach, the strength of the first premise is grounded in theontology of quantum indeterminacy. If indeterminism is a fundamental feature of the real world, rather than anepistemic artefact of incomplete knowledge orhidden variables, he suggests its implications for the Causal Principle would be substantially negative.^[34]

Craig stresses that the phenomenon of indeterminism is specific to theCopenhagen interpretation ofquantum mechanics, remarking that this is only one of several interpretations, some of which are fully deterministic—mentioningBohmian mechanics^[35]—and none of which are as yet known to be true. He concludes that subatomic physics is not a proven exception to the first premise.^[36]

Quantum vacuum phenomena are often expounded to be uncaused in origin, referring toquantum indeterminacy governing the vacuum state andsemantics that define thezero-point field asnothing, in an ontological sense.^[37]Quentin Smith illustrates the example ofvirtual particles, which appear and disappear throughfluctuations in the quantum vacuum, as evidence of uncaused natural phenomena.^[38] In his publication,A Universe from Nothing: Why There is Something Rather Than Nothing,Lawrence Krauss proposes that quantum fluctuations can explain how space, time and matter can emerge from 'nothing' (referring to the vacuum state).^[39]Michael Martin writes:^[40]

"Even if the universe has a beginning in time, in the light of recently proposed cosmological theories this beginning may be uncaused. Despite Craig's claim that theories postulating that the universe 'could pop into existence uncaused' are incapable of 'sincere affirmation,' such similar theories are in fact being taken seriously by scientists."

David Albert deems the term 'nothing' to be misleading when defining the quantum vacuum. In a critique of Krauss's book, he remarks:^[41]

"Relativistic-quantum-field-theoretical vacuum states—no less than giraffes or refrigerators or solar systems—are particular arrangements of elementary physical stuff. The true relativistic-quantum-field-theoretical equivalent to there not being any physical stuff at all isn't this or that particular arrangement of the fields—what it is (obviously, andineluctably, and on the contrary) is the simpleabsence of the fields."

Craig describes the vacuum state as aquantifiable, energetic medium that qualifies assomething rather thannothing, rejecting the view of quantum vacuum phenomena as uncaused. On quantum fluctuations, he writes:^[42]

"... virtual particles do not literally come into existence spontaneously out of nothing. Rather the energy locked up in a vacuum fluctuates spontaneously in such a way as to convert intoevanescent particles that return almost immediately to the vacuum."

Alexander Vilenkin determines that, even in the "absence of space, time and matter", the laws of physics are still present and require explanation, though this state would be "as close to nothing as you can get". He continues:^[43]

"That makes you wonder, where are these laws? If the laws describe the creation of the universe, that suggests they existed prior to the universe. The question that nobody has any idea how to address is where these laws come from and why these laws in particular?"

For scientific confirmation of thefinitude of the past, Craig refers to evidence incosmology andtheoretical physics:

1. Thestandard model of cosmology, which characterises the origin of the universe in theBig Bang.^[44]
2. Thesecond law of thermodynamics, which stipulates that the universe must, in a finite duration, reach a state of equilibrium known asheat death. If the universe has an infinite past, he argues, heat death would have already transpired.^[45]
3. TheBorde–Guth–Vilenkin theorem, according to which any universe that has, on average, been expanding throughout its history cannot have been expanding indefinitely but must have had a past boundary at which inflation began.^[46]

Alexander Vilenkin describes the Borde–Guth–Vilenkin theorem:^[47]

"A remarkable thing about this theorem is its sweeping generality. We made no assumptions about the material content of the universe. We did not even assume that gravity is described byEinstein's equations. So, if Einstein's gravity requires some modification, our conclusion will still hold. The only assumption that we made was that the expansion rate of the universe never gets below some nonzero value, no matter how small."

According to Vilenkin and co-authorAlan Guth, the past boundary described by the Borde–Guth–Vilenkin theorem does not necessarily represent acosmic beginning, instead the beginning ofcosmic inflation.^[48] Though it "opens the door" for theories other than an absolute beginning, in a 2012 lecture, Vilenkin would discuss problems with alternative theories that would claim to avoid a cosmological beginning (includingeternal inflation,cyclic andemergent models) concluding: "All the evidence we have says that the universe had a beginning".^[49] In publications, he would conclude that the Borde–Guth–Vilenkin theorem is sufficient evidence for a beginning of the universe.^[50][51][52]

Sean Carroll observes that the theorem assumes aclassical spacetime, determining it to be incompatible with the extreme energies and densities that define thePlanck era of the early universe, where quantum effects become dominant. Instead of describing a cosmic beginning, he remarks that the theorem's boundary defines the point at whichclassical mechanics of the universe no longer apply:^[53]

"... the real world is governed by quantum mechanics, and the BGV theorem assumes a classical spacetime, so it says nothing definitive about what actually happens in the universe; it is only a guideline to when our classical description breaks down."

Craig responds that, if anything exists before the past boundary described by the theorem, it would be anon-classical region described by a yet-to-be-determined theory ofquantum gravity. This quantum gravity region must also have a beginning, he stipulates, given that its inherentinstability would render any quantum regime impossible to endure indefinitely or exist timelessly and changelessly:^[54]

"If there is such a non-classical region, then it is not past eternal in the classical sense. But neither can it exist literally timelessly, akin to the way in which philosophers considerabstract objects to be timeless or theologians take God to be timeless. For this region is in a state of constant flux, which, given theIndiscernibility of Identicals, is sufficient for time. So even if time as defined inclassical physics does not exist at such an era, some sort of time would."

He draws on arguments fromAnthony Aguirre and John Kehayias, who write:^[55]

"It is very difficult to devise a system, especially a quantum one, that does nothing 'forever', then evolves. A truly stationary or periodic quantum state, which would last forever, would never evolve, whereas one with any instability will not endure for an indefinite time."

As a purelykinematic theorem—relying solely on the geometric properties of expandingclassical spacetime—the Borde–Guth–Vilenkin theorem assumes an average rate ofcosmic expansion greater than zero (H_avg > 0) on the basis of a lineararrow of time.^[46]

Craig and James Sinclair identify 4 exception conditions that bypass this requirement and evade the theorem:^[56]

1. Past eternal static state followed by cosmic expansion (H_avg = 0) e.g. emergent models.
2. Perpetual cycle of cosmic expansion then contraction (H_avg = 0) e.g. cyclic models.
3. Infinite cosmic contraction prior to the current expansion (H_avg < 0) e.g. de Sitter cosmology.
4. Reversal of time at the cosmological boundary, e.g. Aguirre–Gratton model.

They contend that these models contradict observational cosmology or confirm the cosmic beginning they were devised to disprove.^[57]

According to theemergent universe model, the universe existed in a static phase for an infinite duration, then transitioned spontaneously viaquantum tunneling to a dynamicexpansion phase. The static phase ismetastable and, because it endures over infinite time, the universe overall has an average expansion rate of zero (H_avg = 0) thereby avoiding the Borde–Guth–Vilenkin theorem.^[56]

Metastability in this context refers to afalse vacuum state, which is stable according toclassical physics, but unstable at thequantum mechanical level in that it can transition spontaneously via quantum tunneling to a more stabletrue vacuum state. This transition may trigger cosmic inflation, or conversely, collapse of the universe to a hyperdense state.^[58] Vilenkin and Audrey Mithani maintain that the metastable state cannot endure indefinitely. Though an event such as cosmic collapse is highly improbable, they argue that over an infinite duration it becomes a mathematical certainty. If the emergent universe cannot exist indefinitely, then it must have had a beginning.^[59]

Responding to Vilenkin and Mithani,Rube Goldberg cosmology postulates an emergent model ofspacetime that is fully classical, avoiding a quantum gravity era as well as the problems associated with quantum instability. However, the author notes that its composition comes at the cost of a "long chain of highlyad hoc assumptions, akin to aRube Goldberg machine".^[60]

Bounce cosmology refers to any theoretical framework in which the universe rebounds from a preceding phase of contraction to the current phase of expansion, substituting theinitial singularity predicted by classicalgeneral relativity with abig bounce.

Cyclic universes proceed through an infinite cycle of expansions and contractions. Though the earliest models proposed no net expansion or contraction (H_avg = 0), they were noted to be in violation of thesecond law of thermodynamics given that the universe would eventually reach a state ofheat death, rendering an infinite cycle impossible.^[61]Paul Steinhardt andNeil Turok suggest that cosmic volume could increase with each cycle, causingentropy dilution sufficient to avert heat death.^[62] Vilenkin notes, however, that this would put the universe in a state of net expansion, rendering it subject to the Borde–Guth–Vilenkin theorem, therefore finite into the past.^[52]

De Sitter cosmology describes a universe that contracts for infinite time prior to a point of minimum size, followed by expansion. Though it avoids the Borde–Guth–Vilenkin theorem by averaging net contraction through time (H_avg < 0),George Ellis maintains that initial conditions must be inexplicably precise for contraction to rebound intouniform expansion characteristic of the observed universe. This extraordinary fine-tuning must be acausal and assumed asbrute fact, he argues, given that it originates in an infinite past.^[63] Vilenkin writes:^[64]

"You can evade the theorem by postulating that the universe was contracting prior to some time. ... This sounds as if there is nothing wrong with having contraction prior to expansion. But the problem is that a contracting universe is highly unstable. Small perturbations would cause it to develop all sorts of messy singularities, so it would never make it to the expanding phase."

TheAguirre–Gratton model postulates a reversal of time at${\displaystyle t=0}$, withspacetime structured as two cosmic expansions evolving in opposite time directions from apoint of minimum size. The universe resembles a de Sitter 'bounce', but classifies as a model ofeternal inflation by maintaining an inflationary state at every point in time.^[65] Among the model's proponents areVictor J. Stenger,^[66] as well asSean Carroll, who presents it as "proof by construction" that a universe without a beginning is conceivable.^[67] Vilenkin pronounces a reversal of time at${\displaystyle t=0}$ to make the moment "no less special than a true beginning of the universe."^[68] He elaborates to Stenger:^[64]

"Models of this sort have been discussed by Aguirre & Gratton, and by Carroll & Chen. They had to assume though that the minimum of entropy was reached at the bounce and offered no mechanism to enforce this condition. It seems to me that it is essentially equivalent to a beginning."

For philosophical evidence of the finitude of the past, Craig refers to:

1. Hilbert's paradox of the Grand Hotel, to illustrate themetaphysical impossibility ofactual infinites existing in reality.^[69]
2. The Tristram Shandy Paradox, to demonstrate the impossibility of forming an actual infinite by successive addition.^[70][71]

Correspondingly, he argues:

• An infinite series of past events is metaphysically impossible, given that it would represent an actual infinite existing in reality.^[1]
• Past events cannot be extended to an infinite past, given that they consist of a series formed by successive addition.^[1][72]

Variations of these arguments have been presented by philosopherAndrew Loke, who refers to a modified version of Hilbert's Hotel,^[73] and Ben Waters, who has published the story of Methuselah's Diary as a refinement of the diary of Tristram Shandy.^[74]

Craig maintains that, though it is metaphysically impossible for actual infinities to exist in the real world, they (and the absurdities that attend their existence in the real world) aredescribable via mathematics, thereforelogically possible.^[75] He also distinguishes betweenactual infinities andpotential infinities, stating that it is fully possible for potential infinites to exist in the real world, in contrast to the former:^[76]

"A potential infinite is a series which has a beginning and is growing indefinitely; infinity serves merely as an ideal limit of the series which it never reaches ... That’s impossible, since for anynatural numbern,n+1 is always a finite number."

Edward Feser observes that the Kalam cosmological argument is based upon apresentist theory of time in which past and future events do not exist, remarking that this would be incompatible with objections against an eternal past based upon Hilbert's Hotel:^[77]

"If the present alone is real, then how can an infinite series of events in time count as an actual infinite? Past moments of time are not actual; they no longer exist ... In the Hilbert’s hotel scenario [the rooms and guests] exist together all at once, at the same time."

Craig affirms that the simultaneous existence of the enumerated objects is irrelevant, so long as past eventshave been real, thus instantiated in reality, they can be counted.^[78][79] He refers to a narrative byAquinas of a blacksmith who, from an eternal past, has used and broken successive hammers. He writes that the discarded hammers need no longer exist to be counted as an actual infinite.^[80] Furthermore, that the absurdities attending the existence of actual infinites in reality still apply if the enumerated objects no longer exist:^[81]

"... in an infinite series of past events, the number of odd-numbered events is the same as the number of all the events, even though the latter collection includes all the odd-numbered events plus an infinite number of even-numbered events as well."

Feser contends that past events are more analogous toabstract objects thanconcrete objects, such as rooms and guests relevant to Hilbert's Hotel, noting that it is fully tenable for mathematicians to deal withinfinite sets of abstract objects, such asnatural numbers. For this, he refers toAristotle's postulate that denies the existence of time independent ofobjects that change:^[82]

"To speak of time apart from change is a bit like speaking of auniversal like redness apart from actual red things—it is to engage inabstraction from the concrete conditions under which the thing in question (redness, or time) can actually exist."

Craig proposes that, though a beginningless past would qualify as an actually infinite series of past events, an endless future would qualify only as a potential infinite, given that future events, unlike past events, are yet to be actualised and merely potential.^[79]

Wes Morriston and Alex Malpass argue that this asymmetry is arbitrary. They pronounce that future events thatwill be actual satisfy the samereality condition as past events that are deemed actual in that theyhave been. Furthermore, they stipulate thatnatural numbers can be representative of moments in time. Since the set of natural numbers greater than any given value,x, is always an actual infinite, so too, they argue, must future events beyond any given moment in time be actually infinite. They conclude that, if the Hilbert's Hotel paradox disproves an eternal past, so too must it negate an endless future, contradicting theJudeo-Christian doctrine ofeternal life.^[83]

Commenting in agreement that future events cannot be actually infinite, Craig responds that this objectionbegs the question and fails to address theontological distinction between past and future qualified by the objectivity oftemporal becoming underpresentism.^[84][85] He writes:

"The series of future events can be finite but endless. In such a case the series is potentially infinite. This is a view that is so widespread and commonly accepted in the history of philosophy and science that the objector has a considerableburden of proof to bear if he is to show that this view is untenable."

In a critique of Craig's bookThe Kalām Cosmological Argument, published in 1979, Michael Martin writes:^[86]

"It should be obvious that Craig's conclusion that a single personal agent created the universe is anon sequitur. At most, this Kalam argument shows that some personal agent or agents created the universe. Craig cannot validly conclude that a single agent is the creator. On the contrary, for all he shows, there may have been trillions of personal agents involved in the creation."

Martin adds that Craig has not justified his claim of creationex nihilo, remarking that the universe may have been created from pre-existing material in a timeless or eternal state. Moreover, that Craig takes his argument too far beyond what his premises allow in stating that the creator is greater than the universe. For this, he cites the example of a parent creating a child who eventually becomes greater than he or she.^[87]

In theBlackwell Companion to Natural Theology, published in 2009, Craig and James Sinclair present a philosophical analysis of the properties of the cause of the universe, indicating that they follow byentailment from the initial syllogism of the Kalam cosmological argument:^[6]

1. The universe must originateex nihilo in being withoutnatural cause, because no natural explanation can be causally prior to the very existence of the natural world. The cause of the universe is therefore outside of space and time (timeless, thereforechangeless, andspaceless) as well asimmaterial andenormously powerful, in bringingspacetime and its contents into existence.
2. Even if positing a plurality of causes prior to the origin of the universe, the causal chain must terminate in a cause which is absolutely first anduncaused, otherwise aninfinite regress of causes would arise, which Craig and Sinclair argue is impossible.
3. Occam's Razor maintains thatunicity of the First Cause should be assumed in the absence of specific reasons to believe that there is more than one causeless cause.
4. Agent causation, orvolitional action, is the onlyontological condition in which an effect can arise in the absence of prior determining conditions. Therefore, onlypersonal, free agency can account for the origin of a firsttemporal effect from a changeless cause.
5. There are two conceivable categories of objects with the potential to beuncaused,spaceless,timeless andimmaterial:
   • Minds (in some conceptions ofmind-body dualism) may be characterised as immaterial and spatially unextended, with the potential to beunembodied, timeless, changeless and beginningless.^[88]
   • Abstract objects, such as the set ofnatural numbers, may be described as non-spatial and non-temporal, but do not sit in causal relationships and are therefore causally ineffective.^[89]

Based upon their conceptual analysis, Craig concludes:^[6]

"... an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists, whosans the universe^[7] is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless and enormously powerful."

He remarks upon the theological significance of this union of properties:^[8]

"... our whole universe was caused to exist by something beyond it and greater than it. For it is no secret that one of the most important conceptions of what theists mean by 'God' is Creator of heaven and earth."

The Kalam cosmological argument is based on theA-theory of time, also known as the "tensed theory of time" orpresentism, in which past and future events do not exist in reality (theyhave existed, orwill exist, but do not exist now) and only the present exists.^[90] This is opposed to theB-theory of time, also known as the "tenseless theory of time" oreternalism, in which past, present and future events co-exist and there is no privilege to the present other than as aframe of reference.^[91]

Under the A-theory, the passage of time andtemporal becoming are objective andreal features of the universe, with objects coming into being and going out of being. In the B-theory, temporal passage and becoming are illusions ofconsciousness. Craig explains:^[32]

"On a B-Theory of time, the universe does not in fact come into being or become actual at the Big Bang; it just exists tenselessly as a four-dimensional space-time block that is finitelyextended in the earlier than direction. If time is tenseless, then the universe never really comes into being, and, therefore, the quest for a cause of its coming into being is misconceived."

Craig has defended the A-theory against objections fromJ. M. E. McTaggart andhybrid A–B theorists.^[92][93] He refers to theneo‐Lorentzian interpretation of theSpecial Theory of Relativity, which he contends has become tenable in light of recent findings in quantum mechanics concerningBell's theorem.^[94] Similar to Einstein's original interpretation, the Lorentzian view describes a 3-dimensional universe existing through time, with objects in motion demonstratingtime dilation andlength contraction. However, these relativistic distortions occur relative to a privileged rest frame (an absolute frame of reference for the universe) rather than relative to each observer.^[95]

He writes that the Lorentzian interpretation, in postulating anabsolute space and absolute time, resolves the fragmentation of reality that characterises Einsteinian relativity, in which observers in relative motion occupy different spaces and times. Importantly,Lorentz's view of time as dynamic, and distinct from space, renders it compatible with the A-theory conception of a tensed universe.^[96]

Philosopher Yuri Balashov asserts that both consensus and evidence supportMinkowski's interpretation of relativity, which posits a 4D geometric universe inhabited by objects extended in time as well as space.^[97] In spurning the notion of a 3D universe existing in time, Minkowskian relativity rejects the A-theory, correlating instead with the B-theory conception of a tenselessspacetime. Balashov remarks:^[98]

"Despite the fact that presentism has the firm backing ofcommon sense and eternalism revolts against it, eternalism is widely regarded as almost the default view in contemporary debates, and presentism as a highly problematic view."

Craig suggests that Balashov underestimates the challenge to Minkowskian relativity presented by recent findings.^[95] He criticises Balashov for adopting averificationist method that overlooks important metaphysical and theological foundations for the A-theory, declaring that correct interpretation of Special Relativity involves not merely scientific, but also metaphysical, inquiry.^[96][99]

In a 2020 interview, Craig proposed that the Kalam cosmological argument could be adapted to the B-theory of time by:^[100]

• Abandoning the metaphysical argument against forming an actual infinity by successive addition.
• Modifying the causal premise (replacing its appeal to the concept of 'coming into being' with the concept of 'beginning to exist').

Under the B-theory, scientific evidence for the finitude of the past would still be valid and the argument as a whole would be tenable, though requiring reformulation to correct for the negation of temporal becoming. Craig articulates a B-theory version of its syllogism:^[101]

1. If something exists at a timet but it does not exist at any earlier point in time then it has a cause.
2. The universe does exist at timet at which there is no earlier time where the universe existed.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.

Philosopher Ben Waters has also argued that the Kalam cosmological argument does not require a commitment to the A-theory.^[102]

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• Loke, Andrew Ter Ern (2017).God and Ultimate Origins. Springer International.ISBN 9783319575476.

• Moreland, J. P. (1987).Scaling the Secular City: A Defence of Christianity. Baker Academic.
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• Vaas, Rüdiger (2004). "Time before Time – Classifications of universes in contemporary cosmology, and how to avoid the antinomy of the beginning and eternity of the world".Bilder aus der Wissenschaft.10:32–41.arXiv:physics/0408111.Bibcode:2004physics...8111V.
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• Arguments for the existence of God
• Christian apologetics
• Kalam

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