Juche,[a] officially theJuche idea,[b] is a component ofKimilsungism–Kimjongilism, the stateideology of North Korea and the official ideology of theWorkers' Party of Korea. North Korean sources attribute its conceptualization toKim Il Sung, the country's founder and first leader.Juche was originally regarded as a variant ofMarxism–Leninism untilKim Jong Il, Kim Il Sung's son and successor, declared it a distinct ideology in the 1970s. Kim Jong Il further developedJuche in the 1980s and 1990s by making ideological breaks from Marxism–Leninism and increasing the importance of his father's ideas.Juche incorporates thehistorical materialist ideas of Marxism–Leninism but also strongly emphasizes theindividual, thenation state, and nationalsovereignty.Juche posits that a country will prosper once it has become self-reliant by achieving political, economic, and military independence. As Kim Jong Il emerged as Kim Il Sung's likely successor in the 1970s, loyalty to the leader was increasingly emphasized as an essential part ofJuche, as expressed in theTen Principles for the Establishment of a Monolithic Ideological System.
Juche comes from theSino-Japanese word主體 (shinjitai:主体), whoseJapanese reading isshutai. The word was coined in 1887 to translate the concept ofSubjekt inGerman philosophy (subject, meaning "the entity perceiving or acting upon an object or environment") into Japanese. The word migrated to theKorean language at around the turn of the century and retained this meaning.[5]Shutai went on to appear in Japanese translations ofKarl Marx's writings.[6] North Korean editions of Marx used the wordJuche even before the word was attributed to Kim Il Sung in its supposedly novel meaning in 1955.[7]
In contemporary political discourse on North Korea,Juche has a connotation of "self-reliance", "autonomy", and "independence".[8][9][10] It is often defined in opposition to the Korean concept ofSadae, or reliance on the great powers.[11] South Koreans use the word without reference to the North Korean ideology.[12]
The ideology is officially known asJuche sasang (주체사상) in Korean and theJuche idea in English.Juche sasang literally means "subject idea"[13] and has also been translated less commonly asJuche thought[14] orJucheism.[15] Adherents ofJuche are sometimes referred to as "Jucheists".[16]
Western scholars generally agree thatHwang Jang-yop, Kim Il Sung's top adviser on philosophy, was responsible for the conceptualization and early development ofJuche.[22] Hwang rediscovered theJuche speech sometime in the late 1950s, when Kim Il Sung, having established acult of personality,[23] sought to develop his own version ofMarxism–Leninism and solidify his position in theWorkers' Party of Korea (WPK).[24][25] Hwang expanded upon the meaning ofJuche and rewrote Korean communist history to make it appear as though Kim Il Sung had been the WPK's leader since its inception.[24]Andrei Lankov, a Russian scholar of Korean studies, argues that the first reference toJuche as an ideology was on 14 April 1965, when Kim Il Sung gave a speech in Indonesia titled "On Socialist Construction in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the South Korean Revolution" (조선민주주의인민공화국에서의사회주의건설과남조선혁명에대하여). Lankov posits that the 1955 speech "used the word in a different meaning" and thatJuche was adopted as the "basic ideological principle of North Korean politics" only after the 1965 speech.[26]
On the Juche Idea, the principal work onJuche, was published underKim Jong Il's name in 1982.[27] In North Korea it serves as "the authoritative and comprehensive explanation ofJuche."[27] According to the treatise, the WPK is responsible for educating the masses in the ways ofJuche thinking.[27]Juche is inexorably linked with Kim Il Sung and "represents the guiding idea of the Korean revolution".[27] AlthoughJuche is rooted in Marxism–Leninism, it is not merely a creative application of the ideas of Marx and Lenin to Korean conditions.[28] Rather, it is a "new phase of revolutionary theory"[28] and represents "a new era in the development of human history".[27] Kim Jong Il also criticized the Korean communists and nationalists of the 1920s for their "elitist posture", saying they were "divorced from the masses".[29]
The North Korean government issued a decree on 8 July 1997, the third anniversary of thedeath of Kim Il Sung, declaring the adoption of theJuche calendar.[30] TheCentral People's Committee [ja] promulgated regulations regarding its use in August,[31] and the calendar entered public usage on 9 September, theDay of the Foundation of the Republic.[30]Gregorian calendar dates are used for years before 1912 while years after 1912 (the year ofKim Il Sung's birth) are called "Juche years". The Gregorian year 2025, for example, is "Juche 114" as 2025 − 1911 = 114. When used, "Juche years" are often accompanied by the Gregorian equivalent, i.e. "Juche 114, 2025" or "Juche 114 (2025)".[31]
The goal ofJuche is to establish a self-reliant state that independently determines its political, economic, and military affairs. Kim Il Sung summarized the application of this objective to North Korea in a 1967 speech to theSupreme People's Assembly titled "Let Us Embody the Revolutionary Spirit of Independence, Self-sustenance and Self-defence More Thoroughly in All Fields of State Activity":[32]
First, the government of the republic will implement with all consistency the line of independence, self-sufficiency, and self-defence to consolidate the political independence of the country, build up more solidly the foundations of an independent national economy capable of insuring the complete unification, independence, and prosperity of our nation and increasing the country's defence capabilities, so as to safeguard the security of the fatherland reliably by our own force, by splendidly embodying our party's idea ofJuche in all fields.[33]
Political independence (자주;chaju) is a core principle ofJuche.Juche stresses equality and mutual respect among nations, and argues that every state has the right toself-determination.[34] Yielding to foreign pressure or intervention would violate the principle of political independence and threaten a country's ability to defend its sovereignty.[34] This is in contrast tosadaejuui (사대주의), which advocates reliance on agreat power.[35] However,Juche does not advocatetotal isolation and encourages cooperation between socialist states.[34] As Kim Jong Il writes inOn the Juche Idea: "Independence is not in conflict with internationalism but is the basis of its strengthening".[36] Kim Il Sung acknowledged that it was important for North Korea to learn from other socialist states, in particular the Soviet Union and China, but did not want to follow their examples dogmatically.[34] He said the WPK must "resolutely repudiate the tendency to swallow things of others undigested or imitate them mechanically", attributing North Korea's early success to the WPK's independence in policymaking.[34]
Economic self-sufficiency (자립;charip) is required to achieve political independence, according to adherents ofJuche.[34] Kim Il Sung believed that excessive foreign aid threatened a country's ability to develop socialism, which only a state with a strong, independent economy could build.[34] InOn the Juche Idea, Kim Jong Il argues that a state can achieve economic self-sufficiency only when it has created an "independent national economy" based onheavy industry,[37] as this sector will drive the rest of the economy. He also emphasizes the importance of technological independence[38] and self-sufficiency in resources.,[39] but says that this does not rule out "economic cooperation" between socialist states.[39]
Military self-reliance (자위;chawi) is also crucial for a state to maintain its political independence.[40] To accomplish military self-reliance, states must develop a domestic defence industry to avoid dependence on foreign arms suppliers.[41] Kim Jong Il argued that it was acceptable for socialist states to receive military aid from their allies but that such aid would be effective only if the state was militarily strong in its own right.[42]
North Korea maintained close relations with the Soviet Union and China during the Cold War, having emerged fromSoviet occupation and a war it fought alongside Chinese communists. However, North Korea also opposed what it viewed as Soviet and Chinese attempts to interfere in its postwar affairs.[43] For example, afailed challenge to Kim Il Sung's leadership in 1956 led to a purge of pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese elements from the WPK.[44] North Korea rejected thede-Stalinization efforts of Soviet premierNikita Khrushchev but avoided taking sides during theSino-Soviet split.[45]
North Korea was admitted to theNon-Aligned Movement in 1975 and has since presented itself as a leader of theThird World, promotingJuche as a model for developing countries to follow.[46][47]
National survival has been seen as a guiding principle of North Korea's diplomatic strategy.[48] As countries in theEastern Bloc collapsed and introduced market reforms, North Korea increasingly emphasizedJuche in both theory and practice.[49][50][51] Even amid economic and political crises, North Korea continues to emphasize its independence on the world stage.[52]
After the devastation of the Korean War, North Korea began to rebuild its economy with a base in heavy industry, with the aim to become as self-sufficient as possible.[53] As a result, it developed what has been called the "mostautarkic industrial economy in the world".[54][55] North Korea received economic aid and technical assistance from the Soviet Union and China, but it did not joinComecon, the communist common market.[56][57] In the 1990s, it had one ofthe world's lowest rates for dependence on petroleum, using hydroelectric power and coal instead of imported oil.[58] Its textile industry usesvinylon, known as the "Juche fiber", which was invented by a Korean and is made from locally available coal and limestone.[59][60] The history of vinylon often features in propaganda that preaches the virtues of technological self-reliance.[55] North Korea had 10,000CNC machines in 2010.[61] The first domestic homemade CNC machine was introduced in 1995, and in 2017 it had around 15,000 machines.[62]
Commentators have often pointed out the discrepancy between the principle of self-sufficiency and North Korea's dependence on foreign aid, especially during its economic crisis in the 1990s.[63] The pursuit of economicautarky has been blamed for contributing to the crisis.[64] On this view, attempts at self-sufficiency led to inefficiency and to the neglect of export opportunities in industries where there was acomparative advantage.[65]
TheKorean People's Army is one of the largest on earth and has developed its own nuclear missiles.[66][67] It producesUDMH fuel for liquid-fueled missiles[68] andTumansky RD-9Turbojet engines, which power theMikoyan-Gurevich MiG-19 andShenyang J-6.[69] CNC machines produce missiles and centrifuges.[62] North Korea's propaganda since the Korean War has contrasted its military autonomy with the presence of U.S. forces in the South.[55]
Tribute plaques toJuche from foreign delegates, contained in the interior entrance of theJuche Tower
Kim Il Sung believed thatJuche's principles could be applied outside of Korea.[70] He promotedJuche to theThird World as ananti-imperialist ideology and, in particular, the antithesis toU.S. imperialism.[71] Albanian communist leaderEnver Hoxha, who was critical of other communist leaders he regarded as having abandoned Marxism–Leninism, described Kim Il Sung's attempts to spreadJuche in the Third World as "pretensions" done in collaboration withTitoists,U.S. imperialists, and Soviet and Chinesesocial imperialists.[72]
North Korea began organizing international seminars onJuche in 1976. The inaugural International Scientific Seminar on theJuche Idea took place inAntananarivo, Madagascar, from 28 to 30 September 1976 under the sponsorship of theDemocratic Republic of Madagascar. Many prominent party and government officials, public figures, representatives of revolutionary and progressive organizations, scientists and journalists from more than 50 countries attended.Malagasy presidentDidier Ratsiraka expressed sympathy and support for North Korea while giving the seminar's opening speech.[73] In 1978, the North Korean government established the International Institute of theJuche Idea (initially the InternationalJuche Research Centre) inTokyo to supervise internationalJuche study groups' activities.[74] Tribute plaques from these groups are contained in theJuche Tower inPyongyang.[9]
A faction within theSouth Korean student movements of the 1980s embracedJuche as an alternative to the country's political system. It came to be known as theJuche faction orJusapa (주사파) for short.[75]
Juche has been adopted or studied by a number of far-left and far-right organisations outside of Korea. TheBlack Panther Party of the United States studiedJuche during the 1960s and 1970s.[76] In 2014, the secretary-general of the Nigerian–DPRK Friendship Association Alhassan Mamman Muhammed claimed there were thousands ofJuche adherents in Nigeria.[77] TheNepal Workers' and Peasants' Party declaredJuche to be its guiding idea in 2016.[78] The Rural People's Party, an affiliate of theneo-NaziSatanist groupOrder of Nine Angles, reportedly adheres toJuche and has connections with North Korean officials.[79] The neo-Nazi terrorist organisationAtomwaffen Division also promotesJuche.[80]
Propaganda art promotingSongun. The Korean text reads, "Long live the great victory of military-first (Songun) politics!"
Songun (선군정치;sŏn'gun chŏngch'i; 'military-first politics') was first mentioned on 7 April 1997 inRodong Sinmun under the headline "There Is a Victory for Socialism in the Guns and Bombs of the People's Army" (인민군대의 총창우에 사회주의의 승리가 있다). Its description in the article echoed the military-centered thinking of the time: "[Songun is] the revolutionary philosophy to safeguard our own style of socialism under any circumstances". The concept was credited to Kim Jong Il,[81] who posited thatSongun was the next stage of development ofJuche.[82]
A joint editorial entitled "Our Party's Military-First Politics Will Inevitably Achieve Victory and Will Never Be Defeated" (우리 당의 선군정치는 필승불패이다) was published byKulloja andRodong Sinmun (the WPK's theoretical magazine and newspaper, respectively) on 16 June 1999.[83] In it, it was stated thatSongun meant "the leadership method under the principle of giving priority to the military and resolving the problems that may occur in the course of revolution and construction as well as establishing the military as the main body of the revolution in the course of achieving the total tasks of socialism". While the article often referred to "our Party", this was not a reference to the WPK but rather to the personal leadership of Kim Jong Il.[84]
In late 2021, Kim Jong Un declared that the "military-first" politics ofSongun would be replaced by "people-first politics" (인민대중제일주의) guided by himself.[85]
Visitors of theMansu Hill Grand Monument in Pyongyang bow to massive bronze statues of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.
Suryong (수령형상창조;suryŏng hyŏngsang ch'angjo; 'creation of the lead figure') is a revolutionary theory concerning the relationship between leadership and society.[86] Unlike Marxism–Leninism, which considers developments in the material conditions of production and exchange as the driving force of historical progress (known ashistorical materialism),Juche considers human beings in general the driving force in history.[86] It is summarized as "the popular masses are placed in the center of everything, and the leader is the center of the masses".[86]Juche, North Korea maintains, is a "man-centered ideology" in which "man is the master of everything and decides everything".[86] In contrast to Marxism–Leninism, in which a people's decisions are conditioned by their relations to themeans of production,Juche argues that people's decisions take consideration of, but are independent from, external factors.[86] Just like Marxism–Leninism,Juche believes history is law-governed, but that it is only man who drives progress, stating that "the popular masses are the drivers of history".[87] The process for the masses to reach consciousness, independence, and creativity requires the "leadership of a great leader".[87] Marxism–Leninism argues that the popular masses will lead (on the basis of their relation to production), but in North Korea the role of a correct leadership is required to organize a unified and effective group.[88] South Korean political scientist Lee Kyo-duk argues thatSuryong helped Kim Il Sung establish a unitary system over North Korea.[88]
The theory says the leader has a decisive role as an absolute supreme leader.[89] The leader is like the brain of the working class, who is the driving force of revolution.[89] The leader is also a flawless human being who never commits mistakes, who guides the masses.[90] The popular masses are the driving force of history, but they require the guidance of the party leadership.[91]
At its fourth party conference in April 2012, the Workers' Party of Korea declared itself "the party of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il" and Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism as "the only guiding idea of the party".
Kimilsungism (김일성주의) and theTen Principles for the Establishment of a Monolithic Ideological System were formally introduced by Kim Jong Il in 1974.[92] Kim Jong Il reportedly did so to strengthen his position within the WPK, taking advantage of his father's political supremacy.[92] Kimilsungism refers to the ideas of Kim Il Sung, while the Ten Principles serve as a guide for North Korean political and social life.[92] Kim Jong Il argued that his father's ideas had evolved and they therefore deserved their own distinct name.[93] North Korean state media had previously described Kim Il Sung's ideas as "contemporaryMarxism–Leninism"; by calling them "Kimilsungism", Kim Jong Il sought to elevate the ideas of his father to the same level of prestige asStalinism andMaoism.[93] Not long after the introduction of "Kimilsungism" into the North Koreanlexicon, Kim Jong Il began calling for a "Kimilsungist transformation" of North Korean society.[92]
Political analyst Lim Jae-cheon argues that there is no discernible difference between Kimilsungism andJuche, and that the two terms are interchangeable.[92] However, in his 1976 speech "On Correctly Understanding the Originality of Kimilsungism", Kim Jong Il said that Kimilsungism comprises the "Juche idea and a far-reaching revolutionary theory and leadership method evolved from this idea".[94] He further added that "Kimilsungism is an original idea that cannot be explained within the frameworks of Marxism–Leninism. TheJuche idea, which constitutes the quintessence of Kimilsungism, is an idea newly discovered in the history of mankind".[93] Kim Jong Il went further, stating that Marxism–Leninism had become obsolete and must be replaced by Kimilsungism:[95]
The revolutionary theory of Kimilsungism is a revolutionary theory which has provided solutions to problems arising in the revolutionary practice in a new age different from the era that gave rise to Marxism–Leninism. On the basis ofJuche idea, the leader gave a profound explanation of the theories, strategies and tactics of national liberation, class emancipation and human liberations in our era. Thus, it can be said that the revolutionary theory of Kimilsungism is a perfect revolutionary theory of Communism in the era ofJuche.[95]
According to analyst Shin Gi-wook, the ideas ofJuche and Kimilsungism are in essence the "expressions of North Korean particularism over supposedly more universalistic Marxism–Leninism".[95] The new terminology signalled a move from socialism tonationalism.[95] This was evident in a speech presented by Kim Jong Il in 1982, during celebrations of his father's 70thbirthday, in which he stated that love for the nation came before love for socialism.[96] This particularism gave birth to such concepts as "A Theory of the Korean Nation as Number One" (조선민족제일주의) and "Socialism of Our Style" (우리식사회주의).[97]
Following thedeath of Kim Jong Il in December 2011, Kimilsungism becameKimilsungism–Kimjongilism (김일성-김정일주의) at the 4th Conference of the Workers' Party of Korea in April 2012.[98] Party members at the conference stated that the WPK was "the party of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il" and declared Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism "the only guiding idea of the party".[98] Afterwards, theKorean Central News Agency (KCNA) stated that "the Korean people have long called the revolutionary policies ideas of the President [Kim Il Sung] and Kim Jong Il as Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism and recognized it as the guiding of the nation".[99] Kim Jong Un, the son of Kim Jong Il who succeeded him as leader of the WPK, said:
Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism is an integral system of the idea, theory and method ofJuche and a great revolutionary ideology representative of theJuche era. Guided by Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism, we should conduct Party building and Party activities, so as to sustain the revolutionary character of our Party and advance the revolution and construction in line with the ideas and intentions of the President [Kim Il Sung] and the General [Kim Jong Il].[100]
Naenara, the official web portal of the North Korean government, declares: "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is an independent socialist state guided by the great Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism in its activities."[101]
"Socialism of Our Style" (우리식사회주의), also referred to as "Korean-style socialism" and "our-style socialism" within North Korea, is an ideological concept Kim Jong Il introduced on 27 December 1990 in the speech "Socialism of Our Country is a Socialism of Our Style as Embodied by theJuche Idea" (우리 나라 사회주의는 주체 사상을 구현한 우리식 사회주의이다).[97] Speaking after theRevolutions of 1989 that brought down theEastern Bloc countries, Kim Jong Il explicitly stated that North Korea needed – and survived because of – Socialism of Our Style.[97] He argued that socialism in Eastern Europe failed because they "imitated the Soviet experience in a mechanical manner".[97] According to Kim, they failed to understand that the Soviet experience was based on specific historical and social circumstances and could not be used by other countries aside from the Soviet Union itself.[97] He added that "if experience is considered absolute and accepted dogmatically it is impossible to build Socialism properly, as the times change and the specific situation of each country is different from another".[97] Kim Jong Il went on to criticize "dogmatic application" of Marxism–Leninism, stating:[102]
Marxism–Leninism presented a series of opinions on building of Socialism and Communism, but it confined itself to presupposition and hypothesis owing to the limitations of the conditions of their ages and practical experiences... But many countries applied the principles of Marxist–Leninistmaterialistic conception of history dogmatically, failing to advance revolution continually after the establishment of the socialist system.[102]
North Korea would not encounter such difficulties because of the conceiving ofJuche.[103] In his words, North Korea was "a backward, colonial semifeudal society" when the communists took over, but since the North Korean communists did not acceptMarxism, which was based on European experiences withcapitalism, orLeninism, which was based on Russia's experience, they conceived ofJuche.[103] He believed that the situation in North Korea was more complex because of the American presence in nearby South Korea.[103] Thanks to Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il argued, the revolution had "put forward original lines and policies suited to our people's aspirations and the specific situation of our country".[103] "TheJuche idea is a revolutionary theory which occupies the highest stage of development of the revolutionary ideology of the working class", Kim Jong Il said, further stating that the originality and superiority of theJuche idea defined and strengthened Korean socialism.[103] He then conceded by stating that Socialism of Our Style was "a man-centered Socialism", explicitly making a break with basic Marxist–Leninist thought, which argues that material forces are the driving force of historical progress, not people.[103] Socialism of Our Style was presented as an organic sociopolitical theory, using the language of Marxism–Leninism, saying:[104]
The political and ideological might of the motive force of revolution is nothing but the power of single-hearted unity between the leader, the Party, and the masses. In our socialist society, the leader, the Party, and the masses throw in their lot with one another, forming a single socio-political organism. The consolidation of blood relations between the leader, the Party and the masses is guaranteed by the single ideology and united leadership.[104]
Critics have calledJuche anationalist ideology and a departure from Marxist–Leninist principles.[105] AmericanKoreanistBrian Reynolds Myers argues thatJuche has more in common withJapanese fascism andultranationalism than Marxism–Leninism.[2][3] Korean political scientistSuh Dae-sook argues that Kim Il Sung did not explain the difference betweensocialist patriotism, which he said he supported, and nationalism, which he said he opposed. Suh also criticized Kim Il Sung's initial conceptualization ofJuche, saying that he had failed to explain how Marxism–Leninism had been applied to Korean conditions.[4] American historian Derek R. Ford, by contrast, emphasizes the continuity between Marxism–Leninism andJuche,[106] and creditsJuche as the guiding principle that allowed North Korea to survive thecollapse of the Eastern Bloc.[107]
American historianCharles K. Armstrong argues that North Korea may appear "Stalinist in form" but is "nationalist in content".[108] Shin Gi-wook similarly argues that "there is no trace of Marxism–Leninism or the Stalinist notion of nationhood" in North Korea, and its government instead stresses the importance of the Korean people's blood, soul, and national traits, echoing earlier Korean nationalists such asSin Chaeho, Yi Kwangsu, andChoe Namson.[109] Shin believes that the key difference between Marxism–Leninism andJuche is that the latter places ideology above materialism; the vocabulary of family lineage and nationalism is retained and given primacy overclass struggle, while social distinction and hierarchy are supported instead of aclassless society andegalitarianism.[108]
A few critics have dismissed the idea thatJuche is an ideology altogether. Myers argues thatJuche cannot be described as a true political ideology because it does not have an underlyingbelief system,[110] while Alzo David-West calls it "meaningless on logical and naturalistic grounds".[111] American political analystRobert E. Kelly argues thatJuche exists solely to protect theKim family's monopoly over political power in North Korea.[112] However, Myers dismisses the idea thatJuche is North Korea's leading ideology, regarding its public exaltation as designed to deceive foreigners. He argues that it exists to be praised and not actually read.[113] Based on his experience living in North Korea, Swiss businessmanFelix Abt calls Myers's arguments "shaky" and "questionable". Having seen the extent to which North Korean university students actually believe inJuche, Abt says it is "rather absurd" to call it "window-dressing" for foreigners.[114] American historianBruce Cumings and Professor of International RelationsChristoph Hartmut Bluth similarly argue thatJuche is not mere rhetoric, but rather an ideal of self-reliance that North Korea has attempted to implement.[54][57]
Juche has been compared toBa'athism, anArab nationalist ideology that advocates the establishment of a unified Arab state based on socialism and national self-reliance.[115] South Korean political commentator Park Sang-seek argues that Syrian Ba'athism in particular has rhetorical similarities toJuche, but the latter has a stronger ideological basis.[116]
American economist Benjamin Zycher, writing for the conservative thinktankAmerican Enterprise Institute, opined that thepolitical ideology ofDonald Trump shares similarities withJuche. In particular, he noted that both Trump andJuche advocate a policy of isolationism and autarky.[117]
A number of scholars have compared facets ofJuche to those of preexistingKorean religions. Jung Tae-il argues that certain elements ofChristianity,Cheondoism, and Confucianism were appropriated by and incorporated intoJuche.[118] Korean cultural anthropologists Byung Ho Chung and Heonik Kwon liken the commemorations of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il toConfucian ancestor worship.[118] Ju Jun-hui similarly contends thatKorean shamanism influencedJuche, comparing the ecstatic state experienced in ashamanic ritual (gut) to the enthusiasm and fervor North Koreans display for their supreme leader.[118] Armstrong accordingly callsJuche aquasi-religion.[1]
The ideology teaches that the role of a Great Leader is essential for the popular masses to succeed in their revolutionary movement because without leadership they cannot survive.[119] This is the foundation ofKim Il Sung's cult of personality. The personality cult explains how theJuche ideology has endured, even during the North Korean government's undeniable dependence on foreign assistance duringits famine in the 1990s.[120] The concept of a "sacred leader" inJuche as well as the cult around theKim family has been compared to theState Shinto ideology ofImperial Japan, in which theEmperor was seen as adivine being.[121]
Through the fundamental belief in the essential role of the Great Leader, Kim Il Sung has become the "supreme deity for the people" and theJuche doctrine is reinforced in North Korea's constitution as the country's guiding principle.[122] The parallel relationship structure between Kim Il Sung and his people and religious founders or leaders and their followers has led many scholars to considerJuche a religious movement as much as a political ideology.[118] However, those familiar with cults posit thatJuche bypasses the tenets of religion completely and instead meets the criteria of a totalitarian cult.[123]
Juche's emphasis on the political and sacred role of the leader and the ensuing worship by the popular masses has been critiqued by various Western Marxists,[119] who argue that the North Korean proletariat has been stripped of its honor, and call the cult of personality non-Marxist and undemocratic.[124]
The religious behavior ofJuche can also be seen in the perspectives of the North Korean people through refugee interviews from former participants in North Korea's ritual occasions. One pertinent example is theArirang Festival, a gymnastic and artistic festival held in theRungrado 1st of May Stadium in Pyongyang. All components of the festival, from the selection of performers, mobilization of resources, recruitment of the audience, and publicity for the show have been compared to facets of a national religious event.[125]
The Arirang Festival has been said to show the power of the North Korean government to arrange a form of religious gathering. It has done so by "appropriating a mass of bodies for calisthenic and performative arts representing the leader as the father and his faithful followers".[126] The festival's effectiveness in transforming its participants into loyal disciples ofJuche seems to originate from thecollectivist principle of "one for all and all for one" and the ensuing emotional bond and loyalty to the leader.[126] According to accounts of refugees who were recruited to mass gymnastics, the collectivist principle is nurtured by physical punishment such as beatings and more importantly the organization of recruits into small units, whose performances were held accountable by larger units.[127] The festival's ritual components of collectivism serve to reinforce a "certain structure of sociality and affect", establishing Kim Il Sung as the "father" in both the body and psyche of the performers.[126]
American historianCharles K. Armstrong argues that familism has transformed itself into a kind ofpolitical religion in the form ofJuche. With the emergence ofJuche as North Korea's guiding political principle since the 1960s, the familial relationship within the micro-family unit has been translated into a national, macro-unit, with Kim Il Sung representing the father and the North Korean people his children.Juche is thus based on the language of family relationships with its East Asian or neo-Confucian "resonances of filial piety and maternal love".[128]
Armstrong also argues that North Korea has transferred the "filial piety of nationalism in the family of the leader himself" by positioning Kim Il Sung as the universal patriarch.[129] He argues that while the official pursuit of theJuche ideology in the 1960s signalled North Korea's desire to separate from the "fraternity of international socialism", the ideology also replaced Stalin as the father figure with Kim Il Sung.[130] In effect, North Korea's familial nationalism has supplanted the "rather abstract, class-oriented language of socialism with a more easily understandable and identifiable language of familial connections, love and obligations".[131]
After attaining significant positions in the WPK and military in the early 1980s, Kim Jong Il transformed the personality cult surrounding Kim Il Sung into a family cult and became the heir apparent.[132] Armstrong calls this a "family romance", a termSigmund Freud used to describe "the neurotic replacement of a child's real parents with fantasy substitutes".[133] Kim Il Sung's consecration as the "Great Father" has been strengthened by the development of the North Korean family romance with the language, symbols, and rituals associated with familism.[118]
^abArmstrong 2012, p. 4: "Among observers outside of North Korea, opinions about the 'ruling ideology' ofjuche range from the view thatjuche is a complete sham, merely disguising the Kim family despotism, to those who see it as a quasi-religion more or less believed by a majority of the population."
^abKelly 2015: "Brian Myers has led this school, which argues that North Korea is a misunderstood racist state based on Japanese and German fascist forms from the early twentieth century. It rallies its citizens through aggressive race-based nationalism (the defence ofminjok), defends the racial 'cleanliness' of Korea in a big intrusive world, insists that ethnic Koreans of other nationalities are still Koreans, and routinely uses racist language in its diplomacy. On top of this, it is one of the most highly militarised states in the world. Racism plus hypermilitarism looks a lot more like fascism than communism."
^abFisher 2016: "[The Soviets] had a problem: There wasn't really a leftist intelligentsia or officialdom to draw upon. So the Soviets ended up recycling in many of the Koreans who'd been a part of the Japanese fascist project in Korea.... 'Almost all intellectuals who moved to Pyongyang after liberation had collaborated with the Japanese so some degree,' the historian B.R. Myers writes in his bookThe Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why It Matters."
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