During the war, Blaskowitz wrote several memoranda to theGerman high command objecting to theHolocaust and criminal conduct of theSSEinsatzgruppen on theEastern Front, as well, hecourt-martialed SS members for war crimes against Jewish and Polish civilians. As a result of these actions against the SS,Adolf Hitler personally limited Blaskowitz's future career advancement. After the war, he was charged with war crimes in theHigh Command Trial at Nuremberg. Despite the fact he would have been most likely acquitted, he died by suicide during the trial on 5 February 1948.[1]
During World War I, Blaskowitz served on theEastern andWestern Fronts and was employed in theGeneral Staff. He rose to command an infantry company by 1918, and was awarded theIron Cross for bravery.
Blaskowitz visiting the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Prague with German and Czechoslovak officers, 27 March 1939Decree written in poor Czech
Blaskowitz's war service secured him a place in the small postwarReichswehr during theWeimar Republic, through whose ranks he rose to the rank of General. His attitude towards theNazis' seizure of power in 1933 was reportedly indifferent because he believed that the armed forces should be "politically neutral".
In early 1939 he commanded the German forces thatoccupied Czechoslovakia, and was promoted to General of Infantry and given command of the8th Army just prior to the outbreak of World War II. He was mocked because of the poor Czech language used in the first decree as the occupation commander. It was immediately replaced by the corrected version of the decree.[2]
As a traditional soldier, Blaskowitz kept firm control on the men under his command in their dealings with civilians and was opposed toArmy participation in war crimes by theSS andEinsatzgruppen. He handed out death sentences to members of the SS for crimes against the civilian population, which were rescinded byAdolf Hitler.[3] Between November 1939 and February 1940 he wrote several memoranda to higher military officials, in which he detailed SS atrocities in Poland, their negative effects on Wehrmacht soldiers and the German military’s reputation, the insolent attitude of the SS toward the Army, and he warned that the SS "might later turn against their own people in the same way." and that “The attitude of the [Wehrmacht] troops to the SS andpolice alternates between abhorrence and hatred.“[4] However, his protests failed to produce results, and merely earned him the scorn of Hitler,Hans Frank,Reinhard Heydrich andHeinrich Himmler, while Chief of StaffAlfred Jodl dismissed them as naive and "uncalled for".[5][6]
Blaskowitz (right) with Rundstedt during the victory parade in Warsaw, 1939
Commander-in-ChiefWalther von Brauchitsch forwarded Blaskowitz's first memorandum to Hitler on 18 November, who launched a tirade against Blaskowitz, denouncing his concerns about due process as "childish" and poured scorn on his "Salvation Army attitude."[7] In February 1940, Blaskowitz prepared a list of 33 complaints against the SS. Among his complaints were strip searches and rape of Jewish women, a whipping orgy inNasielsk affecting 1,600 Jews, and a clear case ofrace mixing committed by a junior SS officer. Blaskowitz concluded that "It is a mistake to massacre some 10,000 Jews and Poles, as is being done at present; for—so far as the mass of the population is concerned—this will not eradicate the idea of a Polish state, nor will the Jews be exterminated."[8] Blaskowitz was relieved of his command on 29 May 1940.[9] Having thus encountered Hitler's wrath, Blaskowitz was the only Generaloberst at that time who was not promoted to Generalfeldmarschall in summer 1940 after the fall of France.[10]
Following theFall of France in May 1940, Blaskowitz was initially slated to command the9th Army for occupation duties, but the appointment was blocked by Hitler and instead he was appointed to a relatively minor position as Military Governor of Northern France, a position he held until October 1940, when he was transferred to the command of the1st Army, on the southwest coast betweenBrittany and thePyrenees.[11]
On 10 November 1942, the 1st and7th Army under Blaskowitz's command launchedCase Anton, the military occupation ofVichy France. The 1st Army advanced from the Atlantic coast, parallel to theSpanish border, while the 7th Army advanced from central France towardsVichy andToulon. The 50,000-strongVichy French Army took defensive positions around Toulon, but when confronted by German demands to disband, it did so since it lacked the military capability to resist. By the evening of 11 November, German tanks had reached theMediterranean coast.Anton marked the end of the Vichy regime as a nominally independent state. However, Blaskowitz's forces failed to secure theVichy French fleet at Toulon, which was scuttled by the French.
Blaskowitz (left) at a briefing in Paris with Field MarshalsRommel and von Rundstedt, May 1944
In May 1944, following the appointment ofGerd von Rundstedt as Commander-in-Chief in the West, Blaskowitz was appointed the head ofArmy Group G.[12] This comparatively small command, consisting of the1st Army and the19th Army, was given the task of defendingsouthern France from the imminent Allied invasion. When inNormandy, he managed to convince Field MarshalErwin Rommel that the "rumours" Rommel had heard about atrocities on the Eastern Front were actually true.[13]
According to historianChristopher Clark, in France, Blaskowitz tried to "build a constructive relationship with the local population", even though the conditions for him to do so were worse than in Poland. He encouraged the troops deployed to support French agriculture to act "selflessly". On the one hand, he tried to ensure that German counterinsurgency would be conducted in accordance with international norms as far as possible. He publicly distanced himself from units that committed theOradour-sur-Glane massacre. On the other hand, when the prefects inToulouse complained about crimes against civilians in "counter-terrorism" procedures conducted by the SS, Blaskowitz defended the right of the German army to defend itself, even though he admitted sometimes innocent people were harmed: "..He recommended that the French authorities be told that "it is imperative that innocent people sometimes fall victim to the bullet [...]. Against such a struggle [namely on the part of the partisans of the Resistance], the Wehrmacht must and will defend itself under all the means of power at its disposal." After theJuly Bomb Plot, he sent a note that proclaimed loyalty to Hitler. Clark speculates that he might have feared that he was suspected. There was no evidence that suggests Blaskowitz ever protested thedeportation of Jews from France. Although army appraisal forms, compiled by Rundstedt, described him as a National Socialist, Christopher Clark opines that Blaskowitz likely never had any ideological attachment to Nazism. According to Clark, professionalism enabled Blaskowitz to follow his own principles even against the political Zeitgeist, but the same professionalism made him unsuitable for political resistance. After a visit in October 1943,German resistance memberUlrich von Hassell lamented that it was not fruitful to discuss with Blaskowitz who saw everything from a military point-of-view. From this "very bounded standpoint", whatever one thought about the regime's moral character became overshadowed by duty to his superiors and his troops, as well as the people whose fate "now hung in balance."[14]
Blaskowitz as commander of Army Group G, inspecting German defenses in France, June 1944
The invasion of southern France (Operation Dragoon) commenced on 15 August 1944, when Allied forces landed on theRiviera betweenToulon andCannes. Blaskowitz's forces had been weakened by the relocation of its divisions to other fronts and the replacement of its soldiers with third-rateOstlegionen outfitted with obsolete equipment. Although badly outnumbered and lacking air defence, Blaskowitz brought up troops, stabilized the front, and led a fighting withdrawal to the north to avoid encirclement.U.S. Army units pursued Blaskowitz's forces up through theVosges mountains before pausing to regroup and refuel in early September.[15] There, Blaskowitz's troops were reinforced by the5th Panzer Army underHasso von Manteuffel. Blaskowitz was in overall command of German forcesdefending Nancy.Nancy was encircled and fell on 15 September 1944, but most of the German forces escaped encirclement.
By September 1944, Army Group G was pushed back to theAlsace region, near the German border. Blaskowitz wanted to entrench his forces, but Hitler ordered him to immediately counterattackPatton'sU.S. Third Army. Both Manteuffel and Blaskowitz realized the futility of such an action, but obeyed orders.Their attack near Arracourt caught U.S. forces in disarray and pushed them back to nearLunéville on 18–20 September, at which point resistance stiffened and the attack was suspended. As a result, Hitler summarily relieved Blaskowitz, replacing him withHermann Balck.[12] The halt of the Third Army in September allowed Blaskowitz's forces to strengthen the fortress of Metz. Patton's forces first reached the fortress at Metz on 5 September 1944, forcing a German surrender on 21 November 1944.[16] Thebattle of Metz took over 10 weeks, with both sides suffering heavy casualties. An attempt by Third Army toseize Fort Driant just south of Metz was also defeated.[17] Blaskowitz reviewed Patton's decision to launch a headlong attack straight into the fortifications of Metz by saying: "A direct attack on Metz was unnecessary. The Metz fortress area could have been masked. In contrast a swerve northward in the direction ofLuxemburg andBitburg would have met with greater success and caused our 1st Army's right flank collapse followed by the breakdown of our 7th Army."[18][19]
Balck was unable to stop the Third Army's advance and was relieved of command of Army Group G. Since 22 December,[20] Blaskowitz had his previous command again and ordered to attack inAlsace-Lorraine in support of the ongoingArdennes offensive. The goals of the offensive were to destroy theSeventh United States Army andFrench First Army and to seizeStrasbourg.[21] On 1 January 1945, inOperation Nordwind,Army Group G attacked the Seventh Army, forcing them to withdraw.[12] However, the Wehrmacht troops were halted nearHaguenau in late January and failed to achieve their main objectives.[12]
Blaskowitz was subsequently transferred to the Netherlands on 30 January, where he succeededKurt Student as commander ofArmy Group H. For the following three months he conducted a fighting withdrawal against theBritish 2nd Army, and was awarded the Swords to his Knight's Cross. This command was redesignated in early April 1945 and Blaskowitz became commander-in-chief of the northern (still occupied) part of the Netherlands. During theDutch famine of 1944–45, Blaskowitz allowed air corridors forAllied airdrops of food and medicine to the Dutch civilian population.[22]
Blaskowitz (second from right) surrenders German forces in the Netherlands to Canadian officers.
On 5 May Blaskowitz was summoned to theHotel de Wereld inWageningen byLieutenant-GeneralCharles Foulkes, (commander ofI Canadian Corps), to discuss the surrender of the German forces in the Netherlands.Prince Bernhard, acting as commander-in-chief of the Dutch Interior Forces, attended the meeting.[23] Blaskowitz agreed with all proposals by Foulkes. However, nowhere in the building – some sources say nowhere in the whole town – could atypewriter be found. Thus, the surrender document could not be typed. The next day, both parties returned and, in the presence of both Foulkes and Prince Bernhard, Blaskowitz signed the surrender document, which in the meantime had been typed.[24]
Blaskowitz was tried for war crimes at theHigh Command Trial (Case No. 12), one of thesubsequent Nuremberg trials. In one notorious case he was accused of ordering the execution of two deserters after the German surrender. He died by suicide on 5 February 1948. After breaking away from his guards, he jumped off a balcony into the inner courtyard of the court building.[11] During the Nuremberg trials, Blaskowitz andWerner von Blomberg, Minister of War during the years leading to World War II, signed affidavits declaring that:[25]
The whole group of German staff and front officers believed that the question of thePolish Corridor would have to be settled some day, if necessary by force of arms. A war to wipe out the political and economic losses resulting from the creation of the Polish Corridor was regarded as a sacred duty though a sad necessity. Before 1938-39, the German generals were not opposed to Hitler. Hitler produced the results which all of us warmly desired.
Both the indictment and the suicide have since been considered an enigma by scholars because Blaskowitz almost certainly would have been acquitted on all counts and had been told by his defence to expect to be acquitted.[26][27][28] According toHans Laternser, the defence counsel for the lead defendant,Wilhelm von Leeb, the prosecution told him, "Blaskowitz did not need to do that as he would certainly have been acquitted". That led to Laternser questioning the indictment.[29] According to Clark, Blaskowitz could have counted on an acquittal.[30] Historian Jen Scholten states inNorbert Frei's book on the elites of Nazi Germany, that the Nuremberg judges expressly saw Blaskowitz as a positive example of how Wehrmacht officers could have behaved.[31]
Blaskowitz, Johannes -German reaction to the invasion of southern France - (ASIN B0007K469O) - Historical Division, Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, Foreign Military Studies Branch, 1945
Blaskowitz, Johannes -Answers to questions directed to General Blaskowitz - (ASIN B0007K46JY) - Historical Division, Headquarters, United States Army, Europe, Foreign Military Studies Branch, 1945
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