Clockwise from top left: Italian soldiers listening to their general's speech; Austro-Hungarian trench on the Isonzo; Italian trench on the Piave; Austro-Hungarian trench in the Alps
Date
24 May 1915 – 6 November 1918 (3 years, 5 months and 2 weeks)
TheItalian front (Italian:Fronte italiano;German:Südwestfront) was one of the maintheatres of war ofWorld War I. It involved a series of military engagements along the border between theKingdom of Italy andAustria-Hungary from 1915 to 1918. Following secret promises made by theEntente in the 1915Treaty of London, theKingdom of Italy entered the war on theEntente side, aiming to annex theAustrian Littoral, northernDalmatia and the territories of present-dayTrentino andSouth Tyrol. The front soon bogged down intotrench warfare, similar to that on theWestern Front, but at high altitudes and with extremely cold winters. Fighting along the front displaced much of the local population, and several thousand civilians died from malnutrition and illness in Kingdom of Italy and Austro-Hungarian refugee camps.[10]
1908 -Bosnian Crisis: Italy expected compensations in the areas of "Italia Irredenta" ruled byAustria-Hungary in exchange for its recognition of the annexation ofBosnia-Herzegovina, as was agreed upon in theTriple Alliance treaties with Austria-Hungary. However, this did not happen and this became one of the reasons for Italy to break its alliance with Austria-Hungary in 1915.[citation needed] The mutual compensation clause was Article 7 of the 1909 and 1912 versions of the same treaty:
" However, if, in the course of events, the maintenance of the status quo in the regions of the Balkans or of the Ottoman coasts and islands in the Adriatic and in the Aegean Sea should become impossible, and if, whether in consequence of the action of a third Power or otherwise, Austria-Hungary or Italy should find themselves under the necessity of modifying it by a temporary or permanent occupation on their part, this occupation shall take place only after a previous agreement between the two Powers, based upon the principle of reciprocal compensation for every advantage, territorial or other, which each of them might obtain beyond the present status quo, and giving satisfaction to the interests and well-founded claims of the two Parties. "[14]
1914 - 28 June, theAssassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand inSarajevo by the Serbian nationalistGavrilo Princip. The Archduke was heir to the throne and the main proponent ofTrialism. Such reforms would have transformed thedual monarchy Austria-Hungary into a tripartite state Austria-Hungary-Croatia, which competed with Serbia's interest in founding aSouth Slavic kingdom under Serbian leadership.
1914 -July Crisis: The Austro-Hungarian foreign minister,Berchtold, deliberately fails to inform the (official) allies,Italy andRomania, of the intended action against Serbia, breaching Article 7 of the Triple Alliance, since he foresaw that consent would only be given in exchange for compensation.[16]
1914 - 2 August,Antonio Salandra declares Italy's neutrality, in conjunction with Article 3 of the Triple Alliance.
1915 - 26 April, TheTreaty of London is signed by theUnited Kingdom,France, andRussia on the one part, and Italy on the other, in order to entice the latter to enter World War I on the side of theTriple Entente within a month. The Entente also hoped thatRomania andBulgaria would be encouraged to join them after Italy did the same. The Treaty was agreed to be kept a secret according to Article 16, and remained so until December 1917 whenBolshevik leaderVladimir Lenin exposed to the public all treaties of TsarNicholas II and the Entente, including the secret treaty of London.
Anti-Italian leaflet distributed by the Austro-Hungarian government, mocking Italy's entry in the war by describing it as the day "Italy died".1915 - 4 May, In the midst of theGorlice breakthrough, Salandra officially renounces theTriple Alliance in a note toGermany andAustria-Hungary. But on May 13, threatened without a majority in Parliament, Salandra resignes from office and orders Cadorna to stop mobilization.
1915 - 16 May, Salandra is reinstated asGiovanni Giolitti failed to form a new government amid rising tensions in the public and threats from the king. When Parliament resumed on May 20 Salandra secured overwhelming majorities (367 to 54 and 407 to 74) on a Bill conferring extraordinary powers upon the Government in the event of war. General mobilization was ordered on May 22.
1915 - 23 May,Italy declares war on Austria-Hungary.
The Italian Front stretched from theStelvio Pass (at the border triangle between Italy, Austria-Hungary and Switzerland) along theTyrolean,Carinthian, andLittoral borders to theIsonzo. Its total length was around 600 kilometers, of which 450 kilometers ran in high alpine terrain.[18] This information relates to measurements as the crow flies. Taking into account the natural terrain, the many yokes, peaks and ridges with the resulting differences in height, the effective length was several thousand kilometers.[19]
The front touched very different geographical areas: in the first three sections - from theStelvio Pass to theJulian Alps in the area ofTarvisio, it ran through mountainous territory, where the average ridge heights reached 2,700 to 3,200 meters. The higher mountainous regions have a highly rugged relief with little vegetation; Elevations over 2,500 meters are also covered by glaciers. The barren landscape and lack of sufficient arable land led to little development of these high elevations; settlement was largely limited to the lower-lying zones. From the Julian Alps to theAdriatic Sea, the mountains are constantly losing on height and only rarely reach 1,000 meters as in the area aroundGorizia. This area is also sparsely populated and characterized by a harsh climate with cold winters and very hot and dry summers. A craggykarst landscape spreads out around theIsonzo valley, which adjoins the Italian foothills of the Alps in the southwest.[20]
The topographical characteristics of the front area had a concrete impact on the conduct of the war. The rocky ground, for example, made it difficult to dig trenches and in addition, the karst rock in the Isonzo Valley turned out to be an additional danger for the soldiers. If grenades exploded on the porous surface fragments of the exploding rock acted as additional shrapnel.
The digging of trenches on the Isonzo front byAustro-Hungarian soldiers
Archduke Eugen, who was already in command of the Balkan forces, was promoted toGeneraloberst on May 22, 1915 and was given supreme command of the new southwest front.[21] Together with his chief of staffAlfred Krauß the5th Army was reorganized and placed under the command of General d. Inf.Svetozar Boroević who on May 27 had arrived from theEastern Front. The K. u. k. Landesverteidigungskommando inTyrol (LVK) was handed to GdKViktor Dankl to protect the Tyrolean borders. It included the GermanAlpenkorps which was suitable for operations in the high mountains, the first divisions arrived on May 26; a short time later, the Alpenkorps was already taking part in combat operations against Italian units, although theGerman Empire was not officially at war with Italy until August 28, 1916.[22] The "Armeegruppe Rohr" stood under the command ofFranz Rohr von Denta and was to secure theCarinthian front. The transfer of the 5th Army and additional troops from the east went smoothly; within a few weeks, Archduke Eugen had around 225,000 soldiers under his command. In June the 48. Division (FML Theodor Gabriel) and finally, in July, the fourKaiserjäger regiments and threek.k. Landesschützen regiments fromGalicia were added. A major advantage of the Austro-Hungarian defense was its entrenchment on higher ground.
Italy ordered general mobilization on May 22, 1915 and by the end of June four armies had marched into the north-east border area. In the deployment plan of the Italian general staff (Commando Supremo) under the direction of FMLuigi Cadorna, three main points were set:
The 1st Army was to encircle the Tyrolean front from the west and south.
The 4th Army was to set up position in the Cadore and Carnia
The 2nd and 3rd Armies on the other hand, were opposed to the 5th k.u.k. Army, in the Julian Alps and on the Isonzo.
Italian infantry soldier in full marching order; standard Italian Mod. 1909 uniform (used by line Infantery, Bersaglieri, Alpini and Carabinieri), infanterist cap (berretto) and standard Carcano M91 rifle.
Although the Italian armed forces were numerically superior, things initially remained surprisingly quiet on the southwestern front. No attempt was made to break through on theTyrolean front, and there was no major offensive on theIsonzo either. Due to the hesitant implementation of Cadorna's attack plans, the chance to score the decisive blow right at the beginning was lost.[23] FML Cletus Pichler, the chief of staff of the LVK Tirol, wrote:[24]
A general attack on the most important penetration points, such as the Stilfser Joch, Etschtal, Valsugana, Rollepass [sic], [and] Kreuzbergpass, [...] could have led to significant enemy successes in view of the extremely weak defense forces in May.
That the opportunity for a quick breakthrough was not used was partly due to the slow mobilization of the Italian army. Due to the poorly developed transport network, the provision of troops and war material could only be completed in mid-June, i.e. a month later than estimated by the military leadership.[25] The Italian army also suffered from many shortcomings on the structural level.Artillery pieces and munitions were not the only area where shortages were acute. In August 1914 the Italian army had at its disposal only 750,000 rifles of the standardCarcano 1891 model and no hand grenades available at all. This inadequate supply of equipment especially limited the scope and efficiency of training throughout 1914 and 1915. Munitions were also urgently needed: in July 1914 only ca. 700 rounds were available per rifle, despite Cadorna's demand that 2,000 rounds each be found in preparation for war, by May 1915 the army had only succeeded in procuring 900 rounds per rifle.[26] Meanwhile,Emilio De Bono records that "throughout 1915 hand-grenades remained unheard of in the trenches".[27]
Italy's first machine guns were prototypes, as thePerino Model 1908, orMaxim guns acquired in 1913 from the British manufacturer Vickers. In line with the 1911 plan for creating 602 machine gun sections. By August 1914 only 150 of these had been created, meaning there was only one machine gun section per regiment, as opposed to one per battalion, as envisaged in the plans. By May 1915 theFiat-Revelli Mod. 1914 became the standard machine gun of the Italian army and a total of 309 sections had been created, with 618 guns in total; though this was an improvement it was still only half the planned number, leaving many battalions to do without. In contrast a standardk.u.k regiment had four machine gun sections,MG 07/12 "Schwarzlose", one for each battalion, whilst a standard British regiment had by February 1915 four machine gun sections per battalion.[28]
During theItalo-Turkish War in Libya (1911–1912), the Italian military suffered equipment and munition shortages not yet repaired before Italian entry into the Great War.[29] At the opening of the campaign, Austro-Hungarian troops occupied and fortified high ground of theJulian Alps andKarst Plateau, but the Italians initially outnumbered their opponents three-to-one.
An Italian offensive aimed to cross theSoča (Isonzo) river, take the fortress town ofGorizia, and then enter theKarst Plateau. This offensive opened the firstBattles of the Isonzo.
At the beginning of theFirst Battle of the Isonzo on 23 June 1915, Italian forces outnumbered the Austrians three-to-one but failed to penetrate the strong Austro-Hungarian defensive lines in the highlands of northwesternGorizia and Gradisca. Because the Austrian forces occupied higher ground, Italians conducted difficult offensives while climbing. The Italian forces therefore failed to drive much beyond the river, and the battle ended on 7 July 1915.
Despite a professional officer corps, severely under-equipped Italian units lacked morale.[30] Also many troops deeply disliked the newly appointed Italian commander, generalLuigi Cadorna.[31] Moreover, preexisting equipment and munition shortages slowed progress and frustrated all expectations for a "Napoleonic style" breakout.[29] Like most contemporaneous militaries, the Italian army primarily used horses for transport but struggled and sometimes failed to supply the troops sufficiently in the tough terrain.
Two weeks later on 18 July 1915, the Italians attempted another frontal assault against the Austro-Hungarian trench lines with more artillery in theSecond Battle of the Isonzo. In the northern section of the front, the Italians managed to overrun Mount Batognica over Kobarid (Caporetto), which would have an important strategic value in future battles. This bloody offensive concluded in stalemate when both sides ran out of ammunition.
The Italians recuperated, rearmed with 1200 heavy guns, and then on 18 October 1915 launched theThird Battle of the Isonzo, another attack. Forces of Austria-Hungary repulsed this Italian offensive, which concluded on 4 November without resulting gains.
The Italians again launched another offensive on 10 November, theFourth Battle of the Isonzo. Both sides suffered more casualties, but the Italians conquered important entrenchments, and the battle ended on 2 December for exhaustion of armaments, but occasional skirmishing persisted.
After the winter lull, the Italians launched theFifth Battle of the Isonzo on 9 March 1916, and captured the strategic Mount Sabatino. But Austria-Hungary repulsed all other attacks, and the battle concluded on 16 March in poor weather for trench warfare.
Following Italy's stalemate, the Austro-Hungarian forces began planning a counteroffensive (Battle of Asiago) in Trentino and directed over the plateau ofAltopiano di Asiago, with the aim to break through to thePo River plain and thus cutting off the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Italian Armies in the North East of the country. The offensive began on 15 May 1916 with 15 divisions, and resulted in initial gains, but then the Italians counterattacked and pushed the Austro-Hungarians back to the Tyrol.
The Austro-Hungarian supply line over theVršič pass, October 1917
Later in 1916, four more battles along the Isonzo river erupted. TheSixth Battle of the Isonzo, launched by the Italians in August, resulted in a success greater than the previous attacks. The offensive gained nothing of strategic value but did takeGorizia, which boosted Italian spirits. The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth battles of the Isonzo (14 September – 4 November) managed to accomplish little except to wear down the already exhausted armies of both nations.
The frequency of offensives for which the Italian soldiers partook between May 1915 and August 1917, one every three months, was higher than demanded by the armies on the Western Front. Italian discipline was also harsher, with punishments for infractions of duty of a severity not known in the German, French, and British armies.[32]
Shellfire in the rocky terrain caused 70% more casualties per rounds expended than on the soft ground in Belgium and France. By the autumn of 1917 the Italian army had suffered most of the deaths it was to incur during the war, yet the end of the war seemed to still be an eternity away.[32] This was not the same line of thought for the Austro-Hungarians. On 25 August, theEmperor Charles wrote to theKaiser the following: "The experience we have acquired in the eleventh battle has led me to believe that we should fare far worse in the twelfth. My commanders and brave troops have decided that such an unfortunate situation might be anticipated by an offensive. We have not the necessary means as regards troops."[33]
From 1915, the high peaks of theDolomites range were an area of fiercemountain warfare. In order to protect their soldiers from enemy fire and the hostile alpine environment, both Austro-Hungarian and Italian military engineers constructedfighting tunnels which offered a degree of cover and allowed betterlogistics support. Working at high altitudes in the hardcarbonate rock of the Dolomites, often in exposed areas nearmountain peaks and even inglacial ice, required extreme skill of both Austro-Hungarian and Italian miners.
Beginning on the 13th, later referred to asWhite Friday, December 1916 would see 10,000 soldiers on both sides killed by avalanches in the Dolomites.[34] Numerous avalanches were caused by the Italians and Austro-Hungarians purposefully firing artillery shells on the mountainside, while others were naturally caused.
In addition to buildingunderground shelters and covered supply routes for their soldiers like the ItalianStrada delle 52 Gallerie, both sides also attempted to break the stalemate oftrench warfare by tunneling underno man's land and placing explosive charges beneath the enemy's positions. Between 1 January 1916 and 13 March 1918, Austro-Hungarian and Italian units fired a total of34 mines in this theatre of the war. Focal points of the underground fighting werePasubio with 10 mines,Lagazuoi with 5,Col di Lana/Monte Sief also with 5, andMarmolada with 4 mines. The explosive charges ranged from 110 to 50,000 kilograms (240–110,230 pounds) ofblasting gelatin. In April 1916, the Italians detonated explosives under the peaks of Col Di Lana, killing numerous Austro-Hungarians.
The Italians directed a two-pronged attack against the Austrian lines north and east of Gorizia. The Austrians checked the advance east, but Italian forces underLuigi Capello managed to break the Austrian lines and capture theBanjšice Plateau. Characteristic of nearly every other theater of the war, the Italians found themselves on the verge of victory but could not secure it because their supply lines could not keep up with the front-line troops and they were forced to withdraw. However, the Italians despite suffering heavy casualties had almost exhausted and defeated the Austro-Hungarian army on the front, forcing them to call in German help for the much anticipated Caporetto Offensive.
The Austro-Hungarians received desperately needed reinforcements after theEleventh Battle of the Isonzo fromGerman Army soldiers rushed in after theRussianoffensive ordered byKerensky of July 1917 failed. Also arrived German troops from Romanian front after theBattle of Mărășești. The Germans introducedinfiltration tactics to the Austro-Hungarian front and helped work on a new offensive. Meanwhile, mutinies and plummeting morale crippled the Italian Army from within. The soldiers lived in poor conditions and engaged in attack after attack that often yielded minimal or no military gain.
On 24 October 1917 the Austro-Hungarians and Germans launched theBattle of Caporetto (Italian name forKobarid or Karfreit in German).Chlorine-arsenic agent anddiphosgene gas shells were fired as part of a huge artillery barrage, followed by infantry using infiltration tactics, bypassing enemy strong points and attacking on the Italian rear. At the end of the first day, the Italians had retreated 19 kilometres (12 miles) to theTagliamento River.
When the Austro-Hungarian offensive routed the Italians, the new Italian chief of staff,Armando Diaz ordered to stop their retreat and defend the fortified defenses around theMonte Grappa summit between the Roncone and the Tomatico mountains; although numerically inferior (51,000 against 120,000) the Italian Army managed to halt the Austro-Hungarian and German armies in theFirst Battle of Monte Grappa.
Advancing deep and fast, the Austro-Hungarians outran their supply lines, which forced them to stop and regroup. The Italians, pushed back to defensive lines nearVenice on thePiave River, had suffered 600,000 casualties to this point in the war. Because of these losses, the Italian Government called to arms the so-called99 Boys (Ragazzi del '99); the new class of conscripts born in 1899 who were turning 18 in 1917. In November 1917,British and French troops started to bolster the front line, from the 5 and 6 divisions respectively provided.[35][36][a] Far more decisive to the war effort than their troops was the Allies economic assistance by providingstrategic materials (steel, coal and crops – provided by the British but imported from Argentina – etc.), which Italy always lacked sorely. In the spring of 1918, Germany pulled out its troops for use in its upcomingSpring Offensive on the Western Front. As a result of the Spring Offensive, Britain and France also pulled half of their divisions back to the Western Front.
The Austro-Hungarians now began debating how to finish the war in Italy. The Austro-Hungarian generals disagreed on how to administer the final offensive.Archduke Joseph August of Austria decided for a two-pronged offensive, where it would prove impossible for the two forces to communicate in the mountains.
TheSecond Battle of the Piave River began with a diversionary attack near theTonale Pass named Lawine, which the Italians repulsed after two days of fighting.[38] Austrian deserters betrayed the objectives of the upcoming offensive, which allowed the Italians to move two armies directly in the path of the Austrian prongs. The other prong, led by generalSvetozar Boroević von Bojna initially experienced success until aircraft bombed their supply lines and Italian reinforcements arrived.
To the disappointment of Italy's allies, no counter-offensive followed the Battle of Piave. The Italian Army had suffered huge losses in the battle, and considered an offensive dangerous. GeneralArmando Diaz waited for more reinforcements to arrive from the Western Front. By the end of October 1918, Austro-Hungary was in a dire situation. Czechoslovakia, Croatia, and Slovenia proclaimed their independence and parts of their troops started deserting, disobeying orders and retreating. Many Czechoslovak troops, in fact, started working for the Allied Cause, and in September 1918, five Czechoslovak Regiments were formed in the Italian Army.
By October 1918, Italy finally had enough soldiers to mount an offensive. The attack targetedVittorio Veneto, across the Piave. The Italian Army broke through a gap nearSacile and poured in reinforcements that crushed the Austro-Hungarian defensive line. On 31 October, the Italian Army launched a full scale attack and the whole front began to collapse. On 3 November, 300,000 Austro-Hungarian soldiers surrendered, at the same day the Italians entered Trento and Trieste, greeted by the population.
On 3 November, the military leaders of the already disintegrated Austria-Hungary sent aflag of truce to the Italian commander to ask again for an armistice and terms of peace. The terms were arranged by telegraph with the Allied authorities in Paris, communicated to the Austro-Hungarian commander, and were accepted. TheArmistice with Austria was signed in the Villa Giusti, near Padua, on 3 November, and took effect at three o'clock in the afternoon of 4 November. Austria and Hungary signed separate armistices following the overthrow of theHabsburg monarchy and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
Italian military deaths numbered 834 senior officers and generals, 16,872 junior officers, 16,302 non-commissioned officers, and 497,103 enlisted men, for a total of over 531,000 dead (including those who died as POWs or who were declared dead after going missing). Of these, 257,418 men came fromNorthern Italy, 117,480 fromCentral Italy, and 156,251 fromSouthern Italy.[43] While the confirmed death numbers of Italian soldiers on the front in 1915 were 66,090 killed, in 1916 this figure was 118,880 killed, in 1917 it was 152,790 killed, and in 1918 it stood at 40,250 killed soldiers.[44] Another breakdown of fatalities gives 237,353 killed in action, 106,000 died of disease (59,000 in the operating army and 47,000 in the territorial army), 81,430 missing later declared dead, 12,036 accidental deaths, and some 90,000 deaths of prisoners of war in Austro-Hungarian captivity (mostly from disease). An additional 946,640 men were wounded.[45] Excess Italian civilian deaths due to privations and military action are estimated at about 600,000, most of them related to the Spanish flu epidemic.[46]
Austro-HungarianKIAs (this category does not include soldiers who perished in the rear or as POWs) amounted to 4,538 officers and 150,812 soldiers, for a total of 155,350 dead. The losses were increasing over time; there were 31,135 killed in 1915, 38,519 in 1916, 42,309 in 1917 and 43,387 in 1918.[47] While in 1915 killed-in-action fatalities on the Italian front constituted 18% of all Austro-Hungarian KIAs, in 1916 this figure was 41%, in 1917 it was 64%, and in 1918 it stood at 84%.[48] Overall and excluding those who perished as prisoners, 1.2 million Austro-Hungarian soldiers died and 3.62 million were wounded during World War I. About one-third of these losses were incurred on the Italian Front, for a total of about 400,000 dead and 1,200,000 wounded.[49]
Occupation of Dalmatia, Istria, Trentino and Tyrol
Italian soldiers entered Trento whileBersaglieri landed from the sea in Trieste. The following day the Istrian cities ofRovigno andParenzo, the Dalmatian islands ofLissa andLagosta, and the cities ofZara andFiume were occupied: the latter was not included in the territories originally promised secretly by the Allies to Italy in case of victory, but the Italians decided to intervene in reply to a local National Council, formed after the flight of the Hungarians, and which had announced the union to the Kingdom of Italy. TheRegia Marina occupiedPola,Sebenico andZara,[50] which became the capital of theGovernorate of Dalmatia.The Governorate of Dalmatia had the provisional aim of ferrying the territory towards full integration into the Kingdom of Italy, progressively importing national legislation in place of the previous one. The Governorate of Dalmatia was evacuated following the Italo-Yugoslav agreements which resulted in theTreaty of Rapallo (1920). Italy occupied alsoInnsbruck and allTyrol by the III Corps of the First Army with 20–22,000 soldiers.[51]
Furious over the peace settlement, the Italian nationalist poetGabriele D'Annunzio led disaffected war veterans and nationalists to form theFree State of Fiume in September 1919. His popularity among nationalists led him to be calledIl Duce ("The Leader"), and he used black-shirted paramilitary in his assault on Fiume. The leadership title ofDuce and the blackshirt paramilitary uniform would later be adopted by thefascist movement ofBenito Mussolini. The demand for the Italian annexation of Fiume spread to all sides of the political spectrum.[53]
The subsequentTreaty of Rome (1924) led to the annexation of the city ofFiume to Italy. Italy's lack of territorial gain led to the outcome being denounced as amutilated victory. The rhetoric ofmutilated victory was adopted by Mussolini and led to therise ofItalian fascism, becoming a key point in thepropaganda of Fascist Italy. Historians regardmutilated victory as a "political myth", used by fascists to fuelItalian imperialism and obscure the successes ofliberal Italy in the aftermath of World War I.[54] Italy also gained a permanent seat in theLeague of Nations's executive council.
Enrico Toti, Italian patriot and hero of World War I. From Italian weeklyLa Domenica del Corriere, 24 September 1916.Italian propaganda poster in 1917
Territorial Militia Alpini battalions: Val d’Adige (256–258 Cos); Val Leogra (259, 260 Cos); Val Brenta (262, 263 Cos) and Val Cismon (264, 265 Cos)
V, VII, IX, XVII & XVIII Battalions, Royal Customs Guards (Coastal) (Reale Guardia di Finanza di costieri) with Autonomous Cos. 11 and 52
I Battalion, Royal Custom Guards (Frontier)
22nd Light Cavalry Regiment of Catania (arr. 28 May)
15 batteries of mountain artillery: Oneglia Group (batteries 23, 26 & 27); Vincenza Group (batteries 19–21); Genove Group (batteries 28 & 29); Torino Aosta Group (batteries 4–6) and Independent batteries: 1, 8, 57 & 59
5th Field Artillery Regiment (8 batteries) 75/911[j]
"Napoli" Brigade – 75th (I, II, IV; 9 cos only) &76th (I-III) Infantry Regiments
"Piemonte" Brigade – 3rd (II, III, IV; 9 cos only) & 4th (I, II, IV) Infantry Regiments
36th Field Artillery Regiment (2 groups w 5 field batteries) 75/911 plus 3 (sic 6?[q]) mt. batteries: 13th Mt Group (Mt batteries 37–39) & 14th Mt. Group (Mt batteries 63, 64 & 65)
^The heavy field artillery batteries were armed with Krupp 149/12 howitzers, which were essentially Krupp 15 cm M. 1913 howitzers.
^11 June, 23rd squadron of mobile militia cavalry; 29 June, 21st squadron of mobile militia cavalry: both arrived & attached to V Corps. Attached: 305 mm howitzer battery 5 (arr. 1 June).
^4 June, 4th Group of mobile militia cavalry (Squadrons 7 & 8) arrived and attached to 15th Division.
^Five batteries arrived on 26 May; the other two batteries assigned to XIV Corps.
^abUnder command of the Presidio of the Verona Fortress.
^Under command of the Presidio of the Verona Fortress [Lieutenant General Gaetano Gabbo] (together with five batteries of 87 B, 1 battery of 149 G. & 2 batteries of 57)
^2 June, 1st Group of mobile militia cavalry (Squadrons 1 & 2) arrived and attached to 32nd Division.
^3 June 14 Light Cavalry Regiment of Alessandria arrived and attached to IV Corps. Also on 3 June, 2nd Group of mobile militia cavalry (Squadrons 3 & 4) arrived and attached to IV Corps.
^1st Co in the colonies; replaced with 1st bis Co.
^4 June 15 Light Cavalry Regiment of Lodi (Squadrons 2–6) arrived and attached to XII Corps. Squadron 1 was in Libya.
^Table on allocation of mountain batteries (L'Esercito italiano nella grande guerra, Vol I-bis, p. 98) lists both 13th Group & 14th Group with the 36th Field Artillery.
^1st Group was with 23rd Division; 3rd Group was with 24th Division.
^The 149 A cannon was a 149 mm cannon (model 149/35 A) with a steel barrel first manufactured in 1900 to replace the older 149 G (149/23).
^The 149 G cannon was a 149 mm cannon (model 149/23) with a cast iron barrel first manufactured in 1882.
^The 70 mm pack mountain gun (model 70/15) was introduced in 1904. The gun could be broken down into 4 pieces for transport by pack animals.
^Attached for the "first bound forward": 149 G batteries 1–4.
^On 26 May His Royal Highness assumed command of the 3rd Army, which from 24 to 26 May was held temporarily by General Garioni.
^28 May the 17th Light Cavalry Regiment of Caserta arrived and was attached to VI Corps. The regiment arrived with 5 squadrons, with 1st bis Squadron replacing 1st Squadron, which was in Libya.
^The other squadron of this regiment was attached to the Carnia Zone command.
^A Krupp 75 mm cannon designed for horse artillery (75/27 mod. 1912).
^The 2nd Group of this regiment (batteries 4 & 5) was assigned to 1st Cavalry Division.
^10 June 29 Light Cavalry Regiment of Udine arrived and was attached to VII Corps. Also attached: 310 mm howitzer battery 6 (arr. 10 July)
^Attached: 149 A batteries Nos 8 & 9; 305 mm howitzer batteries Nos 1 (arr. 1 June) & 2 (arr. 2 June); 280 mm howitzer battery Nos 4 (arr. 6 June), 5 (arr. 3 June), 6 (arr. 3 June) & 7 (arr. 6 June); 210 mm howitzer battery No 2 (arr. 30 May); 210 mortar batteries Nos 7, 8 (both arr. 3 June), 9 (at Belluno 31 May), 10 & 11.
^The other three batteries were assigned to 31st Division.
^Controlled by the High Command. Attached: 149 A batteries Nos 2–6 (still at Stretti); 310 mm howitzer batteries Nos 3 & 4 (both arr. 1 June); 280 mm howitzer batteries Nos 1–3 (on 24 May via RR directed to Stazione for the Carnia ); 210 howitzer battery No 1 (on 24 May at Spillimbergo); 210 mm mortar batteries Nos 1, 2 (24 May both at Spilimbergo), 3 (29 May at Chiusaforte), 4 (24 May at Spilimbergo), 5 & 6.
^30 May the 2nd Bersagliari Cyclist Battalion left Rome to join this corps.
^29 May the 3rd Group of Mobile Militia cavalry (Squadrons Nos 5 & 6) arrived and were attached to 26th Division. 11 June, the 9th Group of Mobile Militia cavalry (Squadrons Nos 17 & 18) arrived and were attached to 29th Division.
^6 June 18 Light Cavalry Regiment of Piacenza arrived and was attached to X Corps; the regiment arrived with 5 squadrons ( Nos 1, 2, 4, 5& 6) with Squadron No 3 in Libya. 5 June 1 Bersagliari Cyclist Battalion left Naples to join this corps.
^5 June the Royal Piemonte Cavalry Regiment (-) (Squadrons Nos 3, 4 & 5) joined XIII Corps; the other two squadrons were attached to XIV Corps.
^3 June, the 10th Group of Mobile Militia cavalry (Squadron Nos 19 & 20) arrived and were attached to 25th Division.
^1 June, the 6th Group of Mobile Militia cavalry (Squadron Nos 11 & 12) arrived and were attached to 30th Division.
^12 June, the 8th Group of Mobile Militia cavalry (Squadron Nos 15 & 16) arrived and attached to 31st Division.
^5 June Squadron Nos 1 & 2 of Royal Piemonte Cavalry Regiment joined XIV Corps; the rest of the regiment joined XIII Corps.
^30 June, the 7th Group of Mobile Militia cavalry (Squadron Nos 13 & 14) arrived and was attached to 28th Division.
^3 June 4 Bersagliari Cyclist Battalion left Turin to join this division.
^abcdefgUnder the command of the Piazza di Venezia
^The Trappani Brigade was constituted in Palermo on 14 January 1915 with 3 regiments 143rd, 144th and 149th. In May it was dissolved. On 4 May the 149th Regiment was transferred to Brindisi, where it remained at the disposition of the Navy until, on 23 June, it moved into a war zone (Treviso) at the disposition of the High Command. On 6 May the 143rd Regiment (composed of troops from both the 143rd and 144th Regiments) sailed for Libya. The remaining troops of the 143rd and 144th Regiments reformed on the 144th Regiment HQ. On 4 July, the 144th Regiment left for Spresiano. On 4 July the brigade reformed with two regiments: 144th (9 companies) and 149th (12 companies).
^International Labour Office, Enquête sur la production. Rapport général. Paris [etc.] Berger-Levrault, 1923–25. Tom 4, II Les tués et les disparus p. 29
^Bodart, Gaston: "Erforschung der Menschenverluste Österreich-Ungarns im Weltkriege 1914–1918," Austrian State Archive, War Archive Vienna, Manuscripts, History of the First World War, in general, A 91. Reports that 30% of Austro-Hungarian killed/wounded were incurred on the Italian front (including 155,350 out of 521,146 fatalities). While the casualty records remain incomplete (Bodart on the same page estimates the missing war-losses and gets a total figure of 1,213,368 deaths rather than 521,146, including 350,000 deaths in rear areas (technically not filed under any given front, but would be around 105,000 attributable to the Italian Front assuming they followed similar ratios as front casualties) and 341,601 missing men presumed dead by 1921), the proportions are accurate. 30% of casualtiesequates to to 364,000 dead and 1,086,000 wounded.
^Tortato, Alessandro:La Prigionia di Guerra in Italia, 1914–1919, Milan 2004, pp. 49–50. Does not include 18,049 who died. Includes 89,760 recruited into various units and sent back to fight the AH army, and 12,238 who were freed. Clodfelter 2017, p. 419, gives a higher figure of 653,000 captured on the Italian front.
^Petra Svoljšak (1991).Slovene refugees in Italy during the First World War (Slovenski begunci v Italiji med prvo svetovno vojno), Ljubljana. Diego Leoni – Camillo Zadra (1995),La città di legno: profughi trentini in Austria 1915–1918, Trento-Rovereto 1995.
^Cletus Pichler, Der Krieg in Tirol 1915/1916, Innsbruck 1924, p. 33 f.
^Klavora, Karstfront, p. 21; Hans Jürgen Pantenius, Der Angriffsgedanke gegen Italien bei Conrad von Hötzendorf. Ein Beitrag zur Koalitionskriegsführung im Ersten Weltkrieg, Bd. 1, Wien 1984, 613 ff.
^Wilcox, Vanda, Morale and the Italian Army during the First World War, Cambridge University Press, 2016 p. 95
^Emilio de Bono,La guerra: Come e dove l'ho vista e combattuta io (Milan: A.Mondadori, 1935), p. 35.
^Wilcox, Vanda, Morale and the Italian Army during the First World War, Cambridge University Press, 2016 p. 95
^Williamson, Howard J. (2020).The award of the Military Medal for the campaign in Italy 1917-1918. privately published by Anne Williamson.ISBN978-1-8739960-5-8.The book includes: – A detailed overview of the Italian Campaign and its battles. – Notes on the [five] Divisions engaged in Italy.
^Paoletti, Ciro (2008).A Military History of Italy. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 150.ISBN978-0-275-98505-9.... Ludendorff wrote:In Vittorio Veneto, Austria did not lose a battle, but lose the war and itself, dragging Germany in its fall. Without the destructive battle of Vittorio Veneto, we would have been able, in a military union with the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, to continue the desperate resistance through the whole winter, in order to obtain a less harsh peace, because the Allies were very fatigued.
^Ministry of War and later Ministry of Defence: Albo d’Oro [Roll of Honour], 28 vols., Rome 1926–1964.
^Pierluigi Scolè,[1], [in:]International Encyclopedia of the First World War [accessed May 31, 2021]
^Mortara, La salute pubblica in Italia 1925, p. 107.
^Anatol Schmied-Kowarzik,War Losses (Austria-Hungary), [in:]International Encyclopedia of the First World War [accessed May 31, 2021]
^ Anatol Schmied-Kowarzik,War Losses (Austria-Hungary), [in:]International Encyclopedia of the First World War [accessed May 31, 2021]
^"Italian Front Casualties." worldwar1.com. Great War Society. Retrieved November 19, 2025. Data sources are "Gebirgskrieg" by Heinz von Lichem [3 volumes] and "Grande Guerra: Tappe della Vittoria" by Carlo Meregalli.
^Giuseppe Praga, Franco Luxardo.History of Dalmatia. Giardini, 1993. Pp. 281.
Erlikman, Vadim (2004).Poteri narodonaseleniia v XX veke : spravochnik. Moscow: Русская панорама.ISBN5-93165-107-1.
Cassar, George H. (1998).The Forgotten Front: The British Campaign in Italy, 1917–1918. London: Continuum International Publishing Group.ISBN1-85285-166-X.
Clodfelter, M. (2017).Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1492-2015 (4th ed.). Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland.ISBN978-0786474707.
Wolfgang Etschmann:Die Südfront 1915–1918. In: Klaus Eisterer, Rolf Steininger (eds.):Tirol und der Erste Weltkrieg. (= Innsbrucker Forschungen zur Zeitgeschichte, Band 12), Vienna/Innsbruck 1995, pp. 27–60
^c. 300,000 alone duringCaporetto 24 October – 19 November 1917. Note that Italian losses listed are for the entire war, including other fronts and in rear areas. From 90,000 to over 100,000[4] Italian prisoners of war died in captivity.
^Exact figures missing in von Horstenau's work for the year 1916 are provided for August in Wilfried Thanner,Analyse des Stellungskrieges am Isonzo von 1915–1917, p. 301link text and for the time period 15 May – 31 July 1916, from k.u.k. official reports, in Gianni Pieropan,1916. Le montagne scottano, Tamari editori, Bologna, 1968, p. 214.
^150,812 soldiers and 4,538 officers documented killed in action at the front.
^How many of the 175,041 missing were presumed dead by 1921 is not determined. Overall 341,601 Austro-Hungarian soldiers and officers were missing and presumed dead by 1921, an unknown share of that falls onto the Italian Front. Bodart estimates that, overall, half of Austro-Hungarian missing during the war likely died.
^c. 380.000 alone duringVittorio Veneto 24 October – 4 November 1918