PrinceItō Hirobumi (Japanese:伊藤 博文[i.toː(|)çi.ɾoꜜ.bɯ.mʲi]; bornHayashi Risuke (林 利助); 16 October 1841 – 26 October 1909) was a Japanese statesman who served as the firstprime minister of Japan from 1885 to 1888. Itō would again hold office as prime minister from 1892 to 1896, January—June 1898, and 1900 to 1901. He was also a leading member of thegenrō, a group of senior courtiers that dictated policy for theEmpire of Japan during theMeiji era. A pragmatic statesman, Itō became a central figure in the drafting of theMeiji Constitution as well as the establishment of the JapaneseDiet and moderncabinet system.
Born into a poor farming family in theChōshū Domain, Itō Hirobumi and his father were adopted into a low-rankingsamurai family. After theopening of Japan in 1854, he joined the nationalistsonnō jōi movement before being sent to England in 1863 to study atUniversity College London. Following theMeiji Restoration of 1868, Itō was appointed a junior councilor for foreign affairs in the newly formedEmpire of Japan. Later in 1870, he traveled to theUnited States to study Western currency, and subsequently helped establish Japan's modern banking and taxation systems. Itō then set off on another overseas trip with theIwakura Mission to the U.S. and Europe. Upon his return to Japan in 1873, he became a full councilor and public works minister.
During the 1880s, Itō emerged as thede facto leader of theMeiji oligarchy.[2][3][4] In 1881, he was officially entrusted with overseeing the drafting of theMeiji Constitution. After traveling to Europe to study its nations' political systems, Itō settled on adopting a constitution emulating that ofPrussia by reserving considerable power with theemperor while limiting political parties' involvement in government. In 1885, he replaced theDaijō-kan with a cabinet composed of ministry heads, and became the first prime minister. After the constitution was drafted in 1888, he established a supra-cabinetPrivy Council led by himself to deliberate on it before the Meiji Constitution was officially proclaimed in 1889. Even out of office as prime minister, Itō exercised immense influence over Japan's governance as an imperial adviser, orgenkun, and as President of the Privy Council. In 1900, he founded theRikken Seiyūkai political party, recognizing the growing importance of party politics.
On the world stage, Itō pursued an ambitious foreign policy. He strengthened diplomatic ties with Western powers including Germany, the United States, and especially the United Kingdom. In Asia, he oversaw theFirst Sino-Japanese War and negotiated the surrender of China's rulingQing dynasty onterms favorable to Japan, including the annexation ofTaiwan and the release ofKorea from theChinese tributary system. While expanding his nation's claims, Itō sought to avoid conflict with Russia through the policy ofMan-Kan kōkan – the proposed surrender ofManchuria to Russia's sphere of influence in exchange for the recognition of Japanese hegemony in Korea. However, his attempts at diplomacy failed, thereby resulting in theRusso-Japanese War. After Japanese forces defeated the Russians, the ensuingJapan–Korea Treaty of 1905 made Itō the firstResident-General of Korea. Despite initially supporting aprotectorate rather than outright annexation of Korea, pressure from the increasingly powerfulImperial Army and the failure of his gradualist policies ultimately led him to consent to annexation.[5] He resigned as Resident-General in June 1909 only to be assassinated four months later byKorean-independence activist andnationalistAn Jung-geun inHarbin, Manchuria.[6][7]
Itō Hirobumi was born Hayashi Risuke on 16 October 1841 (Tenpō 12, 2nd day of the 9th month) in Tsukari village,Suō Province (present-dayHikari, Yamaguchi Prefecture), within theChōshū Domain.[8] He was the son of Hayashi Jūzō, a farmer of humble origins.[9][10] His father served a low-rankingsamurai named Itō Naoemon in the castle town ofHagi.[8] When Hirobumi was very young, his father was adopted into the Itō family along with his household, granting themsamurai status, albeit at the lowest rank ofchūgen (foot soldier).[9][8] After the adoption, Risuke's name was changed to Itō Risuke, then Itō Shunsuke in 1858, and finally to Hirobumi around 1869.[8] The name "Hirobumi" (博文), meaning "extensive learning", was reportedly suggested byTakasugi Shinsaku and derived fromThe Analects of Confucius.[11]
In 1856, Itō was sent for guard duty inSagami Province.[8] There, in 1857, Kuruhara Ryōzō, a brother-in-law ofKido Takayoshi, recognized Itō's potential and encouraged his intellectual pursuits.[8] Later that year, Itō returned to Chōshū and, with Kuruhara's introduction, enrolled in theShōka Sonjuku, a private academy run by the influential scholar and activistYoshida Shōin.[12] The academy was a crucible for many future leaders of theMeiji Restoration, including Takasugi Shinsaku andYamagata Aritomo.[12]
Yoshida Shōin's execution in theAnsei Purge of 1859 profoundly impacted Itō, who, along with Kido Takayoshi and others, retrieved Yoshida's body for burial.[12] Following this, Itō became deeply involved in the radicalsonnō jōi (Revere the Emperor, Expel the Barbarians) movement.[12] In 1862, he participated in an unsuccessful plot to assassinateNagai Uta, a Chōshū official.[12] Later that year, he took part in the burning of the British legation inEdo. Subsequently, along withYamao Yōzō, he assassinated the Japanese classics scholarHanawa Jirō Tadatomi, acting on a false report.[12]
Despite his early immersion in Shōin's ideology, Itō later distanced himself from its radicalism, viewing the anti-Western sentiment of the era as "entirely emotional" and lacking "thoughtful political calculations".[13] He came to admire figures like Nagai Uta for their pragmatic "political strategy", signaling his own developing preference for statesmanship grounded in realism.[13]
Driven by a strong desire for Western knowledge, Itō was selected as one of theChōshū Five to secretly travel to Britain in 1863 for study, an act that violated theTokugawa shogunate's ban on overseas travel.[15][16] The Chōshū Domain's leadership, includingSufu Masanosuke, saw this as crucial for acquiring "human tools" and understanding Western civilization to prepare Japan for future international engagement.[13] The five students departed Japan on 27 June 1863, arriving in London on 4 November.[17] They commenced their studies atUniversity College London, lodging with ProfessorAlexander Williamson and immersing themselves in English language and Western customs.[18]
Itō's initial period of study in Britain was cut short. After about six months, he andInoue Kaoru decided to return to Japan upon learning fromThe Times about thebombardment of Shimonoseki by Western powers and the conflict between theSatsuma Domain and a British naval squadron.[15][19] Their aim was to persuade the Chōshū leaders of the impracticality of expelling foreigners.[19]
This first overseas experience, though brief, proved to be a pivotal moment in Itō's life.[19] He returned to Japan in July 1864, during a period of national crisis. His firsthand knowledge of the West and his newly acquired English skills made him an invaluable asset.[20] Following Chōshū's defeat by the allied Western naval forces at Shimonoseki, Itō played a crucial role as a negotiator in the peace talks.[20] This experience launched his career as a skilled negotiator, a talent Yoshida Shōin had earlier recognized.[20] His time in Britain broadened his perspective beyond narrow domainal loyalties and the anti-foreign movement, fostering an independent spirit and a commitment to "extensive learning" (the meaning of "Hirobumi").[11] Itō developed a functional command of English, later delivering speeches in the language during the Iwakura Mission and maintaining a habit of reading English publications.[15][21] He frequently gave interviews to Western media without an interpreter and conducted correspondence in English throughout his career.[22]
After theMeiji Restoration in 1868, Itō's understanding of Western affairs became a significant asset, propelling his career in the new imperial government.[11] In February 1868, he was assigned to a role in foreign affairs.[23] Later that year, he was appointed the first governor ofHyōgo Prefecture, which included the recently opened port ofKobe. This position placed him at the forefront of Japan's diplomatic and international trade activities.[24]
In February 1869, Itō submitted a significant policy paper, "Principles for National Policy" (Kokuze kōmoku), also known as the "Hyōgo Proposal".[25] This comprehensive six-point plan advocated for:
The establishment of a monarchy.
The centralization of political and military power under imperial rule, which included supporting thereturn of feudal domains to the emperor (hanseki hōkan).
Active engagement and interaction with foreign countries.
The promotion of scientific learning and knowledge acquisition from around the world.
International cooperation and the definitive end of anti-foreignism (jōi).[25]
The proposal strongly emphasized the necessity "to let people throughout Japan learn the science behind the scientific achievements of the world, thereby spreading knowledge of the natural sciences". He urged the government to cultivate a "civilized and enlightened" populace and proposed the establishment of universities in Tokyo andKyoto.[25]
Itō was profoundly influenced by the example of the United States, viewing its founding as a model for creating a unified nation-state where national prosperity was driven by the "united hearts and minds of the people".[26] He advocated for transcending narrow domainal loyalties to forge a cohesive Japanese national identity.[26]
In 1870, while serving as deputy vice-minister of finance, Itō traveled to the United States to study its financial and monetary institutions.[26] This investigative tour, which lasted from December 1870 to June 1871, directly influenced the establishment of Japan's New Currency Regulation (Shinka Jōrei) in 1871. This landmark legislation placed Japan on thegold standard, aligning its monetary system with those of Western nations.[26] Itō was a fervent champion of this reform, dispatching a memorandum from the U.S. that argued for its adoption based on the successful experience of "civilized Western countries".[27] While the move to the gold standard was considered radical by some contemporaries, the reform also incorporated elements of continuity with Japan's pre-existing monetary framework.[28]
Itō also played a pivotal role in the development of a modern banking system in Japan. He advocated for the creation of abank of issue, and in December 1872, the National Bank Regulation (Kokuritsu Ginkō Jōrei) was promulgated, drawing inspiration from America'sNational Bank Act.[28] His proposal envisioned a system where national banks would be authorized to issuebanknotes backed bygovernment bonds. This was part of a strategy to gradually replace inconvertible paper currency with banknotes convertible intospecie.[28] This methodical, step-by-step approach to monetary reform was an early example of the cautious gradualism that characterized his broader reform philosophy.[28]
From late 1871 to 1873, Itō served as one of four deputy ambassadors in theIwakura Mission, a comprehensive eighteen-month diplomatic and investigative tour of the United States and Europe.[30] As a central member of the embassy, his ability to deliver speeches in English made him an important asset.[15] The primary objectives of the mission were to initiate preliminary negotiations for the revision of theunequal treaties imposed on Japan by Western powers and to observe and study various aspects of Western civilization, including political systems, industry, and education.[30] Itō had been a key proponent of such an undertaking, having earlier suggested sending government officials abroad to study treaty revision and related international practices.[30]
During the mission's initial leg in the United States, Itō's English proficiency and confident demeanor were notable, although his assertive style occasionally caused friction with some colleagues, such asSasaki Takayuki.[31] In January 1872, at a welcoming event inSan Francisco, he delivered a widely reported and spirited address, subsequently known as the "rising sun speech" (hinomaru enzetsu). In this speech, he proudly described Japan's rapid advancements in adopting Western institutions and proclaimed the nation's strong aspiration to achieve a high level of civilization and take its place among the advanced nations of the world.[32]
A significant diplomatic misstep occurred inWashington D.C. when Itō and fellow deputy ambassadorŌkubo Toshimichi advocated for immediate treaty renegotiation with the United States, deviating from the mission's original plan to engage with Western powers collectively at a later stage.[33] They even returned to Japan briefly to secure the necessary fullLetters of Credence for this purpose. However, upon their return to Washington, they discovered that the other mission members, having become aware of the complexities and potential disadvantages of unilateralmost-favored-nation clauses, had decided to adhere to the original strategy.[34] This "Letters of Credence Incident" resulted in considerable embarrassment for Itō and significantly strained his relationship withKido Takayoshi, another influential member of the mission.[35][36]
Despite this setback, the Iwakura Mission proved to be a profoundly transformative experience for Itō, significantly shaping his political philosophy.[30] His direct observations of political conditions in Europe, including periods of instability in France and the intricacies ofOtto von Bismarck'sGermany, led him to a deeper appreciation for well-established institutions and a more measured, gradual approach to national reform.[37] This experience solidified Itō's transition from a proponent of more radical reforms to an advocate for gradual, systematic institution-building, adapted to Japan's specific conditions.[38]
Upon his return to Japan from the Iwakura Mission in September 1873, Itō was immediately thrust into the intense political debate surrounding theSeikanron (debate over conqueringKorea). He aligned himself with senior leaders likeIwakura Tomomi,Kido Takayoshi, andŌkubo Toshimichi, who opposed a military expedition to Korea, advocating instead for a focus on domestic development and gradual reform.[39][40] Following the "Political Crisis of 1873" (Meiji rokunen seihen), which saw the resignation of key proponents of the expedition, includingSaigō Takamori, Itō was appointed as a councilor (sangi) and concurrently asminister of public works, solidifying his position as a key figure in the government.[41]
In November 1873, Itō, along withTerashima Munenori, was tasked with "investigating constitutional government" (seitai torishirabe), marking the formal beginning of Japan's journey towards a written constitution.[42] He was significantly influenced by the ideas of Kido and Ōkubo, both of whom submitted memorials to the throne advocating for the eventual establishment of a constitutional system that would include popular participation, to be achieved through a gradual process.[43][44] Itō began to formulate concrete plans, proposing the convention of prefectural governors to form a lower assembly and the expansion of an existing imperial advisory body, theJakō-no-ma, into an upper assembly.[45] These initiatives culminated in theOsaka Conference of 1875, a meeting of key Meiji leaders that resulted in an imperial edict promising the gradual establishment of constitutional government.[46][47] This edict led to the creation of the Assembly of Prefectural Governors and theGenrōin (Chamber of Elders), institutions Itō saw as precursors to a future parliament.[45][47]
In an 1880 opinion paper on the future constitution, submitted toEmperor Meiji, Itō reiterated his cautious approach. He advised against hastily establishing a full-fledged parliament, proposing instead a further strengthening of theGenrōin and the introduction of a system of public auditors, selected from the general populace, to oversee fiscal matters and promote transparency.[48] This proposal underscored his commitment to gradualism and his belief that the emperor should publicly demonstrate this principle of measured reform.[49] His stance contrasted sharply with theConfucian moralism of court advisers likeMotoda Eifu, who advocated for a state doctrine based on traditional ethics. Itō, in his 1879 paper "On Education" (Kyōiku-gi), argued against the state controlling a "national doctrine" (kokkyō).[50] His primary concern was the destabilizing effect of widespread political debate among an unprepared populace; he therefore advocated for practical, secular education to curb this tendency, rather than for a state-sponsored moral code.[51]
Itō inBerlin in 1883, during his constitutional study tour[52]
The political landscape underwent a significant upheaval with the "Political Crisis of 1881". CouncilorŌkuma Shigenobu, one of the more "enlightened of the younger statesmen" along with Itō andInoue Kaoru, controversially submitted a proposal directly to the throne advocating for the immediate adoption of a British-style parliamentary cabinet system and the rapid establishment of a national assembly, with elections to be held as early as the following year.[53][54][55][56] This move, perceived as a challenge to the established oligarchic leadership and their gradualist approach, combined with public outcry over the "Hokkaido Colonization Office Scandal", significantly weakened Ōkuma's position within the government.[57][58][59] Antagonized by Ōkuma's unilateral action, Itō exploited the ensuing political crisis, offering his own resignation to force the issue. He secured agreement from senior statesmen on a gradualist approach based on aPrussian-influenced model, thereby resolving the internal bureaucratic struggle over the type and timing of the constitution.[60][56][61] Upon successfully pushing for Ōkuma's resignation, Itō emerged asfirst among equals within theMeiji oligarchy.[62][63][64]
In March 1882, Itō embarked on an extensive year-and-a-half-long study tour of Europe, with the primary mission of researching various European constitutions and systems of government in preparation for drafting Japan's own.[15][65][66] His objective was not merely to study constitutional texts but to understand how to effectively operate a constitutional state.[67] The fundamental elements of the future constitution had already been decided upon before he left; the trip was intended to gather theoretical arguments and prestige to counter both liberal and conservative opposition at home.[68] InBerlin, he attended lectures by the legal scholar ProfessorRudolf von Gneist, but found Gneist's emphasis on historical jurisprudence and his skepticism about transplanting constitutional models less directly applicable to Japan's immediate needs.[15][67] Itō encountered strong anti-parliamentarian sentiments in Germany, with both Gneist and even KaiserWilhelm I expressing reservations about the establishment of a powerful parliament, particularly in a nation without a long tradition of such institutions.[69]
A more formative part of his European tour was his time inVienna, beginning in August 1882, where he studied with the political economist ProfessorLorenz von Stein.[15][69] Stein'sStaatswissenschaft (science of the state) had a profound impact on Itō. Stein's theories emphasized the critical role of effective state administration (Verwaltung) as a necessary complement to constitutional government (Verfassung), arguing for a system that could reconcile parliamentary mechanisms with the broader public interest and efficient governance of the state.[70] This approach resonated deeply with Itō's pragmatic desire for practical guidelines for establishing and managing a constitutional state.[69] Stein's ideas provided Itō with a sophisticated conceptual framework that moved beyond the abstractnatural law theories then popular among some popular rights advocates in Japan, offering instead a model of a state grounded in administrative capacity and historical context.[71] Furthermore, Stein stressed the importance of a robust system of education to support a constitutional state and cultivate an informed citizenry, reinforcing Itō's own belief in the importance of education for national development.[72] Itō returned to Japan in August 1883, equipped with new insights and renewed confidence for the task of constitution-making.[15][73]
Drafting and promulgation, first premiership (1885–1888)
Upon his return from Europe, Itō assumed leadership of the newly established Bureau for Investigation of Constitutional Systems (Seido Torishirabe Kyoku) within theImperial Household Agency in 1884. This body was specifically created to draft the constitution.[74] He worked closely with a team of legal scholars and officials, includingInoue Kowashi (often considered the principal drafter of the text),Itō Miyoji, andKaneko Kentarō. The German legal scholarHermann Roesler also served as an important adviser, with his personal draft being extremely close to the final product.[15][75] While Inoue Kowashi was a strong proponent of the German model, Itō's extensive research across Europe, including his period of study in London, contributed to a broader and more nuanced understanding of constitutional principles.[76]
Several key institutional reforms led by Itō paved the way for the new constitutional order:
Establishment of thecabinet system (1885): Itō spearheaded the creation of Japan's modern cabinet system, becoming the nation's firstPrime Minister. This reform replaced the traditionalDaijō-kan system as a means to create a strong executive branch capable of dealing with the future Diet.[77][78][79][80] In principle, it opened cabinet positions to individuals beyond the traditional aristocracy, based on merit and ability.[81]
Founding of theImperial University (1886): He established the Imperial University (later the University of Tokyo) with the specific aim of educating and training a competent bureaucratic elite to administer the modern state.[82] Within the university, theKokka Gakkai (Society forStaatswissenschaft) was founded, with Itō's support, to serve as a policy research institution and think-tank.[83]
Creation of thePrivy Council (1888): After resigning as Prime Minister in April 1888, Itō became the first president of the Privy Council. This body was initially formed to deliberate on the draft constitution and the Imperial Household Law. Itō created it partly to bypass the more liberal-leaningGenrōin, which had produced its own draft constitution and claimed deliberative rights.[84][85][86] He envisioned it as a high-level advisory body to the emperor on important political matters, serving to institutionalize the emperor's constitutional role while keeping the monarch separate from direct involvement in day-to-day political affairs and partisan disputes.[87][83]
TheMeiji Constitution was officially promulgated on 11 February 1889.[88] During the ceremony, Itō, as President of the Privy Council, handed the text of the Constitution to Emperor Meiji, who then handed it to Prime MinisterKuroda Kiyotaka.[89] In speeches delivered shortly after, both Itō and Kuroda affirmed the principle of "transcendental" cabinets that stood above political parties, a final expression of the anti-party sentiment of the 1880s.[90][91]
Itō emphasized that the constitution was granted by the Emperor, a framework rooted in Japan's unique national polity (kokutai). In a speech atŌtsu, he explained that "as the supreme right is one and indivisible, the legislative power remains in the hands of the Sovereign and is not bestowed on the people."[92] In hisCommentaries on the Constitution (1889), he further argued against the theory of laws as contracts between the governing and the governed, asserting that "the legislative power is ultimately under the control of the Emperor, while the duty of the Diet is to give advice and consent."[92] In a famous 1888 speech, he had described the imperial house as the "axis of the nation", a spiritual and historical anchor for the state equivalent to the role ofChristianity in the West.[84][93][94] HisCommentaries blended references to Japan's mythical past with discussions of modern European statecraft.[95] However, he consistently stressed that the constitution also guaranteed popular participation through the Diet and acknowledged the inevitable role of political parties.[96] During the Privy Council debates on the constitution, Itō held his ground against more conservative figures likeMori Arinori, who argued for a purely advisory Diet, insisting that "if we want to establish a constitutional government, we have to give the right of decision to the Diet."[97]
While he initially championed a "transcendental" cabinet that stood above partisan politics, Itō's experiences led him to acknowledge the inevitable rise and importance of political parties.[98] Condemning what he termed "extremely democratic ideas," he believed them unsuitable for a compact nation like Japan that required "solidity of organization and the efficiency of its administrative activity."[99] In an 1885 letter to Inoue Kaoru, he expressed his view that the arguments of party leaderItagaki Taisuke contained principles "completely incompatible with our nation" and were morally hazardous to the Imperial Household.[100] A hallmark of Itō's political career was his pragmatism and his ability to adapt his views to changing circumstances, a trait that earned him the nickname "Round Itō" (Mārui Itō) from commentators likeTokutomi Sohō.[101] He enjoyed a close personal relationship with Emperor Meiji, who often consulted him on practical matters of parliamentary politics, valuing his advice on how to manage the newly established Diet.[102]
Itō's pragmatism was particularly evident in his evolving interpretation ofkokutai (national polity). In an 1884 exchange with the conservative court officialSasaki Takayuki, Itō argued thatkokutai was not immutable but was synonymous with the "national organization," including its land, people, and institutions, and would naturally change with the times. He viewed Sasaki's belief in an unchanging imperial line as the sole definition ofkokutai as erroneous.[103] However, by 1908, in a speech marking the twentieth anniversary of the Constitution's promulgation, Itō reversed his position, declaring that "constitutional government could never change thekokutai" and invoking the familiar rhetoric of an unbroken imperial line sinceEmperor Jimmu. This shift demonstrated his political acumen, adopting the now commonly accepted ideological line for the sake of national unity and political expediency.[101]
Itō remained a powerful figure even out of the Prime Minister's office, primarily through his leadership of thePrivy Council. His influence was shaped by the deepening split within the oligarchy between his own "civil" faction and the "military" faction led byYamagata Aritomo.[104] The first session of theNational Diet was held in November 1890.[105] In August 1892, Itō formed his second cabinet, serving as Prime Minister until August 1896.[105] His ideas had by then begun to diverge from those of his fellow oligarchs; while most still adhered to a strict policy of transcendental cabinets, Itō had reluctantly come to accept the necessity of establishing a government party. He had recommended this in a memorial to the Emperor as early as January 1892, but Yamagata and the other elder statesmen vetoed the idea, viewing it as a step towards British-style party cabinets.[106]
This period was marked by the outbreak of theFirst Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895). Following Japan's victory, Itō was involved in the negotiations for theTreaty of Shimonoseki in 1895.[105][107] His handling of the Diet during this premiership was characterized by pragmatic compromise. In the 1893 budget crisis, he defused an attack on the government by having the Emperor issue a rescript that called for fiscal responsibility from both the government (by contributing from imperial household funds for naval expansion and requiring officials to contribute a tenth of their salaries) and the Diet, a move that allowed both sides to save face.[108][109][110][111][112] He twice dissolved the Diet (the fifth and sixth sessions) largely to demonstrate to foreign powers that his government was in firm control of anti-foreign elements, thereby smoothing the path for the crucial revision of the unequal treaties.[113][114][112]
Itō formed his third cabinet in January 1898, aiming to secure the support of both the oppositionJiyūtō (Liberal) andShimpotō (Progressive) parties, but failed to gain either.[105][115] During this brief premiership, he expressed his intention to found a political party.[105] However, facing difficulties in managing the government, opposition from figures like Yamagata to his party plans, and a failure to secure support from key industrialists, Itō dissolved theHouse of Representatives in June 1898.[116] Later that month, with the merger of the Jiyūtō and Shimpōtō parties into theKenseitō, Itō resigned as Prime Minister. In a masterful political maneuver that outflanked Yamagata, he recommended thatŌkuma Shigenobu andItagaki Taisuke form Japan's first party cabinet, thereby setting a precedent for party-based government that he would later capitalize on himself.[117][118][119]
Itō with Japanese residents ofZhifu, China, during his 1898 visit. Itō is seated front row, fourth from left.
Itō Hirobumi's engagement with China was a significant, though complex, aspect of his later career, influencing his views on regional stability, economic development, and Japan's role in East Asia. His two-month visit to Korea and China in August–November 1898, undertaken shortly after the dissolution of his third cabinet, proved particularly formative.[120][121][122]
During this trip, Itō was warmly received by Chinese reformers, includingKang Youwei, who saw Meiji Japan as a model for China's own modernization.[123] He arrived in Beijing at the height of theHundred Days' Reform movement, led by theGuangxu Emperor.[124] However, Itō found himself on the fringes of the 1898 coup engineered byEmpress Dowager Cixi, which abruptly ended the reforms and led to the persecution of its leaders.[125] While Itō was critical of the reformers' precipitous approach and maintained a cautious distance from their movement, he was deeply concerned by the ensuing political instability and the purge of reformist intellectuals.[126][127] He intervened to help some reformers, likeLiang Qichao, escape to Japan and advocated for the protection of others.[128]
Itō's encounters with prominent Chinese officials likeZhang Zhidong,viceroy of Huguang, were particularly significant.[129] Despite the political turmoil, Itō and Zhang found common ground in their advocacy for gradual reform and their appreciation for Western science and technology, albeit within a framework that respected national context.[130] Itō was particularly interested in Zhang's efforts to develop industry in theHubei region, including theHanyang Steel Mill.[131] Their meeting facilitated an agreement for Japan'sYahata Steel Works to obtainiron ore from China'sDaye mine, a development that marked the beginning of significant Japan-China economic cooperation in this sector, though it later became a point of contention in imperialistic narratives.[132]
While pessimistic about China's immediate political future due to its internal divisions and the perceived rigidity of its institutions, Itō was highly optimistic about its economic potential.[133] He believed that Japan, as a more advanced nation in the region, had a role to play in fostering economic ties and promoting "civilization" – by which he meant modern science, industry, and rational governance – in China.[134] His vision for Japan involved steering clear of direct political interference in China while actively engaging with its economy, seeing mutual benefit in regional development.[135] He consistently argued against territorial expansion for its own sake, emphasizing that economic prosperity and the exchange of knowledge were more important.[136] However, he also spoke of Japan's "moral obligation" as a "pioneer of modernization" to guide China and Korea, a stance that, while framed in terms of shared progress, carried paternalistic undertones.[136] His experiences in China in 1898 reinforced his belief in a gradual, education-focused approach to modernization and informed his strategy for Japan's engagement with the continent, emphasizing economic cooperation and the cultivation of a "nation of commerce".[137]
Following the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution in 1889, Itō embarked on extensive speaking tours across Japan in 1899, the tenth anniversary of the event.[138] His aim was to explain the ideals of constitutionalism and popular government.[139] He used a sophisticated media strategy, ensuring that reporters from newspapers like theTōkyō Nichinichi Shinbun accompanied him, and his speeches were widely disseminated and even compiled into a book.[140] In these speeches, he emphasized that the constitution guaranteed the people's right to participate in government.[141]
A major national goal during Itō's career was the revision of theunequal treaties imposed on Japan by Western powers in the mid-19th century. The new treaties, which abolishedextraterritoriality and partially restored tariff autonomy, came into effect in July–August 1899.[142] Itō saw this as a momentous occasion, marking Japan's full entry into the international community and the "mixed residence" (naichi zakkyo) of Japanese and foreigners.[142] He countered fears of economic invasion by arguing that opening the country would facilitate Japan's economic growth through competition and the absorption of Western knowledge and experience.[142] His primary concern was that Japan should face the world "with the magnanimity of a great nation" and maintain its "civilized" status.[143]
His views on patriotism (aikokushin) were pragmatic, emphasizing economic development and national wealth creation over ideological fervor orjingoism. "Without wealth the culture of the people cannot advance", he stated, advocating for patriotism that served practical ends.[143]
Despite his earlier advocacy for a "transcendental" cabinet, Itō's thinking on the role of political parties evolved. He became increasingly dissatisfied with the existing state of party politics in Japan, which he viewed as fractious and often detrimental to national harmony and effective governance.[144][145][146] His decision to form a new political party stemmed from a desire to reform party politics from within and to create an organization that could support his vision of constitutional government.[147]
In September 1900, Itō founded theRikken Seiyūkai (Friends of Constitutional Government), becoming its first president.[148][149] This marked the birth of Japan's first political party capable of taking the reins of government, and it became a dominant force in Japanese politics for decades, eventually evolving into the modernLiberal Democratic Party.[150]
Itō envisioned the Seiyūkai not merely as a vehicle for gaining political power but as a new kind of political organization – a "society" (kai) rather than a traditional "party" (tō), a term he felt carried connotations of self-serving factions (hōtō).[151] He aimed to create an organization that could transcend narrow partisan interests and act for the public benefit.[151] The decision was a pragmatic response to the political realities of the 1890s, where "transcendental" cabinets had repeatedly failed to secure stable majorities in the Diet, hindering governance and national progress.[144][152] Itō believed that a responsible party should supply competent personnel to the cabinet and contribute to harmonious governance, rather than simply seeking to control the executive branch.[153]
The formation of the Seiyūkai was not without difficulties. Itō's attempts to rally support from the business and financial communities met with limited success.[154] Prominent figures likeShibusawa Eiichi, while sympathetic to Itō's policies, were hesitant to directly join the party, partly due to a traditional disdain among entrepreneurs for direct political involvement and partly due to interference from established political and business interests, such as those connected toIwasaki Yanosuke, who was aligned with Ōkuma'sProgressive Party.[155] Ultimately, the Seiyūkai was formed largely on the existing organizational base of theKenseitō (the formerLiberal Party faction), led by figures likeHoshi Tōru. Itō attempted to disguise this fact, insisting that the Kenseitō formally dissolve before its members joined his new organization.[156][157][158][159]
Itō's draft rules for the Seiyūkai emphasized several key principles:
The Emperor's prerogative in appointing cabinet ministers, with the party not opposing appointments from outside its ranks.
The cabinet's role as an advisory body to the Emperor and a body of responsible government, free from direct party interference.
A focus on administrative reform through the selection of competent individuals for government posts, regardless of party affiliation.
A commitment to acting for the public benefit and avoiding undue involvement in local interests.
Strong leadership by the party president in public pronouncements and parliamentary activities.[151]
In a speech at the party's founding, Itō stated his constitutional philosophy, affirming that "the appointment and dismissal of Cabinet Ministers appertain, under the Constitution, to the prerogatives of the Sovereign," but that party members were not to "interfere in any manner with the discharge of their political duties."[160] These rules reflected Itō's ideal of a party that maintained a distinction between itself and the cabinet, promoted national unity, and was led with clear authority and discipline.[161] He advocated for a "salon-like" or club-style organization for the party's local branches to encourage broad participation and the free exchange of ideas, while simultaneously insisting on strong central leadership.[162]
Soon after its founding, Itō formed his fourth cabinet in October 1900, with most ministerial posts filled by Seiyūkai members.[163] However, this cabinet was short-lived, plagued by internal disunity, difficulties in managing party members' demands for posts, and conflict with the House of Peers, where ex-bureaucratic followers of Yamagata were particularly hostile to the inclusion of party politician Hoshi in the cabinet. After Hoshi was forced to resign, Itō's cabinet faced an internal conflict over financial policy, and he resigned as Prime Minister in June 1901, having failed to secure the approval of the other elder statesmen for a new, reorganized cabinet.[164][165][166][167] He continued as president of the Seiyūkai but faced ongoing challenges in instilling his ideals of party discipline and national-level focus. Disappointment over issues like the government's signing of theAnglo-Japanese Alliance (which he had opposed in favor of a Russo-Japanese entente) and internal party conflicts led to his resignation as Seiyūkai president in July 1903, at which point he was reappointed President of the Privy Council.[168][169][170][171] He was succeeded as party leader bySaionji Kinmochi.[144][172]
Even after stepping down from active party leadership, Itō continued to be deeply involved in shaping Japan's constitutional framework. From 1903, as reappointed president of the Imperial Household Research Committee (which he had first headed in 1899), he embarked on a major project of constitutional reforms, culminating in significant legislative changes in 1907.[173] These reforms aimed to consolidate the national structure, clarify the emperor's role, and strengthen the cabinet's authority in governance.[174]
The committee's primary task, under Itō's guidance and with the detailed work of legal scholarAriga Nagao, was to restructure the imperial household system and integrate it more fully as an organ of the state, rather than a separate entity.[175] This involved revising the Imperial Household Law and establishing a unified system of national laws that clearly positioned the imperial household within the state's constitutional framework.[176] The Kōshikirei Order (Order concerning Forms of Imperial Rescripts, Statutes, and Other State Documents) of 1907 was a key outcome, establishing procedures for issuing imperial edicts and revising fundamental laws, including the Meiji Constitution and the Imperial Household Law itself.[176]
A crucial aspect of these reforms was the effort to bolster the power of the Prime Minister and the cabinet, particularly in relation to the military.[177] The revised Cabinet Organization Order, implemented alongside the Kōshikirei Order, restored the requirement for the Prime Minister to countersign all laws and imperial ordinances, an attempt to curb the military's practice ofiaku jōsō (direct appeal to the emperor on military matters, bypassing the cabinet).[178] Itō envisioned a system of responsible government led by a strong cabinet, with the emperor acting as a constitutional monarch whose prerogatives were exercised in accordance with law and through designated state organs.[179]
However, these efforts to subordinate the military to cabinet control met with strong resistance from army leaders, particularlyYamagata Aritomo.[180] The ensuing compromise resulted in the promulgation of Military Ordinance No. 1 ("On Military Ordinances") in September 1907, which, while intended by some in government (like Home MinisterHara Takashi) to codify and thus limitiaku jōsō, effectively institutionalized the military's right of direct appeal for "supreme command-related matters".[181] This outcome, though a partial setback for Itō's goal of full cabinet supremacy, was seen by him as a step towards clarifying the military's constitutional position, with the ongoing intent to bring military administration under greater legal and cabinet oversight, particularly during his subsequent role in Korea.[182] The 1907 reforms, therefore, represented a complex and somewhat ambiguous development in Meiji constitutionalism, aiming to create a more integrated and powerful state but also inadvertently solidifying a degree of military independence.[183]
Itō (center) in Korean dress, during his tenure asResident-General
During his tenure as Resident-General, Itō simultaneously continued his work on constitutional reforms in Japan as president of the Imperial Household Research Committee.[187] He approached the governance of Korea with the goal of modernizing the country through gradual reforms in its political, economic, and social structures.[188] In a 1906 statement to the Korean cabinet, he argued that Japan did not wish to "swallow up Korea", viewing the creation of an independent and reliable ally under Japanese guidance as a more cost-effective policy than direct colonial rule.[189] He initially expressed a more optimistic view of Koreans' potential for self-government than other Japanese leaders, arguing that their backwardness was a product of a corrupt elite rather than any inherent racial characteristic.[190][191] His strategy was reform through "self-rule", which required finding reliable Korean collaborators.[192]
A central part of Itō's agenda was educational reform. He advocated for the introduction of Western-style practical science and the establishment of a modern education system, aiming to move Korea away from its traditionalConfucian-centric learning, which he viewed as anachronistic and detrimental to progress.[193] He sought to depoliticize the Korean imperial court and integrate it into a rationalized state structure, similar to his efforts with the Japanese imperial system.[194]
However, Itō's policies faced immense challenges. His relationship with EmperorGojong quickly deteriorated into mutual animosity, as Itō constantly reminded the emperor of his precarious hold on power while Gojong continued to resist Japanese authority through secret appeals to other foreign powers.[192] TheHague Secret Emissary Affair in 1907, where Gojong attempted to appeal to international powers against the protectorate, was the "final straw" for Itō. On 3 July, he confronted the emperor and then urged the Korean cabinet, led byYi Wan-yong, to secure the emperor's abdication, which occurred on 19 July.[187][195][196] This led to the signing of theJapan–Korea Treaty of 1907, which significantly expanded the Resident-General's powers and effectively brought Korean domestic administration under Japanese control, including the installation of Japanese vice-ministers and the abolition of the Korean army.[197]
Itō also worked to assert civilian control over the Japanese military garrison in Korea, a continuation of his efforts in Japan to subordinate the military to the cabinet.[198] The ordinance establishing the Residency-General, which Itō himself drafted, granted him the authority to command the Japanese troops in Korea, a rare power for a civilian official.[199] He used this authority to limit military expansion and check arbitrary actions by the army.[200] His efforts were undermined by the growinganti-Japanese resistance. Therighteous army movement escalated into a widespread guerrilla insurgency following the disbandment of the Korean army in 1907. Itō initially underestimated the strength of the popular antipathy but by early 1908 had become pessimistic. He backed the Japanese military's often brutal suppression tactics, which included indiscriminate retaliation against the civilian population, admitting that the measures had been "too severe".[201]
The spread of the "righteous army" movement provided ample proof that Itō's gradualist reform program had failed to win over the Korean populace. Concluding that the policy of "nurturing self-rule" was a dead end, he resigned as Resident-General in June 1909.[202][203] He had never ruled out annexation as an option, telling Foreign MinisterHayashi Tadasu in 1907 that it would be "good policy" to secure Russia's assent in advance.[202] In April 1909, he gave his approval to the annexation plan proposed by Prime MinisterKatsura Tarō and Foreign MinisterKomura Jutarō.[204][205][206] This shift is attributed by Takii to Japan's decision to secure Korea in exchange for ceasing its pursuit of interests inManchuria, a compromise reached amidst international pressures, particularly concerning theGando Convention with China.[207] For Itō, preventing deeper military entanglement in Manchuria became a paramount concern.[207] His final acquiescence, driven by the failure of his policies in Korea and the recognition that it was easier to make enemies than friends there, cleared the way for the advocates of annexation to accelerate their plans.[205]
Even as he agreed to annexation, his dictated memo outlined a post-annexation structure for Korea that included a two-house parliament with elected Korean representatives and a responsible cabinet composed of Koreans, supervised by a Japanese viceroy.[208] This suggests that even in the context of annexation, Itō envisioned a degree of Korean autonomy and popular participation, though whether this was a realistic or achievable plan remains debatable.[208]
On 26 October 1909, Itō Hirobumi was assassinated at theHarbin railway station in Manchuria. He was there to meet withVladimir Kokovtsov, a Russian representative, to discuss regional issues, including Manchuria. As Itō stepped off the train to review the Russian guards, he was shot six times byAn Jung-geun, a Korean nationalist and independence activist; three of the shots were fatal.[7][209][210] An, who was arrested by Russian guards, cited fifteen crimes Itō had committed, including the murder ofEmpress Myeongseong, forcing the abdication of Emperor Gojong, and plundering Korea. An stated he had assassinated Itō as a "lieutenant general of the righteous army" because Itō, by disturbing the peace of East Asia, had estranged Japan and Korea. He hoped that relations between the two countries would become closer, as a model for the world.[211] He also maintained that he had intentionally deceived Emperor Meiji, who desired peace in East Asia and Korean independence.[212]
Itō's death sent shockwaves through Japan and the international community. Upon hearing the news, Emperor Meiji expressed genuine grief.[15] His assassination removed a powerful, albeit controversial, voice from Japanese politics and is considered by some historians to have accelerated Japan's path towards thefull annexation of Korea, which occurred in August 1910.
Itō Hirobumi remains a highly significant and complex figure in modern Japanese history. He is widely recognized as a principal architect of the Meiji state, the "father of theMeiji Constitution", and a driving force behind Japan's rapid modernization in the late 19th century.[213] His achievements include the establishment of key institutions such as the cabinet system, the Imperial University, the Diet, and the Privy Council, all of which laid the groundwork for modern Japanese governance.[214] Affable and garrulous, in contrast to the stern and privateYamagata Aritomo, he was an able and many-sided statesman.[215] He was a quintessential "Meiji bureaucrat as politician", contrasting with Yamagata, who was more of an "ideologue".[216] A French editorial at the time of his death noted that while Itō was an intelligent and active statesman, his "principal work... was to be the head of state, the living symbol of the national life".[217]
His founding of the Rikken Seiyūkai was a pivotal step in the development of party politics in Japan.[218] His decision in 1898 to facilitate the creation of Japan's first party cabinet, and his subsequent formation of the Rikken Seiyūkai in 1900, mark his recognition of the practical necessity of combining bureaucratic expertise with party-based political support, a hybrid model that would shape Japanese politics for decades to come.[219]
However, his legacy is also deeply controversial, particularly due to his role as Resident-General of Korea and his part in the process that led to Korea's annexation.[209] While some interpretations, such as that of Takii Kazuhiro, emphasize his commitment to gradualism, civilization-building, and constitutionalism, even in his approach to Korea, he is widely viewed in Korea as a symbol of Japanese imperialism.[220] The ideology of Japanese imperialism in Korea during his time developed a distinctive cultural cast; the shared history and ethnicity with Koreans permitted the Japanese to imagine a degree of commonality not available to Western colonialists. Itō and others used rhetoric like the "family metaphor" to justify Japanese political and social subordination of Korea as a "natural" hierarchy between an "older" and "younger" brother.[221]
Takii Kazuhiro's scholarship presents Itō not as an unprincipled opportunist, but as a "statesman of knowledge" (chi no seijika) who consistently pursued a vision of a strong, civilized, and constitutional Japanese state.[222] This interpretation highlights Itō's lifelong emphasis on education, the acquisition of practical knowledge, and the gradual development of popular participation in government as essential components of nation-building.[223] His efforts to integrate the imperial institution into a modern constitutional framework and to balance executive power with parliamentary mechanisms were central to his political project.[224]
The complexities of his legacy are reflected in the contrasting ways he is remembered: in Japan, often as a great modernizer, and in Korea, as a key figure in its colonization. His assassination by An Jung-geun is a stark reminder of the deep enmities engendered byJapan's imperial expansion. Reconciling these different facets of Itō Hirobumi's life and impact remains an ongoing task for historians.
The house where Itō lived from age 14 in Hagi after his father was adopted by Itō Naoemon still exists, and is preserved as a museum. It is a one-story house with a thatched roof and a gabled roof, with a total floor area of 29tsubo and is located 150 meters south of theShōkasonjuku Academy. The adjacent villa is a portion of a house built by Itō in 1907 in Oimura, Shimoebara-gun, Tokyo (currentlyShinagawa, Tokyo). It was a large Western-style mansion, of which three structures, a part of the entrance, a large hall, and a detached room, were transported Hagi. The large hall has a mirrored ceiling and its wooden paneling uses 1000-year old cedar trees fromYoshino.[225] The buildings were collectively designated aNational Historic Site in 1932.[226]
In 1932, the Japanese unveiled the Hakubun-ji Buddhist Temple (博文寺) inSeoul, dedicated to Itō as the "Prince Itō Memorial Temple (伊藤公爵祈念寺院)". Situated in then Susumu Tadashidan Park on the north slope of Namsan, which after liberation became Jangchungdan Park 장충단 공원. From October 1945, the main hall served as student home, ca. 1960 replaced by a guest house of thePark Chung-Hee administration, then reconstructed and again a student guest house. In 1979 it was incorporated into the grounds of the Shilla Hotel then opened. Several other parts of the temple are still at the site.
Itō Hirobumi married Itō Umeko, who was the daughter of Kida Kyūbei of Jōnokoshi, Shimonoseki, in 1866.[227] He had previously been married to Irie Sumiko from 1863, but they divorced in 1866.[227] He had a son-in-law,Suematsu Kenchō, and an adopted son,Yūkichi (1870–1931).[228] An emotional man, Itō was known to break down in tears when faced with difficult situations.[229]
^Craig, Albert M. (14 July 2014) [1st pub. 1986]. "Chapter 2: The Central Government". In Jansen, Marius B.; Rozman, Gilbert (eds.).Japan in Transition: From Tokugawa to Meiji. Princeton University Press. pp. 60–61.ISBN978-0691604848.By 1878 Ōkubo, Kido, and Saigō, the triumvirate of the Restoration, were all dead. There followed a three-year interim during which it was unclear who would take their place. During this time, new problems emerged: intractable inflation, budget controversies, disagreement over foreign borrowing, a scandal in Hokkaido, and increasingly importunate party demands for constitutional government. Each policy issue became entangled in a power struggle of which the principals were Ōkuma and Itō. Ōkuma lost and was expelled from the government along with his followers...¶Itō's victory was the affirmation of Sat-Chō rule against a Saga outsider. Itō never quite became an Ōkubo but he did assume the key role within the collective leadership of Japan during the 1880s.
^Beasley, W.G. (1988). "Chapter 10: Meiji Political Institutions". In Jansen, Marius B. (ed.).The Cambridge History of Japan. Vol. V:The Nineteenth Century. Cambridge University Press. p. 657.ISBN0-521-22356-3.Now that Ōkubo was dead and Iwakura was getting old, the contest for overall leadership seemed to lie between Itō and Ōkuma, which gave the latter's views a particular importance. He did not submit them until March 1881. They then proved to be a great deal more radical than any of his colleagues had expected, not least in recommending that a parliament be established almost immediately, so that elections could be held in 1882 and the first session convoked in 1883...Ōkuma envisaged a constitution on the British model, in which power would depend on rivalry among political parties and the highest office would go to the man who commanded a parliamentary majority...Implicit in this was a challenge to the Satsuma and Chōshū domination of the Meiji government. Itō at once took it up, threatening to resign if anything like Ōkuma's proposals were accepted. This enabled him to isolate Ōkuma and force him out of the council later in the year.
^Perez, Louis G. (8 January 2013)."Itō Hirobumi". In Perez, Louis G. (ed.).Japan at War:An Encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO, LLC. p. 149.ISBN9781598847420. Retrieved11 September 2022.In 1878, Itō became Minister of Home Affairs. He and Ōkuma subsequently became embroiled over the adoption of a constitutional form of government. Itō had Ōkuma ousted from office and assumed primary leadership in the Meiji government...
^Perez, Louis G. (8 January 2013)."Itō Hirobumi". In Perez, Louis G. (ed.).Japan at War:An Encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO, LLC. p. 149.ISBN9781598847420. Retrieved11 September 2022.
^Grunden, Walter E. (8 January 2013)."Ōkuma Shigenobu". In Perez, Louis G. (ed.).Japan at War:An Encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO, LLC. p. 295.ISBN9781598847420. Retrieved16 April 2023.In 1878, Ōkuma was placed in charge of the bureau for land tax revision, where he attempted to enforce a series of unsuccessful programs geared toward financial retrenchment. Despite economic setbacks, his public popularity grew because he favored the immediate adoption of a British-style constitution and parliamentary government. Consequently, Ōkuma found himself the chief political rival and competitor of Itō Hirobumi, who championed the Prussian-style constitutional monarchy. In 1881, as the popular rights movement was gaining momentum, Ōkuma publicly advocated the immediate establishment of a national assembly. That stand placed him in direct opposition to Itō, and as a result, he was forced out of office in 1881.
^Craig, Albert M. (14 July 2014) [1st pub. 1986]. "Chapter 2: The Central Government". In Jansen, Marius B.; Rozman, Gilbert (eds.).Japan in Transition: From Tokugawa to Meiji. Princeton University Press. pp. 60–61.ISBN978-0691604848.By 1878 Ōkubo, Kido, and Saigō, the triumvirate of the Restoration, were all dead. There followed a three-year interim during which it was unclear who would take their place. During this time, new problems emerged: intractable inflation, budget controversies, disagreement over foreign borrowing, a scandal in Hokkaido, and increasingly importunate party demands for constitutional government. Each policy issue became entangled in a power struggle of which the principals were Ōkuma and Itō. Ōkuma lost and was expelled from the government along with his followers...¶Itō's victory was the affirmation of Sat-Chō rule against a Saga outsider. Itō never quite became an Ōkubo but he did assume the key role within the collective leadership of Japan during the 1880s.
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Gluck, Carol (1985).Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.ISBN0-691-05449-5.
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Keene, Donald (2002).Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852–1912. Columbia University Press.ISBN978-0-231-12340-2.
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Takii, Kazuhiro (2014).Itō Hirobumi – Japan's First Prime Minister and Father of the Meiji Constitution. Nichibunken Monograph Series. Vol. 16. Translated by Takechi, Manabu. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge.ISBN978-0-415-83886-3.
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