TheIsraeli intelligence community (Hebrew:קהילת המודיעין הישראלית) is made up ofAman (military intelligence),Mossad (foreign intelligence) andShin Bet (domesticintelligence).[1]
| Symbol | Organization | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
Military Intelligence Directorate (Aman):military intelligence branch of theIsrael Defense Forces (IDF) | ||
 | Intelligence Corps | The main intelligence-collection and -analysis body of theIDF General Staff; also includes the Israelisignals-intelligence agency known asUnit 8200 |
 | Information Security Department | The main information-security and counterintelligence unit of Aman |
 | Research Department | The main all-source intelligence-assessment unit of Aman |
 | Air Intelligence Directorate | The intelligence unit of theIsraeli Air Force |
 | Naval Intelligence Division | The intelligence unit of theIsraeli Navy |
 | Combat Intelligence Collection Corps | The intelligence unit ofIsraeli Ground Forces |
 | Sayeret Matkal | The IDF's premierspecial-forces unit, directly subordinate to Aman |
 | Mossad | Theagency responsible primarily for foreign-intelligence work |
| Shin Bet (Shabak) | The organization charged with maintaininginternal security, including in theIsraeli-occupied territories | |
 | Investigations and Intelligence Division | The central body in the police that is responsible for gathering intelligence in the fields of fighting terrorism and crimes. |
 | The Center for Political Research | A research and assessment body of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that focuses on the countries and issues that stand at the center of Israel's political-diplomatic activity |
Parliamentary supervision over the intelligence community is undertaken by the Subcommittee for Intelligence and Secret Services, a subcommittee of theForeign Affairs and Defense Committee, which supervises the entireIsraeli Security Forces.
The issue regarding the suitable structure of the IIC, and questions as to dividing responsibilities and jurisdictions between Aman, Shabak, and Mossad, as well as the format of work for the three in relation toprime ministers and ministers, all of these became agenda issues many times in the past. Various commissions and individual inspectors were appointed throughout the years, whether due to traumatic experiences or as a matter of routine, in order to examine the issues and propose recommendations. These were:
Thegovernment was tasked with the matter on a number of occasions and arrived at various decisions. TheState Comptroller made the issue his agenda and submitted to theKnesset his findings and conclusions. In 1994, the Subcommittee for Intelligence also examined the questions and brought its recommendations before the Prime Minister.
The division of labour among the intelligence arms, Aman, Shabak, and Mossad, in the current structure of the IIC, is usually established upon a geographical basis. There are interfacing and overlapping segments, often rather wide, among the organizations. The level of coordination and inter-regional cooperation has suffered in the past from fundamental shortcomings, which has hindered the effectiveness of intelligence work on several fronts. The organizations repressed the necessity for the mutual sharing of intelligence information and in synchronizing some activities.
There are still open-ended issues remaining to be discussed, including disputed ones, as to the division of jurisdictions and inter-regional sectoral boundaries. In a document known as the "Magna Carta," the heads of the three services continue their attempt to arrive at agreements regarding these. The Intelligence Subcommittee follows this discourse and examines the steps required to practically settle key areas of dispute. If needed, the Subcommittee could become actively involved in the matter so as to ensure appropriate and reasonable standards for overall intelligence work in Israel.
The historical development of the IIC destined Aman with a range of activities and tasks that are conventionally outside the realm of military intelligence in the West, such as the responsibility for intelligence research in political matters and other markedly non-military affairs. This largely followed from the reliance by the State of Israel during its first years on the IDF as an anchor and mechanism to fulfill national tasks, it being a system with organizational capacities, resources, and available human resources. As such, Aman has assumed functions which ordinarily would be handled by other intelligence agencies. Accordingly, some critics say, there is a need to reexamine the position and placement assumed by intelligence bodies within the current structure, and transferring certain strategic and political areas and non-military ones, from Aman to a civilian intelligence authority.
The commission to investigate the intelligence network following the War in Iraq maintained that, notwithstanding the historical consolidation behind the current IIC structure, and despite the advantages gained by Aman'sResearch Department andUnit 8200 during many years of service, it is finally time to restructure the IIC in accordance with a proper work distribution, professional designation, as well as a correct constitutional and legal frame of reference.
The Commission recommendations on reforming the current IIC structure, ending up with three or four independent intelligence services, alongside theNational Security Council, with the distinction between them being based upon the respective spheres of responsibility of each service:
Kahana, Ephraim (2002). "Reorganizing Israel's Intelligence Community".International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence.15 (3):415–428.doi:10.1080/08850600290101686.ISSN 0885-0607.S2CID 154008409.
