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Islamic extremism

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Extreme or radical form of Islam
Not to be confused withIslamic fundamentalism orJihadism.

Muslim protest against the anti-Islamic filmInnocence of Muslims inSydney, 15 September 2012. The protesters carry signs reading "Behead all those who insult theProphet" and "Our dead are inParadise. Your dead are inHELL!"
Part ofa series on
Islamism
Part ofa series on
Islam

Islamic extremism is characterised by extremist beliefs, behaviors and ideologies adhered to by someMuslims withinIslam. The term 'Islamic extremism' is contentious, encompassing a spectrum of definitions, ranging from academic interpretations ofIslamic supremacy to the notion that all ideologies other than Islam have failed and are inferior.[1]

Islamic extremism is a distinct fromIslamic fundamentalism andIslamism. Islamic fundamentalism refers to a movement amongMuslims advocating a return to the fundamental principles of anIslamic state inMuslim-majority countries. Meanwhile, Islamism constitutes a form ofpolitical Islam. However, both Islamic fundamentalism and Islamism can also be classified as subsets of Islamic extremism. Acts of violence committed byIslamic terrorists andjihadists are often associated with these extremist beliefs.

Definitions

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Academic definition

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The academic definition of radical Islam consists of two parts:

  • The first being: Islamic thought that states that all ideologies other than Islam, whether associated with the West (capitalism or democracy) or the East (communism or socialism) have failed and have demonstrated their bankruptcy.[1]
  • The second being: Islamic thought that states that (semi)secular regimes are wrong because of their negligence of Islam.[2]

United Kingdom High Courts' definition

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UK High Courts have ruled in two cases on Islamic extremism, and provided definition.

Aside from those, two major definitions have been offered for Islamic extremism, sometimes using overlapping but also distinct aspects of extreme interpretations and pursuits ofIslamic ideology:

  • The use of violent tactics such as bombing and assassinations for achieving perceived Islamic goals (seeJihadism; orZeyno Baran, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Eurasian Policy at theHudson Institute, prefers the termIslamist extremism)[3]
  • An extremely conservative view of Islam,[4] which does not necessarily entail violence[5] (see alsoIslamic fundamentalism [Baran again prefers the termIslamism]).[3]

In 2019, the United States Institute of Peace issued a report on extremism infragile states, advocating the establishment of a shared understanding, operational framework for prevention, and international cooperation.[6]

Key influences of radical Islam

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Early Islam

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According to the academic definition of radical Islam, the second condition for something to be called radical Islam, is that it is antigovernmental. Consequently, a government is a condition for radical Islam. However, even though thepeace of Westphalia was established in 1648 and thus introduced thenation state, the writings of theformative centuries of Islamic history are influential to the contemporary writings that were coined radical after the concept of the nation state was established in theMuslim world as well. Key influences of radical Islam that stem from early Islam include:

Kharijites

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Main article:Kharijites

Islamic extremism dates back to theearly history of Islam with the emergence of theKharijites in the 7th century CE.[7] The original schism betweenKharijites,Sunnīs, andShīʿas amongMuslims was disputed over thepolitical and religious succession to the guidance of theMuslim community (Ummah) after the death of theIslamic prophetMuhammad.[7] From their essentially political position, the Kharijites developed extreme doctrines that set them apart from both mainstream Sunnī and Shīʿa Muslims.[7] Shīʿas believeʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib is the true successor to Muhammad, while Sunnīs considerAbu Bakr to hold that position. The Kharijites broke away from both the Shīʿas and the Sunnīs during theFirst Fitna (the first Islamic Civil War);[7] they were particularly noted for adopting a radical approach totakfīr (excommunication), whereby they declared both Sunnī and Shīʿa Muslims to be eitherinfidels (kuffār) orfalse Muslims (munāfiḳūn), and therefore deemed themworthy of death for their perceivedapostasy (ridda).[7][8][9]

The Islamic tradition traces the origin of the Kharijities to thebattle between ʿAlī and Mu'awiya at Siffin in 657 CE. When ʿAlī was faced with a military stalemate and agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration, some of his party withdrew their support from him. "Judgement belongs to God alone" (لاَ حُكْمَ إلَا لِلّهِ) became the slogan of these secessionists.[7] They also called themselvesal-Shurat ("the Vendors"), to reflect their willingness to sell their lives inmartyrdom.[10]

These original Kharijites opposed both ʿAlī and Mu'awiya, and appointed their own leaders. They were decisively defeated by ʿAlī, who was in turn assassinated by a Kharijite. Kharijites engaged in guerilla warfare against theUmayyads, but only became a movement to be reckoned with during theSecond Fitna (the second Islamic Civil War) when they at one point controlled more territory than any of their rivals. The Kharijites were, in fact, one of the major threats to Ibn al-Zubayr's bid for the caliphate; during this time they controlled Yamama and most of southern Arabia, and captured the oasis town of al-Ta'if.[10]

The Azariqa, considered to be the extreme faction of the Kharijites, controlled parts of western Iran under the Umayyads until they were finally put down in 699 CE. The more moderateIbadi Kharijites were longer-lived, continuing to wield political power in North and East Africa and in eastern Arabia during the'Abbasid period. Because of their readiness to declare any opponent as apostate, the extreme Kharijites tended to fragment into small groups. One of the few points that the various Kharijite splinter groups held in common was their view of the caliphate, which differed from other Muslim theories on two points.

  • First, they were principled egalitarians, holding that any pious Muslim ("even anEthiopian slave") can become Caliph and that family or tribal affiliation is inconsequential. The only requirements for leadership are piety and acceptance by the community.
  • Second, they agreed that it is the duty of the believers to depose any leader who falls into error. This second principle had profound implications for Kharijite theology. Applying these ideas to the early history of the caliphate, Kharijites only accept Abu Bakr and 'Umar as legitimate caliphs. Of 'Uthman's caliphate they recognize only the first six years as legitimate, and they reject 'Ali altogether.

By the time that Ibn al-Muqaffa' wrote his political treatise early in the 'Abbasid period, the Kharijites were no longer a significant political threat, at least in theIslamic heartlands. The memory of the menace they had posed to Muslim unity and of the moral challenge generated by their pious idealism still weighed heavily on Muslim political and religious thought, however. Even if the Kharijites could no longer threaten, their ghosts still had to be answered.[10] The Ibadis are the only Kharijite group to survive into modern times.

Ibn Taymiyyah

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Main article:Ibn Taymiyyah

Ottoman Empire

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See also:Kadizadeli

Kadızadelis (alsoQādīzādali) was a seventeenth-century puritanical reformist religious movement in theOttoman Empire that followedKadızade Mehmed (1582-1635), a revivalist Islamic preacher. Kadızade and his followers were determined rivals ofSufism andpopular religion. They condemned many of the Ottoman practices that Kadızade felt werebidʻah "non-Islamic innovations", and passionately supported "reviving the beliefs and practices of the first Muslim generation in the first/seventh century" ("enjoining good and forbidding wrong").[11]

Driven by zealous and fiery rhetoric, Kadızade Mehmed was able to inspire many followers to join in his cause and rid themselves of any and all corruption found inside theOttoman Empire. Leaders of the movement held official positions as preachers in the major mosques of Baghdad, and "combined popular followings with support from within the Ottoman state apparatus".[12] Between 1630 and 1680 there were many violent quarrels that occurred between the Kadızadelis and those that they disapproved of. As the movement progressed, activists became "increasingly violent" and Kadızadelis were known to enter "mosques,tekkes andOttoman coffeehouses in order to mete out punishments to those contravening their version of orthodoxy."

Modern Islam

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Salafism and Wahhabism

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Main articles:Salafi movement andWahhabism
Further information:International propagation of Salafism and Wahhabism,International propagation of Salafism and Wahhabism by region,Petro-Islam, andSalafi jihadism
Part ofa series on:
Salafi movement

iconPolitics portal

Islam portal

TheSalafiyya movement is a conservative,[13]Islahi (reform)[14] movement withinSunnī Islam that emerged in the second half of the 19th century and advocate a return to the traditions of the "devout ancestors" (Salaf al-Salih). It has been described as the "fastest-growing Islamic movement"; with each scholar expressing diverse views across social, theological, and political spectrum. Salafis follow a doctrine that can be summed up as taking "afundamentalist approach to Islam, emulating the ProphetMuhammad and his earliest followers—al-salaf al-salih, the 'pious forefathers'....They reject religious innovation, orbidʻah, and support the implementation ofSharia (Islamic law)."[15] The Salafi movement is often divided into three categories: the largest group are the purists (orquietists), who avoid politics; the second largest group are themilitant activists, who get involved in politics; the third and last group are thejihadists, who constitute a minority.[15] Most of the violent Islamist groups come from theSalafi-Jihadist movement and their subgroups.[16] In recent years, Jihadi-Salafist doctrines have often been associated with the armed insurgencies of Islamic extremist movements andterrorist organizations targeting innocent civilians, both Muslims and Non-Muslims, such asal-Qaeda,ISIL/ISIS/IS/Daesh,Boko Haram, etc.[17][18][15][16] The second largest group are the Salafi activists who have a long tradition of political activism, such as those that operate in organizations like theMuslim Brotherhood, theArab world's majorIslamist movement. In the aftermath of widescale repressions after theArab Spring, accompanied by their political failures, the activist-Salafi movements have undergone a decline. The most numerous are thequietists, who believe in disengagement from politics and accept allegiance to Muslim governments, no matter how tyrannical, to avoidfitna (chaos).[15]

TheWahhabi movement was founded and spearheaded by theḤanbalī scholar and theologianMuhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab,[19][20][21] a religious preacher from theNajd region incentral Arabia,[22][23][24][25][26] and was instrumental in the rise of theHouse of Saud to power in the Arabian peninsula.[19] Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab sought torevive and purifyIslam from what he perceived as non-Islamic popular religious beliefs and practices by returning to what, he believed, were thefundamental principles of the Islamic religion.[23][24][25][26] His works were generally short, full of quotations from theQuran andHadith literature, such as his main and foremost theological treatise,Kitāb at-Tawḥīd (Arabic:كتاب التوحيد; "The Book of Oneness").[23][24][25][26] He taught that the primary doctrine of Islam was theuniqueness and oneness of God (tawḥīd), and denounced what he held to be popular religious beliefs and practices among Muslims that he considered to be akin toheretical innovation (bidʿah) andpolytheism (shirk).[23][24][25][26]

Wahhabism has been described as a conservative, strict, andfundamentalist branch of Sunnī Islam,[27] withpuritan views,[27] believing in a literal interpretation of the Quran.[19] The terms "Wahhabism" and "Salafism" are sometimes evoked interchangeably, although the designation "Wahhabi" is specifically applied to the followers of Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab and hisreformist doctrines.[19] The label "Wahhabi" was not claimed by his followers, who usually refer themselves asal-Muwaḥḥidūn ("affirmers of the singularity of God"), but is rather employed by Western scholars as well as his critics.[19][20][24] Starting in the mid-1970s and 1980s, theinternational propagation of Salafism and Wahhabism within Sunnī Islam[27] favored by theKingdom of Saudi Arabia[22][28][29] and otherArab states of the Persian Gulf has achieved what the French political scientistGilles Kepel defined as a "preeminent position of strength in the global expression of Islam."[30]

22 months after theSeptember 11 attacks, when theFBI consideredal-Qaeda as "the number one terrorist threat to the United States", journalistStephen Schwartz and U.S. SenatorJon Kyl have explicitly stated during a hearing that occurred in June 2003 before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security of theU.S. Senate that "Wahhabism is the source of theoverwhelming majority of terrorist atrocities in today's world".[31] As part of the global "War on terror", Wahhabism has been accused by theEuropean Parliament, various Western security analysts, and think tanks like theRAND Corporation, as being "a source of global terrorism".[31][32] Furthermore, Wahhabism has been accused of causing disunity in theMuslim community (Ummah) and criticized for its followers'destruction of many Islamic, cultural, and historical sites associated with theearly history of Islam and the first generation of Muslims (Muhammad's family and hiscompanions) in Saudi Arabia.[33][34][35][36]

Contemporary Islam

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Main article:Political aspects of Islam

The contemporary period begins after 1924. With thedefeat and dissolution of the Ottoman Empire (1908–1922), theOttoman Caliphate was alsoabolished. This event heavily influenced Islamic thinking in general, but also what would later be coined radical Islamic thought.[37] Key thinkers that wrote about Islam in the 20th century, and especially aboutjihad, include:

Muhammad Abduh

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Main article:Muhammad Abduh

Rashid Rida

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Main article:Rashid Rida

Hassan al-Banna

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Main article:Hassan al-Banna

Abul A'la al-Maududi

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Main article:Abul A'la Maududi

Sayyid Qutb

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Main article:Sayyid Qutb
Osama bin Laden andAyman al-Zawahiri ofal-Qaeda have promoted the overthrow of secular governments.[38][39][40]

Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian Islamist ideologue and prominent figurehead of theMuslim Brotherhood in Egypt, was influential in promoting thePan-Islamist ideology in the 1960s.[41] When he was executed by theEgyptian government under theregime of Gamal Abdel Nasser,Ayman al-Zawahiri formed the organizationEgyptian Islamic Jihad to replace the government with an Islamic state that would reflect Qutb's ideas for theIslamic revival that he yearned for.[42] TheQutbist ideology has been influential on jihadist movements andIslamic terrorists that seek to overthrow secular governments, most notablyOsama bin Laden andAyman al-Zawahiri ofal-Qaeda,[38][39][40] as well as theSalafi-jihadi terrorist groupISIL/ISIS/IS/Daesh.[43] Moreover, Qutb's books have frequently been cited by Osama bin Laden andAnwar al-Awlaki.[44][45][46][47][48][49]

Sayyid Qutb could be said to have founded the actual movement of radical Islam.[40][41][50] Unlike the other Islamic thinkers that have been mentioned above, Qutb was not anapologist.[50] He was a prominent leader of theMuslim Brotherhood and a highly influential Islamist ideologue,[40][50] and the first to articulate these anathemizing principles in his magnum opusFī ẓilāl al-Qurʾān (In the shade of the Qurʾān) and his 1966 manifestoMaʿālim fīl-ṭarīq (Milestones), which lead to his execution by the Egyptian government.[50][51] Other Salafi movements in theMiddle East and North Africa and across theMuslim world adopted many of his Islamist principles.[40][50]

According to Qutb, theMuslim community (Ummah) has been extinct for several centuries and reverted tojahiliyah (the pre-Islamic age of ignorance) because those who call themselves Muslims have failed to follow thesharia law.[40][50] Torestore Islam, bring back its days of glory, and free the Muslims from the clasps of ignorance, Qutb proposed the shunning of modern society, establishing a vanguard modeled after the early Muslims, preaching, and bracing oneself for poverty or even death as preparation forjihad against what he perceived asjahili government/society, and overthrow them.[40][50]Qutbism, the radical Islamist ideology derived from the ideas of Qutb,[40] was denounced by many prominent Muslim scholars as well as other members of the Muslim Brotherhood, likeYusuf al-Qaradawi.

Active Islamic extremist groups

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Groups

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This list isincomplete; you can help byadding missing items.(October 2016)
Group NameBannerHome BaseLeadersStrengthCasualtiesIdeology
Al-QaedaAfghanistan,Pakistan, andMENA regionOsama bin Laden  (1988–2011)
Ayman al-Zawahiri  (2011–2022)

Saif al-Adel(de facto; 2022–present)

300–3,000[52][53]4,400 casualties[54]SunnīIslamist andmilitantterrorist organization which aims to "restore Islam" and establish "trueIslamic states", implementSharia law, and rid theMuslim world of anyNon-Muslim influences by following thedoctrine and teachings of the Egyptian Islamist ideologue and propagandistSayyid Qutb.[55] The title translates to "Organization of the Base of Jihad".
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic MaghrebKabylie Mountains, AlgeriaAbdelmalek Droukdel  (2007-2020)800–1,000+[56]200+AQIM is aSunnīIslamist andmilitantterrorist organization which aims to overthrow theGovernment of Algeria and replace it with anIslamic state.
Al-Mourabitoun
a.k.a.al-Qaeda West Africa
Mali,Niger, andLibyaMokhtar BelmokhtarUnder 100 (French claim)Killed 27 in the2015 Bamako hotel attack.Affiliated branch ofal-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb listed above.
Ansar al-Sharia in Yemen
a.k.a.Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
YemenNasir al-Wuhayshi (2011–15)
Qasim al-Raymi (2015–2020)[57]
2,000+Over 250 killed in the2012 Sana'a bombing and2013 Sana'a attack.[58]AQAP is considered the most active[59] of al-Qaeda's branches, or "franchises", that emerged due to weakening central leadership.[60] TheU.S. Government believes AQAP to be the most dangerous al-Qaeda branch due to its emphasis on attacking the "far enemy" and its reputation for plotting attacks on overseas targets.[58][61]
al-Qaeda in the Indian SubcontinentIndia,Pakistan,Bangladesh, andMyanmarAsim Umar300[62][63]Claims 6 killed in assassinations. Naval frigate hijacking attempted in 2014.AQIS is aSunnīIslamist andmilitantterrorist organization which aims to overthrow the Governments ofPakistan,India,Myanmar, andBangladesh to establish anIslamic state.
Boko Haram – West Africa Province of theIslamic State CaliphateNortheasternNigeria,Chad,Niger,Mali, and northernCameroon[64]Mohammed Yusuf  (founder

2002 – 2009)
Abubakar Shekau  (2009–2021)

Estimates range between 500 and 9,000[65][66][67]Since 2009, it has killed 20,000 and displaced 2.3 million.Title means "Western education is forbidden", founded as aSunnīIslamic fundamentalist sect and influenced by theWahhabi doctrine, advocating a strict form ofSharia law.[64] Since 2015 Boko Haram has pledged allegiance to theIslamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), rebranding itself asIslamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP).[64]
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (commonly known as ISIS, ISIL, IS, or Daesh)Iraq andSyria (occupied territories)Abu Musab al-Zarqawi  (founder 1999 – 2006)
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi  (2010–2019)
Abu Ibrahimi al-Hashimi al-Qurashi  (2019–2022)[68]
Abu al-Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi (2022)[69]Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurashi (2022–2023)Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi (2023–present)
40,000–200,000 at its height across all 'provinces'[70][71]30,000+ killed, including thegenocides ofShīʿa Muslims,Christians,Yazidis, other ethnic and religious minorities in the Middle East, and many others around the world by ISIL or groups associated or inspired by ISIL. Since 2015 includesBoko Haram, rebranded as "Islamic State's West Africa Province" (ISWAP).[64][72]Salafi-jihadist andSunnīmilitantterrorist organization that follows theIslamic fundamentalistWahhabi doctrine of Sunnī Islam.[73] Originated as theIslamic State of Iraq (ISI).Gained large swathes of territory in Iraq in 2014 and iscurrently at war withIraq,Syria, anda coalition of 60 other countries including the United States, United Kingdom, and France.
Jemaah IslamiyahSoutheast Asia:Abu Bakar Bashir5,000[74]Over 250 killed in bombings throughout Indonesia since 2002With a name meaning "Islamic Congregation" (frequently abbreviatedJI),[75] is a Southeast AsianSunnīIslamist andmilitantterrorist organization dedicated to the establishment of aDaulah Islamiyah (regional Islamic caliphate) in Southeast Asia.[76]
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan
a.k.a.Pakistani Taliban
Northwest PakistanMaulana Fazlullah25,000[77]hundredsTTP is an umbrella organization of variousSunnīIslamist andmilitant groups protecting foreignIslamic terrorists hiding in the mountains ofPakistan.
Jaish-e-MohammedKashmir, IndiaMasood AzharAim is to annexJammu and Kashmir toPakistan. Operates primarily in Jammu and Kashmir.
Lashkar-e Tayyiba

a.k.a.LeT

Kashmir, IndiaHafiz SaeedAim is to annexJammu and Kashmir toPakistan and, ultimately, install Islamic rule throughout South Asia. Operational throughout India, especially in the northern region of Jammu and Kashmir since at least 1993.[78]
National Thowheeth Jama'athSri Lanka269 (excluding 9 bombers)Convert Sri Lanka into an Islamic caliphate

Foreign political support

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According to the British historianMark Curtis, in his bookSecret Affairs: Britain's Collusion with Radical Islam, Britain has been accused of consistently supporting radical Islam to combat secular nationalism because the secular nationalists threatened to seize the resources of their countries and use it for internal development, which was not accepted by England.[79] The United States, like Britain before it, has been accused of historically supporting radical Islam in the face of secular nationalism, seen as a major threat to Western colonial dominance.Chomsky and coauthors accuseIsrael of destroying Egypt and Syria in 1967, two bastions of secularArab nationalism opposed to Saudi Arabia, which they view as the leader of radical Islam.[80]

See also

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References

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  1. ^abCook, David (2015).Understanding Jihad. University of California Press. p. 103.ISBN 9780520287327.
  2. ^Cook, David (2015).Understanding Jihad. University of California Press. p. 107.ISBN 9780520287327.
  3. ^abBaran, Zeyno (10 July 2008)."The Roots of Violent Islamist Extremism and Efforts to Counter It"(PDF).Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.Archived(PDF) from the original on 1 March 2021. Retrieved11 November 2011.
  4. ^Brian R. Farmer (2007).Understanding radical Islam: medieval ideology in the twenty-first century. Peter Lang. p. 36.ISBN 978-0-8204-8843-1.
  5. ^Jason F. Isaacson; Colin Lewis Rubenstein (2002).Islam in Asia: changing political realities. Transaction Publishers. p. 191.ISBN 978-0-7658-0769-4.
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