| Islamic State – Sahel Province | |
|---|---|
| Leaders | Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi † Abu al-Bara' al-Sahrawi |
| Dates of operation | 13 May 2015–present |
| Group | |
| Headquarters | NearMénaka,Gao Region,Mali |
| Active regions | Mali,Niger,Burkina Faso |
| Ideology | Islamic Statism Fulani extremism[1] |
| Size | c. 2,000–3,000 (2025)[2] |
| Part of | |
| Opponents | State opponents Non-state opponents |
| Designated as a terrorist group by | See below |
TheIslamic State – Sahel Province[a](ISSP), formerly known asIslamic State in the Greater Sahara (IS-GS), is anIslamist militant group adhering to the ideology ofSalafi Jihadism. IS-GS was formed on 15 May 2015 as the result of a split within the militant groupAl-Mourabitoun. The rift was a reaction to the adherence of one of its leaders,Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi,[5] to theIslamic State. From March 2019 to 2022, IS-GS was formally part of theIslamic State – West Africa Province (ISWAP);[6] when it was also called "ISWAP-Greater Sahara".[7] In March 2022, IS declared the province autonomous, separating it from its West Africa Province[8] and naming it Islamic State – Sahel Province (ISSP).
Al-Mourabitoun was created on 22 August 2013 after the merging ofMUJAO andAl-Mulathameen.[9] On 13 May 2015, elements of Al-Mourabitoun under the leadership ofAdnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi pledged allegiance to theIslamic State.[10][11][12][13] It operated independently until 30 October 2016, when it was formally recognized by the Islamic State.[14][15][16][17][18]
The group's ranks increased by dozens of Malian militants and sympathizers from theGao Region[19] nearMénaka.[20]
On 1 November 2019, gunmen killed over 50soldiers in the2019 Indelimane attack in theMénaka Region of Mali.[21] A week later in Burkina Faso,gunmen stormed a convoy of buses for theBoungouminers, killing 37, although some estimate the death toll to be much higher.[22][23]
On 28 November 2019, Spanish authorities issued a warning on the possibility of a terror attack in the region against Spanish citizens visiting or working in the Saharawi refugee camps in Western Sahara.[24] Spanish authorities feared the attacks would coincide with the Spanish Día de la Constitución (December 6) celebrations.[25] Secret services warned of the risk of a jihadist attack in theSahara region at refugee camps inTindouf,Algeria.[26] TheSahrawi Arab Democratic Republic denied this threat.[27] No attack happened.
On 10 December 2019, a large group of fighters belonging to the IS-GS attacked a military post inInates, Niger,[28] killing over seventysoldiers and kidnapping others.[29] On 9 January 2020, a large group of IS-GS militantsassaulted a Nigerien military base at Chinagodrar, in Niger's Tillabéri Region, killing at least 89 Nigerien soldiers.[30]
During 2021, the group carried out massacres inNiger, mainly in the regions ofTillabéri andTahoua, killing more than 600 people.[31] The killings included theTchoma Bangou and Zaroumdareye massacres, theMarch 2021 Darey-Daye massacre, theTillia massacres and the2021 Adab-Dab attack.
In December 2021, the French Army announced that it had killed in Niger, one of the perpetrators of the assassination of six French humanitarian workers and their Nigerien companions in the Kouré reserve in August 2020. The man is presented asSoumana Boura. The staff had identified him as leading a group of several dozen EIGS fighters, in the Gober Gourou and Firo area, in western Niger. a member of the Islamic State in the Grand Sahara (EIGS).[32]
On 11 June 2022, the groupattacked the town ofSeytenga in Burkina Faso, killing at least 100 civilians in a massacre.[33]
On 15 June 2022, it was announced the French military force capturedOumeya Ould Albakaye, a senior ISGS leader in Mali overnight between 11-12 June.[34]
Between 2022 and 2023, the groupsaw major gains in theMali War, occupying large swarths of territory in southeastern Mali.Tidermène was captured by the group on 12 April 2023.[35]
In early April 2023, the groupkilled at least 44 civilians in the towns of Kourakou and Tondobi in Burkina Faso.[36]
On 21 March 2024, the groupambushed Nigerien soldiers inTillabéri Region, Niger, killing at least 23 soldiers.[37]
As reported in the BBC in 2025, the Sahel has become the global epicenter of terrorism, now accounting for over half of all terrorism-related deaths, according to theGlobal Terrorism Index (GTI). In 2023, the region recorded 3,885 fatalities out of 7,555 worldwide, a nearly tenfold increase since 2019. The rise in extremist violence is driven by the expansion of groups like ISIS-Sahel and Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), which compete for land and impose strict Sharia governance. Political instability, weak governance, and military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Niger have further fueled the insurgency. These groups finance operations through ransom kidnappings, illicit gold mining, and drug trafficking, with the Sahel now a major route for cocaine smuggling from South America to Europe. Meanwhile, regional governments have shifted from Western alliances to Russia and China, relying on paramilitary groups like the Africa Corps (formerly Wagner) for security assistance, though with little success. The violence is now spreading to neighboring countries like Togo and Benin, raising concerns about further regional destabilization.[38]
On March 22, 2025, Niger's Interior Ministry blamed an attack inKokorou that left 44 Muslim worshippers dead while they were performing Friday prayers in the Islamic State. The attackers also set fire to a market and houses before retreating, according to the ministry.[39]
The group was founded and headed byAdnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi until he was killed by a French drone strike in Mali in 2021.[40]
Al-Sahraoui may have been replaced towards the end of 2019 by a new wali, Abdoul Hakim Al-Sahraoui.[citation needed] Among his other commanders are Doundoun Chefou, Illiassou Djibo alias Petit Chafori (or Djafori) and Mohamed Ag Almouner, known as "Tinka", killed by the French Army on August 26, 2018.
In 2024,Heni Nsaibia reported that ISGS is operated by amajlis al-shura, or central leadership council, with a governor currently led byAbu al-Bara' al-Sahrawi.[41] Under the majlis al-shura are four offices: the Law and Sanctions Office, the Military and Operations Office, Logistics Office, and the Foreign Fighters Office. The Law and Sanctions Office (LSO) is operated by al-Sahrawi, Youssof Ould Chouaib, Talha al-Jazairi, and Dadi Ould Chouaib.[41] The Military and Operations Office (MOO) is commanded by Mohamed Ould Manaha, Youssof Ould Chouaib, Abdou Tchougel, Moussa Moumimi, Bolla ag Mohamed, andJoulde Pirodji, also known as Khatab.[41] The Logistics Office (LO) is operated by Idrissa Ould Chouaib and Muawiya.[41] The Foreign Fighters Office (FFO) is operated by Abu Hachim, Abu Umar al-Libi, and Abu Jafar.[41]
There is also a Media Office run by the Majlis al-Shura.[41] The media office propagates IS-Sahel and IS-Central propaganda.[41]
IS-Sahel operates in five zones. Each zone is operated by an emir, a qadi (judge)
Zone 1, the Burkina Faso and Gourma zone, is located in Burkina Faso'sOudalan andSéno provinces, theGourma region of Mali (encompassingTessit commune and the surrounding area), and Niger'sBankilare andTéra departments.[41] The emir, or leader, of Zone 1 isSadou Tongomayel also known as Sadou Ibrahim or Almoustapha Ould Zeidi.[41] Under Tongomayel's command are Moussa Moumini, Oumaya Ould Albakaye, Abu Houreira, Yero Belko, Moukailou Djibrilou, and Mamoudou Kouka.[41]
Zone 2, the Haoussa zone, encompasses the Gabero, Bara, Bourra, Ouatagouna, andTin Hama communes nearAnsongo andGao in Mali on the left bank of the Niger river.[41]Baye Ag Adil is the emir of Zone 2, with Oubel Boureima and Moussa Djibo serving under him.[41]
Zone 3, encompasses from Amalaoulaou to Akabar and Tabankort in rural eastern Mali, with a base located near In Arab.[41] Bara' al-Sahrawi is the emir of this zone, with Abdou Tchoguel and Issa Barry serving under him.[41] Both Zone 2 and 3 are collectively known as the Muthalath zone, or Triangle, referring to the confluence of the Nigerien, Malian, and Burkinabe borders.[41]
Zone 4, also known as Anderamboukane, extends fromMénaka in Mali toAbala in Niger, with headquarters inAndéramboukane.[41]Zoubeirou is the emir of the region, and Mourtala Magadji is the military leader.[41]
Zone 5, also known as theAzawagh zone, extends fromTidermène in the north to the Ezza valley in the south.[41] Khatab is the emir, and Magadji serves as the military leader there too.[41]
In early 2017, Marc Mémier, a researcher at the French Institute for International Relations (IFRI), estimated that the Islamic State in the Grand Sahara had a few dozen men – not counting sympathizers – mostly Malians in the region of Gao. At the end of 2015, RFI indicated that the group's workforce would total around one hundred.
The early composition of ISGS was predominantlySahrawi, although many were killed during the French intervention in Mali.[41] Despite new leadership and a new demographic, much of ISGS' top brass are Sahrawi or Malian Arabs.[41]
According to a report from the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point, ISGS had 425 combatants in August 2018.

The group is based in theMénaka region.
As with other armed groups in theSahel, jihadists or not, the ISGS is part of a largely community-based dynamic. A large part of its combatants is thusPeuls. In Mali, the latter are for the most part Nigerien nationals whom thedroughts in the Sahel and the demographic surge ofZarma andHausa peasants, which is exerted from the south to the north, have pushed on the Malian side of the border. Adnan Abu Walid Al-Sahraoui won the support of many members of this community by promising to protect them against raids and theft of cattle carried out by theTuaregs, starting with theDahoussahak (Idaksahak).
However, ISGS would include members from the two communities. Thus, at present, the combatants of ISGS are divided into two katibas (combatant units), one composed mainly of Daoussahak and the other of Peuls.
| Country | Date | References |
|---|---|---|
United States | 23 May 2018 | [42] |
| 23 February 2020 | [43] | |
| 23 February 2020 | [44] | |
| 23 February 2020 | [45] | |
| 2 February 2021 | [46] | |
| ? | [47] |
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