Irregular warfare (IW) is defined inUnited States joint doctrine as "a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations" and in U.S. law as "Department of Defense activities not involving armed conflict that support predetermined United States policy and military objectives conducted by, with, and through regular forces, irregular forces, groups, and individuals."[1][2]In practice, control of institutions and infrastructure is also important. Concepts associated with irregular warfare are older than the term itself.[3]
Irregular warfare favors indirect warfare andasymmetric warfare approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities in order to erode the adversary's power, influence, and will. It is inherently a protracted struggle that will test the resolve of astate and its strategic partners.[4][5][6][7][8]
One of the earliest known uses of the termirregular warfare isCharles Edward Callwell's classic 1896 publication for theUnited KingdomWar Office,Small Wars: Their Principles and Practices, where he noted in defining 'small wars':
"Small wars include the partisan warfare which usually arises when trained soldiers are employed in the quelling of sedition and of insurrections in civilised countries; they include campaigns of conquest when a Great Power adds the territory of barbarous races to its possessions; and they include punitive expeditions against tribes bordering upon distant colonies....Whenever a regular army finds itself engaged upon hostilities against irregular forces, or forces which in their armament, their organization, and their discipline are palpably inferior to it, the conditions of the campaign become distinct from the conditions of modern regular warfare, and it is with hostilities of this nature that this volume proposes to deal. Upon the organization of armies for irregular warfare valuable information is to be found in many instructive military works, official and non-official."[10]
A similar usage appears in the 1986 English edition of "Modern Irregular Warfare in Defense Policy and as a Military Phenomenon" by formerNazi officerFriedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte. The original 1972 German edition of the book is titled "Der Moderne Kleinkrieg als Wehrpolitisches und Militarisches Phänomen". The German word "Kleinkrieg" is literally translated as "Small War."[11] The word "Irregular," used in the title of the English translation of the book, seems to be a reference to non "regular armed forces" as per theThird Geneva Convention.
IW is a form of warfare that has as its objective the credibility and/or legitimacy of the relevant political authority with the goal of undermining or supporting that authority. IW favors indirect approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities to seek asymmetric approaches in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will.[25]
IW is defined as a violent struggle amongstate and non-state actors forlegitimacy and influence over the relevantpopulation(s)
IW involves conflicts in which enemy combatants are not regular military forces of nation-states.[26][unreliable source?]
IW is "war among the people" as opposed to "industrial war" (i.e., regular war).[27]
Nearly all modern wars include at least some element of irregular warfare. Since the time of Napoleon, approximately 80% of conflict has been irregular in nature.However, the following conflicts may be considered to have exemplified by irregular warfare:[3][12]
a December 2011 Naval War College Maritime Stability Operations Game focused specifically on stability operations in the maritime domain conducted by the Naval Service.[34]
^According to the definition of "regular forces," which came much after theAmerican Revolutionary War (ARW), the American forces did not meet the following criteria at all times during theARW:
having a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance
carrying arms openly
conducting operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war
Notwithstanding, in terms of modern international humanitarian law which was also developed much later than theARW, the American forces formed part of the armed forces of a party to an armed conflict but not belonging to that party's regular forces (since theUnited States of America did not exist and hence could not have had regular forces; the American forces were an insurgency at least until 1776) and operating in or outside of their own territory even if the territory is under occupation.American forces did become regular forces but cannot be considered regular forces during the entire period of theARW. For example, the American flag got established (1777) 2 years after theARW started (1775). Also, there were great disparities between the American and British forces. It was not until France started to assist American forces (1778) that the disparity started to be narrowed. Conflict during the disparity surely counts asAsymmetric warfare. Also, theBoston Tea Party (1773) can be viewed asguerrilla tactics. At the very least, a good portion of theARW should be counted as IW, although the entireARW being counted as IW is controversial. However, since more than 1/2 of theARW was fought asARW then it is thought that it is safe to classify it as IW even though that the American forces acted in all respects as regular forces towards the end of the conflict.
^Southworth, Samuel A.; Tanner, Stephen (2002).U.S. Special Forces : A Guide to America's Special Operations Units : The World's Most Elite Fighting Force (1st ed.). Cambridge, MA:Da Capo Press.ISBN978-0-306-81165-4.OCLC49594086.
^Stone, Kathryn & Williams, Anthony R.,All Necessary Means: Employing CIA operatives in a Warfighting Role Alongside Special Operations Forces,United States Army War College (USAWC), 7 April 2003
^Shooting at the Moon: The Story of America's Clandestine War in Laos, Steerforth Press,ISBN978-1-883642-36-5, 1996
^"U. S. Army Enhancement of Irregular Warfare Modeling & Simulation",United States Army Modeling and Simulation Office, 24 February 2009[8]Archived 2016-12-22 at theWayback Machine
Armed Groups and Irregular Warfare; Adapting Professional Military Education,Richard H. Shultz, Jr.,Roy Godson, and Querine Hanlon (Washington, DC: National Strategy Information Center, 2009).[18]
