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Iraqi–Kurdish conflict

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Series of wars and rebellions by ethnic Kurds against successive Iraqi administrations
Iraqi–Kurdish conflict (1919-present)
Part of spillover ofIranian–Kurdish,Kurdish–Turkish, andSyrian–Kurdish conflicts

Kurdish refugees in camps along the Turkey-Iraq border, 1991
Date1919–present (106 years)
Location
StatusOngoing
Belligerents

Kingdom of Kurdistan (1922–1924)


KDP
PUK
ICP
INC
Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq
Supported by:
Israel(1961–1970)
Iran(before 1988)
Ba'athist Syria(1980–1988)


Iraqi Kurdistan
EnforcingNo-Fly Zone perUNSC Resolution 688:


Kurdistan RegionKurdistan Regional Government (2005–present)

IraqMandatory Iraq
Supported by:
United Kingdom(1922–1924)


IraqKingdom of Iraq


Iraqi Republic


IraqBa'athist Iraq


IraqCentral Government of Iraq (2005–present)
Commanders and leaders

Mahmud Barzanji


Ahmed Barzani


Mustafa Barzani
Idris Barzani
Masoud Barzani
Babakir Zebari
Mahmoud Ezidi 
Margaret George Shello
Jalal Talabani
Ibrahim Ahmad
Ali Askari 
Nawshirwan Mustafa
Kosrat Rasul Ali
Mama Risha 
Uthman Abd-Asis
Ahmed Chalabi
Aziz Muhammad
IranMohsen Rezaee
IranAli Sayad Shirazi
Abdul Aziz al-Hakim

United StatesJohn Shalikashvili
IraqFaisal I of Iraq
IraqFaisal II of Iraq

Abd al-Karim Qasim Executed
IraqAbdul Salam Arif Executed
IraqAbdul Rahman Arif
IraqTahir Yahya Executed
IraqAhmed Hassan al-Bakr 
IraqSaddam Hussein Executed
IraqAli Hassan al-Majid Executed
IraqTaha Yassin Ramadan Executed
IraqIzzat Ibrahim al-Douri
IraqTariq Aziz
IraqSaddam Kamel

IraqQusay Hussein 
IraqUday Hussein 

IraqFuad Masum
IraqHaider al-Abadi
Iraq Gen.Othman al-Ghanmi

Iraq Lt. Gen.Juma Inad
Strength

KDP:
15,000–20,000 (1962)[1][2]
6,000 (1970)[3]
50,000–60,000 (1974)[4]
KDP & PUK:
5,000 (1980)[5]
100,000 (1991)[6]

Iraqi Kurdistan 70,000 (2003)[7]

IraqIraqi Armed Forces
48,000 (1969)[8]
90,000 (1974)[8]
180,000 (1978)[9]
300,000 (1980)[10]
1,000,000 (1988)[10]
382,500 (1992)[11]

424,000 (2002)[12]
Casualties and losses
163,800–345,100 killed[a]
Millions of Kurdsdisplaced and turned refugees

TheIraqi–Kurdish conflict consists of a series of wars, rebellions and disputes between theKurds and the central authority ofIraq starting in the 20th century shortly after the defeat of theOttoman Empire inWorld War I. Some put the marking point of the conflict beginning to the attempt byMahmud Barzanji to establish an independentKingdom of Kurdistan,[13] while others relate to the conflict as only the post-1961 insurrection by the Barzanis.[14]

Since theUS-led invasion of Iraq and the subsequent adoption offederalism in 2005 and the recognition of theKurdistan Region (KRI) as a federal region in the newIraqi constitution, the number and scope of armed clashes between the central government of Iraq and the Kurds have decreased. In spite of that, however, there are still outstanding issues that continue to cause strife such as thedisputed territories of northern Iraq and the right to export oil and gas, leading to occasional disputes and armed clashes. In September 2023, following a series of punitive measures by the central government in Iraq against KRI,Masrour Barzani sent a letter to thePresident of the United States expressing concerns about a possible collapse of Kurdistan Region, and calling for theUnited States to intervene. In March 2024, after several court rulings issued against Kurdistan Region by theSupreme Court of Iraq, Kurdish authorities in Iraq expressed dissatisfaction at what they described as an evident shift of the political system in Iraq back towardscentralism.

Background

The first chapter of the Iraqi–Kurdish dispute followed the end of World War I and the arrival of British forces.Mahmud Barzanji begansecession attempts in 1919 and in 1922 proclaimed the short-livedKingdom of Kurdistan. Though Mahmud's insurrections were defeated, another Kurdish sheikh,Ahmed Barzani, began to actively oppose the central rule of the Mandatory Iraq during the 1920s. The first of the majorBarzani revolts took place in 1931, after Barzani, one of the most prominentKurdish tribal leaders, succeeded in defeating a number of other Kurdish tribes.[15] He ultimately failed and took refuge in Turkey. The next serious Kurdish secession attempt was made by his younger brotherMustafa Barzani in 1943, but that revolt failed as well, resulting in the exiling of Mustafa to Iran, where he participated in an attempt to form the KurdishRepublic of Mahabad.

In 1958, the younger Barzani and his fighters returned to Iraq from exile, and an attempt was made to negotiate Kurdish autonomy in the north with the new Iraqi administration of Gen.Abdul Karim Qassim. The negotiations ultimately failed and theFirst Iraqi–Kurdish War erupted on 11 September 1961,[14] lasting until 1970 and resulting in 75,000–105,000 casualties. Despite the attempts toresolve the conflict by providing Kurds with recognized autonomy in northern Iraq, the negotiations failed in 1974, leading to resumed hostilities known as theSecond Iraqi–Kurdish War, which resulted in the collapse of the Kurdish militias and the reconquest of northern Iraq by Iraqi government forces. As a result, Mustafa and most of theKDP leadership fled to Iran, while the nascentPUK, led byJalal Talabani gained power in the vacuum, and lead aninsurgency campaign against the central Iraqi government, which eventually also failed. During the period between 1976 and 1977, intra-Kurdish conflict climaxed with KDP and PUK both dealing blows against each other in a string of tit for tat raids. The most notableBa'athistArabization campaigns in northern Iraq happened in the late 1970s.

Theconflict re-emerged as part of theIran–Iraq War, with the two Kurdish parties collaborating againstSaddam Hussein, while receiving military support from the Islamic Republic of Iran. By 1986, the Iraqi government conducted a genocidal campaign known asAl-Anfal, to oust the Kurdish fighters and take revenge on the Kurdish population—an act often described as theKurdish genocide, with an estimated 50,000–200,000 casualties. The Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988.

In the aftermath of theGulf War, in 1991,a series of uprisings happened in the north and south of the country. This, combined with the enforcing of the northern-southernno-fly zones by the United States, United Kingdom and France, and the subsequent withdrawal of the Iraqi armed forces from parts of northern Iraq, allowed the Kurds to regain control in the north by filling the vacuum. In the mid-1990s the internal conflict between the KDP and PUK erupted once again, resulting in abloody civil war, with Iraq and Iran supporting both KDP and PUK respectively. The conflict ended in 1997, with the signing of the Washington Agreement.

Another critical event was theinvasion of Iraq in 2003, which resulted in the toppling of theBa'athist regime and the adoption offederalism. Despite the constitutional recognition ofKurdistan Region as a federal region in the Republic of Iraq, relations between Kurdistan Region and theIraqi central government grew strained between 2011 and 2012 due to power-sharing issues and the export of oil. Following the failedKurdish independence referendum in 2017, as well as the subsequent defeat of the Peshmerga at the hands of the Iraqi armed forces in the2017 Iraqi–Kurdish conflict, Iraq has since taken steps to weaken Kurdistan Region and expand its own authorities in order to shift the political dynamics of the country back towards acentralised political system; the one it had before the invasion.

History

Mahmud Barzanji (1919–1924)

Mahmud Barzanji revolts were a series of armed uprisings against the British forces in the newly conquered Mesopotamia and later theBritish Mandate in Iraq. Following his first insurrection in May 1919, Sheykh Mahmud was imprisoned and eventually exiled to India for a one-year period. When he returned he was once again appointed a governor, but shortly afterwards revolted again and declared himself the ruler of theKingdom of Kurdistan. The Kingdom of Kurdistan lasted from September 1922 – 1924.[16] With British forces greatly exceeding his in ammunition and training, Barzanji was finally subdued and the region reverted to central British Iraqi rule in 1924. Sheykh Mahmud retreated into the mountains, and eventually reached terms with the independentKingdom of Iraq in 1932, over his return from the underground. Shaykh Mahmud revolts are considered the first chapter of the modern Iraqi–Kurdish conflict.

1931 Kurdish revolt

Ahmed Barzani revolt refers to the first of the majorBarzani revolts, taking place in 1931 afterAhmed Barzani, one of the most prominentKurdish leaders inSouthern Kurdistan, succeeded in unifying a number of other Kurdish tribes.[15] TheBarzan forces were eventually overpowered by the Iraqi Army with British support, forcing the leaders of Barzan to go underground.

Ahmed Barzani was later forced to flee toTurkey, where he was held in detention and then sent to exile in the south ofIraq. Although initially a tribal dispute, the involvement of the Iraqi government inadvertently led to the growth of Shaykh Ahmad and Mulla Mustafa Barzani as prominent Kurdish leaders.[17]

1943 Kurdish revolt

Main article:1943 Barzani revolt

The1943–1945 Kurdish revolt in Iraq was a Kurdish nationalistic insurrection in the Kingdom of Iraq, during World War II. The revolt was led by Mustafa Barzani and later joined by his older brother Ahmed Barzani, the leader of theprevious Kurdish revolt in theKingdom of Iraq. The revolt, initiating in 1943, was eventually put down by Iraqi military assault in late 1945, combined with the defection of a number of Kurdish tribes. As a result, the Barzanis retreated with much of their forces intoIranian Kurdistan, joining the local Kurdish elements in establishing theRepublic of Mahabad.

Negotiations over Kurdish autonomy (1958–1960)

After themilitary coup byAbdul Karim Qasim in 1958,Mustafa Barzani was invited by new Iraqi President Qasim to return from exile, and was greeted with a "hero's welcome", as a former dissident to the now abolished Iraqi monarchy. As part of the deal arranged between Qasim and Barzani, Qasim promised to give the Kurds regional autonomy in return for Barzani's support for his policies. Meanwhile, during 1959–60, Barzani became the head of theKurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which was granted legal status in 1960.

First Iraqi–Kurdish War (1961–1970)

Main article:First Iraqi–Kurdish War

First Iraqi–Kurdish War[18] or Barzani Rebellion was a major event of the Iraqi–Kurdish conflict, lasting from 1961 to 1970. The struggle was led byMustafa Barzani in an attempt to establish an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq. Throughout the 1960s the uprising escalated into a long war, which failed to resolve despite internal power changes in Iraq. The war ended with a stalemate by 1970, resulting in between 75,000[19] to 105,000 casualties.[20] A series ofIraqi–Kurdish negotiations followed the war in an attempt to resolve the conflict.

Cease-fire (1970–1974)

Main article:Iraqi–Kurdish Autonomy Agreement of 1970

AKurdish Autonomy agreement was reached in March 1970 by theIraqi government and theKurds, in the aftermath of theFirst Iraqi–Kurdish War, for the creation of anAutonomous Region, consisting of the three Kurdish governorates and other adjacent districts that have been determined by census to have a Kurdish majority. The plan also gave Kurds representation in government bodies, to be implemented in four years.[21] For its time it was the most serious attempt to resolve the long-running conflict.

Second Iraqi–Kurdish War (1974–1975)

Main article:Second Iraqi–Kurdish War

Second Iraqi–Kurdish War was an offensive, led by Iraqi forces against rebelKDP troops ofMustafa Barzani during 1974–75. The war came in the aftermath of theFirst Iraqi–Kurdish War (1961–70), as the 1970peace plan for Kurdish autonomy had failed to be implemented by 1974. Unlike the previous guerilla campaign, waged by Barzani, the 1974 war was an attempt for symmetric warfare against the Iraqi Army, which eventually led to the quick collapse of the Kurds, lacking advanced and heavy weaponry. The war ended with the exile of the Iraqi KDP and between 7,000 and 20,000 deaths on both sides.

Arabization of northern Iraq and PUK insurgency (1976–1979)

Main articles:PUK insurgency andBa'athist Arabization campaigns in North Iraq

ThePUK insurgency was a low-level militant campaign by thePatriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) against the state ofIraq, after the defeat of theKurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in theSecond Iraqi–Kurdish War, which forced the KDP organization to declare a ceasefire and move into exile. Due to lack of foreign support, however, the guerrillas were only able to operate in the highest regions of northern Iraq's mountains.[22] The PUK also faced the KDP, the KDPI, led byAbdul Rahman Ghassemlou, and Iran supporting the Iraqis at various occasions. The insurgency dimmed with the1979 Kurdish rebellion in Iran.

Ba'athist Arabization campaigns in North Iraq were forced displacement and culturalArabization of minorities (Kurds, Yezidis,Assyrians, Shabaks,Armenians, Turkmen, Mandeans), in line withsettler colonialist policies, led by the Ba'athist government of Iraq from 1960s to early 2000s, in order to shift the demographics of North Iraq towards Arab domination. The Baath party under Saddam Hussein engaged into active expulsion of minorities from the mid-1970s onwards.[23] The campaigns took place during the Iraqi–Kurdish conflict, being largely motivated by the Kurdish-Arab ethnic and political conflict.

The policies are sometimes referred as "internal colonialism",[24] described by Francis Kofi Abiew as a "Colonial 'Arabization'" program, including large-scale Kurdish deportations and forced Arab settlement in the region.[25]

Kurdish rebellion during the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988)

Main article:1983-1986 Kurdish rebellions in Iraq

Between 1980 and 1988, the conflict intensified as theIran–Iraq War commenced. One of the groups targeted in particular by Iraqi authorities were theFeyli Kurds, a community ofShi'ite Kurds settled in the southern area of theZagros Mountains near Iraq's border with Iran.Saddam Hussein considered the group as 'Iranians' and began a campaign to drive the settlers out of the area as a part of his 'Arabization' policy in 1980.,[26] Saddam Hussein was severely critical of theKurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) as they aligned forces with Iran in the conflict. In 1983, to avenge this liaison, he ordered the Army to abduct as many as 8,000 men and boys fromErbil province, where the clan ofBarzani Kurds was based.Massoud Barzani, the leader of the clan and the KDP, himself lost 37 members of his family to the Iraqi troops. They were reported to having been sent to Nugra Salman prison in the southern deserts of Iraq, where they were tortured. Subsequently, the remains of 512 Barzani men were discovered in a mass grave.[27] On March 16, 1988, Iraqi troops began shelling the Kurdish town ofHalabja, in retaliation for an attack on Iraqi positions carried out byIranian Revolutionary Guards and the alignedPeshmerga fighters. Subsequently, the town was attacked with a mix of chemical substances such asVX (nerve agent),sarin andmustard gas (seeHalabja chemical attack). Over 5,000 people are believed to have been killed in the attack, which was considered to be a part of theAl-Anfal Campaign, directed against Kurds by the government under the command ofAli Hassan al-Majid, head of the Northern Bureau of theBa'ath Party.[28][29]

1991 Kurdish uprising

Main article:1991 uprisings in Iraq

On 2 August 1990, Saddam launched a military invasion onto neighboringKuwait, reportedly due to its vast oil reserves, which would have helped him pay off the debts he owed to other countries during theIran–Iraq War (seeGulf War). Within 24 hours, theEmir of Kuwait had fled. However, subsequently, an international coalition force consisting ofAmerican,British,Saudi and other troops liberated the country in 1991 and Iraqi troops were forced out of Kuwait (seeOperation Desert Storm).[30] Subsequently, one month after the Gulf War in February 1991,United States PresidentGeorge H. W. Bush called on the Iraqi people to stage an uprising against Saddam Hussein. This was followed by a series of rebellions in many parts of the country, such as the south byShi'ite groups such asSCIRI and theIslamic Da'awa Party in what is known as theSha’ban revolution. Meanwhile, the Kurds in the north staged their own uprising for autonomy, under the leadership ofMassoud Barzani, leader of theKurdistan Democratic Party, andJalal Talabani, leader of thePatriotic Union of Kurdistan. ThePeshmerga were trained into hardened guerrillas, who managed to infiltrate the Jash, a Saddam-orientated Kurdish militia (seeJash (term) andNational Defense Battalions (Iraq)). The rebels soon managed to capture the town ofRanya,Sulaimaniya and ultimately the oil center ofKirkuk. Saddam retaliated swiftly, battering Kirkuk with artillery and targeting hospitals in particular. Geographically the towns captured by the Kurdish rebels were difficult to defend as they sat on plains below mountains. The rebels were forced to retreat in the mountains, where reportedly the Iraqi helicopters threw flour on them (which was believed to be a grim legacy of the reputed powderychemical weapons which were used by the Iraqi administration during theAl-Anfal Campaign).[31]

Iraqi no-fly zones

Main article:Iraqi no-fly zones conflict

In August 1991, the United States, United Kingdom and France enforced two no-fly zones in Iraq after the latter's loss in theGulf War, one in the north and one in the south. This gave the Kurds de facto autonomy in the north for the first time, and theShias in the south a sense of security after they had taken part in their own uprising against Saddam, which is referred to as theSha'ban revolution. The no-fly zones effectively ended with the start of theIraq war.

The "two-state solution" for the conflict refers to the permanent separation of Kurdish-populated areas from Iraq, as opposed to retaining Iraqi unity within a federal state. It would change the long-term status which has existed in the country following the formation of the Kurdish autonomy in Northern Iraq in 1991 facilitated by the enforcement of the no-fly zones.[32][33] Another solution that has been proposed is the "three-state solution", dividing the country into three independent states for its three major components: the Shia Arabs, the Sunni Arabs and the Kurds.[34][35]

Kurdish Civil War (1994–1997)

Main article:Iraqi Kurdish Civil War

TheIraqi Kurdish Civil War was a military conflict, which took place between rivalKurdish factions in the mid-1990s; that is, between the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party. Over the course of the conflict, Kurdish factions fromIran andTurkey, as well as Iranian,Iraqi and Turkish forces were drawn into the fighting, with additional involvement from the American forces. Between 3,000 and 5,000 fighters and civilians were killed throughout more than 3 years of warfare.

Operation Viking Hammer

Main article:Operation Viking Hammer

Arriving in July 2002 to Iraqi Kurdistan, the CIA seldom worked with the Peshmerga, despite their claim to be on a counterterrorism mission against Ansar al-Islam. To the disappointment of PUK Peshmerga intent on destroying Ansar al-Islam, the true mission of the CIA was to acquire intelligence about the Iraqi government and military. CIA-Peshmerga operations eventually went beyond the scope of intelligence gathering however, as PUK Peshmerga were used to destroy key rail lines and buildings prior to the U.S. attack in March 2003.[36] FollowingTurkey's decision to deny any official use of its territory, the Coalition was forced to modify the planned simultaneous attack from north and south.[37] Special Operations forces from the CIA and US Army managed to build and lead the Kurdish Peshmerga into an effective force and assault for the North.

On March 20, 2003, at approximately 02:30UTC or about 90 minutes after the lapse of the 48-hour deadline, at 05:33 local time, explosions were heard in Baghdad, signaling the beginning of theU.S.-led invasion. Beginning on 21 March 2003, U.S. forces launched Tomahawk missiles at selected Ansar al-Islam positions throughout the Sargat Valley. In preparation for the ground assault, nicknamedOperation Viking Hammer, American Lt. Col. Tovo divided his forces into six mixed peshmerga-Special Forces units. The peshmerga in two of these teams refused to contribute to the assault for various reasons including having lost too many personnel in previous fighting.[36] The Peshmerga who did fight were once again armed with AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenades, and other assorted weapons.

Despite their well-armed adversaries, during the operation only 24 Peshmerga were killed in the fighting, compared the opposite body count of over 300.[36]

Invasion and occupation of Iraq

Main articles:Invasion of Iraq andOccupation of Iraq (2003–2011)

The invasion of Iraq in 2003 saw a full military occupation of the country and the toppling of theBa'athist regime and the installation of a temporaryCoalition Provisional Authority (CPA) tasked with administering the country until the issuance of the newconstitution as well as the establishment of the new Iraqi government following general elections. In 2004, UN Resolution 1546 stipulated the installation of aninterim Iraqi government which succeeded the CPA. In 2005 following months of deliberation and discussions represented by different components of the Iraqi population, the new constitution was issued and voted into effect. The new Iraqi constitution recognized the Kurdistan Region as a “federal region” with its owngovernment andparliament within the federal Republic of Iraq.[38] The military occupation of Iraq ended in 2011.

2011–2012 tensions

Further information:Disputed territories of Northern Iraq
Kurdish flag in the Kurdistan Region

Following the withdrawal of occupational forces from Iraq, tensions between Iraqi Kurdistan and the central Iraqi government mounted through 2011–2012 on the issues of power sharing, oil and gas, and territorial control.[39] In April 2012, the president of Iraq's semi-autonomous northern Kurdish region demanded that officials agree to their demands or face consequences of a secession from Baghdad by September 2012.[40]

In September 2012, the Iraqi government ordered theKurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to transfer its powers over Peshmerga to the central government and the relations strained further by the formation of a new command center (Tigris Operation Command) for Iraqi forces to operate in a disputed area over which both Baghdad and theKurdistan Regional Government (KRG) claim jurisdiction.[41]

On 16 November 2012, a military clash between the Iraqi forces and the Peshmerga resulted in one person killed.[41] CNN reported that 2 people were killed (one of them an Iraqi soldier) and 10 wounded in clashes at the Tuz Khurmato town.[42]

On the night of November 19, it was reported that clashes between security forces of the central Iraqi government and the KRG forces in Tigrit left 12 Iraqi soldiers and one civilian dead, according to Doğan news agency.[43] The clash erupted when Iraqi soldiers attempted to enter northern Iraq; Peshmergas tried to prevent the Iraqi soldiers from entering the area upon Barzani's instructions.[43] There was no confirmation of the event.

On November 25, it was reported that Iraqi Kurdistan sent reinforcements to a disputed area, where its troops are "involved in a standoff with the Iraqi army", despite calls on both sides for dialogue to calm the situation.[44]

On December 11, Iraqi Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani, dressed in a military uniform, visited Kurdish-controlled areas of Kirkuk, a city long seen as a flashpoint for Arab-Kurdish tensions after the US military withdrawal in December 2011.[45] Following Massoud Barzani's visit of Kurdish troops stationed in the disputed area near Kirkuk, Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki's party – The State of Law – issued a statement that "the visit of the President of Kurdistan Region Massoud Barzani and his son wearing a military helmet to inspect the battlefronts in Kirkuk province is a 'declaration of war' on all Iraqis not only Maliki, and even on President Jalal Talabani".[46]

Kurdistan Region initiates oil exports to Turkey

In late 2013, theKurdistan Regional Government announced that it had started independent oil exports toTurkey.[47] This came after theKurdistan Region Parliament enacted its own hydrocarbon law in 2007.[48] The Iraqi central government voiced its disapproval at both actions, and vowed to take legal action after the KRG started exporting oil to Turkey without its consent. Iraq subsequently issued an international arbitration case against Turkey in May 2014, at theInternational Chamber of Commerce based in Paris.

2014 Northern Iraq offensive

Main articles:Northern Iraq offensive (June 2014),Northern Iraq offensive (August 2014), andExpulsion of Iraqis in Kirkuk (2016)

In 2014, Iraqi army units withdrew from large parts of northern Iraq in the face of attacks by theIslamic State in Iraq and the Levant. Peshmerga forces took control of Kirkuk and other Kurdish-populated areas outside the official territory of the KRG. Officials in Baghdad were angered by the sale of tankers worth of oil transported through theKirkuk–Ceyhan Oil Pipeline.[49]

In November 2016,Amnesty International reported that Kurdish authorities (namelyPeshmerga andAsayish) had taken part inKurdification (forced displacement of Arabs) in Kirkuk, namely by bulldozing homes and banishing the residents.[50]

Failed Iraqi Kurdistan independence referendum, Peshmerga defeated in Kirkuk

Main articles:2017 Iraqi Kurdistan independence referendum and2017 Iraqi–Kurdish conflict
Pro-independence rally inErbil in September 2017

Following the defeat ofIslamic State in the Battle of Mosul, the formerPresident of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region,Masoud Barzani, facilitated the2017 Iraqi Kurdistan independence referendum.[51]

Angered by the decision, thePrime Minister of Iraq,Haider al-Abadi, demanded the cancellation of the referendum and called on theKRG to initiate dialogue "in the framework of the constitution", ordered it to withdraw its forces from the disputed territories seized in 2014, and warned of a possible military retaliation.[51][52]

Following the reluctance of the KRG to heed the warnings, in October 2017, Iraq began to move its forces into areas seized by the KRG in 2014, and all the disputed areas outside the Kurdish Region, including Kirkuk. In a successfulmilitary operation that lasted less than two weeks, the Iraqi Armed Forces defeated the Peshmerga and successfully reclaimed the area seized by the KRG, as well as later took control of the airports inErbil andSulaymaniyah. Masoud Barzani subsequently announced his resignation and the referendum was effectively abandoned.

Arabisation of disputed territories

Since October 2017, Kurdish news reports have made claims of Arabisation and forced demographic displacement of Kurds, most notably in Kirkuk, Tuz Khurmatu and Khanaqin.[53][54][55] In June 2024, an Iraqi Kurdish source claimed that the Arabisation campaign of Kirkuk, under the administration of Arab governor Rakan Al-Jubouri, surpassed even the level committed by the previousBa'athist regime.[56]

Iraqi government reinstates control over oil in Kurdistan Region

In light of the Kurdistan Region initiating independent oil exports toTurkey in late 2013, on 23 May 2014, Iraq issued an international arbitration case against the latter at theInternational Chamber of Commerce based in Paris, regarding Turkey's role in the illegal sale of crude oil by theKurdistan Regional Government through theKirkuk-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline. Iraq claimed Turkey had breached provisions of the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline Agreement (ITPA 1973) by not heeding the instructions of the IraqiMinistry of Oil. In February 2023, theInternational Court of Arbitration issued a verdict in favour of Iraq and on 25 March 2023, all oil exports from the Kurdistan Region were halted. Since then, the KRG has been officially rendered unable to resume the export of oil to Turkey without the permission of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, as outlined in the ITP Agreement.[57][58][59][60]

On 25 September 2025, the Iraqi federal government announced that it had reached a multilateral deal with the Kurdistan Regional Government and international oil companies (IOCs) operating in the KRI wherein precise technical guidelines and conditions of payment for crude oil production and transportation are set out. The deal is in line with the 2023-2025 Federal Budget Law approved by the Iraqi Council of Representatives.

Under the deal, the Federal Government will receive at least 230 000 barrels of oil produced in KRI and delivered directly to the IraqiState Organization for Marketing of Oil (SOMO), which will in turn independently conduct the sale of these barrels through the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline. Conditional on SOMO receiving at least 230 000 barrels daily, the Federal Ministry of Finance will in turn pay the KRG its annual share of the federal budget according to the Federal Budget Law. The IOCs on the other hand, will be reimbursed for production and transportation costs of the amount received by SOMO (USD 14$ per barrel) paid through an escrow account directly.

The deal stipulates that KRG and IOCs will be completely excluded from the export process, and won’t directly receive revenues from exports of oil barrels produced in KRI. Instead, the Iraqi government will allocate the revenues gained from independently exporting at least 230 000 barrels produced in the KRI to the central government budget, from which the KRG will receive its share proportional to its population, a mechanism identical to that used with other Iraqi oil-producing governorates, such as Basrah. Of the amount produced by the international oil companies –that is, at least 280 000 barrels– an amount no more than 50 000 barrels will be allocated for KRI domestic consumption. The IOCs will be allowed to sell this amount to domestic buyers and receive the revenues of this amount only.[61][62]

The Iraqi Ministry of Oil reiterated its "firm commitment to managing oil resources in accordance with the principle of national sovereignty and the supreme interest of the state, in order to ensure a fair distribution of wealth among all the Iraqi people, in accordance with the constitution".[63] The Iraqi minister of oil, Hayyan Abdul-Ghani stated that the deal guarantees that the Iraqi government controls all revenues of the country.[64]

2023 Unrest in Kirkuk

Main article:2023 unrest in Kirkuk

The 2023 unrest in Kirkuk was an incident which resulted in four Kurdish protesters being killed. The incident involved Arab, Kurdish and Turkmen residents of the city ofKirkuk. It began on 26 August 2023, after a building that used to be the headquarters of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (which was used at the time by the Iraqi Armed Forces as a Joint Operations Command) was about to be transferred back to the former following an order by the Prime Minister of Iraq. Two days later, on 28 August, Arab and Turkmen anti-KDP residents of Kirkuk staged a sit-in in front of the building to prevent its transfer as well as blocked the main road between Erbil and Kirkuk. In response, pro-KDP Kurds iniated counter-protests as well as demanded the opening of the blocked road. Iraqi security forces responded by opening fire on the Kurdish protesters. Following this, the government imposed a curfew in Kirkuk. The Supreme Court of Iraq subsequently issued a verdict halting the transfer of the building back to KDP, which was criticized by the latter.

Concerns about possible Kurdistan Region collapse

In September 2023,Al-Monitor published an article claiming that the Prime Minister of the KRG,Masrour Barzani, had sent a letter to thePresident of the United States urging him to mediate between Erbil and Baghdad on issues threatening the Kurdistan Region, stating: "I write to you now at another critical juncture in our history, one that I fear we may have difficulty overcoming. ...[W]e are bleeding economically and hemorrhaging politically. For the first time in my tenure as prime minister, I hold grave concerns that this dishonorable campaign against us may cause the collapse of ... the very model of a Federal Iraq that the United States sponsored in 2003 and purported to stand by since."[65]

Yerevan Saeed, director of the 'Global Kurdish Initiative for Peace' at American University in Washington, expressed concerns in February 2024 about the future of the Kurdistan Region if problems persist. He stated that the combined effect of Baghdad's obstructive attitude towards the Kurdistan Region as well as intra-Kurdish problems will “inevitably result in the diminishment of the Kurdistan Region's political, legal, and economic influence, and could potentially lead to its dissolution."[66]

2023 Makhmour clashes

Main article:2023 Makhmour clashes

On 22 October 2023, clashes between Iraqi security forces and Peshmerga occurred in the town ofMakhmour after it was handed over to the Iraqi forces following the withdrawal of thePKK. At around noon, both sides exchanged mortar fire for two hours until a ceasefire was announced. The clashes resulted in six deaths in total, including the 18th Peshmerga Infantry Brigade commander and his deputy.[67]Both sides denied being the aggressor. The town of Makhmour is situated strategically betweenMosul,Erbil andKirkuk.

Growing state centralism

In March 2024, after a series of court rulings by theSupreme Court of Iraq targeting the Kurdistan Region, Abdul Rahman Zibari a Kurdish judge resigned in protest, describing the Court's actions as "a move towards centralization and a blatant violation of the constitutional rights of the Kurdistan Region".[68] In his resignation statement, the judge hinted at concerns about Baghdad's departure from the principles offederalism, the political system adopted after the US-led invasion of Iraq.[69][70] The Supreme Court subsequently announced that the resignation of Zibari will not hinder its work.

TheKDP also announced that it will not participate in the upcomingregional parliamentary elections dated June 10, 2024, citing "unconstitutional rulings against the Kurdistan Region in the past four years" and labeling the actions of the Supreme Court as "a clear and dangerous violation of the constitution” and an attempt to “return Iraq to acentralized system."[71][needs update]

Casualties

[a].^ Iraqi–Kurdish conflict (combined casualty figure until 2003; 163,800–345,100):

Mahmud Barzanji revolts (1919–1924) – unknown
Ahmed Barzani revolt (1931–1932) – hundreds killed
1943 Barzani revolt (1943–1945) – hundreds killed
First Iraqi–Kurdish War (1961–1970) – 12,000–105,000 killed.[72]
Second Iraqi–Kurdish War (1974–1975) – 9,000 killed.[73]
PUK insurgency (1976–1978) – 800 killed.
1980Persecution of Feyli Kurds under Saddam Hussein - 25,000[74][75][clarification needed]
Iraqi Kurdish uprising (1982–1988) – 50,000–198,000 killed.
Battle of Sulaymaniyah (1991) – 700–2,000 killed.
Iraqi Kurdish Civil War (1994–1997) – 3,000[76]–5,000 killed
2003 invasion of Iraq (Operation Viking Hammer) – 300 Islamists killed, at least 24 Peshmerga killed;[36] unknown number of Iraqi agents "eliminated".
2017 Iraqi-Kurdish conflict – 150 Iraqi forces (Army + PMU) killed (7 inBattle of Kirkuk per Kirkuk hospital), 105 Peshmerga killed, 200 wounded, 45 detained as well as 400 Kurdish civilians killed, 200 missing in Kirkuk (per Kurdish sources) and 183,000 displaced (per United Nations)
2023 unrest in Kirkuk – 4 Kurdish protesters killed, 16 injured, 40 detained
2023 Makhmour clashes – 2 Iraqi soldiers killed, 6 injured and 4 Peshmerga killed, 5 injured

See also

References

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