Demographics

Factions

Election results

Presidential elections

Parliament

Parties and organizations

Alliances

Media

See also

References

1. ^Mohseni, Payam (2016). "Factionalism, Privatization, and the Political economy of regime transformation". In Brumberg, Daniel; Farhi, Farideh (eds.).Power and Change in Iran: Politics of Contention and Conciliation. Indiana Series in Middle East Studies. Indiana University Press. p. 47.ISBN 978-0253020680.
2. ^^abSaid Amir Arjomand; Nathan J. Brown (2013).The Rule of Law, Islam, and Constitutional Politics in Egypt and Iran. SUNY Press. p. 150.ISBN 978-1-4384-4597-7.'Conservative' is no longer a preferred term in Iranian political discourse. 'Usulgara', which can be clumsily translated as 'principlist', is the term now used to refer to an array of forces that previously identified themselves as conservative, fundamentalist, neo-fundamentalist, or traditionalist. It developed to counter the termeshlahgara, or reformist, and is applied to a camp of not necessarily congruous groups and individuals.
3. ^^abcRandjbar-Daemi, Siavush (2012)."Glossary of the most commonly-used Persian terms and abbreviations".Intra-State Relations in the Islamic Republic of Iran: The Presidency and the Struggle for Political Authority, 1989–2009 (Ph.D. thesis). Martin, Vanessa (Supervisor).Royal Holloway, University of London. p. 11. Open access material licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License.
4. ^^[2][3]
5. ^Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi (2013), "Women's Rights, Shari'a Law, and the Secularization of Islam in Iran",International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society,26 (3), New York:237–253,doi:10.1007/s10767-013-9143-x,S2CID 145213603,'Principlism' or osul-gera'i first appeared in the Iranian political lexicon during the second-term presidency ofMohammad Khatami as an alternative to eslāh-talabi or reformism. Although principlists do not share a uniform political platform, they all believed that the reformist movement would lead the Republic towards secularism. One of the most common elements of their political philosophy is the comprehensiveness of the shari'a. The responsibility of the Islamic state is to determine ways of implementing the mandates of Islam, rather than the reformist project of reinterpreting the shari'a to correspond to the demands of contemporary society.
6. ^^abMehdi Mozaffari (2007),"What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept"(PDF),Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions,8 (1):17–33,doi:10.1080/14690760601121622,S2CID 9926518,In fact, Iranian 'Islamists' of our day call themselves 'Usul gara', which literally means 'fundamentalist', but in a positive sense. It designates a 'person of principles' who is the 'true Muslim'.
7. ^^[5][6]
8. ^^abcdSherrill, Clifton (2011). "After Khamenei: Who Will Succeed Iran's Supreme Leader?".Orbis.55 (4):631–47.doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2011.07.002.
9. ^^abBarbara Ann Rieffer-Flanagan, ed. (March 22, 2013).Evolving Iran: An Introduction to Politics and Problems in the Islamic Republic. Georgetown University Press. p. 69.On the political spectrum neoconservatives, also sometimes referred to as hard-line conservatives or principlists, are on the far right. Reformists, sometimes called the Islamic left, are the furthest away from the neoconservatives, with pragmatic conservatives falling somewhere in between the two.
10. ^^[8][9]
11. ^^abcMelody Mohebi (2014),The Formation of Civil Society in Modern Iran: Public Intellectuals and the State, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 129–131,ISBN 978-1-137-40110-6
12. ^^abRobert J. Reardon (2012),Containing Iran: Strategies for Addressing the Iranian Nuclear Challenge, RAND Corporation, pp. 81–82,ISBN 978-0833076373
13. ^^[11][12]
14. ^Tait, Robert (18 August 2010)."Iranian President's New 'Religious-Nationalism' Alienates Hard-Line Constituency".Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
15. ^"Freedom in the World: Iran",Freedom House, 2017, archived fromthe original on 17 May 2017, retrieved25 May 2017
16. ^Mehdi Moslem (2002),Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran, Syracuse University Press, p. 135,ISBN 9780815629788
17. ^Axworthy, Michael (2016),Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic, Oxford University Press, p. 430,ISBN 9780190468965
18. ^Kevan Harris (2017).A Social Revolution: Politics and the Welfare State in Iran. Univ of California Press. p. 157.ISBN 9780520280816.This discourse was eventually tagged with the Persian neologism osulgarāi, a word that can be translated into English as 'fundamentalist', since 'osul' means 'doctrine', 'root', or 'tenet'. According to several Iranian journalists, state-funded media were aware of the negative connotation of this particular word in Western countries. Preferring not to be lumped in with Sunni Salafism, the English-language media in Iran opted to use the term 'principlist', which caught on more generally.
19. ^Haddad Adel, Gholamali; Elmi, Mohammad Jafar; Taromi-Rad, Hassan (2012-08-31). "Jāme'e-ye Rowhāniyyat-e Mobārez".Political Parties: Selected Entries from Encyclopaedia of the World of Islam. EWI Press. p. 108.ISBN 9781908433022.
20. ^Robin B. Wright, ed. (2010),The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy, US Institute of Peace Press, p. 37,ISBN 978-1601270849
21. ^Masoud Kazemzadeh (2008), "Intra-Elite Factionalism and the 2004 Majles Elections in Iran",Middle Eastern Studies,44 (2):189–214,doi:10.1080/00263200701874867,S2CID 144111986,In Western sources, the term 'hard-liners' is used to refer to the faction under the leadership of Supreme Leader Ali Khamanehi. Members of this group prefer to call themselvesOsul-gara. The wordosul (plural ofasl) means 'fundamentals', or 'principles' or 'tenets', and the verbal suffix-gara means 'those who uphold or promote'. The more radical elements in the hard-line camp prefer to call themselvesOmmat Hezbollah.Ommat is a technical Arabic-Islamic term referring to people who are Muslim.Hezbollah literally means 'Party of Allah'. Before the rise of Ahmadinejad to the presidency in 2005, many official sources in the Islamic Republic referred to this group asmohafezeh-kar ('conservative'). Between 1997 and 2006, many Iranians inside Iran used the termseqtedar-gara ('authoritarian') andtamamiyat-khah ('totalitarian') for what many Western observers have termed 'hard-liners'. Members of the reformist faction of the fundamentalist oligarchy called the hard-linerseqtedar-gara.
22. ^Banafsheh Keynoush (2012), "Iran After Ahmadinejad",Survival: Global Politics and Strategy,54 (3), New York:127–146,doi:10.1080/00396338.2012.690988,S2CID 153661674,What is important, however, is that the principlist camp now increasingly represents not just hard-liners, but also more centre-right factions.
23. ^Etel Solingen, ed. (2012),Sanctions, Statecraft, and Nuclear Proliferation, Cambridge University Press, p. 222,ISBN 9781107010444
24. ^Ladane Nasseri; Kambiz Foroohar; Yeganeh Salehi (June 16, 2013)."Iranians Celebrate Surprise Rohani Win as Reason for Hope".Bloomberg. RetrievedMarch 10, 2015.
25. ^Seyed Hossein Mousavian (2012),The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir, Brookings Institution Press, p. 486,ISBN 9780870033025
26. ^^abSHAUL, BAKHASH (12 September 2011)."Iran's Conservatives: The Headstrong New Bloc".Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.Tehran Bureau. RetrievedMarch 10, 2015.
27. ^"Masoud Pezeshkian sworn in as Iranian president".www.nhk.or.jp. Retrieved2 August 2024.
28. ^"Poll Results of Popular Leaning Towards Principlists and Reformists",Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA) (in Persian), 28 April 2017, retrieved1 June 2017 – via Khabaronline
29. ^"Disappointed in Rouhani, Iranians Seek a Different Sort of Leader in June Elections".Chicago Council on Global Affairs. 9 April 2021. Archived fromthe original on 7 November 2024.According to other IranPoll results, the support base for the reformists has shrunk by about 8 percentage points since 2017, while the support base for the conservatives has grown by 4 percentage points. Still, more Iranians self-identify as a reformist (21%) or leaning reformist (10%) than identify as a "principlist" (19%) or leaning principlist (7%). Four in 10 (43%) have no preference.
30. ^Thaler; et al. (2010).Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics. Sacramento, CA:RAND Corporation.ISBN 978-0-8330-4773-1.

External links