The Khampa Tibetans and Lhasa Tibetans held each other in mutual contempt and dislike, with the Khampas in some cases hating Lhasa rule even more than Chinese rule, which was why the Khampas did little to resist Chinese forces as they entered eastern Kham and subsequently took over the whole of Tibet.[16] Likewise, the Qinghai (Amdo) Tibetans view the Tibetans of Central Tibet (Tibet proper, ruled by the Dalai Lamas from Lhasa) as different from themselves and even take pride in the fact that they were not ruled by Lhasa ever since the collapse of theTibetan Empire.[17]
Khampas like thePandatsang clan had led rebellions for autonomy from Lhasa. Because of this, the Chinese communists viewed them as potential revolutionary allies. In January 1950, the communists officially proposed to aid the Pandatsang brothers' cause in exchange for them to stay on the sidelines during the "liberation of Tibet", but the Pandatsang brothers decided instead to sendGeorge Patterson to India to seek alternate aid.[18]
Western Kham and eastern Kham separated by a blue line in the Simla Convention map
After the defeat of majorKuomintang forces in theChinese Civil War, thePeople's Liberation Army (PLA) turned its attention to the Republic of China territories in the hinterland. Eastern Kham was the Chinese-held part ofSikang and the gateway to Tibetan areas. The 18th Army of the PLA formed the leading detachment advancing toward Tibet with the 52nd Division as its main force, and arrived atYa'an on 12 February 1950. In March, the People's Liberation Army arrived inKangding (Tachienlu). By mid-April, the 18th Army had at least 30,000 passing through Kangding, and 10,000 Tibetans helped to build the road from Kangding toGarzê (Kandze), which was completed in August. The 18th Army of the PLA assembled at Garzê on 30 July, headquartered atXinlong, and enteredLitang from the east. The Qinghai Cavalry Detachment enteredGyêgu on 22 July, forming a north–southpincer on Chamdo.[19]
In June 1950, the PLA and the Tibetan army fought for the first time in Dengke (also known as Dengo[15]). Dengke is located beside the main road from Garzê toYushu, about 100 miles northeast of Chamdo. Former Chamdo governorLhalu Tsewang Dorje had set up a radio station there. 50 PLA soldiers captured Dengke and destroyed the radio station.[15] Two weeks later (July), 800 Khampa militia (including 300 monks) raided Dengke, claiming to have killed 600 PLA soldiers.[20] In the end, the PLA succeeded in occupying eastern Kham.[21]
After months of failed negotiations,[15] attempts by Lhasa to secure foreign support and assistance,[22] and the troop buildups by the PRC[23] and Tibet,[24] the PLA crossed theJinsha River on 6 or 7 October 1950 into Lhasa-controlled Chamdo, crossing thede facto border[25] at five places.[26]
Two PLA units quickly captured the bordertown of Chamdo by 19 October, by which time 114 PLA[6] soldiers and 180 Tibetan[6][7][8] soldiers had been killed or wounded. The Chamdo governor and commander of Tibetan forces,Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, surrendered with his 2,700 men. Writing in 1962,Zhang Guohua claimed that 5,738 enemy troops were "liquidated", over 5,700 were "destroyed", and "more than 3,000" peacefully surrendered.[27] Active hostilities were limited to a border area controlled by Lhasa northeast of the riverGyalmo Ngulchu River (upper reaches ofSalween River in Tibet) and east of the 96th meridian.[28]
After confiscating their weapons, the PLA soldiers gave the prisoners lectures onsocialism and a small amount of money, before allowing them to return to their homes.[29] According tothe Dalai Lama, the PLA did not attack civilians.[30]
With the capture of Chamdo, the PLA believed the objective to have been reached, unilaterally ceased hostilities,[7][31] and sentNgabo toLhasa to reiterate terms of negotiation, and waited for Tibetan representatives to respond through delegates toBeijing.[32]
On 21 October, Lhasa instructed its delegation to leave immediately for Beijing for consultations with the PRC government, and to accept the first provision if the status of the Dalai Lama could be guaranteed, while rejecting the other two conditions. It later rescinded even acceptance of the first demand, after a divination before theSix-Armed Mahākāla deities indicated that the three points could not be accepted, since Tibet would fall under foreign domination.[33][34][35]
On 24 October, all military operations ended.[citation needed]
After releasing the captured soldiers, Chinese broadcasts promised that if Tibet was "peacefully liberated", the Tibetan elites would not be denied their positions and power.[36]
Some Khampa fighters continued their opposition. Local warlords later became united under a common objective and hence resulted in the formation ofChushi Gangdruk with assistance from the CIA.[37]
According to contemporary authorMelvyn Goldstein, the campaign aimed to capture the Lhasa army occupying Chamdo, demoralize the Lhasa government, and to exert pressure to get Tibetan representatives to agree to negotiations in Beijing and sign terms recognizing China's sovereignty over Tibet.[38]
^abcShakya 1999, p. 45. Shakya also quotes PRC sources reporting 5738 enemy troops "liquidated" and over 5700 "destroyed". Shakya does not provide an estimate of PRC casualties.
^NOTE: The exiled Tibetan government in India calls The battle the "...invasion of Tibet by the People's Liberation Army of China," seeTibet: Proving Truth From Facts. The Status of Tibet: "At the time of its invasion by troops of the People's Liberation Army of China in 1949, Tibet was an independent state in fact and by law."
^Tsering Shakya,Dragon in The Land of Snows: The History of Modern Tibet since 1947, Random House, 2012, Google e-book: "Tibet had never received de jure recognition from any state; in any case such recognition would be disputed not only by Beijing but also by the nationalist regime in Taiwan.
^Stephanie Roemer,The Tibetan government-in-exile: politics at large, p. 32: "the Tibetans signed the so-called 'Seventeen Point Agreement', where they officially acknowledged the Chinese intentions to liberate Tibet, which meant the end of Tibet's de-facto independence."
^Dunham, Mikel (2005).Buddha's warriors : the story of the CIA-backed Tibetan freedom fighters, the Chinese invasion, and the ultimate fall of Tibet. New Delhi: Penguin Books. pp. 54–60, 62.ISBN0144001047.OCLC224529359.
^Dunham, Mikel (2005).Buddha's warriors: the story of the CIA-backed Tibetan freedom fighters, the Chinese invasion, and the ultimate fall of Tibet. New Delhi: Penguin Books. p. 60.ISBN0144001047.OCLC224529359.
^Sam van Schaik,Tibet. A History, Yale University Press, 2013, p. 2009: "So when Ngapo arrived in Chamdo in 1950, he was in a pessimistic mood. Still, he had his orders and reinforcements were arriving from Lhasa. Tibet would fight."
^Melvin C. Goldstein,A History of Modern Tibet: The Calm Before the Storm: 1951–1955, University of California Press, 2009, Vol. 2, p. 48.
^Shakya 1999 p. 32 (6 Oct). Goldstein 1997 p. 45 (7 Oct).
Feigon, Lee.Demystifying Tibet: Unlocking the Secrets of the Land of Snows (1996) Ivan R. Dee Inc.ISBN1-56663-089-4.
Ford, Robert.Wind Between The Worlds The extraordinary first-person account of a Westerner's life in Tibet as an official of the Dalai Lama (1957) David Mckay Co., Inc.
Goldstein, Melvyn C.A History of Modern Tibet, Volume 1: 1913–1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State (1989) University of California Press.ISBN978-0-520-06140-8.
Goldstein, Melvyn C.A History of Modern Tibet, Volume 2: The Calm Before the Storm 1951–1955 (2007) University of California Press.ISBN978-0-520-24941-7.
Goldstein, Melvyn C.The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama (1997) University of California Press.ISBN0-520-21254-1.
Tibet
China
.svg)