Information warfare (IW) is thebattlespace use and management ofinformation and communication technology (ICT) in pursuit of a competitive advantage over an opponent. It is different fromcyberwarfare that attacks computers, software, and command control systems. Information warfare is the manipulation of information trusted by a target without the target's awareness so that the target will make decisions against their interest but in the interest of the one conducting information warfare.[1][2] As a result, it is not clear when information warfare begins, ends, and how strong or destructive it is.[3]
Information warfare may involve thecollection of tactical information,assurance(s) that one's information is valid, spreading ofpropaganda ordisinformation todemoralize ormanipulate[4] the enemy and the public, undermining the quality of the opposing force's information, and denial of information-collection opportunities to opposing forces. Information warfare is closely linked topsychological warfare.[5]
Information warfare has been described as "the use of information to achieve our national objectives."[6] According toNATO, "Information war is an operation conducted in order to gain an information advantage over the opponent."[7] The term has existed at least since 1970, when Dale Minor, a reporter, publishedThe Information War[8] a book about propaganda and news manipulation during the Vietnam War era.[9], although its current usage as a military capability dates from 1976, whenThomas P. Rona, than a Boeing Company engineer, referred to "information war" in a company monograph[10] prepared for theOffice of Net Assessment[11].
The organized use of social media and other online content-generation platforms can be used to influence public perceptions.[12]
TheUnited States Air Force has had Information Warfare Squadrons since the 1980s. In fact, the official mission of the U.S. Air Force is now "To fly, fight and win... in air, space and cyberspace",[13] with the latter referring to its information warfare role.
As the U.S. Air Force often risks aircraft and aircrews to attack strategic enemy communications targets, remotely disabling such targets using software and other means can provide a safer alternative. In addition, disabling such networks electronically (instead of explosively) also allows them to be quickly re-enabled after the enemy territory is occupied. Similarly, counter-information warfare units are employed to deny such capability to the enemy. The first application of these techniques was used against Iraqi communications networks in theGulf War.
Also during the Gulf War, Dutchhackers allegedly stole information about U.S. troop movements fromU.S. Defense Department computers and tried to sell it to the Iraqis, who thought it was a hoax and turned it down.[14] In January 1999, U.S. Air Intelligence computers were hit by a coordinated attack (Moonlight Maze), part of which came from a Russian mainframe. This could not be confirmed as a Russian cyber attack due to non-attribution – the principle that online identity may not serve as proof of real-world identity.[15][16][17]
Some militaries are now employing the use ofiPhones to upload data and information gathered by drones in the same area.[18][19]
In 2022, theArmed Forces of Ukraine took advantage of deficiencies in Russian communications by allowing them to piggyback on Ukrainian networks, connect, and communicate. Ukrainian forces then eavesdrop and cut off Russian communications at a crucial part of the conversation.[a]
To build support before it invaded Ukraine,Russia perpetuated a narrative that claimed the Ukrainian government was committing violence against its own Russian speaking population. By publishing large amounts of disinformation on the internet, the alternate narrative was picked up in search results, such asGoogle News.[28]
Research suggests that Russia and the West are also engaged in an information war. For instance, Russia believes that the West is undermining its leader through the encouragement of overthrowing authoritarian regimes and liberal values. In response, Russia promotes the anti-liberal sentiments, including racism, antisemitism, homophobia, and misogyny.[33][32] Russia has sought to promote the idea that the American democratic state is failing.[32]
The Telegraph reported in 2024 that China and Russia were promotingpro-Palestinianinfluencers in order to manipulate British public opinion in favor of Russian and Chinese interests.[34] NBC reported that Russia was using different tools to cause division within the US, by delegitimizing US police operations against Pro Palestinian protests and by pivoting public conversation from the Russian invasion in Ukraine to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[32] Russian media activity increased by 400% in the weeks after Hamas' Oct. 7 attack on Israel.[32]
According to a report byReuters, the United States ran apropaganda campaign to spread disinformation about theSinovac ChineseCOVID-19 vaccine, including using fake social media accounts to spread the disinformation that the Sinovac vaccine contained pork-derived ingredients and was thereforeharam underIslamic law.[35] The campaign was described as "payback" forCOVID-19 disinformation by China directed against the U.S.[36] The campaign ran from 2020 to mid-2021, primarily targeting people in thePhilippines and used a social mediahashtag for "China is the virus" inTagalog. The primary contractor for the U.S. military on the project wasGeneral Dynamics IT, which received $493 million for its role.[35]
While information warfare has yielded many advances in the types of attack that a government can make, it has also raised concerns about the moral and legal ambiguities surrounding this particularly new form of war. Traditionally, wars have been analyzed by moral scholars according tojust war theory. However, with Information Warfare, Just War Theory fails because the theory is based on the traditional conception of war. Information Warfare has three main issues surrounding it compared to traditional warfare:
The risk for the party or nation initiating the cyberattack is substantially lower than the risk for a party or nation initiating a traditional attack. This makes it easier for governments, as well as potential terrorist orcriminal organizations, to make these attacks more frequently than they could with traditional war.[37]
Information communication technologies (ICT) are so immersed in the modern world that a very wide range of technologies are at risk of a cyberattack. Specifically, civilian technologies can be targeted for cyberattacks and attacks can even potentially be launched through civilian computers or websites. As such, it is harder to enforce control of civilian infrastructures than a physical space. Attempting to do so would also raise many ethical concerns about the right to privacy, making defending against such attacks even tougher.
The mass-integration of ICT into our system of war makes it much harder to assess accountability for situations that may arise when using robotic and/or cyber attacks. For robotic weapons and automated systems, it's becoming increasingly hard to determine who is responsible for any particular event that happens. This issue is exacerbated in the case of cyberattacks, as sometimes it is virtually impossible to trace who initiated the attack in the first place.[17]
Recently, legal concerns have arisen centered on these issues, specifically the issue of theright to privacy in the United States of America. Lt. GeneralKeith B. Alexander, who served as the head of Cyber Command under PresidentBarack Obama, noted that there was a "mismatch between our technical capabilities to conduct operations and the governing laws and policies" when writing to theSenate Armed Services Committee. A key point of concern was the targeting of civilian institutions for cyberattacks, to which the general promised to try to maintain a mindset similar to that of traditional war, in which they will seek to limit the impact on civilians.[38]
^Connectivity toGLONASS may be a factor in the lack of Russian PGM availability,[23] and the use of 3G/4G cell towers for Russian encrypted communications (Era)[24] during the2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. This weakness was unearthed during the use of open communication ("Russian commanders are sometimes piggybacking on Ukrainian cell phone networks to communicate")[25] when FSB was discussing the deaths of their generals: Vitaly Gerasimov, killed 7 Mar 2022;[26]Andrei Sukhovetsky, killed 28 Feb 2022.[27][23]
^MEHUL SRIVASTAVA, MADHUMITA MURGIA, AND HANNAH MURPHY, FT (3/9/2022, 8:33 AM)The secret US mission to bolster Ukraine's cyber defences ahead of Russia's invasionArchived 2022-03-31 at theWayback Machine European official: "instead of communicating solely through encrypted military-grade phones, Russian commanders are sometimes piggybacking on Ukrainian cell phone networks to communicate, at times simply by using their Russian cell phones.'The Ukrainians love it—there is so much data in simply watching these phones, whether or not they are using encrypted apps,' he said.The Ukrainians then block Russian phones from their local networks at key moments, further jamming their communications. 'Then you suddenly see Russian soldiers grabbing cell phones off Ukrainians on the street, raiding repair shops for sims,' he said. 'This is not sophisticated stuff. It's quite puzzling."
Jerome Clayton Glenn, "Future Mind" Chapter 9. Defense p. 195-201. Acropolis Books LTD, Washington, DC (1989)
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