TheImperial German Army (1871–1919), officially referred to as theGerman Army (German:Deutsches Heer[9]), was the unified ground and air force of theGerman Empire. It was established in 1871 with the political unification of Germany under the leadership ofPrussia, and was dissolved in 1919, after the defeat of the German Empire inWorld War I (1914–1918). In the Federal Republic of Germany, the termDeutsches Heer refers to theGerman Army, the land component of theBundeswehr.
Two Imperial German infantry soldiers during World War I. Colorized family photo taken in Lower Silesia (1914–1918)German Armyhussars on the attack during maneuvers, 1912
The states that made up the German Empire contributed their armies; within theGerman Confederation, formed after theNapoleonic Wars, each state was responsible for maintaining certain units to be put at the disposal of the Confederation in case of conflict. When operating together, the units were known as theFederal Army (Bundesheer). The Federal Army system functioned duringvarious conflicts of the 19th century, such as theFirst Schleswig War from 1848 to 1852. However, by the time of theSecond Schleswig War of 1864, tension had grown between the main powers of the confederation, theAustrian Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia, and the German Confederation was dissolved after theAustro-Prussian War of 1866.
Prussia formed theNorth German Confederation and the treaty provided for the maintenance of a Federal Army and aFederal Navy (Bundesmarine orBundeskriegsmarine).[10] Further laws on military duty also used these terms.[11] Conventions (some later amended) were entered into between the North German Confederation and its member states, subordinating their armies to thePrussian Army in time of war, and giving the Prussian Army control over training, doctrine, and equipment.[a]
Shortly after the outbreak of theFranco-Prussian War in 1870, the North German Confederation also entered into conventions on military matters with states that were not members of the confederation, namelyBavaria,Württemberg, andBaden.[b] Through these conventions and the 1871Constitution of the German Empire, an Army of the Realm (Reichsheer) was created. The Constitution of the German Empire, dated April 16, 1871, changed references in theNorth German Constitution from Federal Army to either Army of the Realm (Reichsheer) or German Army (Deutsches Heer).[12]
The contingents of theBavarian,Saxon, andWürttemberg kingdoms remained semi-autonomous, while the Prussian Army assumed almost total control over the armies of the other states of the Empire. After 1871, the peacetime armies of the four kingdoms remained relatively distinct. The term "German Army" was used in various legal documents, such as the Military Penal Code, but otherwise, the Prussian, Bavarian, Saxon, and Württemberg armies maintained their distinct identities.[13] Each kingdom had its own War Ministry, Bavaria andSaxony published their own rank and seniority lists for their officers and the Württemberg list was a separate chapter of the Prussian Army rank lists. Württemberg and Saxon units were numbered according to the Prussian system but Bavarian units maintained their own numbers (the 2nd Württemberg Infantry Regiment was Infantry Regiment No. 120 under the Prussian system).[citation needed]
The commander of the Imperial German Army, less the Bavarian contingent, was theKaiser. He was assisted by aMilitary Cabinet and exercised control through thePrussian Ministry of War and theGreat General Staff. The Chief of the General Staff became the Kaiser's main military adviser and the most powerful military figure in the empire. Bavaria kept its ownMinistry of War andGeneral Staff, but coordinated planning with the Prussian General Staff. Saxony also maintained its ownMinistry of War and General Staff, and theMinistry of War of Württemberg and General Staff also continued to exist.
The command of the Prussian Army had been reformed in the wake of thedefeats suffered by Prussia in theNapoleonic Wars. Rather than rely primarily on the martial skills of the individual members of the German nobility, who dominated the military profession, the Prussian Army instituted changes to ensure excellence in leadership, organisation, and planning. The General Staff system, which sought to institutionalise military excellence, was the main result. It sought to identify military talent at the lower levels and develop it thoroughly through academic training and practical experience on division, corps, and higher staffs, up to the Great General Staff, the senior planning body of the army. It provided planning and organisational work during peacetime and wartime. The Prussian General Staff, proven in battle in theWars of Unification, became the German General Staff upon the formation of the German Empire, given Prussia's leading role in the German Army.
German infantry charging across open ground on the battlefield, 1914
In the German Empire, diplomatic relations were the responsibility of theChancellor and his Foreign Minister. The German Army reported separately to the emperor, and increasingly played a major role in shaping foreign policy when military alliances or warfare was at issue.[14] In diplomatic terms, Germany used the Prussian system of military attachés attached to diplomatic locations, with highly talented young officers assigned to evaluate the strengths, weaknesses, and military capabilities of their assigned nations. They used close observation, conversations, and paid agents to produce very high-quality reports that gave a significant advantage to the military planners.[15] The military staff grew increasingly powerful, reducing the role of the Minister of War, and increasingly asserted itself in foreign policy decisions.
Otto von Bismarck, the Imperial Chancellor from 1871 to 1890, was annoyed by military interference in foreign policy affairs – in 1887, for example, they tried to convince the emperor to declare war onRussia; they also encouragedAustria-Hungary to attack Russia. Bismarck never controlled the army, but he did complain vehemently, and the military leaders drew back. In 1905, when theFirst Moroccan Crisis was roiling international politics, the Chief of the General StaffAlfred von Schlieffen called for a preventive war againstFrance. At a critical point in theJuly Crisis of 1914,Helmuth von Moltke, the chief of staff, without telling the emperor or chancellor, advised his counterpart in Austria-Hungary to mobilise against Russia at once. During the First World War,GeneralfeldmarschallPaul von Hindenburg increasingly set foreign policy, working directly with the emperor—and indeed shaped his decision-making—leaving the chancellor and civilian officials in the dark. HistorianGordon A. Craig says that the crucial decisions in 1914, "were made by the soldiers and that, in making them, they displayed an almost complete disregard for political considerations."[16]
The Kaiser had full control of the armed forces but the organisation was highly complex.[17]
In peacetime the Imperial German Army was divided into four basic levels, the Army inspectorate (Armee-Inspektion), the army corps (Armeekorps), the division, and the regiment. During wartime, the staff of the Army inspectorates formed field army commands, which controlled the corps and subordinate units. During World War I, a higher command level, the army group (Heeresgruppe), was created. Each army group controlled several field armies.
Germany was divided into army inspectorates, each of which oversaw three or four corps. There were five in 1871, with three more added between 1907 and 1913.[18]
I Army Inspectorate: Headquartered inDanzig, became the8th Army on mobilisation (2 August 1914)
II Army Inspectorate: Headquartered inBerlin, became the3rd Army on mobilisation (2 August 1914)
III Army Inspectorate: Headquartered inHannover, became the2nd Army on mobilisation (2 August 1914)
IV Army Inspectorate: Headquartered inMunich, became the6th Army on mobilisation (2 August 1914)
V Army Inspectorate: Headquartered inKarlsruhe, became the7th Army on mobilisation (2 August 1914)
VI Army Inspectorate: Headquartered inStuttgart, became the4th Army on mobilisation (2 August 1914)
VII Army Inspectorate: Headquartered in Berlin, became the5th Army on mobilisation (2 August 1914)
VIII Army Inspectorate: Headquartered inSaarbrücken, became the1st Army on mobilisation (2 August 1914)
The basic organisational formation was the armycorps (Armeekorps). The corps consisted of two or more divisions and various support troops, covering a geographical area. The corps was also responsible for maintaining the reserves andLandwehr in the corps area. By 1914, there were 21 corps areas under Prussian jurisdiction and three Bavarian army corps. Besides the regional corps, there was also aGuard Corps (Gardecorps), which controlled the elite Prussian Guard units. A corps usually included a light infantry (Jäger) battalion, a heavy artillery (Fußartillerie) battalion, an engineer battalion, a telegraph battalion, and a trains battalion. Some corps areas also disposed of fortress troops; each of the 25 corps had a Field Aviation Unit (Feldflieger Abteilung) attached to it normally equipped with six unarmed"A" or "B" class unarmed two-seat observation aircraft apiece.[19]
In wartime, the army corps became a mobile tactical formation and fourHöhere Kavallerie-Kommando (Higher Cavalry Commands) were formed from the Cavalry Inspectorate, the equivalent of corps, being made up of two divisions of cavalry.
The areas formerly covered by the corps each became the responsibility of aWehrkreis (military district, sometimes translated as corps area). The military districts were to supervise the training and enlistment of reservists and new recruits. Originally each military district was linked to an army corps; thusWehrkreis I took over the area that I.Armeekorps had been responsible for and sent replacements to the same formation. The first sixteen reserve corps raised followed the same pattern; X.Reserve-Korps was made up of reservists from the same area as X.Armeekorps. However, these links between rear areas and front line units were broken as the war went on and later corps were raised with troops from all over Germany.
The basic tactical formation was thedivision. A standard Imperial German division was organised into:
Division HQ
Two infantry brigades organised into a brigade HQ and two regiments each (either of the line or light infantry),
A cavalry brigade organised into a brigade HQ and two regiments
An artillery brigade organised into an HQ and two regiments
Combat service and support regiments under division HQ
One of the divisions in a corps area usually also managed the corpsLandwehr region (Landwehrbezirk). In 1914, besides the Guard Corps (two Guard divisions and a Guard cavalry division), there were 42 regular divisions in the Prussian Army (including four Saxon divisions and two Württemberg divisions), and six divisions in the Bavarian Army.
These divisions were all mobilised in August 1914. They were reorganised, receiving engineer companies and other support units from their corps, and giving up most of their cavalry to form cavalry divisions. Reserve divisions were also formed,Landwehr brigades were aggregated into divisions, and other divisions were formed from replacement (Ersatz) units. As World War I progressed, additional divisions were formed, and by wars' end, 251 divisions had been formed or reformed in the German Army's structure.
Theregiment was the basic combat unit as well as the recruiting base for soldiers. When inducted, a soldier entered a regiment, usually through its replacement or training battalion, and received his basic training. There were three basic types of regiment: infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Other specialties, such as pioneers (combat engineers) and signal troops, were organised into smaller support units. Regiments also carried the traditions of the army, in many cases stretching back into the 17th and 18th centuries. After World War I, regimental traditions were carried forward in theReichswehr and its successor, theWehrmacht, but the chain of tradition was broken in 1945 as West German and East German units did not carry forward pre-1945 traditions.
Each Imperial German regiment of infantry had headquarters units, three battalions, and one training battalion assigned to the regimental depot. Cavalry, field, and horse artillery regiments were also similarly organised.
The German Empire was formed by 38 duchies and kingdoms each with their traditions of warfare. Although the new army of the united German Empire was nominally "German" and most state forces served integrated into the Prussian Army, the Bavarian Army, the Saxon Army, and the Württemberg Army remained independent national contingents:
The Royal Saxon Army...was the national army of the Kingdom of Saxony one of the four states of the GermanReich to retain its own armed forces.
Nevertheless, in times of war, all of these would pledge allegiance to the Kaiser and the German nation.[21] They did, however, remain organisationally distinct, being able to raise units of their own without assistance from the dominating Prussians. In one instance, Freiherr von Sonden (from Württemberg) was able to "quite legitimately send a request directly to the Ministry of War inStuttgart for the raising of a new artillery regiment".[22]
While the aforementioned contingents wore distinctive uniforms, with the differences becoming less over time, the origin of units would be denoted on the uniform in the colours of the rank insignia until the early 20th century. They also had differentcockades on the headgear. The Imperial cockade was to be worn above the state cockade on hats and caps, while they were worn on the right (state on the left) of helmets and more specialised headgear.
When the British decided toreformtheir army in the 1860s, they surveyed the major European forces and decided that the Prussian system was the best one. That system was continued into the Imperial Army after 1871 and resulted in a modest cadre of professional officers and sergeants, and a large reserve force that could be quickly mobilised at the start of a war. The British could not use the system because they rejected conscription. The Japanese, however, were also observing the reserve system and, unlike the British, decided to copy the Prussian model.[24]Barnett (1970) explains that every young man was drafted at age 18, with the upper-class becoming officers:
the Prussian system... was based on service of only three years with the colors... and four years in the reserve. The Prussian standing army had become simply a training cadre for the intake of conscripts. The Prussian army's organization for peace and war was virtually the same. Prussia was divided into army-corps districts for the purposes both of administration and of recruitment. On the outbreak of war the command organizations of the district became that of a corps in the field. Localization of the Army and its recruitment gave the districts pride and interest in their 'own' corps.[25]
At the time of the first world war, compulsory military service for men began at the age of 18 and lasted until the age of 46. Compulsory service was divided into army service andLandsturm-service. Those drafted into the army served: (1) active-duty service during 2 years (3 in the cavalry) from the age of 20, (2) reserve-duty service during 5 years (4 in the cavalry), (3) in theLandwehr first levy during the 18th and 19th year of age, and for 5 years after the reserve-duty service, (4) in the Landwehr second levy until the 40th birthday. At that age army conscripts belonged to the Landsturm until the age of 46. Men not drafted for the army or the navy belonged to the Landsturm from age 18 until age 46.[26]
One-year volunteers served for just one year, but was required to equip and support themselves at their own expense during the military service. They were expected to be trained asreserve officers if suitable, or otherwise as reserve non-commissioned officers.[27]
The German Empire accounted for 12% of global industrial output in 1914, making it the largest industrial base in Continental Europe, and behind only Great Britain (18%) and the United States (22%) worldwide. The army closely cooperated with industry, especially in the Great War, with particular focus on the very rapidly changing aircraft industry. The army set prices and labour exemptions, regulated the supply of credit and raw materials, limited patent rights so as to allow cross-licensing among firms, and supervised management–labour relationships. The result was very rapid expansion and a high output of high-quality aircraft, as well as high wages that attracted the best machinists. Apart from aircraft, the army's regulation of the rest of the war economy was largely inefficient.[28]
TheDeutscheLuftstreitkräfte, known before October 1916 asDie Fliegertruppen des deutschen Kaiserreiches (The Air Corps of the German Empire),[29] was the over-land air arm of the German Army during World War I. Although its name actually means something very close to the "Air Forces", it remained an integral part of the German Army for the duration of the war. TheKaiserliche Marine of the German Empire had their own,separateMarine-Fliegerabteilung maritime aviation forces, apart from theLuftstreitkräfte of the army.
The German Army from 1871 to 1914 inherited the various traditions and military ranks of its constituent states, thus becoming a truly federal armed service.
Critics long believed that the army's officer corps was heavily dominated byJunker aristocrats, so that commoners were shunted into low-prestige branches, such as the heavy artillery or supply. However, by the 1890s, the top ranks were opened to highly talented commoners.[30][31]
Militärkonvention zwischen dem Norddeutschen Bunde (bzw. Preußen) und Sachsen vom 7. Februar 1867
Militärkonvention zwischen dem Norddeutschen Bunde und Hessen vom 13. Juni 1871 (Ersatz für die vom 7. April 1867)
Militärkonvention zwischen dem Norddeutschen Bunde und Mecklenburg-Schwerin vom 19. Dezember 1872 (Ersatz für die von 24. Juni 1868)
Militärkonvention zwischen dem Norddeutschen Bunde und Mecklenburg-Strelitz vom 23. Dezember 1872 (Ersatz für die vom 9. November 1867)
Militärkonvention zwischen dem Norddeutschen Bunde und Oldenburg vom 15. Juni 1867
Militärkonvention zwischen dem Norddeutschen Bunde und Braunschweig vom 9./18. März 1886
Militärkonvention zwischen dem Norddeutschen Bunde einerseits und Sachsen-Weimar-Eisenach, Sachsen-Altenburg, Sachsen-Coburg-Gotha, Sachsen-Meiningen, Reuß ältere Linie, Reuß jüngere Linie und Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt vom 15. September 1873
Militärkonvention zwischen dem Norddeutschen Bunde und Anhalt vom 16. September 1873 (Ersatz für die vom 28. Juni 1867)
Militärkonvention zwischen dem Norddeutschen Bunde und Schwarzburg-Sondershausen vom 17. September 1873 (Ersatz für die vom 28. Juni 1867)
Militärkonvention zwischen dem Norddeutschen Bunde und Lippe vom 14. November 1873 (Ersatz für die vom 26. Juni 1867)
Militärkonvention zwischen dem Norddeutschen Bunde und Schaumburg-Lippe vom 25. September 1873 (Ersatz für die vom 30. Juni 1867)
Militärkonvention zwischen dem Norddeutschen Bunde und Waldeck vom 24. November 1877 (Ersatz für die vom 6. August 1867)
Militärkonvention zwischen dem Norddeutschen Bunde und Lübeck vom 27. Juni 1867
Militärkonvention zwischen dem Norddeutschen Bunde und Bremen vom 27. Juni 1867
Militärkonvention zwischen dem Norddeutschen Bunde und Hamburg vom 23. Juli 1867
Artikel III. § 5 of theBundesvertrag vom 23. November 1870 mit Bayern
Militärkonvention zwischen dem Norddeutschen Bunde und Baden vom 25. November 1870
Militärkonvention zwischen dem Norddeutschen Bunde und Württemberg vom 25. November 1870
^Several German armies and national contingents, including Prussia and Bavaria, traditionally used two different captain ranks that originated with the ownership of units. The Captain 1st Class was either the proprietor who had raised and equipped the Company / Troop / Battery or was a gentleman or nobleman who had bought a commission as its nominal Captain. The Captain 2nd Class (orStabshauptmann > "Staff Captain") was its actual commander. By the end of the 19th century that dual-system had been gradually phased out and replaced by a single rank.
^"Militair-Strafgesetzbuch vom 20. Juni 1872" inGesetz-Sammlung für das Deutsche Reich, 1867 bis 1883, incl. Vol. 1. Berlin, 1884.p. 408.Archived 2023-04-04 at theWayback Machine(in German)
^H. E. Fisk (1924),The Inter-Allied Debts, pp. 13 & 325, reprinted in Horst Menderhausen (1943 edition),The Economics of War, appendix table II
^"Militair-Strafgesetzbuch vom 20. Juni 1872" inGesetz-Sammlung für das Deutsche Reich, 1867 bis 1883, incl. Vol. 1. Berlin, 1884.p. 408.Archived 2023-04-04 at theWayback Machine(in German)
^Gordon A. Craig,The politics of the Prussian army 1640–1945 (1955) 255–298.
^James Stone, "Spies and diplomats in Bismarck's Germany: collaboration between military intelligence and the Foreign Office, 1871–1881."Journal of Intelligence History (2014) 13#1 pp: 22–40.
^Bara, Xavier (2012). "The Kishū Army and the Setting of the Prussian Model in Feudal Japan, 1860–1871".War in History.19 (2):153–171.doi:10.1177/0968344511432980.S2CID154743242.
^Barnett, Correlli (1970).Britain and her Army 1509–1970: A Military, Political and Social Survey. p. 285.
^Morrow, John H. Jr (1977). "Industrialization Mobilization in World War I: The Prussian Army and the Aircraft Industry".Journal of Economic History.37 (1):36–51.doi:10.1017/S0022050700096704.JSTOR2119443.S2CID153992821.
^Ulrich Trumpener, "Junkers and Others: The Rise of Commoners in the Prussian Army, 1871–1914,"Canadian Journal of History (1979) 14#1 pp. 29–47
^Dennis E. Showalter, "The Political Soldiers of Bismarck's Germany: Myths and Realities,"German Studies Review (1994) 17#1 pp. 59–77in JSTORArchived 2016-11-13 at theWayback Machine
^Edmonds, James (1987).The Occupation of the Rhineland. London: HMSO. p. 213.ISBN978-0-11-290454-0.
Herrera, Geoffrey L. "Inventing the Railroad and Rifle Revolution: Information, Military Innovation and the Rise of Germany."Journal of Strategic Studies (2004) 27#2 pp: 243–271.online
Hull, Isabel V.Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany (Cornell University Press, 2004)[ISBN missing]
Muth, Jörg.Command Culture: Officer Education in the US Army and the German Armed Forces, 1901–1940, and the Consequences for World War II (University of North Texas Press, 2011)[ISBN missing]
Showalter, Dennis. "From Deterrence to Doomsday Machine: The German Way of War, 1890–1914."Journal of Military History (2000) 64#3 pp: 679–710.JSTOR120865.
Showalter, Dennis E.Railroads and rifles: soldiers, technology, and the unification of Germany (Archon Books, 1975)[ISBN missing]
Showalter, Dennis E. "Army and Society in Imperial Germany: The Pains of Modernization."Journal of Contemporary History (1983): 583–618.JSTOR260305.
Stevenson, David. "Fortifications and the European Military Balance before 1914."Journal of Strategic Studies (2012) 35#6 pp: 829–859.
Stone, James.The war scare of 1875: Bismarck and Europe in the mid-1870s (Steiner, 2010)[ISBN missing]
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