Identity politics is politics based on a particular identity, such asethnicity,race,nationality,religion,denomination,gender,sexual orientation,social background,political affiliation,caste,age,education,disability,opinion,intelligence, andsocial class. The term encompasses various often-populist political phenomena and rhetoric, such as governmental migration policies that regulate mobility and opportunity based on identities, left-wing agendas involvingintersectional politics orclass reductionism, and right-wing nationalist agendas of exclusion of national or ethnic "others".
The termidentity politics dates to the late twentieth century, although it had precursors in the writings of individuals such asMary Wollstonecraft andFrantz Fanon.[1] Many contemporary advocates of identity politics take anintersectional perspective, which they argue accounts for a range of interacting systems of oppression that may affect a person's life and originate from their various identities. To these advocates, identity politics helps center the experiences of those they view as facing systemic oppression so that society can better understand the interplay of different forms of demographic-based oppression and ensure that no one group is disproportionately affected by political actions.[2][3][4][5] Contemporary identitylabels—such as people of specific race, ethnicity, sex,gender identity,sexual orientation, age—are not mutually exclusive but are, in many cases, compounded into one when describing hyper-specific groups. An example is that ofAfrican-Americanhomosexualwomen, who can constitute a particular hyper-specific identity class.[6]
Criticism of identity politics often comes from either thecenter-right or thefar-left on the political spectrum. Manysocialists,anarchists andMarxists have criticized identity politics for its divisive nature, claiming that it forms identities that can undermine their goals ofproletariat unity andclass struggle.[7][8][9] On the other hand, many conservativethink tanks andmedia outlets have criticized identity politics for other reasons, such as that it is inherentlycollectivist and prejudicial. Center-right critics of identity politics have seen it asparticularist, in contrast to theuniversalism espoused by manyliberal politics, or argue that it detracts attention from non-identity based structures of oppression and exploitation.
A leftist critique of identity politics, such as that ofNancy Fraser,[10] argues that political mobilization based on identitarian affirmation leads to surface redistribution—that is, a redistribution within existing structures and relations ofproduction that does not challenge the status quo. Instead, Fraser argued, identitarian deconstruction, rather than affirmation, is more conducive to leftist goals of economic redistribution. Marxist academics such as Kurzwelly, Pérez, and Spiegel, writing forDialectical Anthropology, argue that because the termidentity politics is defined differently based on a given author's or activist's ideological position, it is analytically imprecise.[11] The same authors argue in another article that identity politics often leads to reproduction andreification ofessentialist notions of identity, which they view as inherently erroneous.[12]
TheOxford English Dictionary traces the phrase "identity politics" to 1973.[13]
Mark Mazower writes of the late 20th century: "In general, political activism increasingly revolved ... around issues of'identity.' At some point in the 1970s this term was borrowed fromsocial psychology and applied with abandon to societies, nations and groups."[14]
During the late 1970s, increasing numbers of women—namely Jewish women, women of color, and lesbians—criticized the assumption of a common "woman's experience" irrespective of unique differences in race, ethnicity, class, sexuality, and culture.[15] The termidentity politics was (re-)coined by theCombahee River Collective in 1977.[16] The collective group of women saw identity politics as an analysis that introduced opportunity for Black women to be actively involved in politics, while simultaneously acting as a tool to authenticate Black women's personal experiences.[17] In the ensuing decades, the term has been employed in myriad cases with different connotations dependent on context.[18][1] It subsequently gained currency with the emergence ofsocial activism,[clarification needed] manifesting in various dialogues within thefeminist, Americancivil-rights, andLGBT movements, as well as within multiplenationalist andpostcolonial organizations.[19][20]
In academic usage, the termidentity politics refers to a wide range of political activities and theoretical analyses rooted in experiences of injustice shared by different, often excluded social groups. In this context, identity politics aims to reclaim greaterself-determination and political freedom for marginalized peoples through understanding particularparadigms and lifestyle factors, and challenging externally-imposed characterizations and limitations, instead of organizing solely aroundstatus quo belief-systems or traditional party-affiliations.[1]Identity is used "as a tool to frame political claims, promote political ideologies, or stimulate and orient social and political action, usually in a larger context of inequality or injustice and with the aim of asserting group distinctiveness and belonging and gainingpower and recognition."[19]
The termidentity politics may have been used in political discourse since at least the 1970s.[18] The first known written appearance of the term is found in the April 1977 statement of theBlack feministsocialist group,Combahee River Collective, which was originally printed in 1979'sCapitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism,[21] later inHome Girls: A Black Feminist Anthology, edited byBarbara Smith, a founding member of the Collective,[22] who have been credited with coining the term.[23][24] In their terminal statement, they said:[25]
[A]s children we realized that we were different from boys and that we were treated different—for example, when we were told in the same breath to be quiet both for the sake of being 'ladylike' and to make us less objectionable in the eyes of white people. In the process of consciousness-raising, actually life-sharing, we began to recognize the commonality of our experiences and, from the sharing and growing consciousness, to build a politics that will change our lives and inevitably end our oppression....We realize that the only people who care enough about us to work consistently for our liberation are us. Our politics evolve from a healthy love for ourselves, our sisters and our community which allows us to continue our struggle and work. This focusing upon our own oppression is embodied in the concept of identity politics. We believe that the most profound and potentially most radical politics come directly out of our own identity, as opposed to working to end somebody else's oppression.
— Combahee River Collective, "The Combahee River Collective Statement"[26]
Identity politics, as a mode of categorizing, are closely connected to the ascription that some social groups are oppressed (such as women,ethnic minorities, andsexual minorities); that is, the idea that individuals belonging to those groups are, by virtue of their identity, more vulnerable to forms of oppression such ascultural imperialism,violence,exploitation of labour,marginalization, or subjugation.[1] Therefore, these lines of social difference can be seen as ways to gain empowerment or avenues through which to work towards a more equal society.[27] In the United States, identity politics is usually ascribed to these oppressed minority groups who are fighting discrimination. In Canada and Spain, identity politics has been used to describeseparatist movements; in Africa, Asia, and eastern Europe, it has described violent nationalist and ethnic conflicts. Overall, in Europe, identity politics are exclusionary and based on the idea that thesilent majority needs to be protected fromglobalization andimmigration.[28]
During the 1980s, the politics of identity became very prominent and it was also linked to a new wave of social movement activism.[29][additional citation(s) needed]Social movements have a significant influence on the law through statutory and constitutional evolution according toWilliam Eskridge.[30]
Racial identity politics dominated American politics in the 19th century, during theSecond Party System (1830s–1850s)[31] as well as theThird Party System (1850s–1890s).[32] Racial identity has been the central theme inSouthern politics sinceslavery was abolished.[33]
Similar patterns which have appeared in the 21st century are commonly referenced in popular culture,[34] and are increasingly analyzed in media and social commentary as an interconnected part of politics and society.[35][36] Both a majority and minority group phenomenon, racial identity politics can develop as a reaction to the historical legacy of race-based oppression of a people[37] as well as a general group identity issue, as "racial identity politics utilizes racial consciousness or the group'scollective memory and experiences as the essential framework for interpreting the actions and interests of all other social groups."[38]
Carol M. Swain has argued that non-white ethnic pride and an "emphasis on racial identity politics" is fomenting the rise ofwhite nationalism.[39] AnthropologistMichael Messner has suggested that theMillion Man March was an example of racial identity politics in the United States.[40]
Arab identity politics concerns the form of identity-based politics which is derived from the racial or ethnocultural consciousness of theArabs. In theregionalism of theArab world and theMiddle East, it has a particular meaning in relation to the national and cultural identities of the citizens of non-Arab countries, such asTurkey andIran.[41][42] In their 2010Being Arab: Arabism and the Politics of Recognition, academicsChristopher Wise andPaul James challenged the view that, in the post-Afghanistan andIraq invasion era, Arab identity-driven politics were ending. Refuting the view that had "drawn many analysts to conclude that the era of Arab identity politics has passed", Wise and James examined its development as a viable alternative toIslamic fundamentalism in the Arab world.[43]
According toMarc Lynch, the post-Arab Spring era has seen increasing Arab identity politics, which is "marked by state-state rivalries as well as state-society conflicts". Lynch believes this is creating a newArab Cold War, no longer characterized by Sunni-Shia sectarian divides but by a reemergentArab identity in the region.[44]Najla Said has explored her lifelong experience with Arab identity politics in her bookLooking for Palestine.[45]
In the political realm of the United States, according to Jane Junn and Natalie Masuoka, the possibilities which exist for an Asian American vote are built upon the assumption that those Americans who are broadly categorized as Asians share a sense of racial identity, and thisgroup consciousness has political consequences. However, the belief in the existence of a monolithic Asian American bloc has been challenged because populations are diverse in terms of national origin and language—no one group is predominant—and scholars suggest that these many diverse groups favor groups which share their distinctive national origin over any belief in the existence of apan-ethnic racial identity.[46] According to the 2000 Census, more than six national origin groups are classified collectively as Asian American, and these include: Chinese (23%), Filipino (18%), Asian Indian (17%), Vietnamese (11%), Korean (11%), and Japanese (8%), along with an "other Asian" category (12%). In addition, the definitions which are applied to racial categories in the United States are uniquely American constructs that Asian American immigrants may not adhere to upon entry to the United States.
Junn and Masuoka find that in comparison to blacks, the Asian American identity is more latent, and racial group consciousness is more susceptible to the surrounding context.
Black feminist identity politics are the identity-based politics derived from the lived experiences of struggles and oppression faced by Black women.
In 1977, theCombahee River Collective (CRC) argued that Black women struggled with facing their oppression due to the sexism present within theCivil Rights Movement and the racism present withinsecond-wave feminism. The CRC coined the term "identity politics", and in their opinion, naming the unique struggle and oppression Black women faced, aided Black women in the U.S. within radical movements and at large. The term "identity politics", in the opinion of those within the CRC, gave Black women a tool, from which they could use to confront the oppression they were facing. The CRC also claimed to expand upon the prior feminist adage that "the personal is political", pointing to their own consciousness-raising sessions, centering of Black speech, and communal sharing of experiences of oppression as practices that expanded the phrase's scope. As mentioned earlier K. Crenshaw, claimed that the oppression of Black women is illustrated in two different directions: race and sex.
In 1988, Deborah K. King coined the termmultiple jeopardy, theory that expands on how factors of oppression are all interconnected. King suggested that the identities of gender, class, and race each have an individual prejudicial connotation, which has an incremental effect on the inequity of which one experiences.
In 1991, Nancie Caraway explained from a white feminist perspective that the politics of Black women had to be comprehended by broader feminist movements in the understanding that the different forms of oppression that Black women face (via race and gender) are interconnected, presenting a compound of oppression (Intersectionality).
A contemporary example of Black identity politics is #BlackLivesMatter which began with a hashtag. In 2013, Alicia Garza, Patrisse Cullors and Opal Tometi created the hashtag in response to the acquittal ofGeorge Zimmerman, the man who killedTrayvon Martin in 2012.[47] Michael Brown andEric Garner were killed by police in 2014, which propelled the #BlackLivesMatter movement forward, first nationally, and then globally.[48] The intention of #BlackLivesMatter was to create more widespread awareness of the way law enforcement engages with the black community and individuals, including claims of excessive force and issues with accountability within law enforcement agencies.[49] The hashtag and proceeding movement garnered a lot of attention from all sides of the political sphere. A counter movement formed the hashtag, #AllLivesMatter, in response to #BlackLivesMatter.[50]
In 1998, political scientistsJeffrey Kaplan and Leonard Weinberg predicted that, by the late 20th-century, a "Euro-American radical right" would promote a trans-nationalwhite identity politics, which would invoke populist grievance narratives and encourage hostility against non-white peoples andmulticulturalism. In the United States, mainstream news has identifiedDonald Trump's presidency as a signal of increasing and widespread utilization of white identity politics within the Republican Party and political landscape. JournalistsMichael Scherer andDavid Smith have reported on its development since the mid-2010s.
Ron Brownstein believed that President Trump uses "White Identity Politics" to bolster his base and that this would ultimately limit his ability to reach out to non-White American voters for the2020 United States presidential election. A four-yearReuters andIpsos analysis concurred that "Trump's brand of white identity politics may be less effective in the 2020 election campaign." Alternatively, examining the same poll, David Smith has written that "Trump's embrace of white identity politics may work to his advantage" in 2020. During theDemocratic primaries, presidential candidatePete Buttigieg publicly warned that the president and his administration were using white identity politics, which he said was the most divisive form of identity politics. ColumnistReihan Salam writes that he is not convinced that Trump uses "white identity politics" given the fact that he still has significant support from liberal and moderate Republicans—who are more favorable toward immigration and the legalization of undocumented immigrants—but believes that it could become a bigger issue as whites become a minority and assert their rights like other minority groups. Salam also states that an increase in "white identity" politics is far from certain given the very high rates ofintermarriage and the historical example of the once Anglo-Protestant cultural majority embracing a more inclusive white cultural majority which included Jews, Italians, Poles, Arabs, and Irish.[undue weight? –discuss]
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A contemporary example of "White identity politics" is the right-wing groupProud Boys.Proud Boys was formed byGavin McInnes in 2016. Members are males who identify as right-wing conservatives. They take part in political protests with the most infamous beingJanuary 6, 2021, at the U.S. Capitol, which became violent and led to the arrest of their leader,Henry "Enrique" Tarrio and many others.[51]Proud Boys identify as supporters ofDonald Trump for President and are outspoken supporters of Americans having unfettered access to firearms by way of the 2nd amendment of the US constitution, having expressed the belief that gun law reform is a "sinister authoritarian plot" to disarm law abiding citizens.[52] According to an article published by Southern Poverty Law Group,Proud Boys members are regularly affiliated with white nationalist extremists and are known for sharing white nationalist content across social media platforms.[53]
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Another contemporary example is the hashtag movement #AllLivesMatter. #AllLivesMatter began as a counter narrative to #BlackLivesMatter. People who identify with this countermovement use this hashtag to represent what they call "anti-identity" identity politics, which is supposed to symbolize a movement against racial identities, but they've been criticized as being a white nationalist movement.[54] Created, adopted and circulated beginning in 2016, #WhiteLivesMatter exalted themselves as an anti-racist movement, while identifying #BlackLivesMatter as the opposite.[54]
ColumnistRoss Douthat has argued that white identity politics have been important to American politics since theRichard Nixon-era of the Republican Party. HistorianNell Irvin Painter has analyzedEric Kaufmann's thesis that the phenomenon of white identity politics is caused by immigration-derivedracial diversity, which reduces the white majority, and an "anti-majority adversary culture". Writing inVox, political commentatorEzra Klein believes that demographic change has fueled the emergence of white identity politics.
Viet Thanh Nguyen says that "to have no identity at all is the privilege of whiteness, which is the identity that pretends not to have an identity, that denies how it is tied to capitalism, to race, and to war".
According toLeonie Huddy,Lilliana Mason, andS. Nechama Horwitz, the majority of Latinos in the United States identity with the Democratic Party.[55] Latinos' Democratic proclivities can be explained by: ideological policy preferences and an expressive identity based on the defense of Latino identity and status, with a strong support for the latter explanation hinged on an analysis of the 2012 Latino Immigrant National Election Study and American National Election Study focused on Latino immigrants and citizens respectively. When perceiving pervasive discrimination against Latinos and animosity from the Republican party, a strong partisanship preference further intensified, and in return, increased Latino political campaign engagement.
In India, caste, religion, tribe, ethnicity play a role in electoral politics, government jobs andaffirmative actions, development projects.[56]
Due to somewhat competing tribe-based versus pan-Māori concepts, there is both an internal and external utilization of Māori identity politics inNew Zealand.[57] Projected outwards, Māori identity politics has been a disrupting force in thepolitics of New Zealand and post-colonial conceptions of nationhood.[58] Its development has also been explored as causing parallel ethnic identity developments in non-Māori populations.[59] AcademicAlison Jones, in her co-writtenTuai: A Traveller in Two Worlds, suggests that a form of Māori identity politics, directly oppositional toPākehā (white New Zealanders), has helped provide a "basis for internal collaboration and a politics of strength".[60]
A 2009,Ministry of Social Development journal identified Māori identity politics, and societal reactions to it, as the most prominent factor behind significant changes in self-identification from the 2006 New Zealand census.[61]
Since the 1970s, the interaction of religion and politics has been associated with the rise of Islamist movements in the Middle East. Salwa Ismail posits that the Muslim identity is related to social dimensions such as gender, class, and lifestyles (Intersectionality), thus, different Muslims occupy different social positions in relation to the processes of globalization. Not all uniformly engage in the construction of Muslim identity, and they do not all apply to a monolithic Muslim identity.
The construction of British Muslim identity politics is marked withIslamophobia; Jonathan Brit suggests that political hostility toward the Muslim "other" and the reification of an overarching identity that obscures and denies cross-cutting collective identities or existential individuality are charges made against an assertive Muslim identity politics in Britain.[62] In addition, because Muslim identity politics is seen as internally/externally divisive and therefore counterproductive, as well as the result of manipulation by religious conservatives and local/national politicians, the progressive policies of the anti-racist left have been outflanked. Brit sees the segmentation that divided British Muslims amongst themselves and with the anti-racist alliance in Britain as a consequence of patriarchal, conservative mosque-centered leadership.
ALe Monde/IFOP poll in January 2011 conducted in France and Germany found that a majority felt Muslims are "scattered improperly"; an analyst forIFOP said the results indicated something "beyond linking immigration with security or immigration with unemployment, to linking Islam with a threat to identity".[63]
Gender identity politics is an approach that views politics, both in practice and as an academic discipline, as having a gendered nature and that gender is an identity that influences how people think.[64] Politics has become increasingly gender political as formal structures and informal 'rules of the game' have become gendered. How institutions affect men and women differently are starting to be analysed in more depth as gender will affect institutional innovation.[65]
A key element of studying electoral behavior in all democracies ispolitical partisanship. In 1996, Eric Plutzer and John F. Zipp examined the election of 1992 election, also commonly referred to as "Year of the Woman", where a then-record- breaking fourteen women ran for governor or U.S. senator, four of whom were successfully elected into office. In analyzing the possibility that male and female voters react differently to the opportunity to cast a vote for a woman, the study provided lent support to the idea that women tend to vote for women and men tend to vote against them.[66] For example, among Republican voters in California,Barbara Boxer ran 10 points behindBill Clinton among men and about even among women, whileDianne Feinstein ran about 6 points among men but 11 points ahead among women. This gender effect was further amplified for Democratic female candidates who were rated as feminist. These results demonstrate that gender identity has and can function as a cue for voting behavior.
Scholars of social movements and democratic theorists disagree on whether identity politics weaken women's social movements and undermine their influence on public policy or have reverse effects. S. Laurel Weldon argues that when marginalized groups organize around an intersectional social location, knowledge about the social group is generated, feelings of affiliation between group members are strengthened, and the movement's agenda becomes more representative. Specifically for the United States, Weldon suggests that organizing women by race strengthens these movements and improves government responsiveness to both violence against women of color and women in general.[67]
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By the early-1960s,lesbian,gay,bisexual, andtransgender people in the United States were forming more visible communities, and this was reflected in the political strategies of Americanhomophile groups.Frank Kameny, an Americanastronomer andgay rights activist, had co-founded theMattachine Society of Washington in 1961. While the society did not take much political activism to the streets at first, Kameny and several members attended the 1963March on Washington, where having seen the methods used by Blackcivil rights activists, they then applied them to thehomophile movement. Kameny had also been inspired by the black power movements slogan "Black is Beautiful", coining his own term "Gay is Good".[68]
Thegay liberation movement of the late-1960s urged lesbians and gay men to engage in radicaldirect action, and to counter societal shame withgay pride.[69] In thefeminist spirit of the personal being political, the most basic form of activism was an emphasis oncoming out to family, friends and colleagues, and living life as an openly lesbian or gay person.[69]
By the mid-1970s, an "ethnic model of identity" had surpassed the popularity of both the homophile movement and gay liberation.[70] Proponents operated through asexual minority framework and advocated eitherreformism orseparatism (notablylesbian separatism).[70]
While the 1970s were the peak of "gay liberation" in New York City and other urban areas in the United States, "gay liberation" was the term still used instead of "gay pride" in more oppressive areas into the mid-1980s, with some organizations opting for the more inclusive "lesbian and gay liberation".[69][71] Women and transgender activists had lobbied for more inclusive names from the beginning of the movement, but theinitialismLGBT, or "queer" as a counterculture shorthand for LGBT, did not gain much acceptance as an umbrella term until much later in the 1980s, and in some areas not until the '90s or even '00s.[69][71][72] During this period in the United States, identity politics were largely seen in these communities in the definitions espoused by writers such as self-identified, "black, dyke, feminist, poet, mother"Audre Lorde'sview, thatlived experience matters, defines us, and is the only thing that grants authority to speak on these topics; that, "If I didn't define myself for myself, I would be crunched into other people's fantasies for me and eaten alive."[73][74][75]
The termidentity politics has been applied retroactively to varying movements that long predate its coinage. HistorianArthur Schlesinger Jr. discussed identity politics extensively in his 1991 bookThe Disuniting of America. Schlesinger, a strong supporter of liberal conceptions ofcivil rights, argues that aliberal democracy requires a common basis for culture and society to function. Rather than seeing civil society as already fractured along lines of power and powerlessness (according to race, ethnicity, sexuality, etc.), Schlesinger suggests that basing politics on group marginalization is itself what fractures the civil polity, and that identity politics therefore works against creating real opportunities for ending marginalization. Schlesinger believes that "movements for civil rights should aim toward full acceptance and integration of marginalized groups into the mainstream culture, rather than … perpetuating that marginalization through affirmations of difference."[76]
Similarly in the United Kingdom, authorOwen Jones argues that identity politics often marginalize theworking class, saying:
In the 1950s and 1960s, left-wing intellectuals who were both inspired and informed by a powerful labour movement wrote hundreds of books and articles on working-class issues. Such work would help shape the views of politicians at the very top of the Labour Party. Today, progressive intellectuals are far more interested in issues of identity. ... Of course, the struggles for the emancipation of women, gays, and ethnic minorities are exceptionally important causes. New Labour has co-opted them, passing genuinely progressive legislation on gay equality and women's rights, for example. But it is an agenda that has happily co-existed with the sidelining of the working class in politics, allowing New Labour to protect its radical flank while pressing ahead with Thatcherite policies.
— Owen Jones,Chavs: The Demonization of the Working Class[77][undue weight? –discuss]
Some supporters of identity politics take stances based onGayatri Chakravorty Spivak's work (namely, "Can the Subaltern Speak?") and have described some forms of identity politics asstrategic essentialism, a form which has sought to work withhegemonic discourses to reform the understanding of "universal" goals.[78][79][80] Others point out the erroneous logic and the ultimate dangers of reproducing strong identitarian divisions inherent in essentialism.[81] For queer theoristPaul B. Preciado, "movements for the emancipation of subaltern minorities (racial, gender and sexual, etc.) ended up crystallizing into identity politics. Without having dismantled the regimes of racial, sexual or gender oppression, identity politics have ended up renaturalizing and even intensifying the differences."[82]
Anies Baswedan, who has been doing identity politics inIndonesia since 2017, referred to it as unavoidable because every candidate competing in a political contest will always have an identity as their nature.[83][84] During his 2024 Presidential Candidate, he added that identity politics is a form of support and conveying the aspirations of society that should not be met with concern.[85]
Critics argue that groups based on a particular shared identity (e.g. race, or gender identity) can divert energy and attention from more fundamental issues, similar to the history ofdivide and rule strategies.
In response to the formulations of theCombahee River Collective that necessitated the organization of women around intersectional identities to bring about broader social change, socialist and radical feminists insisted that, instead, activism would require support for addressing more "basic" forms of oppression.[15] Other feminists also mirrored this sentiment, implying that a politics of issues should supersede a politics of identity. Tarrow also asserts that identity politics can produce insular, sectarian, and divisive movements incapable of expanding membership, broadening appeals, and negotiating with prospective allies.[86] In other words, separate organization undermines movement identity, distracts activists from important issues, and prevents the creation of a common agenda.
According toJonathan Haidt, those who criticize identity politics from the right see it as inherentlycollectivist andprejudicial, in contradiction to the ideals ofclassical liberalism.[87]
Jordan Peterson has criticized identity politics and argues that it is practiced on both sides of the political divide: "[t]heleft plays them on behalf of theoppressed, let's say, and theright tends to play them on behalf ofnationalism andethnic pride". He considers both equally dangerous, saying that what should be emphasized, instead, is individual focus and personal responsibility.[88]
Those who criticize identity politics from the left, such asMarxists andMarxist–Leninists, see identity politics as a version ofbourgeois nationalism, i.e. as adivide and conquerstrategy by theruling classes to divide people bynationality,race,ethnicity,religion, etc. so as todistract theworking class from uniting for the purpose ofclass struggle andproletarian revolution.[89][7][90][91]
SociologistCharles Derber asserts that the American left is "largely an identity-politics party" and that it "offers no broad critique of the political economy of capitalism. It focuses on reforms for blacks and women and so forth. But it doesn't offer a contextual analysis within capitalism." Both he andDavid North of theSocialist Equality Party posit that these fragmented and isolated identity movements which permeate the left have allowed for a far-right resurgence.[92]Cornel West asserted that discourse on racial, gender and sexual orientation identity was "crucial" and "indispensable", but emphasized that it "must be connected to a moral integrity and deep political solidarity that hones in on a financialized form of predatory capitalism. A capitalism that is killing the planet, poor people, working people here and abroad."[93] HistorianGary Gerstle writes that identity politics and multiculturalism thrived in theneoliberal era precisely because these movements did not threatencapital accumulation, and over the same period "pressure on capitalist elites and their supporters to compromise with the working class was vanishing." The ideological space to oppose capitalism shrank with thefall of communism, forcing the left to "redefine their radicalism in alternative terms".[94]
Critiques of identity politics have also been expressed by writers such asEric Hobsbawm,[89]Todd Gitlin,[95]Adolph Reed,[96][97]Michael Tomasky,Richard Rorty,Michael Parenti,[91]Jodi Dean,[98]Sean Wilentz,[99]Gabriel Rockhill[100] and philosopherSlavoj Žižek.[101] Hobsbawm, as a Marxist, criticized nationalisms and the principle of national self-determination adopted in many countries after 1919, since in his view national governments are often merely an expression of a ruling class or power, and their proliferation was a source of the wars of the 20th century. Hence, Hobsbawm argues that identity politics, such asqueer nationalism,Islamism,Cornish nationalism orUlster loyalism are just other versions ofbourgeois nationalism. The view that identity politics (rooted in challenging racism, sexism, and the like) obscures class inequality is widespread in the United States and other Western nations. This framing ignores how class-based politics are identity politics themselves, according toJeff Sparrow.[102] Marc James Léger has noted that the cross-class alliances that are proposed by identity movements have ideological affinity with not only nationalism but the political right and that moreover, the micro-political emphasis on difference and lifestyle associates identity politics with the petty-bourgeois concerns of theprofessional-managerial class.[103][104]
Considering the effectiveness of identity politics for achieving social justice, Kurzwelly raised four main points of critique:
[..] an argument for identity politics and strategic essentialism [could be], [f]or example, claims that because racism is real, and that people keep perceiving social race as real (despite scientific rejection of biological races), may justify using racial and other racialising categories to correct social injustices based upon them. Yet, there are several arguments against such a stance: (1) Social essentialism is inherently erroneous so seeking to address social injustices using essentialist thinking perpetuates that error and risksunforeseen consequences (even if motivated by good intentions [...]). (2) Addressing injustices through using essentialist identity categories assumes that people are necessarily underprivileged primarily because of their identity. Even if, in specific contexts, experiences of oppression and exploitation statistically correlate with identity, using identity categories is an imprecise and indirect strategy for addressing their exploitation and oppression. Rather than using fixed identity categories as variables for social justice, one could take account of contextual relative positionality, or use processual variables, both of which would be more precise in assessing relative privilege and capability to seek justice and access rights. (3) Seeking to address injustices on the basis of identities sometimes forces people to adopt and perform an unwanted identity, and to comply with normative expectations about its contents. For example, [...] gender-specific legislation in Argentina forced gender-non-conforming persons to choose between seeking justice and expressing their identity. Similarly, a shift from justice based on fixed categories to justice based on processes might offer a solution. (4) Overall, using essentialist identities in struggles for justice and political change—the strategy of identity politics—stands in an uneasy tension with a politics that prioritises redistribution of means of production and seeks sustained change in economic relations [...].[105]
In her journal articleMapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics and Violence against Women of Color,Kimberlé Crenshaw treats identity politics as a process that brings people together based on a shared aspect of their identity. Crenshaw applauds identity politics for bringing African Americans (and other non-white people), gays and lesbians, and other oppressed groups together in community and progress.[27] But she critiques it because "it frequently conflates or ignores intragroup differences."[27] Crenshaw argues that for Black women, at least two aspects of their identity are the subject of oppression: their race and their sex.[106] Thus, although identity politics are useful, we must be aware of the role of intersectionality. Nira Yuval-Davis supports Crenshaw's critiques inIntersectionality and Feminist Politics and explains that "Identities are individual and collective narratives that answer the question 'who am/are I/we?" [107]
InMapping the Margins, Crenshaw illustrates her point using the Clarence Thomas/Anita Hill controversy. Anita Hillaccused US Supreme Court Justice nominee Clarence Thomas of sexual harassment; Thomas would be the second African American judge on the Supreme Court. Crenshaw argues that Hill was then deemed anti-Black in the movement against racism, and although she came forward on the feminist issue of sexual harassment, she was excluded because when considering feminism, it is the narrative of white middle-class women that prevails.[27] Crenshaw concludes that acknowledging intersecting categories when groups unite on the basis of identity politics is better than ignoring categories altogether.[27]
Inpostmodernist analyses,labels are a form of regulation, and any activism based on them increases their regulatory power over subordinate groups.[108] Consequently, "identity politics appears to be narrow, political, state-centered activism that fails to adequately address the cultural bases of power."[108] This view responds to the emergence of queer politics in the late 1980s, exemplified by the groupQueer Nation. Scholars have identified queer politics as the opposite of identity politics, aiming to unite diverse marginalized groups and transcend traditional categories.[108]
Thefoundationalist reasoning of identity politics tends to assume that an identity must first be in place in order for political interests to be elaborated and, subsequently, political action to be taken. My argument is that there need not be a "doer behind the deed," but that the "doer" is variably constructed in and through the deed.[109]
Writers in the field ofqueer theory have at times argued thatqueer, despite generations of specific use to describe a "non-heterosexual" sexual orientation,[110] no longer needs to refer to any specific sexual orientation at all; that it is now only about "disrupting the mainstream", with authorDavid M. Halperin arguing that straight people may now also self-identify as "queer".[111] However, many LGBT people believe this concept of "queer heterosexuality" is an oxymoron and offensive form ofcultural appropriation which not only robs gays and lesbians of their identities, but makes invisible and irrelevant the actual, lived experience of oppression that causes them to be marginalized in the first place.[112][113] "It desexualizes identity, when the issue is precisely about a sexual identity."[114]
Criticism of identity politics also appears in contemporary queer activism. The insurrectionary anarchist networkBash Back!, for example, understood identity politics as being fundamentally reformist and based on afallacy of coherent communities.[115]
One of the major challenges in providing quality representation within all modern democracies comes from the many different ways in conceptualizing representation.Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, in her seminal studyThe Concept of Representation,[116] identifies four forms: descriptive, substantive, formalistic, and symbolic representation.
Formalistic representation focuses on the formal procedures of institutions and has two dimensions: authorization and accountability.[116] Authorization looks at the means by which a representative obtains their position in office. Accountability centers around the ability of constituents topunish representatives for failing to act according to their wishes or theresponsiveness of the representative to the constituents.
Symbolic representation involves constituents' perception of their representatives, including the represented's feelings of being fairly and effectively represented.[116] Work on symbolic representation by scholars of race and ethnic politics indicate that marginalized group's presence cues the legitimacy of both outcomes and procedure.[117] A study by Nancy Scherer and Brett Curry was concerned with the question if racial diversity on the federal bench impact citizens' views of the U.S. courts. They found that African-Americans had more trust in the legitimacy of the federal courts as the proportion of African-American judges rose.[118] Another study by Matthew Hayes and Matthew V. Hibbing evaluated that when the level of black representation was below proportional levels, perceptions of fairness and satisfaction decreased (e.g. symbolic representation).[119]
Descriptive representation refers to whether officeholders resemble those being represented. It is concerned only with who a representative is, such as their race, ethnicity, gender, sexual identity, etc.[116]
Substantive representation is defined as having one's policy views expressed by an elected representative, independent of whether the representatives resemble their constituents and their social anddemographic identities.[116] There have been studies that examined the substantive benefits of minority groups's representation. In a series of experiments by Amanda Clayton, Diana Z. O'Brien, and Jennifer M. Piscopo, these researchers controlled both the makeup of the decision-making body and the outcome reached.[120] Across all decision outcomes and issue topics, women's equal presence legitimized the decision-making process for respondents. Moreover, gender balance helped improve perceptions of substantive legitimacy when the decision-making body reached an anti-feminist decision. This effect was more pronounced among men, who tend to hold less certain views on women's rights
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: location (link)One of the most famous rallying cries of communism Workers of the world, unite!
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: publisher location (link){{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) CS1 maint: others (link)There are disputes regarding the origins of the term 'identity politics' .... Almost all authors, even while disagreeing over who was the first to use the term, agree that its original usage goes back to the 1970s and even the 1960s.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: publisher location (link){{cite book}}: CS1 maint: publisher location (link)As the husband of a Muslim woman from Somalia,Bowie couldn't help but be highly attuned to racial identity politics.
Some Republicans worry that Trump's focus on racial identity politics so close to the election is undercutting their message to swing voters on subjects like the economy and health care.
Trump's game isn't difficult to discern. He is practicing the same resentment-based, racial-identity politics that has fuelled his political rise since the earlier part of this decade, when he began expressing doubts that the first black American president was actually born in the United States.
For example, where a legacy of oppression based on race exists, an identity politics of race can be formed in opposition to that form of oppression, and it can help to provide an occasion for racial pride and resistance to that oppression.
The continued emphasis on racial identity politics and the fostering of an ethnic group pride on the part of nonwhite minority groups.
Iranian and Arab identity politics thwarted, perverted, and dismembered communitarian thinking for long periods in the twentieth century and the same applies to other forms of psycho-nationalism in Turkey
To explore the role played by Arab identity politics in regionalism with regard to the status of non-Arab states, this article presents a study of the competing hegemonic regional discourses employed by Turkey, Iran and Egypt
The tensions created by the intersection of tribe as identity, versus tribe as organisation, are central to Maori identity politics.
Maori identity politics have disrupted the colonially-inspired constructions of the New Zealand nation and state from a base of indigeneity.
The material on biculturalism particularly shows how ethnicity interdigitates with identity politics for Maori and stimulates parallel developments among non-Maori New Zealanders.
As Jones and Jenkins (2008) point out, an oppositional Māori identity politics has been the 'basis for internal collaboration and a politics of strength' (p.475).
Māori identity politics and Treaty settlements, as well as their reactions – the latter included challenges to historical settlements and so-called "race-based" funding.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)The famous rallying cry from The Communist Manifesto, "workers of the world unite!" was meant only to hasten the [...]
Seizing upon anything but class, U.S. leftists today have developed an array of identity groups centering around ethnic, gender, cultural, and life-style issues. These groups treat their respective grievances as something apart from class struggle, and have almost nothing to say about the increasingly harsh politico-economicclass injustices perpetrated against us all.
Identity politics, like the multiculturalism affiliated with it, is a contemporary manifestation of the culturalism and essentialism that have long characterized bourgeois ideology. The latter seeks to naturalize social and economic relations that are the consequence of the material history of capitalism.
