Proponents of Hindutva, particularly its early ideologues, have used political rhetoric and sometimes misinformation to justify the idea of a Hindu-majority state, where the political and cultural landscape is shaped by Hindu values. This movement, however, has often been criticised for misusing Hindu religious sentiments to divide people along communal lines and for distorting the inclusive and pluralistic nature of Hinduism for political gains.[17] In contrast to Hinduism, which is a spiritual tradition rooted in compassion, tolerance, and non-violence, Hindutva has been criticised for its political manipulation of these ideas to create divisions and for promoting an agenda that can marginalise non-Hindu communities.[18][19] This political ideology, while drawing on certain aspects of Hindu culture, often misrepresents the core teachings of Hinduism by focusing on political dominance rather than the spiritual, ethical, and philosophical values that the religion embodies.[18]
Etymology
According toJulius J. Lipner, a scholar of Hinduism,Hindutva is aSanskrit word, which connotes "Hinduness", and the term first gained usage among Bengali Indian intellectuals during theBritish colonial era. The term took roots in light of the description of Indic religions and the "western preconceptions about the nature of religion", which the Indian intellectuals disagreed with. This attempt to articulate what Hinduism is, coupled with emerging political and cultural beliefs, has evolved and contributed to the various meanings of the term.[20]
The word Hindutva was already in use the late 1890s byChandranath Basu.[21][22][23][24] However, Basu's usage of the word was to merely portray a traditional Hindu cultural view in contrary to the formation of the political ideology byVinayak Damodar Savarkar.[25][26]
Definitions of the term
Tertiary sources
According to theOxford English Dictionary (OED), Hindutva is "Originally: the state or quality of being Hindu; 'Hinduness'. Now: an ideology advocating, or movement seeking to establish, the hegemony ofHindus andHinduism within India; Hindu nationalism."[4] Its etymology, according to the OED, is: "from modern Sanskrithindutva (Hindu qualities, Hindu identity) fromHindu (from Hindihindū : see Hindu n.) + classical Sanskrit -tva, suffix forming abstract nouns, after Hindihindupan, in the same sense."[4] The etymology and meaning ofHindu, according to the OED is: "Partly a borrowing from Hindi and Urdu. Partly a borrowing from Persian. Etymons: Urduhindū, Persianhindū. from (i) Hindihindū and Urduhindū, originally denoting a person from India, now specifically a follower of Hinduism, and its etymon (ii) Persianhindū, in the same senses (Middle Persian hindūg, denoting a person from India), apparently formed already in Old Persian ...Hindu, denoting an eastern province of theAchaemenid empire."[27]
According toMerriam-Webster's Encyclopedia of World Religions, Hindutva is a concept of "Indian cultural, national, and religious identity."[28] The term "conflates a geographically based religious, cultural, and national identity: a true 'Indian' is one who partakes of this'Hindu-ness'. Some Indians insist, however, that Hindutva is primarily a cultural term to refer to the traditional and indigenous heritage of the Indian nation-state, and they compare the relationship between Hindutva and India to that ofZionism andIsrael."[28] This view, as summarised byMerriam-Webster's Encyclopedia of World Religions, holds that "even those who are not religiously Hindu but whose religions originated in India – Jains, Buddhists, Sikhs, and others – share in this historical, cultural, and national essence. Those whose religions were imported to India, meaning primarily the country's Muslim and Christian communities, may fall within the boundaries of Hindutva only if they subsume themselves into the majority culture."[28]
According to theConcise Oxford Dictionary of Politics and International Relations, "Hindutva, translated as 'Hinduness,' refers to the ideology of Hindu nationalists, stressing the common culture of the inhabitants of the Indian subcontinent. ... Modern politicians have attempted to play down the racial and anti-Muslim aspects of Hindutva, stressing the inclusiveness of the Indian identity; but the term hasFascist undertones."[1] According toThe Dictionary of Human Geography, "Hindutva encapsulates the cultural justification of Hindu nationalism, a 'Hinduness' allegedly shared by all Hindus."[3] According toA Political and Economic Dictionary of South Asia, "One of the main purposes behind the concept of Hindutva was to construct a collective identity to support the cause of 'Hindu-unity' (HinduSanghatan) and to avoid too narrow a definition of Hinduism, which had the consequence of excluding Buddhists, Sikhs and Jains from the Hindu community. Later, Hindu-nationalist ideologues transformed the concept into a strategy to include non-Hindus, in order to widen their social base, and for political mobilisation.[29]
According toEncyclopædia Britannica's article onVinayak Damodar Savarkar, a Hindu and Indian nationalist,[30] "Hindutva ("Hinduness") ... sought to define Indian culture as a manifestation of Hindu values; this concept grew to become a major tenet of Hindu nationalist ideology."[30] According to theEncyclopedia of Hinduism, Hindutva as defined in the classic statement of its ideology, is the "culture of the Hindu race" where Hinduism is but an element and "Hindu dharma is a religion practiced by Hindus as well as Sikhs and Buddhists." The article further states, "proponents of Hindutva have sought to promote the identification of national identity with the religious and broader cultural heritage of Hindus. Measures taken to achieve this end have included attempts to 'reclaim' individuals judged to have taken up 'alien' religions, the pursuit of social, cultural and philanthropic activities designed to strengthen awareness of Hindu belonging, and direct political action through various organisations, including recognised political parties such as theBharatiya Janata Party (BJP)."[31]
Savarkar
For Savarkar, inEssentials of Hindutva, Hindutva is an inclusive term of everything Indic. The three essentials ofHindutva in Savarkar's definition were the common nation (rashtra), common race (jati), and common culture or civilisation (sanskriti).[32] Savarkar used the words "Hindu" and "Sindhu" interchangeably.[32][33] Those terms were at the foundation of his Hindutva, as geographic, cultural and ethnic concepts, and "religion did not figure in his ensemble", states Sharma.[32][34] His elaboration of Hindutva included allIndic religions, i.e. Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism. Savarkar restricted "Hindu nationality" to "Indian religions" in the sense that they shared a common culture and fondness for the land of their origin.[32][33] Savarkar had made clear distinction between Hinduism and Hindutva, that they are not same things as Hindutva does not concern religion or rituals but the basis of India's national character.[35][36]
A Hindu means a person who regards this land of Bharatvarsha, from the Indus to the seas as his Fater-Land as well as his Holy-Land that is the cradle land of his religion
— Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, "Hinditva - Who Is a Hindu"[37]
In summary, Savarkar's Hinduism is a concept beyond the practice of religion. It encompasses India's cultural, historical, and national identity rooted in Hindu traditions and values. Hindutva is to build a strong Hindu nation, and this is the principle that holds together the customs and culture of this land.[38]
According toChristophe Jaffrelot, a political scientist specialising in South Asia, Savarkar – declaring himself as anatheist – "minimises the importance of religion in his definition of Hindu", and instead emphasises an ethnic group with a shared culture and cherished geography.[33][34] To Savarkar, states Jaffrelot, a Hindu is "first and foremost someone who lives in the area beyond the Indus river, between the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean."[33] Savarkar composed his ideology in reaction to the "pan-Islamic mobilisation of theKhilafat movement", where Indian Muslims were pledging support to the Istanbul-based Caliph of the Ottoman Empire and to Islamic symbols, his thoughts predominantly reflect deep hostility to Islam and its followers. To Savarkar, states Jaffrelot, "Muslims were the real enemies, not the British", because their Islamic ideology posed "a threat to the real nation, namely Hindu Rashtra" in his vision.[33] All those who reject this historic "common culture" were excluded by Savarkar. He included those who had converted to Christianity or Islam but accepted and cherished the shared Indic culture, considering them as those who can be re-integrated.[33]
According to Chetan Bhatt, a sociologist specialising in Human Rights and Indian nationalism, Savarkar "distances the idea of Hindu and of Hindutva fromHinduism."[39][a] He describes Hindutva, states Bhatt, as "one of the most comprehensive and bewildering synthetic concepts known to the human tongue" and "Hindutva is not a word but a history; not only the spiritual or religious history of our people as at times it is mistaken to be by being confounded with the other cognate term Hinduism, but a history in full."[39]
The definition and the use ofHindutva and its relationship with Hinduism has been a part of several court cases in India. In 1966,chief justiceP. B. Gajendragadkar wrote for theSupreme Court of India inYagnapurushdasji (AIR 1966 SC 1127), that "Hinduism is impossible to define."[42][b] The court adopted Radhakrishnan's submission that Hinduism is complex and "the theist and atheist, the sceptic and agnostic, may all be Hindus if they accept the Hindu system of culture and life."[42] The Court judged that Hinduism historically has had an "inclusive nature" and it may "broadly be described as a way of life and nothing more."[42]
The 1966 decision has significantly influenced the judicial interpretation of the term Hindutva in subsequent cases, particularly in the seven rulings delivered by the Supreme Court during the 1990s, collectively referred to as the "Hindutva judgments." These judgments broadly characterised Hindutva as a "way of life" or a "state of mind," rather than as a political ideology or a religious doctrine.[42][44] These judgements have faced widespread criticism. The Indian lawyerA. G. Noorani states that the Supreme Court in its 1995 ruling gave "Hindutva a benign meaning, calling Hindutva the same as Indianisation, etc." and these were unnecessary digressions from the facts of the case, and in doing so, "the court may have brought down the wall separating religion and politics."[45]Mukul Kesavan, a historian and writer, argues that the judgments lend legitimacy to a sectarian vision of India and undermine the secular pluralism enshrined in the constitution. According to Kesavan, the judgements effectively sanitised the ideological project of the Sangh Parivar and enabled political actors to invoke majoritarian themes without transgressing the legal boundaries of religious appeals under electoral law.[46]
If Hindutva is at all understood as a way of life it is understood as a Hindu way of life. The proposed obliteration of difference and the development of a uniform culture is to be effected by making minorities sacrifice their own identities at the altar of Hindutva, that is, the religious and cultural practice of the majority community, the Hindus.
Following the2002 Gujarat riots, Shubhra Verma, the daughter ofJustice J.S. Verma, who had authored the 1995 judgement, said, "He always had a regret about being misunderstood after 1995 and how for their own purposes, a group of politicians had twisted the spirit of his judgment."[47] In 2016, the Supreme Court declined a plea seeking a review of the "devastating consequences" arising from its 1995 judgment.[48]
Ideology and themes
In 1923, Savarkar, a radical nationalist and ideologue, wrote a book titledEssentials of Hindutva (later retitledHindutva: Who Is a Hindu?).[6][49] In the book, he outlined his ideology and "the idea of a universal and essential Hindu identity." The term "Hindu identity" is broadly interpreted and distinguished from "ways of life and values of others."[49] The contemporary meaning and usage of Hindutva largely derives from Savarkar's ideas, as does the post-1980s nationalism and mass political activity in India.[24]
M. S. Golwalkar was the secondSarsanghchalak (Chief) of theRashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. One of the most influential Hindutva thinkers, Golwalkar was among the first to put forward the concept of "Hindu Rashtra" (Hindu Nation).
According toChristophe Jaffrelot, a political scientist andIndologist, Hindutva as outlined in Savarkar's writings "perfectly illustrates" an effort at identity-building through the "stigmatisation and emulation of threatening others." In particular, it waspan-Islamism and similar "Pan-isms" that he assumed made the Hindus vulnerable, as he wrote:
O Hindus, consolidate and strengthen Hindu nationality; not to give wanton offence to any of our non-Hindu compatriots, in fact to any one in the world but in just and urgent defence of our race and land; to render it impossible for others to betray her or to subject her to unprovoked attack by any of those "Pan-isms" that are struggling forth from continent to continent.
Since Savarkar's time, the "Hindu identity" and the associated Hindutva ideology has been built upon the perceived vulnerability of Indian religions, culture, and heritage from those who, through "orientalist construction," have vilified them as inferior to a non-Indian religion, culture, and heritage.[51] In its nationalistic response, Hindutva has been conceived "primarily as an ethnic community" concept, states Jaffrelot, then presented ascultural nationalism, where Hinduism along with other Indian religions are but a part.[32][52][c]
According toArvind Sharma, a scholar of Hinduism, Hindutva has not been a "static and monolithic concept", rather its meaning and "context, text and subtext has changed over time." The struggles of the colonial era and the formulation ofneo-Hinduism by the early 20th century added a sense of "ethnicity" to the original "Hinduness" meaning of Hindutva.[56] Its early formulation incorporated the racism and nationalism concepts prevalent in Europe during the first half of the 20th century, and culture was in part rationalised as a result of "shared blood and race." Savarkar and his Hindutva colleagues adopted thesocial Darwinism theories prevalent by the 1930s.[57] In the post-independence period, states Sharma, the concept has suffered from ambiguity and its understanding aligned on "two different axes," one of religion versus culture, another of nation versus state. In general, the Hindutva thought among many Indians has "tried to align itself with the culture and nation" axes.[58]
The non-Hindu peoples inHindusthan must either adopt the Hindu culture and language, must learn to respect and hold in reverence Hindu religion, must entertain no idea but those of glorification of the Hindu race and culture—in one word they must cease to be foreigners, or may stay in the country, wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation, claiming nothing, deserving no privileges, far less preferential treatment—not even citizen's rights.
When Prime MinisterV. P. Singh launched theMandal Commission to broadenreservations in government and public university jobs to a significant portion of theShudras who were officially branded theOther Backward Classes (OBC), the mouthpiece of the Hindutva organisation RSS,Organiser magazine, wrote of "an urgent need to build up moral and spiritual forces to counter any fallout from an expected Shudra revolution."[60][61]
According to social scientist and economistJean Drèze, the Mandal Commission angered theupper castes and threatened to distance the OBCs, but theBabri Masjid's destruction and ensuing events helped to reduce this challenge and reunified Hindus on ananti-Muslim stance. He further claims "The Hindutva project is a lifeboat for the upper castes in so far as it promises to restore theBrahminical social order" and the potential enemies of this ideology is anybody whose acts or might hinder the process of restoring the Brahminic social order. Drèze further claims that although Hindutva is known as a majoritarian movement, it can be best expressed as an oppressive minority movement.[62]
According to Jaffrelot, the Sangh Parivar organisations with their Hindutva ideology have strived to impose the belief structure of the upper caste Hindus.[61] According to Dalit rights activist and political theoristKancha Ilaiah, "Hindutva Is Nothing But Brahminism" and that only "Dalitisation can effectively counter the danger of Brahminical fascism disguised as Hindutva."[63]
According to sociologist Amritorupa Sen, the privileges of the upper caste and especially Brahmins have become invisible. There has been a cultural norm that Brahmins take care of the lower castes out of a moral responsibility but also out of human kindness.[64]
Separatism
Hindutva ideology is also described to be separatist in its form.Siddharth Varadarajan writes that Hindutva separatism seeks to depart from the "philosophical, cultural and civilisation mores of the country, includingHinduism itself".[14][15]
TheHindu Mahasabha received funding from various princely states and advocated for their continued independence following India's liberation from British rule. Savarkar, in particular, praised Hindu-majority princely states such asMysore,Agra and Oudh, andTravancore, describing them as "progressive." He defended their autocratic authority, referring to these states as "citadels of organised Hindu power."[65][66]
According to Jaffrelot, the Hindutva ideology has roots in an era where the fiction in ancient Indian mythology andVedic antiquity was presumed to be valid. This fiction was used to "give sustenance to Hindu ethnic consciousness."[67] Its strategy emulated the Muslim identity politics of the Khilafat movement afterWorld War I, and borrowed political concepts from the West—mainly German.[67] Hindutva organisations treat events inHindu mythology as history.[68][69][70][71] Hindutva organisations have been criticised for their belief in statements or practices that they claim to be both scientific and factual but are incompatible with thescientific method.[72][73]
According toAnthony Parel, a historian and political scientist, Savarkar'sHindutva, Who is a Hindu? published in 1923 is a fundamental text of Hindutva ideology. It asserts, states Parel, India of the past to be "the creation of a racially superior people, the Aryans. They came to be known to the outside world as Hindus, the people beyond the Indus River. Their identity was created by their race (Jati) and their culture (Sanskriti). All Hindus claim to have in their veins the blood of the mighty race incorporated with and descended from the Vedic fathers. They created a culture—an ensemble of mythologies, legends, epic stories, philosophy, art and architecture, laws and rites, feasts and festivals. They have a special relationship to India: India is to them both a fatherland and a holy land." Savarkar's text presents the "Hindu culture as a self-sufficient culture, not needing any input from other cultures," which is "an unhistorical, narcissistic and false account of India's past," states Parel.[74]
The premises of early Hindu nationalist thought, states Chetan Bhatt, reflected the colonial era European scholarship andOrientalism of its times.[75] The ideas of "India as the cradle of civilisation," or "humanity's homeland and primal philosophy," or "humanism in Hindu values," or of Hinduism offering redemption for contemporary humanity, along with the colonial era scholarship of Frederich Muller,Charles Wilkins, William Jones, Alexander Hamilton, and others were a natural intellectual matrix for Savarkar and others to borrow and germinate their Hindu nationalist ideas.[75]
Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad, aFellow of the British Academy and a scholar of Politics and Philosophy of Religion, states that Hindutva is a form of nationalism that is expounded differently by its opponents and its proponents.[76] The opponents of Hindutva either consider it as a fundamentalist ideology that "aims to regulate the working of civil society with the imperatives of Hindu religious doctrine", or alternatively, as another form of fundamentalism while accepting that Hinduism is a diverse collection of doctrines, is complex and is different from other religions. According to Ram-Prasad, the proponents reject these tags, viewing it to be their right and a desirable value to cherish their religious and cultural traditions.[76] Hindutva, according to Savarkar, is a "geography, race, and culture" based concept. However, the "geography" is not strictly territorial but is an "ancestral homeland of a people", and the "race" is not biogenetic but described as the historic descendants of the intermarriage ofAryans,native Dravidian peoples, and "different peoples" who arrived over time.[77] So, "the ultimate category for Hindutva is culture," and this culture is "not strictly speaking religious, if religion is meant a commitment to certain doctrines of transcendence."[77]
Hostility towards academic freedom
Hindutva has been associated with threats and intimidation directed at academics and students, both within India and in the United States.[78][79] A notable instance occurred in 2011, when Hindutva activists successfully campaigned for the removal of an essay discussing the multiple narrative traditions of theRamayana, an ancient Sanskrit epic, from the history syllabus at theDelhi University, one of India’s most prestigious institutions of higher education.[80]Romila Thapar, one of India's most eminent historians, has faced sustained criticism and attacks from Hindutva-affiliated groups.[81] The Hindu right has also been implicated in efforts to discredit and obstruct scholars of South Asian studies and Hinduism based in North America. Notable figures such asWendy Doniger andSheldon Pollock have been targets of such campaigns. Doniger's book ceased publication in India following a legal settlement in which the publisher agreed to withdraw the title over claims that it defamed Hinduism. Pollock, similarly, was accused of misrepresenting the country's cultural heritage and of allegedly showing "disrespect for the unity and integrity of India."[82] Under the leadership of the BJP, the Indian state has faced allegations of monitoring academics and restricting access to research resources for scholars.[83]Audrey Truschke, an American historian of South Asia, remains a frequent target of threats and harassment by those aligned with Hindutva.[84][85]
In 2021, a collective of scholars of South Asia based in North America published theHindutva Harassment Field Manual in response to what they characterised as threats to their academic freedom emanating from Hindutva adherents.[86][79] The manual documented numerous incidents of harassment, dating back to the 1990s, aimed at academics engaged in critical scholarship on South Asia and Hinduism.[87] TheAssociation for Asian Studies described Hindutva as a "majoritarian ideological doctrine" distinct fromHinduism and condemned the increasing attacks on scholars, artists, and journalists who engage critically with its political tenets.[88] Several academics and conference participants withdrew from scholarly events due to threats received from ultranationalists and Hindutva-affiliated actors.[89][90][91]
Fascism
The Hindutva ideology has significantly borrowed ideas and concepts fromEuropean fascism.[9][10] Parallels between Hindutva and European fascism are observed in concepts such as repeated mobilisations, appeals to a mythic past, anti-communism, its purist racial elements, among others.[92][93]
After the 1940s and 1950s, a number of scholars have labelled or compared Hindutva to fascism.[94][95][96] Many scholars have pointed out that early Hindutva ideologues were inspired by fascist movements in early 20th-century Italy and Germany.[97][98][99][100] Marzia Casolari is one such scholar who has linked the association and the borrowing of pre-World War II European fascist ideas by early leaders of Hindutva ideology.[101] According to theConcise Oxford Dictionary of Politics and International Relations, the term Hindutva has "fascist undertones."[1]
The Indian Marxist economist and political commentatorPrabhat Patnaik calls Hindutva "almost fascist in the classical sense." He states that the Hindutva movement is based on "class support, methods and programme."[12] According to Patnaik, Hindutva has the following fascist ingredients: "an attempt to create a unified homogeneous majority under the concept of "the Hindus"; a sense of grievance against past injustice; a sense of cultural superiority; an interpretation of history according to this grievance and superiority; a rejection of rational arguments against this interpretation; and an appeal to the majority based onrace andmasculinity."[12]
According to Jaffrelot, the early Hindutva proponents such as Golwalkar envisioned it as an extreme form of "ethnic nationalism", but the ideology differed from fascism and Nazism in three respects.[67] First, unlike fascism and Nazism, it did not closely associate Hindutva with its leader. Second, while fascism emphasised the primacy of the state, Hindutva considered the state to be a secondary. Third, while Nazism emphasised primacy of the race, the Hindutva ideology emphasised primacy of the society over race.[67][d] According toAchin Vanaik, several authors have labelled Hindutva as fascist, but such a label requires "establishing a fascist minimum." Hindu nationalism, states Vanaik, is "a specific Indian manifestation of a generic phenomenon [of nationalism] but not one that belongs to the genus of fascism."[104]
Sociologists Chetan Bhatt and Parita Mukta have described difficulties in identifying Hindutva with fascism or Nazism, because of Hindutva's embrace of cultural rather than racial nationalism, its "distinctively Indian" character, and "the RSS's disavowal of the seizure of state power in preference for long-term cultural labour incivil society." They describe Hindutva as a form of "revolutionary conservatism" or "ethnic absolutism."[16] According to Thomas Hansen, Hindutva represents a "conservative revolution" in postcolonial India, and its proponents have been combining "paternalistic and xenophobic discourses" with "democratic and universalist discourses on rights and entitlements" based on "desires, anxieties and fractured subjectivities" in India.[105]
Hindutva and Nazism
An editorial published on 4 February 1948 in theNational Herald, the mouthpiece of theIndian National Congress party, stated that "it [RSS] seems to embody Hinduism in a Nazi form" with the recommendation that it must be ended.[106] Similarly, in 1956, another Congress party leader compared theBharatiya Jana Sangh to the Nazis in Germany.[107][e]
Savarkar criticisedJawaharlal Nehru for condemning Germany and Italy, asserting that "crores of Hindu Sanghatanists in India [...] cherish no ill-will towards Germany or Italy or Japan." In 1938, Savarkar publicly expressed support for theGerman occupation of Czechoslovakia.[109] Although, at the outbreak of theSecond World War, Savarkar and theHindu Mahasabha initially advocated a stance of neutrality, his rhetoric became increasingly strident over time. He characterised German Jews as a communal force and endorsed Hitler’s anti-Jewish policies. Moreover, he drew a parallel between German Jews and Indian Muslims, stating, "The Indian Muslims are on the whole more inclined to identify themselves and their interests with Muslims outside India than Hindus who live next door, like Jews in Germany."[109][110] As late as 1961, he spoke favourably ofNazi Germany and compared it to Nehru's "cowardly democracy."[111]
German race pride has now become the topic of the day. To keep up the purity of the Race and its culture, Germany shocked the world by her purging the country of the semitic Races — the Jews. Race pride at its highest has been manifested here. Germany has also shown how wellnigh impossible it is for Races and cultures, having differences going to the root, to be assimilated into one united whole, a good lesson for us in Hindusthan to learn and profit by.
According to Prabhu Bapu, a historian and scholar of Oriental Studies, the term and the contextual meaning of Hindutva emerged from the Indian experience in the colonial era, memories of its religious wars as theMughal Empire decayed, an era of Muslim and Christianproselytisation, a feeling that their traditions and cultures were being insulted, whereby the Hindu intellectuals formulated Hindutva as a "Hindu identity" as a prelude to a national resurgence and a unified Indian nation against the "foreign invaders."[113] The development of "religious nationalism" and thedemand by the Muslim leaders on theIndian subcontinent for thepartition of British India into Muslim and non-Muslim nations (Pakistan and Bangladesh being Muslim-majority, and India being Hindu-majority) during the middle of the 20th century, confirmed its narrative of geographical and cultural nationalism based on Indian culture and religions.[56][f][g] ProfessorMuqtedar Khan has argued that Hindu nationalism further grew because of the religious divisions between Hindus and Muslims that were fomented by post-1947Pakistani terrorist attacks in andmilitary conflicts with India.[118]
According to Chetan Bhatt, the various forms of Hindu nationalism including the recent "cultural nationalist" form of Hindutva, have roots in the second half of the 19th century.[119] These are a "dense cluster of ideologies" ofprimordialism,[h] and they emerged from the colonial experiences of the Indian people in conjunction with ideas borrowed from European thinkers but thereafter debated, adapted and negotiated. These ideas included those of a nation, nationalism, race,Aryanism,Orientalism,Romanticism and others.[119][122][i] Decades before he wrote his treatise on Hindutva, Savarkar was already famous in colonial India for his version of theIndian Rebellion of 1857. He studied in London between 1906 and 1910. There he discussed and evolved his ideas of "what constituted a Hindu identity", made friends with Indian student groups as well as non-Indian groups such as theSinn Féin.[119][123] He was a part of the underground home rule and liberation movement of Indians, before getting arrested for anti-British activities. While in prison, Savarkar submitted multiple mercy petitions to the British, seeking clemency and promising loyalty to the crown.[124][125] After his release, he moved away from anti-colonial politics and worked to develop Hindutva.[126] His political activities and intellectual journey through European publications, according to Bhatt, influenced him, his future writings, and the 20th-century Hindutva ideology that emerged from his writings.[119][123]
Adoption
Savarkar's Hindutva ideology reachedK. B. Hedgewar inNagpur (Maharashtra) in 1925, and he found Savarkar'sHindutva inspirational.[127][128] He visited Savarkar inRatnagiri shortly after and discussed with him methods for organising the 'Hindu nation'.[129][130] Discussions between the two led to Hedgewar founding theRashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS, lit. "National Volunteer Society"), afar-right Hindutvaparamilitary organisation with this mission, in September of that year.[131][132] This organisation swiftly expanded to become the foremost Hindu nationalist organisation.[128] However, the termHindutva was not used to describe the ideology of the new organisation; it wasHindu Rashtra (Hindu nation), with one RSS publication stating, "it became evident that Hindus were the nation inBharat and thatHindutva wasRashtriyatva [nationalism]."[133]
Hedgewar's RSS not only propagated Hindutva ideology, it developed a grassroots organisational structure (shakhas) to reform the Hindu society. Village level groups met for morning and evening physical training sessions, martial training and Hindutva ideology lessons.[128] Hedgewar kept RSS an ideologically active but an "apolitical" organisation. This practice of keeping out of national and international politics was retained by his successorM. S. Golwalkar through the 1940s.[128] PhilosopherJason Stanley states "the RSS was explicitly influenced by European fascist movements, its leading politicians regularly praisedHitler andMussolini in the late 1930s and 1940s."[134] In 1931,B. S. Moonje met with Mussolini and expressed a desire to replicate the fascist youth movement in India.[135] According to Sali Augustine, the core institution of Hindutva has been the RSS. While the RSS states that Hindutva is different from Hinduism, it has been linked to religion. Therefore "cultural nationalism" is a euphemism, states Augustine, and it is meant to mask the creation of a state with a "Hindu religious identity."[136] According to Jaffrelot, the regional heads of the RSS have included Indians who are Hindus as well as those who belong to other Indian religions such asJainism.[137]
In parallel to the RSS, Savarkar, after his release from the colonial prison, joined and became the president ofAkhil Bharatiya Hindu Mahasabha in 1937. There, he used the termsHindutva andHindu Rashtra liberally, according to Graham.[138]Syama Prasad Mukherjee, who served as its president in 1944 and joined theJawaharlal Nehru Cabinet after independence, was a Hindu traditionalist politician who wanted to uphold Hindu values but not necessarily to the exclusion of other communities. He asked for the membership of Hindu Mahasabha to be thrown open to all communities. When this was not accepted, he resigned from the party and founded a new political party in collaboration with the RSS. He understood Hinduism as a nationality rather than a community but, realising that this is not the common understanding of the termHindu, he chose "Bharatiya" instead of "Hindu" to name the new party, which came to be called theBharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS or JS; often known as the Jan Sangh), a far-right Hindutva-based political party, which served as the political arm of the RSS.[138][139][140]
Growth
The cabinet of the first prime minister of IndiaJawaharlal Nehru banned the RSS and arrested more than 200,000 RSS volunteers, afterNathuram Godse, a former volunteer of RSS,assassinated Mahatma Gandhi.[141] Nehru also appointed government commissions to investigate the assassination and related circumstances. The series of investigations by these commissions, states the political science scholar Nandini Deo, later found the RSS leadership and "the RSS innocent of a role in the assassination."[142] The mass arrested RSS volunteers were released by the Indian courts, and the RSS has ever since used this as evidence of "being falsely accused and condemned."[142]
According to the historian Robert Frykenberg specialising inSouth Asian Studies, the RSS membership enormously expanded inindependent India. In this period, while the RSS remained "discretely out of politics", the Jan Sangh entered the Indian political landscape. The Jan Sangh had limited success in the Indian general elections between 1952 and 1971.[143][144] This was, in part, because of its poor organisation and leadership; its focus on the Hindutva sentiment did not appeal to the voters, and its campaign lacked adequate social and economic themes.[144] This was also, in part, because Congress party leaders suchIndira Gandhi had co-opted some of the key Hindutva ideological themes and fused it with socialist policies and her father's Soviet-style centrally controlled economic model.[141][145][146] The RSS continued its grassroots operations between 1947 and early 1970s, and its volunteers provided humanitarian assistance to Hindu and Sikh refugees from thepartition of British India, victims of war and violence, and helped disaster victims to resettle economically.[141][147]
From 1975 to 1977, Indira Gandhi declared and enforceda national emergency, which saw widespread censorship, mass arrests of dissenters and political opponents, the suspension of the constitution, and the nullification of fundamental rights, alongside a rule by decree and an unprecedented centralisation of power. The abuses of Emergency triggered a mass resistance and the rapid growth of volunteers and political support to the Hindutva ideology.[141][145][148][149] Indira Gandhi and her party were voted out of power in 1977. The Hindutva ideology-based Jan Sangh members such asAtal Bihari Vajpayee,Brij Lal Varma, andL. K. Advani gained national prominence, and the Hindutva ideology sympathiserMorarji Desai became the prime minister of a coalition non-Congress government.[141] This coalition did not last past 1980, and from the consequent break-up of coalition parties was the founding of the Bharatiya Janata Party in April 1980. This new national political party relied on the Hindutva ideology-based rural and urban grassroots organisations that had rapidly grown across India from the mid-1970s.[141]
On 5 August 2019, theModi administration revoked the special status, orlimited autonomy, granted toJammu and Kashmir underArticle 370 ofIndia's Constitution.[150][151] The decision was upheld by the Supreme Court.[152][153][154] The revocation was accompanied by the deployment of thousands of security forces, the detention and arrest of several Kashmiri politicians including a former chief minister, as well as the imposition ofan years-long lockdown and communications blackout which saw intense government crackdown and the detention of thousands of Kashmiri civilians.[j] The government's move was criticised and opposed,[155][156] though it was heavily celebrated in nationalist and Hindutva circles across the country.[157][158]
Indian states that prohibit forced conversions (2022)
Many BJP-ruled states, such asUttar Pradesh,Madhya Pradesh,Haryana andKarnataka, have considered laws designed to preventforced conversions from Hinduism to Islam through marriage. Hindutva advocates call this "love jihad", and it is widely considered to be an Islamophobic conspiracy theory.[168][169][170] In September 2020, Uttar Pradesh Chief MinisterYogi Adityanath asked his government to come up with a strategy to prevent "religious conversions in the name of love."[171][172] On 31 October, he announced that a law to curb "love jihad"[k] would be passed by his government. The law, which also includes provisions against "unlawful religious conversion", declares a marriage null and void if the sole intention was to "change a girl's religion" and both it and the one in Madhya Pradesh imposed sentences of up to 10 years in prison for those who broke the law.[174][175] The ordinance came into effect on 28 November 2020[176][177] as theProhibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance. In December 2020, Madhya Pradesh approved an anti-conversion law similar to the Uttar Pradesh one.[178][179][180][181][182][183] As of 25 November 2020[update], Haryana and Karnataka were still in discussion over similar ordinances.[169][170] In April 2021, theGujarat Assembly amended theFreedom of Religion Act, 2003, bringing in stringent provisions against forcible conversion through marriage or allurement, with the intention of targeting "love jihad."[184][185] The Karnataka state cabinet also approved an anti-conversion bill, making it a law in December 2021.[186][187] This law was revoked by the new Government of Karnataka.[188]
Hindutva is the guiding ideology of the RSS and its affiliated family of organisations, theSangh Parivar.[189] In general,Hindutvavadis (followers of Hindutva) believe that they represent the well-being of Dharmic religions:Hinduism,Sikhism,Buddhism, andJainism.[citation needed]
Most nationalists are organised into political, cultural and social organisations using the concept of Hindutva as a political tool. The first Hindutva organisation formed was the RSS, founded in 1925. A prominent Indian political party, the BJP, is closely associated with a group of organisations that advocate Hindutva. They collectively refer to themselves as the "Sangh Parivar" or family of associations, and include the RSS,Bajrang Dal and the VHP.[citation needed] Other organisations include:
Political parties that are independent from the Sangh Parivar's influence but that also espouse the Hindutva ideology include theHindu Mahasabha, Prafull Goradia's Akhil Bharatiya Jana Sangh,[190] and the Marathi nationalistShiv Sena,[191]Shiv Sena (UBT) and theMaharashtra Navnirman Sena. TheShiromani Akali Dal (SAD) is aSikh religious party that maintained ties with Hindutva organisations and political parties, as they also represent Sikhism.[192] By September 2020, SAD left theNDA over the farms bill.[193]
Vishva Hindu Parishad and the Bharatiya Janata Party
The RSS established a number of affiliate organisations afterIndian Independence to carry its ideology to various parts of society. Prominent among them is the Vishva Hindu Parishad, which was set up in 1964 with the objective of protecting and promoting the Hindu religion. It subscribed toHindutva ideology, which came to mean in its hands political Hinduism and Hindu militancy.[194]
A number of political developments in the 1980s caused a sense of vulnerability among the Hindus in India. This was much discussed and leveraged by the Hindutva ideology organisations. These developments include the mass killing of the Hindus by the militantKhalistan movement, the influx ofundocumented Bangladeshi immigration intoAssam coupled with the expulsion of Hindus from Bangladesh, the Congress-led government's pro-Muslim bias in theShah Bano case as well asthe Rushdie affair.[195] The VHP and the BJP utilised these developments to push forward a militant Hindutva nationalist agenda leading to theRam Janmabhoomi movement. The BJP officially adopted Hindutva as its ideology in its 1989 Palampur resolution.[7][8]
The BJP claims thatHindutva represents "cultural nationalism" and its conception of "Indian nationhood", but not a religious or theocratic concept.[196] It is "India's identity", according to the RSS ChiefMohan Bhagwat.[197]
According to the anthropologist and South Asia Politics scholar Thomas Hansen, Hindutva in the post-Independence era has emerged as a political ideology and a populist form of Hindu nationalism.[198] For Indian nationalists, it has subsumed "religious sentiments and public rituals into a larger discourse of national culture (Bharatiya culture) and the Hindu nation, Hindu rashtra", states Hansen.[198] This notion has appealed to the masses in part because it "connects meaningfully with everyday anxieties of security, a sense of disorder" in modern Indian life.[198] The BJP has deployed the Hindutva theme in its election campaign since early 1991, as well as nominated candidates who are affiliated with organisations that support the Hindutva ideology.[198] The campaign language of the Congress Party leaderRajiv Gandhi in the 1980s mirrored those of Hindutva proponents. The political speeches and publications by Indian Muslim leaders have declared their "Islamic religious identity" being greater than any "political ideology or national identity." These developments, states Hansen, have helped Hindu nationalists spread essentialist constructions per contemporary Hindutva ideology.[199]
The Hindutva leaders have sought aUniform Civil Code for all thecitizens of India, where the same law applies to all its citizens irrespective of the individual's religion.[200][201] They state that differential laws based on religion violate theIndian Constitution and have sowed the seeds of divisiveness between different religious communities.[200][201][202] Under the current laws that were enacted in 1955–56, state John Hutchinson andAnthony D. Smith, the constitutionally directive principle of a Uniform Civil Code covers only non-Muslims. The Uniform Civil Code is opposed by the Muslim leaders.[200] A Uniform Civil Code that applies equally to the Muslims in India is also opposed by political parties such as theIndian National Congress and theCommunist Party.[203]
The followers of Hindutva are known for their criticism of theIndian government as too passive with regard to theexodus of Kashmiri Hindus by Kashmiri Muslim separatists and the1998 Wandhama massacre, and advocates of Hindutva wish a harder stance inJammu and Kashmir.[204][205] The supporters of Hindutva sought to protect the native Hindu culture and traditions especially those that symbolised the Hindu culture. They believe that Indian culture is identical with the Hindu culture.[206] These include animals, language, holy structures, rivers and medicine.[207]
They opposed the continuation of Urdu being used as a vernacular language as they associated it with Muslims. They felt that Urdu symbolised a foreign culture. For them, Hindi alone was the unifying factor for all the diverse forces in the country. They even wanted to make Hindi as the official language of India and felt that it should be promoted at the expense of English and the other regional languages, with some Hindutva followers describing this with the slogan "Hindi-Hindu-Hindustan."[208][209] However, this caused a state of tension and alarm in the non-Hindi regions. The non-Hindi regions saw it as an attempt by the north to dominate the rest of the country. Eventually, this demand was put down in order to protect the cultural diversity of the country.[210]
Hindutva activists haveboycotted severalBollywood movies in recent years, claiming that they use too much Urdu and are anti-Hindu;[211][212] some activists have called forSouth Indian cinema to be patronised instead, claiming that it is more culturally rooted.[213][214] Hindutva opposition to Urdu coincides with a desire to spread aSanskritised Hindi across India.[215][216][209]
Since the mid-2010s, there has been a notable increase in violence motivated by Hindutva ideology, particularly towards Muslims,[217] and includes acts ofextremist terroristic violence.[218][219][220] This has principally been perpetrated by or has implicated members, or alleged members, of Hindu nationalist organisations such as the RSS orAbhinav Bharat.[221][222][223] The violence has also been condoned by the BJP politicians and used as an electoral strategy to garner support from the far-right Hindu population.[224][225] The veneration of cows as deities and restrictions on meat consumption have also been used by to justify violence againstMuslims,Christians,Dalits, and lower-caste Hindus.[226]
There has been a rise in the number of incidents of cow vigilantism since the election of a BJP majority in theParliament of India in 2014. The frequency and severity of cow vigilante violence has been described as "unprecedented."[227]Human Rights Watch has reported that there has been a surge in such violence since 2015.[228] The surge is attributed to the recent rise inHindu nationalism in India.[227][229] Many vigilante groups say they feel "empowered" by the victory of the Hindu nationalist BJP in the 2014 election.[230][231]
According to aReuters report, there were 63 attacks in India between 2010 and mid 2017 resulting in 28 deaths, 24 of them Muslim, and 124 injuries. Most attacks occurred after Narendra Modi took office in 2014.[232]
Many BJP states have passed laws against cattle slaughter such as Gujarat.[233][234][235][236] On 6 June 2017, Uttar Pradesh's Chief MinisterYogi Adityanath directed the state police to take action against cow slaughter and cattle smuggling under theNational Security Act and the Gangster Act,[237] and in (2021)Assam Assembly passed a bill that prohibits the slaughter or sale of beef within a 5-kilometre (3.1 mi) radius of any temple. The legislation seeks to ensure that permission for slaughter is not granted to areas that are predominantly inhabited by Hindu, Jain, Sikh and other non-beef eating communities or places that fall within a 5-kilometre (3.1 mi) radius of a temple, satra and any other institution as may be prescribed by the authorities. Exemptions, however, might be granted for certain religious occasions.[238][239]
Hindutva pop is a subgenre ofIndian pop promoting Hindutva ideas. It openly calls for violence against many non-Hindu minorities, especially Muslims.[240] Hindutva pop artists defend their music as neither xenophobic nor Islamophobic, arguing it promotes truth. Popular Hindutva pop artists like Laxmi Dubey and Prem Krishnavanshi mainstream the xenophobic values of the genre.[241][240]
^According to sociologist Aparna Devare, Savarkar distinguishes between Hindutva and Hinduism, but includes it in his definition. Savarkar wrote, "Hinduism is only a derivative, a fraction, a part of Hindutva."[40]
^Sen writes, "Drawing primarily from English language sources, the Court put forward the view that Hinduism was "impossible" to define [quoting from the case file Yagnapurushdasji at 1121–1128]: "When we think of the Hindu religion, we find it difficult, if not impossible, to define Hindu religion or even adequately describe it. Unlike other religions in the world, the Hindu religion does not claim any one God; it does not subscribe to any one dogma; it does not believe in one philosophic concept; it does not follow any one set of religious rites." Confronted with this amorphous entity, the Court concluded, "[I]t [Hinduism] does not appear to satisfy the narrow traditional features of any religion or creed. It may broadly be described as a way of life and nothing more.[43]
^According toGavin Flood, a scholar of Hinduism, the term "Hindutva" differs from "Hindu dharma." The latter term means Hinduism and its various sub-traditions, while the term Hindutva in Savarkar's ideology meant the "socio-political force to unite all Hindus against foreign influences," states Flood.[53] According toKlaus Klostermaier, a scholar of Hinduism, Hindutva has become more than the original search for Hinduness during the Indian freedom movement, and has morphed into "Hindutva movement" in the post-Independent India.[54] This movement—though reviled by Western and West-oriented Indian scholars—has been ongoing, according to Klostermaier, as a political ideology which "takes elements of Hindu tradition and reshapes them in the light of their own time so as to provide answers to the needs of their contemporaries."[54][55] In this historical and sociological context, Hindutva is an assertion of values and a non-aberrant response to the Indic experiences and memories of Islamic conquests, Christian imperialism, and the abuses of colonialism, according to Klostermaier.[54]
^For further elaboration on the primacy of state in fascism, see Walter Laqueur.[102] For further elaboration on the primacy of race in Nazism, seeRichard Bessel.[103]
^Hindutva organisations were not exclusively criticised in the 1940s by Indian political leaders. The Muslim League was criticised as well for "its creed of Islamic exclusiveness, its cult of communal hatred and its practice of terrorism and treachery" and called a replica of the German Nazis.[108]
^Savarkar's early writings and speeches on cultural nationalism contained an embryonic form of a two-nation theory. This embryo took a more detailed form with the Lahore Resolution of 1940 of the Muslim League, which declared, "India's Muslims were a 'separate nation'."[114]Mohammed Ali Jinnah explained the Indian Muslims demand by asserting a cultural distinctiveness of Islam and this "constituted the rationale for a separate nation-state of 'Pakistan'." Jinnah's speech and rationale confirmed Savarkar's beliefs and his early Hindutva's narrative.[114] The historian Prabhu Bapu quotes and summarises the ideas of the Muslim leaders in British India around 1940: "there were two nations in India, Hindu and Muslim", said Jinnah, British India should be partitioned into "Pakistan and Hindustan." According to Jinnah, "the differences between Hindus and Muslims in India were not merely religious, but entirely different ways of life and thought. [...] The two communities were distinct peoples, with different religious philosophies, social customs, literatures, and histories. [...] For more than a thousand years, the bulk of Muslims in India had lived in a different world, in a different society, in a different philosophy and a different faith. [...] Muslims must have a state of their own in which they would establish their own constitution and make their own laws."[114] According to Prabhu, such ideas and rationale fuelled the Hindutva narrative for a radical exclusivist Hindu nation, and became "the apologia for the two-nation theory of the 1940s."[115]
^According to the Political Scientist Christophe Jaffrelot, in the pre-1947 period, the two nationalism and separatist movements in South Asia influenced each other. This history is an example of the Ernest Gellner theory of nationalism, states Jaffrelot.[116] The Gellner theory states that nationalistic movements arise when there exist two groups, one privileged and other under-privileged. When the privilege-power equation is threatened by the social forces of history, "culture, skin pigmentation" and such ethnic markers become a basis to presume inferiority of the other and a pretext to manipulate the situation. Using a language of nationalism, one group tries to maintain the status quo, while the other seeks to overthrow it. In British India, states Jaffrelot, Muslim nationalism and separatism "certainly did not develop" from feelings of having been discriminated against, but their mobilisation came from "the fear of decline and marginalization" of their historic privilege among the Muslim elites in British India.[116] They deployed Islamic cultural symbols and pressed for Perso-Arabic script-based Urdu language for their separatist and nationalist rationale, while Hindu nationalists deployed Hindu cultural symbols and pressed for the use of Indic script-based (Hindi) language – both languages nearly similar when spoken. The mutual use of identity symbols helped crystallise the other's convictions and fuel each other's fears.[116] These identity symbols and the continued mutual use of such ideological statements fuel the nationalistic discourse in contemporary India and Pakistan. They have been and remain central to organisations such as the BJP and theSangh Parivar associated with the Hindutva ideology, according to Jean-Luc Racine, a scholar of nationalisms and separatisms with a focus on South Asia.[117]
^Primordialism is the belief that the deep historical and cultural roots of nations is a quasi‐objective phenomenon, by which outsiders identify individuals of an ethnic group and what contributes to how an individual forms a self-identity.[120][121]
^For example, the "writings ofGiuseppe Mazzini made a profound impression on Savarkar", states Thomas Hansen.[57]
^abc"Hindutva, n.",Oxford English Dictionary Online, Oxford University Press, 2011,archived from the original on 16 October 2015, retrieved17 November 2021
^Frykenberg 2008, pp. 178–220: "This essay attempts to show how — from an analytical or from an historical perspective — Hindutva is a melding of Hindu fascism and Hindu fundamentalism."
^abChetan Bhatt; Parita Mukta (May 2000). "Hindutva in the West: Mapping the Antinomies of Diaspora Nationalism".Ethnic and Racial Studies.23 (3):407–441.doi:10.1080/014198700328935.S2CID143287533. Quote: "It is also argued that the distinctively Indian aspects of Hindu nationalism, and the RSS's disavowal of the seizure of state power in preference for long-term cultural labour in civil society, suggests a strong distance from both German Nazism and Italian Fascism. Part of the problem in attempting to classify Golwalkar's or Savarkar's Hindu nationalism within the typology of 'generic fascism', Nazism, racism and ethnic or cultural nationalism is the unavailability of an appropriate theoretical orientation and vocabulary for varieties of revolutionary conservatism and far-right-wing ethnic and religious absolutist movements in 'Third World' countries."
^Bhattacharya, Snigdhendu (30 September 2020)."Hindutva and idea that 'Hindus are in danger' were born in Bengal".ThePrint.Archived from the original on 17 February 2021. Retrieved23 December 2020.Chadra Nath Basu's book Hindutva was published in 1892 by Gurudas Chatterjee. The first recorded use of the word Hindutva, at least in print, is believed to have been made in this book.
^abMartha Nussbaum (2009).The Clash Within: Democracy, Religious Violence, and India's Future. Harvard University Press. pp. 58–59.ISBN978-0-674-04156-1., Quote: "Savarkar had long lived abroad, and his Hindutva is a European product from its opening words on. [...] Savarkar was not a religious man; for him, traditional religious belief and practice did not lie at the heart of Hindutva. He did, however, consider the religion's cultural traditions to be key markers of Hindutva, along with geographical attachment to the motherland and a sense of oneself as a part of a "race determined by a common origin, possessing a common blood."
^abW. J. Johnson (2010).A Dictionary of Hinduism. Oxford University Press. p. 142.ISBN978-0-19-861026-7.Archived from the original on 7 October 2024. Retrieved1 May 2019.,QuoteArchived 9 May 2019 at theWayback Machine: "A term that first surfaces in literary form in the mid 1870s in Bankim Chandra Chatterjee's serialization of his novel Ānandamaṭh in the journal, Bangadarshan. It was subsequently employed by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar in his book Hindutva: Who Is a Hindu? (1923) to convey the idea of a universal and essential Hindu identity. As used by its author, and other right-wing nationalist ideologues, it is predicated on an assumed consensus about what constitutes Hindu identity and distinguishes it from the ways of life and values of other (implicitly 'foreign') people and traditions, especially Indian Muslims."
^Gavin D. Flood (1996).An Introduction to Hinduism. Cambridge University Press. p. 262.ISBN978-0-521-43878-0.Archived from the original on 7 October 2024. Retrieved29 January 2020.The party's most vociferous leader was Vinayak Damodar Savarkar who made a distinction between 'Hindu Dharma', the religion of the various traditions, and 'Hindutva', the socio-political force to unite all Hindus against foreign influences
^abcKlaus Klostermaier (2006). Anna King (ed.).Indian Religions: Renaissance and Renewal - The Spalding Papers on Indic Studies. Equinox. pp. 16–18,3–27, also see comments of Anna King at p. xii.ISBN978-1-845-53169-0.
^[a]Sarkar, Sumit (1 January 1993). "The Fascism of the Sangh Parivar".Economic and Political Weekly.28 (5):163–167.JSTOR4399339. [b]Ahmad, Aijaz (1993). "Fascism and National Culture: Reading Gramsci in the Days of Hindutva".Social Scientist.21 (3/4):32–68.doi:10.2307/3517630.JSTOR3517630.
^Sen, Satadru (2 October 2015). "Fascism Without Fascists? A Comparative Look at Hindutva and Zionism".South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies.38 (4):690–711.doi:10.1080/00856401.2015.1077924.S2CID147386523.
^South Asia Scholar Activist Collective."What is Hindutva?".Hindutva Harassment Field Manual.Archived from the original on 10 July 2021. Retrieved11 July 2021.
^Achin Vanaik (1994). "Situating Threat of Hindu Nationalism: Problems with Fascist Paradigm".Economic and Political Weekly.29 (28):1729–1748.JSTOR4401457.
^Bhatt, Chetan (2001).Hindu Nationalism: Origins, Ideologies and Modern Myths. Routledge. pp. 107–108.ISBN9781859733486.
^Desmond Graham, Bruce (2007).Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics: The Origins and Development of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh.Cambridge University Press. p. 46.ISBN9780521053747.
^Frykenberg 2008, pp. 193–196: "After Independence in 1947, the RSS saw an enormous expansion in numbers of new swayamsevaks and a proliferation of disciplined and drilled shakhas. This occurred despite Gandhi's assassination (January 30, 1948) by Nathuram Vinayak Godse, a former sevak and despite being outlawed. (p. 193) [...] Thus, even as the RSS discretely stayed out of open politics, and continued its campaign to convert more and more people to the cause of Hindutva, its new party [Jan Sangh] engaged in political combat. (p. 194) [...] For the next two decades, the Jan Sangh followed a narrowly focused agenda. [...] In 1971, despite softening its Hindutva voice and joining a grand alliance, it was not successful. (p. 195)"
^abBruce Desmond Graham (2007). "The Jana Sangh in electoral politics, 1951 to 1967".Hindu Nationalism and Indian Politics: The Origins and Development of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. Cambridge University Press. pp. 196–198, context: Chapter 7.ISBN978-0-521-05374-7.Archived from the original on 7 October 2024. Retrieved10 May 2019.; Quote: "We have now considered the main factors which worked against the Jana Sangh's attempt to become a major party in Indian politics [between 1951 and 1967]. It was seriously handicapped in electoral competition by the limitations of its organization and leadership, by its inability to gather support through appeals to Hindu nationalist sentiment, and by its failure to establish a broad base of social and economic interests."
^abVernon Hewitt (2007).Political Mobilisation and Democracy in India: States of Emergency. Routledge. pp. 2–4.ISBN978-1-134-09762-3.Archived from the original on 7 October 2024. Retrieved6 May 2019., Quote: "The use of socialism, ofgaribi hatao (Indira Gandhi's populist slogan translated as 'out with poverty') and of Hindutva are in the first instance conceptualized as differing state strategies of co-optation, deployed by elites ..."; From Taylor & FrancissummaryArchived 6 May 2019 at theWayback Machine: "[Vernon Hewitt's book] demonstrates how the Internal Emergency of 1975 led to increased support of groups such as the BJS and the RSS, accounting for the rise of political movements advocating Hindu nationalism –Hindutva – as a response to rapid political mobilization triggered by the Emergency, and an attempt by political elites to control this to their advantage."
^Gupta, Charu, "Hindu Women, Muslim Men: Love Jihad and Conversions."Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 44, no. 51, 2009, pp. 13–15.JSTORArchived 22 January 2021 at theWayback Machine
^abRadha Sarkar. "Sacred Slaughter: An Analysis of Historical, Communal, and Constitutional Aspects of Beef Bans in India".Politics, Religion & Ideology.17 (4).
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