Thegovernance ofAndreas Papandreou during his terms asPrime Minister of Greece (1981–1989 and 1993–1996) is characterized by apopulist approach and rooted in personal authority rather thaninstitutional strength.
His administrations prioritized party loyalty over expertise, reinforcing a newly adopted centralizedpatronage system that distributed public sector jobs to political supporters. Papandreou employed populist rhetoric to galvanize his base, often intensifyingpolitical polarization at the expense of democratic norms. However, the weaknesses inherent in his leadership approach led to recurring government inefficiencies, frequentcabinet reshuffles, and corruption scandals that led to early economic and social failures.[1]
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Papandreou had lifelong experience inpolitical campaigning, which few could match in the metapolitefsi era (1974–1990), and had commanding leadership in setting the narrative of Greece in the greater context. However, he had little ministerial experience,[i][2] and spent little time preparing on how to govern before the 1981 election victory.[3] The lack of experience was exacerbated by two more choices. First, Papandreou chose ministers with no previous ministerial experience but who were also ideologically similar, thus eliminating differences of opinion out of fear of leading to intra-party factionalism, as happened inIouliana.[2][4] Second, Papandreou's political party, Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), passed Law 1232/82 in 1982, which purged senior civil servants from all ministries (eliminatinginstitutional memory) based on the allegation that they were hostile to the new regime, and they were replaced by party loyalists who had little knowledge of how the government worked.[5] The lack of experience in Papandreou's governments led to early failures, with costly economic and social consequences.[1]
Papandreou had unchallenged authority in PASOK to the point of being "authoritarian."[6][7][8] He acted as the 'final arbiter,' and he was "ruthless" if he felt threatened.[9] He did not hesitate to silence his intra-party critics with expulsion from PASOK,[9] followed by acharacter assassination from the pro-PASOK press and even state media.[10] His grip on the government and his party started to weaken after theKoskotas scandal.[11][12]
Papandreou experimented with various government structures (both in size and form) and restarted the government frequently as he holds the record for the most ministerial reshuffles (13 times in 1981–1989, with over 100 people changing various ministerial positions).[13] Papandreou found the day-to-day government management less interesting (especially after 1983) and instead focused on the grant narratives of Greece's democratization process.[14] Limited access to Papandreou (especially in later years), lack of guidance, and fluid organizational structure left his ministers spending valuable time decoding what their 'Leader' wanted. Ministers who have worked with Papandreou have recorded their frustration at Ministerial Councils, where Papandreou would not disagree with anyone.[15] These choices reflected his aversion to institutional development, and he instead opted for personality (reactive) politics to be the cohesive force that kept PASOK together. The result was that Papandreou's governments were dysfunctional and lacked coordination, with ministers having little or no time until the next reshuffle to implement campaign promises.[16] The fluid government style of Papandreou, both in structure and in personnel, also made his governments vulnerable to corruption, as the Koskotas scandal proved.[17]
Both major parties in the Metapolitefsi era,New Democracy and PASOK, promoted an inclusive society, but PASOK held an advantage due to Papandreou's populist rhetoric.[18] He framed Greek history through stark binaries, Left vs. Right, privileged vs. underprivileged, intentionally deepening political polarization.[19][20] Papandreou and his inner circle often invoked the trauma of theGreek Civil War, appealing to the "revenge of the losers [of the Civil War]" (Greek:"η ρεβάνς των ηττημένων") narrative to reassure left-leaning supporters that PASOK remained true to its roots.[21] He claimed to empower the 'underprivileged' through his leadership,[19] even at the expense of democratic institutions,[22] once declaring: "There are no institutions – only the people rule this country."[23] His populism includedvilifying opponents and blaming conservatives for the Civil War (1946–1949) and thejunta (1967–1974): "Greek people never forget what the Right has done."[24] With little policy difference between the two parties, Mitsotakis eventually adopted similar populist tactics, further intensifying polarization. By 1985, The Economist described Greece as a "country divided," tearing open wounds of Civil War.[25] Papandreou's populism also extended into his foreign policy rhetoric (seeforeign policy).[26]
The class struggle that Papandreou campaigned on had little basis in reality according toCostas Simitis,[22] it was instead part of old-fashioned patronage politics. Papandreou transformed the localized voter-patron relation, where the patrons were local aristocratic families, into a centralized national machine where the state controlled by PASOK became the source of patronage. He rewarded his loyal supporters with civil service jobs to an unprecedented degree.[27][28] Papandreou's generosity depended on PASOK's performance in the polls. One day before the 1989 elections and as the scandals were closing in, he gave a public command to the Minister of FinanceDimitris Tsovolas to "give it all [to them]" (Greek:Τσοβόλα δώσ'τα όλα), implying to empty the state coffers, and the gathered crowd chanted this back.[29][30] Later on, Papandreou claimed that he was joking, but this event became an infamous moment of the era.[31][32][33]
The mass-scale patronage from PASOK was made feasible by abolishing the merit-based evaluations in selecting civil servants in the public domain, such as utility companies and theNational Bank of Greece (see alsoeducation). After a decade without merit-based evaluations and intensified PASOK's clientelism, these organizations were near collapse.[34] In 1994, merit-based evaluations were reintroduced by PASOK, known asSupreme Council for Personnel Selection (ASEP).[35] Despite initial criticism of this behavior, Mitsotakis' and future governments adopted Papandreou's newly established voter-patron relation.[36]
Papandreou's populism remained popular[ii] in a significant fraction (approximately 40%) of Greek society,[37] despite the deterioration of the economy and the various corruption scandals. Papandreou's son,George Papandreou, capitalized on his father's reputation and was elected leader of PASOK in February 2004 and prime minister during theOctober 2009 parliamentary elections.[38][39]
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