| Glassboro Summit Conference | |
|---|---|
 PremierAlexei Kosygin and PresidentLyndon B. Johnson during the meeting in Glassboro. | |
| Host country |  United States |
| Date | 23–25 June 1967 |
| Cities | Glassboro, New Jersey |
| Venues | Whitney Mansion |
| Participants |  Alexei KosyginLyndon B. Johnson |
| Follows | Vienna summit (1961) |
| Precedes | Moscow Summit (1972) |
TheGlassboro Summit Conference, usually just called theGlassboro Summit, was the 23–25 June 1967 meeting of the heads of government of the United States and theSoviet Union—PresidentLyndon B. Johnson andPremierAlexei Kosygin, respectively—for the purpose of discussingSoviet Union–United States relations inGlassboro, New Jersey. During the Arab–IsraeliSix-Day War diplomatic contact and cooperation increased, leading some to hope for an improvement in the two countries' relations. Some even hoped for joint cooperation on theVietnam War. Although Johnson and Kosygin failed to reach agreement on anything important, the generally amicable atmosphere of the summit was referred to as the "Spirit of Glassboro" and is seen to have improved Soviet–US relations.
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With the United States gradually losing ground in theVietnam War, the administration was looking for other solutions to the conflict.
On 5 June 1967 theSix-Day War began betweenIsrael and theArab states. The war led to an increase in Soviet-US diplomatic contact and cooperation; there were some who hoped this could continue to help the US solve theVietnam War and other pressing international issues.[1] On 10 June 1967, Premier Alexei Kosygin wrote a letter to contact President Lyndon B. Johnson. The "hot line" message arrived at the White House to seek communication between the United States and the Soviet Union. Alexei Kosygin gives a quick explanation of what the Soviet Union and United States should do in regards to the Middle Eastern Crisis. In the message Alexei Kosygin writes:
To The White House
To President Lyndon B. Johnson
Dear Mr. President:
The events of the last days have forced me to express to you with all frankness our view. As the situation shows, the resolutions of the Security Council are invalid. Israel has completely ignored them. As you can understand, after the many attempts taken in this direction and the resolutions of the Security Council concerning the termination of aggression on the part of Israel in the Near East - - these attempts have proved ineffective.
A very crucial moment has now arrived which forces us, if military actions are not stopped in the next few hours, to adopt an independent decision. We are ready to do this. However, these actions may bring us into a clash, which will lead to a grave catastrophe. Obviously in the world there are powers to whom this would be advantageous.
We purpose that you demand from Israel that it unconditionally cease military action in the next few hours. On our part, we will do the same. We purpose to warn Israel that, if this is not fulfilled, necessary actions will be taken, including military.
Please give me your views.
A. Kosygin[2]
Several days later theSoviet Union sent PremierAlexei Kosygin toNew York City to deliver a speech on the then-ongoing Middle Eastern crisis at theUnited Nations headquarters. When theUnited States government was informed of this the Americans gladly welcomed Kosygin to a meeting between him and PresidentLyndon B. Johnson. On 13 June 1967 Johnson sought outJ. William Fulbright, a Senator, at aWhite House reception.Llewellyn Thompson, thenUS ambassador to the USSR, believed that a conference could "start the process of moving toward an understanding with the Soviets". Fulbright even believed that Johnson was reconsidering his Vietnam strategy. Later Fulbright wrote two letters to Johnson about the importance of a summit between the two nations. Johnson agreed, and wrote a letter in return, which said they were waiting for a Soviet response for US invitation.Walt Rostow, theNational Security Advisor at the time, said it was a 20 percent chance of the summit having a good effect on Soviet–US relations, and only a 10 percent chance of the summit going awry.[3]
The SovietPolitical Bureau (Politburo) were divided over the usefulness of the summit.Andrei Gromyko, theMinister of Foreign Affairs at the time and still not a member of the Politburo, was able to win support for it. Gromyko noted that Soviet-US dialogue which had been suspended in 1963 should be reactivated, despite theVietnam War putting a great deal strain on the two countries' relations.[4]
Kosygin had agreed to address theUnited Nations and as such, wished to conduct the summit in New York. Johnson, wary of encountering protesters against the war in Vietnam, preferred to meet inWashington, D.C. Roughly equidistant,Hollybush, the residence of the President of Glassboro State College (nowRowan University) inGlassboro, New Jersey was selected as a compromise.
In their first meeting held on 23 June 1967 there were only four people present,Alexei Kosygin andLyndon B. Johnson and their respective interpreters. The main subjects discussed between the two was the ongoing crisis in theMiddle East and the Soviet-USarms race. Towards the end of the meeting, Johnson said he was willing to discuss a peace settlement regarding war in Vietnam; literally meaning dividing the country in half, one part communist another part capitalist. He assured Kosygin that the only reason for American bombing inNorth Vietnam was because of North Vietnamese intervention intoSouth Vietnam. Johnson offered the Soviets to supervise the democratic election in South Vietnam in the aftermath of the war. Kosygin responded by returning to the original subject; the crisis in the Middle East. During their afternoon meeting, Kosygin told Johnson that he was recently in contact withPhạm Văn Đồng, thePrime Minister of North Vietnam, and that they had discussed the possibilities on putting an end to the war. The North Vietnamese reply came during Kosygin's lunch with Johnson. Kosygin compared the Vietnam War with theAlgerian War which ended whenCharles de Gaulle's France signed a peace treaty signifying the end of French colonisation ofAlgeria; he believed this would happen to the United States if the war continued. He also made it very clear that the North Vietnamese would not give up their goal of a unified Vietnam that easily.[5]
Johnson was worried of North Vietnamese betrayal, saying he would be "crucified" politically in the United States if the North Vietnamese decided to send their troops into South Vietnam if and when the United States stopped bombing them. Kosygin said, relieving Johnson of his worries, that a North Vietnamese delegation could meet anywhere in the world to discuss a peace settlement with the Americans.[6]
The two world leaders met for three days, from 23 June to 25 June 1967, at Hollybush Mansion, home of the college president. Although Johnson and Kosygin failed to reach agreement on limitinganti-ballistic missile systems, the generally amicable atmosphere of the summit was referred to as the "Spirit of Glassboro".
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