
Prior to theinvasion of the Soviet Union duringWorld War II, theGerman armed forces were not aware of two newly developed Soviet tanks, theT-34 and theKV. As a result, they were surprised when they met them in combat for the first time in June 1941. The Germans' standard anti-tank weapons were found to be ineffective against these new Soviet vehicles. This experience prompted a notable leap in tank development in Nazi Germany, mainly in an effort to counter these new threats.
By 22 June 1941, the Red Army deployed almost 1,000 T-34 and over 500 KV tanks,[1] concentrated in five[2] of their twenty-ninemechanized corps. By the end of December 1941, they had lost 2,300 T-34 and over 900 KV tanks, accounting for 15% of the 20,500 tanks lost that year.[3]
At the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, the Germans were expecting little from their opponent's tank forces, which were composed of the oldT-26 andBTs. While most of the Soviet Union's armoured forces were composed of such tanks, the T-34 and the KV designs, which were previously unknown, took the Germans by surprise.[4] Both types were encountered on the second day of the invasion – 23 June 1941.[5]
Half a dozen anti-tank guns fire shells at him [a T-34], which sound like a drumroll. But he drivesstaunchly through our line like an impregnable prehistoric monster... It is remarkable that lieutenant Steup's tank made hits on a T-34, once at about 20 meters and four times at 50 meters, withPanzergranate 40 (caliber 5 cm), without any noticeable effect.
— German battle report, Finkel[6]

The KV tanks were usually assigned to the same units as the more numerous T-34 and, although they were much larger, their overall performance was quite similar; many sources discuss the impact of both types. The most common model of KV was theKV-1. It was in theBattle of Raseiniai where German forces encountered the Soviet KV for the first time. The Soviet 2nd Tank Division from the3rd Mechanized Corps attacked and overran elements of the German6th Panzer Division nearSkaudvilė on 23 June.[7] GermanPanzer 35(t) light tanks and anti-tank weapons were practically ineffective against the Soviet armoured giants, which closed with and, even though some of them were out of ammunition, destroyed some German anti-tank guns by simply driving over them.[5][8]
The next day, at a crossroads nearRaseiniai, Lithuania, a single KV heavy tank managed to block the advance of elements of the6th Panzer Division, which had established bridgeheads on theDubysa River. It stalled the German advance for a full day while being attacked by a variety of anti-tank weapons before being overrun after it finally ran out of ammunition.[9][10]
Historians initially believed that the new tanks were "scattered" among the army in small numbers,[11] but recent research shows the exact opposite.[12] The new tanks were concentrated into dedicated types of formations, such as themechanized corps.
While the re-creating of the mechanised corps had been organised as proposed byGeorgy Zhukov, this had not been completed when Nazi Germany attacked in 1941. Originally done underMarshal Tukhachevsky, the mechanised corps had been broken up by the Commissar for DefenceMarshal Voroshilov in a misreading of the lessons of theSpanish Civil War and theWinter War with Finland. Voroshilov had been replaced byMarshal Timoshenko as Commissar in May 1940. Zhukov had drawn a different conclusion about armoured warfare from the success of the panzers in France and from his own experience in theBattles of Khalkhin Gol against Japan.[13]
| Soviet corps | Soviet divisions | Total Soviet tanks | T-34 and KV |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6th Mechanized Corps | 4th, 7th, 29th | 1,131 | 452[nb 1] |
| 4th Mechanized Corps | 8th, 32nd, 81st | 979 | 414 |
| 8th Mechanized Corps | 12th, 34th, 7th | 899 | 171 |
| 15th Mechanized Corps | 10th, 37th, 212th | 749 | 136 |
| 3rd Mechanized Corps | 2nd, 5th, 84th | 672 | 110 |
| 7th Mechanized Corps | 14th, 18th, 1st | 959 | 103 |
| 16th Mechanized Corps | 15th, 39th, 240th | 478 | 76 |
| 2nd Mechanized Corps | 11th, 16th, 15th | 527 | 60 |
| 22nd Mechanized Corps | 19th, 41st, 215th | 712 | 31 |
| 11th Mechanized Corps | 29th, 33rd, 204th | 414 | 20 |
| 5th Mechanized Corps | 13th, 17th, 109th | 1,070 | 17 |
| Total | 8,590 | 1,590 |
| German corps | German divisions | Total German tanks[nb 2] | Tanks with 37 mm gun (incl. Panzer 38(t) andPanzer III) | Tanks with 50 mm or larger gun (incl. Panzer III andPanzer IV) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| XXXXI Panzer Corps | 1st,6th | 390 | 155 | 121 |
| LVI Panzer Corps | 8th | 212 | 118 | 30 |
| XXXIX. Armeekorps mot | 7th,20th | 494 | 288 | 61 |
| LVII Panzer Corps | 12th,19th | 448 | 219 | 60 |
| XXXXVII Panzer Corps | 17th,18th | 420 | 99 | 187 |
| XXXXVI Panzer Corps | 10th | 182 | 0 | 125 |
| XXIV Panzer Corps | 3rd,4th | 392 | 60 | 207 |
| III Panzer Corps | 13th,14th | 296 | 42 | 140 |
| XXXXVIII Panzer Corps | 11th,16th | 289 | 47 | 135 |
| XIV Panzer Corps | 9th | 143 | 11 | 80 |
| Any other unit of Army Group North, Centre, or South[12] | 0 | 0 | 0 | |
| Total | 3,266 | 1,039 | 1,146[12] | |
Among the mechanized corps (MC), four formations were especially well equipped. On the day of German invasion, about 70% of the total T-34 and KV tanks produced at that time were deployed in the 4th, 6th, 8th, and 15th MC. The 6th MC operated in theBiałystok area, and all of the others in the SovietUkraine. All of their engagements with German tanks happened during or just before theBattle of Brody:[16]
Tank-to-tank battles were rare at the beginning of Operation Barbarossa as the Germans did not seek them; they preferred to bypass the Soviet armour whenever possible. The two stand-out formations, the 4th and 6th MCs, lost almost all of their T-34 and KVs during movement, not from any German attack.[19][20] Both corps tried to assemble counterattacks against German infantry (not against panzers), but the counterattacks had no impact and were barely noticeable.[19][20] The same pertained to the 15th MC after 26 June.[16]
In the first two weeks of the invasion, the Soviet Union suffered the loss of most of its T-34s and KVs, as well as the loss of most of the older tanks:
On one hand, these corps had, within weeks, lost most of their T-34s and KVs,[21] but on the other hand, German reports did not note such a massive elimination in combat.[citation needed] The number of non-combat losses was unprecedented.

In the first weeks of the invasion, the main German anti-tank and tank weapon was the3.7 cm Pak 36, the5 cm KwK 38 and5 cm KwK 39, as well as the short-barreled, howitzer-like German7.5 cm KwK 37 gun. The new5 cm Pak 38 had just begun to enter service in small numbers, with a maximum of two weapons per infantry regiment.[22]
German tank guns proved to be somewhat ineffective at greater range and within the lethality envelope of theF-34 tank gun used by the T-34 and KV-1. Generally, the T-34 outclassed the existing Panzer III and short-barreled Panzer IV medium tanks.[23]
Attempts to destroy the T-34s and KVs concentrated on first immobilising them by firing at their tracks and then by tackling them withfield artillery,anti-aircraft guns, or by blowing them up at close range byshaped charge grenades.
| 20mm | 37mm | 50mm | 75mm | 88mm | 105mm | Unknown |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4.7 | 10 | 61.8 | 10.1 | 3.4 | 2.9 | 7.1 |
On 4 October 1941, the 4th Panzer Division, part of GeneralHeinz Guderian's Panzer Group 2 suffered a severe setback atMtsensk, nearOryol. Heinz Guderian demanded an inquiry into the realities of tank warfare on the Eastern Front, suggesting that the quickest solution was to produce a direct copy of the T-34.[25]
A specialPanzerkommision arrived on the Eastern Front on 20 November 1941[26] to assess the T-34.[27] The Weapons Department held that Germany would have difficulty copying the T-34 as Guderian had suggested, because of the quantity of steel alloy and diesel engines required. Hence a new German medium tank was proposed, incorporating three features of the T-34: a long overhanging gun, good off-road mobility from large tracks, and sloped glacis armour to give greater protection with a modest thickness of armour.[25]
Daimler-Benz and MAN were asked to develop a 30-tonne tank, Daimler-Benz with theirVK 30.02 (D) and MAN with their VK 30.02 (M), incorporating a new Rheinmetall turret. Hitler preferred the Daimler-Benz, but the Weapons Department preferred the MAN, which was more like earlier German tanks. Originally, theVK20, a new 20-tonne tank, had been proposed in 1938 as the next German tank, but this project was clearly inadequate now. In May 1942, MAN was contracted to produce pre-production prototypes, although thePanther tank did not enter production until 1943, and the Model D Panther with increased thickness of armour now weighed 44.8 tonnes. Their combat deployment in June 1943 forOperation Citadel was a debacle.[28] The largerTiger I heavy tank was also in use by this time.