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General secretaryship of Xi Jinping

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Leadership of the Chinese Communist Party since 2012
"Xi Jinping administration" redirects here. Not to be confused withXi Jinping–Li Keqiang Administration.
Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the Core
以习近平同志为核心的党中央

5th generation Communist leadership of
the People's Republic of China
Incumbent
Xi Jinping in 2025
Date formed15 November 2012
People and organisations
Head of stateXi Jinping
Head of governmentLi Keqiang
Li Qiang
No. of ministers31
Member partyChinese Communist Party
Eight minor parties
History
Elections18th Congress in November 2012
19th Congress in October 2017
20th Congress in October 2022
Legislature terms12th National People's Congress
13th National People's Congress
14th National People's Congress
PredecessorHu Jintao Administration/
Xi–Li Administration
General secretaryship of Xi Jinping
Simplified Chinese习近平体制
Traditional Chinese習近平體制
Literal meaningXi Jinping System
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinXí Jìnpíng tǐzhì
Yue: Cantonese
Jyutpingzaap6 gan6ping4 tai2zai3
Alternative Chinese name
Simplified Chinese以习近平同志为核心的党中央
Traditional Chinese以習近平同志為核心的黨中央
Literal meaningThe Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the Core
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinYǐ Xí Jìnpíng tóngzhì wéi héxīn de dǎng zhōngyāng
Second alternative Chinese name
Simplified Chinese以习近平同志为总书记的党中央
Traditional Chinese以習近平同志為總書記的黨中央
Literal meaningThe Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the General Secretary
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinYǐ Xí Jìnpíng tóngzhì wéi zǒngshūjì de dǎng zhōngyāng
This article is part of
a series about
Xi Jinping


CCP General Secretary




Xi Jinping succeededHu Jintao asGeneral Secretary of theChinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012, and later in 2016 was proclaimed the CCP's fourthleadership core, followingMao Zedong,Deng Xiaoping, andJiang Zemin.[1][2][3]

While overseeing China's domestic policy, Xi has introduced far-ranging measures to enforce party discipline and strengthen internal unity. Hisanti-corruption campaign led to the downfall of prominent incumbent and retired CCP officials, including former PSC memberZhou Yongkang. For the sake of promoting "common prosperity", Xi has enacted a series of policies designed to increase equality, overseentargeted poverty alleviation programs as part of thebattle against poverty, and directed a broad crackdown in 2021 against the tech sector, as well as drastically curtailing the tutoring industry and reducing homework burdens. Furthermore, he has expanded support forstate-owned enterprises (SOEs), emphasized advanced manufacturing and tech development, advancedmilitary-civil fusion, and led attempts to reform China's property sector. Following the onset of theCOVID-19 pandemic in mainland China, he initially presided over azero-COVID policy from January 2020 to December 2022 before ultimately shifting towards amitigation strategy afterCOVID-19 protests occurred. In foreign policy, Xi emphasizes theCommunity of Common Destiny. He seeks to increase China's ability to shape international norms in emerging policy areas (described as "new frontiers") like space and the internet, where China can position itself as an early entrant. Xi also seeks to increase China's discourse power, which he frames as China's "right to speak." Xi has pursued a more hardline foreign policy particularly with regard toChina's relations with the United States, thenine-dash line in theSouth China Sea, and theSino-Indian border dispute. Additionally, for the sake of advancing Chinese economic interests abroad, Xi has sought to expand China's influence in Africa and Eurasia by championing theBelt and Road Initiative.

Xi presided over a deterioration in relations between Beijing and Taipei under Taiwanese presidentTsai Ing-wen, successor ofMa Ying-jeou whom Ximet in 2015. In 2020, Xi oversaw the passage of anational security law in Hong Kong, which clamped down on political opposition in the city, especiallypro-democracy activists. Since coming to power, Xi's tenure has witnessed a significant increase incensorship andmass surveillance, a deterioration inhuman rights (including thepersecution of Uyghurs), the rise of acult of personality, theremoval ofterm limits for the presidency in 2018, as well as an increased role for the CCP in society. Xi's political ideas and principles, known asXi Jinping Thought, have been incorporated into theparty andnational constitutions. As the central figure of the fifth generation of leadership of the PRC, Xi has centralized institutional power by taking on multiple positions, overseen significant reforms of Party, state and military bodies, while also increasing CCP's influence over the state bodies. In October 2022, Xi secured a third term as CCP General Secretary, and was re-elected state president for an unprecedented third term in March 2023.

Economic policies

[edit]
See also:Economic history of China (1949–present) andTargeted Poverty Alleviation

Xi Jinping has set three overarching goals for China's economy.[4]: 10  First, to increase China's capacity for innovation so that it will be able to more actively shape global economic rules.[4]: 10  Second, to enhance order and security in China's domestic market.[4]: 10  Third, creating common prosperity and increasing wealth distribution to the poor.[4]: 10 

During the Xi Jinping era, the Chinese government continues to usestate-owned enterprises (SOEs) to serve non-market objectives and CCP control of SOEs has increased[5]: 138  while taking some limited steps towards market liberalization, such as increasing mixed ownership of SOEs.[5]: 141  Although China has promotedits national champion companies since the Jiang Zemin administration,[6]: 158  it has done so particularly strongly since 2017, especially in the technology sector.[7]: 91 

Since 2015, the CCP has issued several industrial plans designed to emphasize high-tech innovation and digital development.[8]: 135  These industrial plans includeMade in China 2025, the "Action Outline for Promoting the Development of Big Data", and the "Three-Year Action Plan to Promote the Development of a New Generation of Artificial Intelligence Industry".[8]: 135  China's Thirteenth and Fourteenth Five-Year Plans have also emphasized high-tech and innovative development.[8]: 135 

During the Xi Jinping administration, China has emphasized an economic strategy ofdual circulation.[9]: 170  First, it seeks to rely more on China's domestic consumers.[9]: 160  Second, it seeks to innovate more domestically developed technology and thereby reduce China's reliance on western technology.[9]: 160 

By 2020, China became the largest trading partner of more than 120 countries.[10]: 228  At the end of that year, China signed major free trade agreements with the European Union as well as fifteen different Asia-Pacific countries.[7]: 259  As of at least 2023, China is the world's largest exporter, a status it has maintained continuously since 2010.[9]: 88 

China's was the only major world economy to experience GDP growth in 2020, when its GDP increased by 2.3%.[7] In 2021, China's GDP growth reached 8.1% (its highest in a decade) and its trade surplus reached an all-time high $687.5 billion.[7]

Education

[edit]
See also:Education in China

Xi has implemented a number of education reforms.[4]: 155  Schools are required to adjust their opening hours to be consistent with work hours in their area so that parents can pick-up their children directly after work (in order to reduce reliance on private classes for adult supervision after school hours).[4]: 155  Schools must also promote health by requiring outdoor physical education classes daily and providing eye examinations twice per term.[4]: 155  Educational reforms have also limited the amount of homework students can be assigned.[4]: 156 

As part of Xi's 2021 directive on "double lessening" (reducing excessive off-campus tutoring and reducing homework burdens), schools may not assign homework to children to grades one and two, homework is limited to no more than 60 minutes for children in grades three to six, and no more than 90 minutes for middle school children.[4]: 156  In July 2021, China enacted a series of rules designed to shutdown the private tutoring sector.[4]: 156 

The government's rationale was that rising educational costs were antithetical to the goals ofcommon prosperity.[10]: 67  Shutting down private tutoring was intended to narrow the education gap between rich and poor.[11]: 5  Rules issued in July 2021 prohibits new registration of private tuition tutoring centers and required existing centers to re-organize as non-profits.[4]: 156  Tuition centers are prohibited from being listed on the stock market or receiving "excessive capital."[4]: 156  They are no longer permitted to offer tutoring on the weekends or during public holidays.[4]: 156 

Since September 2021, private schools providing compulsory education can no longer be controlled by foreign entities or individuals.[4]: 57  Only Chinese nationals may serve on their boards of directors.[4]: 157 

Foreign policy

[edit]
Main articles:Foreign policy of Xi Jinping,Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy, andBelt and Road Initiative

During the Xi Jinping administration, China seeks to shape international norms and rules in emerging policy areas where China has an advantage as an early participant.[4]: 188  Xi describes such areas as "new frontiers," and they include policy areas such as space, deep sea, polar regions, the Internet, nuclear safety, anticorruption, and climate change.[4]: 188 

In his effort to build additional institutional capacity for foreign policy coordination, Xi Jinping created theNational Security Commission (NSC), which absorbed the NSLG.[12]: 180  The NSC's focus is holistic national security and it addresses both external and internal security matters.[12]: 180  Xi introduced theholistic security concept in 2014, which he defined as taking "the security of the people as compass, political security as its roots, economic security as its pillar, military security, cultural security, and cultural security as its protections, and that relies on the promotion of international security."[13]: 3 

During the Xi Jinping era, theCommunity of Common Destiny has become China's most important foreign relations formulation.[13]: 6  In hisforeign policy discourse, Xi cites the examples of "foreignfriends of China" to acknowledge other countries' sacrifices to assist in China's national liberation, particularly with regard to theSecond Sino-Japanese war.[14]: 42  For example, during diplomatic visits to other countries, Xi has praised the contributions of people likeClaire Lee Chennault,Norman Bethune,Dawarkanath Kotnis, and Soviet pilots.[14]: 42 

Xi emphasizes his desire to increase China's discourse power in international matters, often characterizing this in terms of China's "right to speak".[15]: 103 

During Xi's administration, China has often extended state-backed loans for energy and infrastructure-building in exchange for natural resources in regions like Central Asia and Africa.[16]: 87 

Ideology

[edit]
Main article:Xi Jinping Thought

"Xi Jinping Thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era" was formally launched at the19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party having gradually been developed since 2012, when Xi becameGeneral Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party.[4]: 21–26 

In his political discourse, Xi incorporates historical examples and themes.[14]: 32  He describes history as "the best teacher" and "the best textbook".[14]: 32  Especially since the COVID-19 pandemic, Xi encourages the Chinese people to develop "historical self-confidence".[14]: 32  Xi includes ancient history in his political discourse, characterizing China as a "splendid civilization" and highlightingits five thousand years of history.[14]: 33  He often cites theFour Great Inventions as a source of national pride and China's contribution to humanity.[14]: 33  In his discourse for foreign audiences regardingChina's peaceful rise, Xi quotes theConfucian saying, "If you do not want to have it yourself, you should not want to impose it on others."[14]: 64  In his discourse on the community of shared future, Xi cites the third century scholarChen Shou's saying that "delicious soup is made by combining different ingredients."[14]: 64 

Anti-corruption

[edit]
This section is an excerpt fromAnti-corruption campaign under Xi Jinping.[edit]
The anti-corruption campaign began after the conclusion of the18th National Congress of theChinese Communist Party held in Beijing in November 2012.




History
Military organ










flagChina portal

A far-reachinganti-corruption campaign was launched inChina following the conclusion of the18th National Congress of theChinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012. Initiated byCCP general secretaryXi Jinping, the campaign became the most extensive and systematic anti-corruption effort in the history of CCP governance. The campaign began with theCentral Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) conducting investigations into numerous high-ranking CCP and government officials, as well asPeople's Liberation Army (PLA) generals and heads ofstate-owned enterprises and institutions, for violations of discipline and law. Nationwide, disciplinary inspection and supervision departments at all levels of the CCP and government have investigated and punished CCP members and senior officials for violations of discipline and law.

Upon assuming office, Xi Jinping pledged to crack down on both "tigers and flies", referring respectively to high-ranking officials and grassroots civil servants. Most of the officials investigated were dismissed from office and faced charges of bribery andabuse of power, though the severity and nature of the alleged misconduct varied considerably. Administered primarily by the CCDI itsSecretary from 2012 to 2017,Wang Qishan, alongside the relevant military and judicial bodies, the campaign has targeted hundreds of senior officials, including dozens of ministerial-level official and senior PLA officers, hundreds of deputy ministerial-level officials, several executives ofstate-owned enterprises, and five national leaders.

The campaign notably investigated both sitting and former national-level leaders. These included formerPolitburo Standing Committee (PSC) memberZhou Yongkang and formerPolitburo members andCentral Military Commission (CMC)vice chairmenXu Caihou andGuo Boxiong. The campaign also targeted sitting Politburo members such as Chongqing Party secretarySun Zhengcai in 2017, and CMC vice chairmenHe Weidong andZhang Youxia in 2025 and 2026 respectively. As of 2023, approximately 2.3 million government officials had beenprosecuted. The campaign formed a central component of a broader initiative aimed at curbing corruption within the CCP and reinforcing internal unity. It has since become one of the defining features of Xi's political legacy.

Military reform

[edit]
This section is an excerpt fromDeepening National Defense and Military Reform § History.[edit]

Reform of China's defense and military structure began afterXi Jinping became theGeneral Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and theChairman of the Central Military Commission in 2012. UnderXi's administration, China created theCCP National Security Commission and established anair defense identification zone in theEast China Sea in 2013.[17] In 2014, Xi told theCCP Politburo that the PLA should operate by integrating multiple services.[17]

In January 2014, Chinese senior military officers[who?] said that thePeople's Liberation Army (PLA) was planning to reduce the number ofmilitary regions from seven to fiveTheater Commands to have joint command with the ground, naval, air and rocket forces. This is planned to change their concept of operations from primarily ground-oriented defense tomobile andcoordinated movements of all services and to enhance offensive air and naval capabilities. The coastal areas would be turned into three military regions, each with a joint operations command (Jinan,Nanjing andGuangzhou) for projecting power into theYellow Sea,East China Sea andSouth China Sea. The four other inland military regions (Shenyang,Beijing,Chengdu andLanzhou) will be streamlined into two military areas mainly for organizing forces for operations. The change was projected to occur through 2019.[18]

Xi announced a reduction of 300,000 troops from the PLA in September 2015, bringing its size to 2 million troops. Xi described this as a gesture of peace, while analysts such as Rory Medcalf have said that the cut was done to reduce costs as well as part of PLA's modernization.[19] Around half of the 300,000 troops were officers, and most were from thePeople's Liberation Army Ground Force.[20] The "deepening national defense and military reform" was announced in November 2015 at aplenary session of theCentral Military Commission (CMC)'sCentral Leading Group for Military Reform.[21] They were expected to be long and extensive that aimed at turning the PLA into a modern military on par with international standards.[21] Before the reforms were announced, Xi said the CMC should directly control the military and new regional commands be created.[17] On 1 January 2016, the CMC issued its "Deepening National Defense and Military Reform" document, which called for major restructuring of the military with the goal of modernizing and enhancing the military's operational capabilities.[22]: 288 

Religion

[edit]
This section is an excerpt fromReligious policy of Xi Jinping.[edit]
This articleis written like apersonal reflection, personal essay, or argumentative essay that states a Wikipedia editor's personal feelings or presents an original argument about a topic. Pleasehelp improve it by rewriting it in anencyclopedic style.(January 2026) (Learn how and when to remove this message)

Religious sinicization (from "sinicize", meaning somebody or something modified under Chinese influence)[23] usually refers to "the indigenisation of religious faith, practice, and ritual in Chinese culture and society".[24] SinceXi Jinping took office as theGeneral Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012, the officially atheistChinese Communist Party (CCP) has tightened restrictions on religion in thePeople's Republic of China.[25]

The party's attitude towards religion dates back to thefounding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, when early CCP leaders viewed religion as a potential threat, associating it with foreign influence, feudalism, and superstition.[26] During theCultural Revolution (1966–1976),CCP ChairmanMao Zedong took measures to eliminate religion, which led to the widespread destruction of religious sites and persecution of believers.[27] UnderDeng Xiaoping, the CCP shifted to a regulatory policy, aimed at managing religion and using its influence to achieve other party objectives, as well as to suppress any threat it might present to the party's authority.[27][page needed] Given the apparent expansion of religion in Chinese society in recent decades, CCP leaders have responded with a combination of regulations and repression.[27][page needed]

The Xi general secretaryship has broadly followed a similar approach to religion and continued policies initiated by its predecessors.[27][page needed] However, religious policy under Xi Jinping can be distinguished from that of theHu Jintao era in four key ways: a set of new, more restrictive legal instruments has been introduced, religious persecution targets have broadened, there is increased state interference in daily religious practices, and there are new forms of technological surveillance.[27][page needed]

In May 2015,sinicization entered the official discourse when Xi Jinping declared, at the Central United Front Work Conference, that religion in China should be adapted to align with socialist values and must adhere to the path of sinicization.[28] The theme of religious sinicization has grown more prominent in official discourse.[29] He further emphasized his strategy of religious Sinicisation in a speech in 2016.[30] This was followed up in 2018 by theNational People's Congress andChinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) approving the administrative, ideological, and legal frameworks for the policy of Sinicisation, with these measures coming into force on the 1st of February 2020.[24]

The CCP's policy is an attempt to bring religions under state control and align them with Chinese culture.[31] The campaign particularly affects religions deemed 'foreign', such as Christianity and Islam.[30] Xi Jinping perceives these religions as susceptible to 'Western values' and extremism, which he considers to be a threat to his ruling objectives.[30]

The religious sinicization policy has three main focuses for the CCP to monitor and manage religion in China: bureaucratically, the CCP streamlines oversight of religion; ideologically, it reinforces Party influence over religious beliefs and practices; and legally, it provides the juridical framework to monitor and control the growth of religion and its influence in China.[24]  Religious Sinicization requires patriotic education and public displays of loyalty to the CCP in churches, mosques, and temples. The leaders of Christianity and Islam are expected to "align their teachings and customs with Chinese traditions and 'pledge loyalty' to the state".[25] Thus, rather than adapting religion to Chinese culture and traditions, it is about making religions subservient toCCP ideology.

Human rights

[edit]
See also:Human rights in China

According to theHuman Rights Watch, Xi has "started a broad and sustained offensive on human rights" since he became leader in 2012.[32] The HRW also said that repression in China is "at its worst level since the Tiananmen Square massacre."[33] Since taking power, Xi has cracked down on grassroots activism, with hundreds being detained.[34] He presided over the709 crackdown on 9 July 2015, which saw more than 200 lawyers, legal assistants and human rights activists being detained.[35] His term has seen the arrest and imprisonment of activists such asXu Zhiyong, as well as numerous others who identified with theNew Citizens' Movement. Prominent legal activistPu Zhiqiang of theWeiquan movement was also arrested and detained.[36]

In 2017, the local government of theJiangxi province toldChristians to replace their pictures ofJesus with Xi Jinping as part of a general campaign on unofficial churches in the country.[37][38][39] According to local social media, officials "transformed them from believing in religion to believing in the party."[37] According to activists, "Xi is waging the most severe systematicsuppression of Christianity in the country since religious freedom was written into the Chinese constitution in 1982," and according to pastors and a group that monitors religion in China, has involved "destroying crosses, burning bibles, shutting churches and ordering followers to sign papers renouncing their faith."[40]

Ethnic minorities

[edit]

Under Xi, the CCP has embraced assimilationist policies towards ethnic minorities, scaling backaffirmative action in the country by 2019,[41] and scrapping a wording in October 2021 that guaranteed the rights of minority children to be educated in their native language, replacing it with one that emphasized teaching the national language.[42] In 2014, Xi called to foster asense of community for the Chinese nation among ethnic minorities.[43] In 2020,Chen Xiaojiang was appointed as head of theNational Ethnic Affairs Commission, the first Han Chinese head of the body since 1954.[44] On 24 June 2022,Pan Yue, another Han Chinese, became the head of the commission, with him reportedly holding assimilationist policies toward ethnic minorities.[45] Xi outlined his official views relations between the majority Han Chinese and ethnic minorities by saying "[n]eitherHan chauvinism norlocal ethnic chauvinism is conducive to the development of a community for theChinese nation."[46]

Xinjiang

[edit]
Main article:Persecution of Uyghurs in China
Xi Jinping's picture at the entrance hall of theXinjiang Museum inÜrümqi, August 2018

There were several terrorist attacks inXinjiang in 2013 and 2014; anattack in Ürümqi in April 2014 occurred just after the conclusion of a visit by Xi Jinping to Xinjiang.[47] Following these attacks, CCP leaders held a secret meeting to find a solution to the attacks,[48] leading to Xi to launch theStrike Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism in 2014, which involved mass detention, and surveillance of ethnicUyghurs there.[49][50] The campaign included the detainment of 1.8 million people ininternment camps, mostly Uyghurs but also including other ethnic and religious minorities, by 2020,[48] and a birth suppression campaign that led to a large drop in the Uyghur birth rate by 2019.[51] Human rights groups and former inmates have described the camps as "concentration camps", where Uyghurs and other minorities have been forcibly assimilated into China's majorityethnic Han society.[52] This program has been called agenocide by some observers, whilea report by theUN Human Rights Office said they may amount tocrimes against humanity.[53][54]

Internal Chinese government documents leaked to the press in November 2019 showed that Xi personally ordered a security crackdown in Xinjiang, saying that the party must show "absolutely no mercy" and that officials use all the "weapons of thepeople's democratic dictatorship" to suppress those "infected with the virus of extremism."[50][55] The papers also showed that Xi repeatedly discussed aboutIslamic extremism in his speeches, likening it to a "virus" or a "drug" that could be only addressed by "a period of painful, interventionary treatment."[50] However, he also warned against the discrimination against Uyghurs and rejected proposals to eradicateIslam in China, calling that kind of viewpoint "biased, even wrong."[50] Xi's exact role in the building of internment camps has not been publicly reported, though he's widely believed to be behind them and his words have been the source for major justifications in the crackdown in Xinjiang.[56][57]

During a four-day visit to Xinjiang in July 2022, Xi urged local officials to always listen to the people's voices[58] and to do more in preservation of ethnic minority culture.[59] He also inspected theXinjiang Production and Construction Corps and praised its "great progress" in reform and development.[60] During another visit to Xinjiang in August 2023, Xi said in a speech that the region was "no longer a remote area" and should open up more fortourism to attract domestic and foreign visitors.[61][62]

Current members

[edit]

Standing Committee

[edit]
These tables are an excerpt from20th Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party § Composition.[edit]
Members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
[63]
R.Officeholder19thBirthPMBirthplaceAcademic featsPositionsRef.
1Xi JinpingXi Jinping习近平Old19531974Beijing[64]
2Li QiangLi Qiang李强New19591983Zhejiang
Fifteen
[65]
3Zhao LejiZhao Leji赵乐际Old19571975Qinghai[66]
4Wang HuningWang Huning王沪宁Old19551984Shanghai[67]
5Cai QiCai Qi蔡奇New19551975Fujian
Fifteen
[68]
6Ding XuexiangDing Xuexiang丁薛祥New19621984Jiangsu
Thirteen
[69]
7Li XiLi Xi李希New19561982Gansu[70]

Politburo

[edit]
These tables are an excerpt from20th Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party § Composition.[edit]
Members of the Political Bureau of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
[71]
Officeholder19thBirthPMBirthplaceEducationOffices heldRef.
Cai QiCai Qi蔡奇Old19551975FujianGraduate[72]
Chen Jining陈吉宁New19641984LiaoningGraduate
One
[73]
Chen Min'er陈敏尔Old19601982ZhejiangGraduate
One
[74]
Chen Wenqing陈文清New19601983SichuanGraduate[75]
Ding XuexiangDing Xuexiang丁薛祥Old19621984JiangsuGraduate
One
[76]
He Lifeng何立峰New19551981GuangdongGraduate[77]
He Weidong[I]何卫东New19571978FujianUndergraduate[78]
Huang Kunming黄坤明Old19561976FujianGraduate
One
[79]
Li Ganjie李干杰New19641984HunanGraduate
One
[80]
Li Hongzhong李鸿忠Old19561976ShenyangGraduate[81]
Li QiangLi Qiang李强Old19591983ZhejiangGraduate[82]
Li ShuleiLi Shulei李书磊New19641986HenanGraduate
One
[83]
Li XiLi Xi李希Old19561982GansuGraduate[84]
Liu Guozhong刘国中New19621986HeilongjiangGraduate
One
[85]
Ma Xingrui马兴瑞New19591988HeilongjiangGraduate
One
[86]
Shi Taifeng石泰峰New19561982ShanxiGraduate[87]
Wang HuningWang Huning王沪宁Old19551984ShanghaiGraduate[88]
Wang Yi王毅New19531981BeijingGraduate[89]
Xi JinpingXi Jinping习近平Old19531974BeijingGraduate
Eleven
[90]
Yin Li尹力New19621980ShandongGraduate
One
[91]
Yuan Jiajun袁家军New19621992JilinGraduate
One
[92]
Zhang Guoqing张国清New19641984HenanGraduate
One
[93]
Zhang Youxia张又侠Old19501969BeijingGraduate[94]
Zhao LejiZhao Leji赵乐际Old19571975ShandongGraduate[95]

Notes

[edit]
  1. ^He Weidong was removed from the Politburo on 17 October 2023.

References

[edit]
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  2. ^Ross, Robert S.; Bekkevold, Jo Inge (2016).China in the Era of Xi Jinping: Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges. Georgetown University Press.ISBN 978-1-62616-298-3.Archived from the original on 2023-08-07. Retrieved2020-10-31.
  3. ^Zhang 张, Wei 炜 (31 October 2016).点评中国:六中“核心论”意味着什么.BBC News Chinese (in Simplified Chinese).Archived from the original on 2019-07-26. Retrieved2019-07-26.
  4. ^abcdefghijklmnopqrTsang, Steve; Cheung, Olivia (2024).The Political Thought of Xi Jinping.Oxford University Press.ISBN 9780197689363.
  5. ^abPieke, Frank N.; Hofman, Bert, eds. (2022).CPC Futures The New Era of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics. Singapore:National University of Singapore Press.doi:10.56159/eai.52060.ISBN 978-981-18-5206-0.OCLC 1354535847.
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  7. ^abcdMarquis, Christopher; Qiao, Kunyuan (2022-11-15).Mao and Markets: The Communist Roots of Chinese Enterprise.Yale University Press.doi:10.2307/j.ctv3006z6k.ISBN 978-0-300-26883-6.JSTOR j.ctv3006z6k.S2CID 253067190.
  8. ^abcLiu, Zongyuan Zoe (2023).Sovereign Funds: How the Communist Party of China Finances its Global Ambitions. The Belknap Press ofHarvard University Press.doi:10.2307/jj.2915805.ISBN 9780674271913.JSTOR jj.2915805.S2CID 259402050.
  9. ^abcdBrown, Kerry (2023).China Incorporated: The Politics of a World Where China is Number One. London:Bloomsbury Academic.ISBN 978-1-350-26724-4.
  10. ^abJin, Keyu (2023).The New China Playbook: Beyond Socialism and Capitalism. New York: Viking.ISBN 978-1-9848-7828-1.
  11. ^Zhang, Angela Huyue (2024).High Wire: How China Regulates Big Tech and Governs Its Economy.Oxford University Press.ISBN 9780197682258.
  12. ^abZhao, Suisheng (2023).The Dragon Roars Back: Transformational Leaders and Dynamics of Chinese Foreign Policy. Stanford, California:Stanford University Press.doi:10.1515/9781503634152.ISBN 978-1-5036-3088-8.OCLC 1331741429.
  13. ^abShinn, David H.; Eisenman, Joshua (2023).China's Relations with Africa: a New Era of Strategic Engagement. New York:Columbia University Press.doi:10.7312/shin21000.ISBN 978-0-231-21001-0.JSTOR 10.7312/shin21000.
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