Strawson, the elder son of Oxford philosopherP. F. Strawson, was educated at theDragon School,Oxford (1959–65), where he won a scholarship toWinchester College (1965–68). He left school at 16, after completing hisA-levels and winning a place atTrinity Hall, Cambridge. At Cambridge, he read Oriental studies (1969–71), social and political science (1971–72), and moral sciences (1972–73) before moving to the University of Oxford, where he received his BPhil in philosophy in 1977 and his DPhil in philosophy in 1983. He also spent a year as anauditeur libre (audit student) at theÉcole Normale Supérieure in Paris and at theUniversité Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne as a French Government Scholar (1977–78).
In thefree will debate, Strawson holds that there is a fundamental sense in which free will is impossible, whetherdeterminism is true or not. He argues for this position with what he calls his "basic argument", which aims to show that no-one is ever ultimately morally responsible for their actions, and hence that no one has free will in the sense that usually concerns us. In its simplest form, the basic argument runs thus:
You do what you do, in any given situation, because of the way you are.
To be ultimately responsible for what you do, you have to be ultimately responsible for the way you are—at least in certain crucial mental respects.
But you cannot be ultimately responsible for the way you are in any respect at all.
So you cannot be ultimately responsible for what you do.[5]
Strawson has argued that what he calls "realistic physicalism" (or "realistic monism")entails panpsychism.[7] He writes that "as a real physicalist, then, I hold that the mental/experiential is physical."[7]: 7 He quotes the physicistArthur Eddington in support of his position as follows: "If we must embed our schedule of indicator readings in some kind of background, at least let us accept the only hint we have received as to the significance of the background—namely that it has a nature capable of manifesting itself as a mental activity.[7]: 11 The editor of theJournal of Consciousness Studies, Anthony Freeman, has written that panpsychism is regarded by many as either "plain crazy, or else a direct route back to animism and superstition".[7]: 1 But it has a long tradition in Western thought.[8]
Things That Bother Me: Death, Freedom, the Self, etc. (2018) (The New York Review of Books),ISBN978-1-68137-220-4
Korean translation (Forthcoming)
Consciousness and Its Place in Nature: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism, 2nd edition, revised and expanded, ed. A. Freeman and G. Horswell, (Exeter: Imprint Academic) (2024),ISBN978-1788361187
Stuff, Quality, Structure: The Whole Go (2024) (Oxford University Press),ISBN978-0-19-890365-9
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"Hume on himself" (2001), inEssays in Practical Philosophy: From Action to values, ed. D. Egonsson, J. Josefsson, B. Petersson and T. Rønnow-Rasmussen (Aldershot: Ashgate Press), pp. 69–94.
"Against 'corporism': the two uses of I" (2009)Organon F 16, pp. 428–448.
"The Self" inThe Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, ed. B. McLaughlin and A. Beckermann (Oxford University Press), pp. 541–64.
"5 Questions on Mind and Consciousness" (2009), inMind and Consciousness: 5 Questions (AutomaticPress/VIP,) pp. 191–204.
"5 Questions on Action" (2009), inPhilosophy of Action: 5 Questions (AutomaticPress/VIP), pp. 253–9.
"On the SESMET theory of subjectivity" (2009), inMind That Abides, ed. D. Skrbina (Amsterdam: John Benjamins), pp. 57–64.
"The identity of the categorical and the dispositional" (2008),Analysis 68/4, pp. 271–8.
"Radical Self-Awareness" (2010), inSelf, No Self?:Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions, ed. M. Siderits, E. Thompson, and D. Zahavi (Oxford University Press), pp. 274–307.
"The depth(s) of the twentieth century" (2010),Analysis 70/4:1.
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"Narrativity and non-Narrativity" (2010), in Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science 1, pp. 775–80.
"La impossibilidad de la responsabilidad moral en sentido último" (2010), Spanish Translation of "The Impossibility of (Ultimate) Moral Responsibility", inCuadernos Eticos
"Cognitive phenomenology: real life" (2011), inCognitive Phenomenology, ed.T. Bayne and M. Montague (Oxford University Press), pp. 285–325.
"The impossibility of ultimate responsibility?" inFree Will and Modern Science, ed. R. Swinburne (London: British Academy) (December), pp. 126–40.
"Owning the Past: Reply to Stokes" (2011),Journal of Consciousness Studies 18, pp. 170–95.
"The minimal self" (2011), inOxford Handbook of the Self, ed. S. Gallagher (Oxford University Press), pp. 253–278.
"Real naturalism" (2012), inProceedings of the American Philosophical Association 86/2, pp. 125–154.
"I and I: immunity to error through misidentification of the subject" (2012), inImmunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays, ed. S. Prosser and F. Recanati (Cambridge University Press)
"All My Hopes Vanish: Hume’s Appendix" (2012), inThe Continuum Companion to Hume, ed. A Bailey and D. O’Brien (London: Continuum)
"We live beyond any tale that we happen to enact" (2012), inHarvard Review of Philosophy 18, pp. 73–90.
"Contra la Narratividad" (2013), Spanish Translation of "Against Narrativity", inCuadernos de Crîtica 56 (México: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas)
Italian Translation of "The Minimal Subject" (2014) inQuel che Resta dell’Io (Roma: Castelvecchi) pp. 41
"Free will" (2015), inNorton Introduction toPhilosophy, ed. A. Byrne, J. Cohen, G. Rosen and S. Shiffrin (New York:Norton)
"Real direct realism" (2015), inThe Nature of Phenomenal Qualities, ed. P. Coates and S. Coleman (Oxford University Press)
"Nietzsche’s metaphysics?" (2015), inNietzsche on Mind and Nature, ed.M. Dries and P. Kail (Oxford University Press)
"When I enter most intimately into what I call myself" (2015), inOxford Handbook of David Hume ed. Paul Russell (Oxford University Press)
"The unstoried life" (2015), inOn Life-Writing, ed. Z. Leader (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
"'The secrets of all hearts': Locke on personal identity" (2015), inMind, Self, and Person, ed. A. O'Hear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
"Mind and being: the primacy of panpsychism", inPanpsychism: Philosophical Essays, ed. G. Bruntrup and L. Jaskolla (New York: Oxford University Press)
"The concept of consciousness in the twentieth century" (2016), inConsciousness, ed. A. Simmons (New York: Oxford University Press)
"Narrative bypassing", inA New Approach to Studies of the Self, ed. N. Praetorius,Journal of Consciousness Studies 16, pp. 125–139
"Conceivability and the silence of physics" (2017),Journal of Consciousness Studies
"Descartes's mind" (2017), inDescartes and Cartesianism: Essays in Honour of Desmond Clarke, ed. S. Gaukroger and C. Wilson (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
"Consciousness never left" (2017), inThe Return of Consciousness, ed. K. Almqvist and A. Haag (Stockholm: Axel and Margaret Axson Johnson Foundation)
"Physicalist panpsychism" (2017), inThe Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, 2nd ed, ed. S. Schneider and M. Velmans (New York: Wiley-Blackwell)
"Contre la narrativité" (2017), French Translation of "Against Narrativity", inFabula-LHT
"What does 'physical' mean? A prolegomenon to physicalist panpsychism", inRoutledge Handbook of Panpsychism
"Descartes and the Buddha—arapprochement?" inReasons and Empty Persons: Mind, Metaphysics, and Morality: Essays in Honor of Mark Siderits, ed. C. Coseru (Springer, 2023) pp. 63-86
"Blockers and laughter: panpsychism, archepsychism, pantachepsychism" (2024), in second revised and expanded edition ofConsciousness and its Place in Nature, ed. A Freeman (Exeter: Imprint Academic)
"The Impossibility of Subjectless Experience" (2024), inJournal of Consciousness Studies vol. 31, pp. 26–36
"Brimming with X", book review of Michael Pollan'sHow to Change Your Mind: The new science of psychedelics, in theTimes Literary Supplement, August 8, 2018