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TheFourteenth Amendment (Amendment XIV) to theUnited States Constitution was adopted on July 9, 1868, as one of theReconstruction Amendments. Considered one of the most consequential amendments, it addressescitizenship rights and equal protection under the law at all levels of government. The Fourteenth Amendment was a response to issues affectingfreed slaves following theAmerican Civil War, and its enactment was bitterly contested. States of the defeatedConfederacy were required to ratify it to regain representation inCongress. The amendment, particularly its first section, is one of the most litigated parts of the Constitution, forming the basis for landmarkSupreme Court decisions, such asBrown v. Board of Education (1954; prohibitingracial segregation inpublic schools),Loving v. Virginia (1967; endinginterracial marriage bans),Roe v. Wade (1973; recognizing federalright to abortion untiloverturned in 2022),Bush v. Gore (2000; settling2000 presidential election),Obergefell v. Hodges (2015; extendingright to marry tosame-sex couples), andStudents for Fair Admissions v. Harvard (2023; prohibitingaffirmative action in mostcollege admissions).
The amendment's first section includes theCitizenship Clause,Privileges or Immunities Clause,Due Process Clause, andEqual Protection Clause. The Citizenship Clause broadly defines citizenship, superseding the Supreme Court's decision inDred Scott v. Sandford (1857), which held that Americans descended from African slaves could not become American citizens. The Privileges or Immunities Clause was interpreted in theSlaughter-House Cases (1873) as preventing states from impeding federal rights, such as thefreedom of movement. The Due Process Clause builds on theFifth Amendment to prohibit all levels of government from depriving people of life, liberty, or property withoutsubstantive andprocedural due process. Additionally, the Due Process Clause supports theincorporation doctrine, by which portions of theBill of Rights have been applied to the states. The Equal Protection Clause requires each state to provide equal protection under the law to all people, including non-citizens, within itsjurisdiction.
The second section superseded theThree-fifths Compromise, apportioning theHouse of Representatives andElectoral College using each state's adult male population. In allowing states to abridge voting rights "for participation in rebellion, or other crime," this section approvedfelony disenfranchisement. The third section disqualifies federal and state candidates who "have engaged in insurrection or rebellion," but inTrump v. Anderson (2024), the Supreme Court left its application to Congress for federal elections and state governments for state elections. The fourth section affirmspublic debt authorized by Congress while declining to compensate slaveholders foremancipation. The fifth section providescongressional power of enforcement, but Congress' authority to regulate private conduct has shifted to theCommerce Clause, while theanti-commandeering doctrine restrains federal interference in state law.
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment formally definesUnited States citizenship and protects variouscivil rights from being abridged or denied by anystate law orstate action.[2][3] InShelley v. Kraemer (1948), the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment's historical context of countering the discriminatoryBlack Codes of southern states must be used in its interpretation.[4] Primarily written by RepresentativeJohn Bingham, Section 1 is the most frequently litigated part of the amendment,[5] and this amendment is the most frequently litigated part of the Constitution.[6][7][8]

TheCitizenship Clause overruled the Supreme Court'sDred Scott decision that African Americans could not become citizens.[9] The clause constitutionalized theCivil Rights Act of 1866's grant of citizenship to all born within the United States, except the children of foreign diplomats.[10][11][12] Compared against Europeanjus sanguinis laws that assign citizenship by one's parents, historians have framed the United States' Citizenship Clause as an extension of the Fourteenth Amendment's egalitarian principles.[13][14]
Congress' debate over the Citizenship Clause shows explicit rejection of SenatorEdgar Cowan'santi-Romani sentiment, affirming that birthright citizenship cannot be revoked from children born to disfavored ethnic minorities.[15][16] Birthright citizenship was meant to repudiate theAmerican Colonization Society's repatriation offreeborn people of color andemancipated slaves to Africa.[17][18] InUnited States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898), the Supreme Court confirmed that children born in the United States receive birthright citizenship, regardless of whether their parents are non-citizen immigrants.[19]
InElk v. Wilkins (1884), the Supreme Court interpreted the Citizenship Clause as grantingbirthright citizenship to all born within the jurisdiction of the United States and allowing Congress to establish alternativepathways for naturalization.[20] Consistent with the views of the clause's author, SenatorJacob M. Howard, the Supreme Court held that becauseIndian reservations are not under the federal government's jurisdiction, Native Americans born on such land are not entitled to birthright citizenship.[21][15][22] The 1887Dawes Act offered citizenship to Native Americans who acceptedprivate property as part ofcultural assimilation, while the 1924Indian Citizenship Act offered citizenship to all Native Americans born within the nation'sterritorial limits.[23]
InMackenzie v. Hare (1915), the Supreme Court upheld theExpatriation Act of 1907, which dictated that all American women who voluntarily married aforeign alienrenounced their American citizenship.[24]Perez v. Brownell (1958) similarly held that Congress could designate voting in foreign elections ordraft evasion as renunciations of citizenship. However, inAfroyim v. Rusk (1967) andVance v. Terrazas (1980), the Supreme Court reversed itself, holding that renunciations of American citizenship must be formally expressed.[25]
In January 2025, PresidentDonald Trump issuedExecutive Order 14160 to deny birthright citizenship to children with parents ofillegal ortemporary immigration status.[26] While this topic was not considered by the 39th Congress, nor has it been addressed by the Supreme Court, enforcement of the Executive Order has been blocked as unconstitutional by multiple federal judges.[27] Furthermore, many of the freed slaves whose children were covered by the Citizenship Clause were illegal immigrants brought in violation of the 1807Act Prohibiting Importation of Slaves.[28]
ThePrivileges or Immunities Clause was written to providecongressional power of enforcement to the similarPrivileges and Immunities Clause ofArticle Four of the Constitution.[29] In 1823, Supreme Court JusticeBushrod Washington decidedCorfield v. Coryell, interpreting the latter clause as protecting theright to travel, seekhabeas corpus, and hold property in multiple states, among other rights.[30] In theSlaughter-House Cases (1873), the Supreme Court rejected arguments that the Privileges or Immunities Clause furtherincorporated the Bill of Rights against state governments or transferredpolice power to the federal government.[31][32] InMcDonald v. City of Chicago (2010) andTimbs v. Indiana (2019), Supreme Court JusticeClarence Thomas advocated transferring the incorporation doctrine from theDue Process Clause to the Privileges or Immunities Clause, but this has been criticized as a veiled attempt to restrict the rights of non-citizens within the United States.[33]
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by reference to any code. The best that can be said is that, through the course of this Court's decisions, it has represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized society. If the supplying of content to this constitutional concept has of necessity been a rational process, it certainly has not been one where judges have felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take them. The balance of which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court which radically departs from it could not long survive, while a decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound. No formula could serve as a substitute, in this area, for judgment and restraint.
TheDue Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly applies theFifth Amendment's similar clause to state governments. This reinforcement of due process rights was in response to theFugitive Slave Act of 1850 allowing slave owners to recapture their fugitive slaves "without process" and rejecting the testimony of alleged fugitives.[17] In protecting all people againstarbitrary denial of life, liberty, or property, courts have recognized bothprocedural andsubstantive due process.[34][35] Procedural due process deals with the processes for restraining life, liberty, or property, such as theright to be notified of ahearing by aneutral decision-maker.[36] In comparison, substantive due process involves the government's justification for engaging in those processes.[37]
In deciding whether legislation unconstitutionally infringes on one's liberty, most government acts are subject torational basis review, under which the government must present a legitimatestate interest and the law must be rationally related to advancing that interest. When the government infringes on fundamental rights, such asracial equality,strict scrutiny requires its actions to instead be narrowly tailored to address a compelling state interest.[38]
The early 20th century has been referred to as theLochner era for the Supreme Court's embrace of afreedom of contract in cases likeAllgeyer v. Louisiana (1897) andLochner v. New York (1905).[39] While that freedom was ultimately curtailed inWest Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937), those early cases recognized substantive due process rights within the Due Process Clause. For example,Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) andPierce v. Society of Sisters (1925) struck down anti-immigrant state education laws as violations of substantive due process.[37]
In 1890, future Supreme Court JusticeLouis Brandeis and his law partner,Samuel D. Warren II, published "The Right to Privacy" in theHarvard Law Review.[40] While the article only advocated fortort actions to protect one's privacy, the Supreme Court later elevatedprivacy to a fundamental right, protectingcontraceptive sales inGriswold v. Connecticut (1965),consensual sex inLawrence v. Texas (2003), andsame-sex marriage inObergefell v. Hodges under substantive due process.[41] InRoe v. Wade (1973), the Supreme Court recognized a substantive due processright to abortion, but that holding was overturned inDobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization (2022), which stated that "a right to abortion is not deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and traditions."[42]
Prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court held inBarron v. Baltimore (1833) that the Bill of Rights only restrained the federal government.[43] However, inChicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago (1897), the Supreme Court applied theFifth Amendment'sTakings Clause to theeminent domain power of state governments under the Due Process Clause, beginning an ongoing process of incorporation. Legal scholarAkhil Reed Amar has argued that while Congress intended the Fourteenth Amendment to reverse theBarron decision, Representative Bingham expected incorporation to rely on the Privileges or Immunities Clause.[44] The Supreme Court has explicitly rejected incorporation of the Fifth Amendment's Grand Jury Clause andSeventh Amendment, and it has never addressed theThird Amendment.[45]

TheEqual Protection Clause was written to constitutionalize theanti-discrimination principles of theCivil Rights Act of 1866 and prevent enforcement of the southern states'Black Codes.[11] InStrauder v. West Virginia (1880), the Supreme Court recognized exclusion of African Americans fromWest Virginianjuries as an unconstitutional infringement of this clause, triggering the 1866 law's provision to remove the underlying case to federal court.[47] InYick Wo v. Hopkins (1886), the Supreme Court clarified that race-neutral laws administered in discriminatory ways were similarly unconstitutional.[48]
Whereas thePrivileges or Immunities Clause refers to citizens, this clause refers to all people within the jurisdiction of the United States. Accordingly, inPlyler v. Doe (1982), the Supreme Court prohibited state governments from restrictingpublic education on the basis of a child's immigration status.[49] In that decision, JusticeWilliam J. Brennan Jr. noted that inWong Wing v. United States (1896), the Supreme Court had already recognized illegal immigrants as within American jurisdiction for the purposes ofdue process rights.[50]
While the Fourteenth Amendment'sDue Process Clauseincorporates the Bill of Rights against state governments, the Fifth Amendment's similar clause has been used forreverse incorporation of the Equal Protection Clause against the federal government. InBolling v. Sharpe (1954), the Supreme Court used this doctrine to prevent the federal government from maintainingsegregated public schools in Washington, D.C.[51]
While states can vary taxation by the taxpayer's profession or form of their property, the Equal Protection Clause restrains the government from engaging in discriminatorytax assessment.[52] Additionally, inMetropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward (1985), the Supreme Court treated the Equal Protection Clause as affirming theDormant Commerce Clause doctrine against stateprotectionism.[53] InSanta Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co. (1886),Supreme Court Reporter of DecisionsBancroft Davis affirmedcorporate personhood in the decision'sheadnote without full discussion by the court. InMinneapolis & St. Louis Railway Co. v. Beckwith (1889), the Supreme Court fully embraced this treatment of businesses as people.[54]

InPlessy v. Ferguson (1896), the Supreme Court held thatracial segregation laws did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, and inCumming v. Richmond County Board of Education (1899), it applied its "separate but equal" doctrine to uphold racial segregation inpublic schools. Through civil rights litigation, groups like theNAACP weakened this doctrine, culminating inBrown v. Board of Education (1954) holding segregated facilities to be inherently unequal.[55] The ruling was met with "massive resistance" in southern states, leading state and federal courts to overturn many segregationist state laws.[56][57]
The Supreme Court clarified inHernandez v. Texas (1954) that the Equal Protection Clause applies to all racial groups.[58] InReed v. Reed (1971), the Supreme Court unanimously struck down anIdahoprobate law favoring men in its first application of the Equal Protection Clause tosex discrimination. Responding tosecond-wave feminism, the Supreme Court ruled inCraig v. Boren (1976) that sex classifications would thereafter be subjected tointermediate scrutiny.[59]
The Supreme Court ruled inRegents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978) that diverse student bodies were acompelling interest for universities while deemingracial quotas inpublic university admissions unconstitutional.[60] In the 2003companion casesGratz v. Bollinger andGrutter v. Bollinger, the Court continued to accept race-conscious admissions while striking down a points-based system that quantified minority status.[61] InStudents for Fair Admissions v. Harvard (2023), the Supreme Court effectively overturned that precedent, declaringaffirmative action unconstitutional in private universities that accept federal funds and all public universities exceptmilitary academies.[60][62]
With the 1964 casesWesberry v. Sanders andReynolds v. Sims, the Supreme Court embraced a "one man, one vote" approach to apportioning congressional districts. Whileracial gerrymandering was held illegal inShaw v. Reno (1993),partisan gerrymandering was deemed apolitical question inRucho v. Common Cause (2019).[63] InBush v. Gore (2000), the Supreme Court required states to impose uniform ballot counting procedures across their counties under the Equal Protection Clause. Deeming a complete recount of the2000 presidential election in Florida impractical, the Supreme Court accepted theFlorida Secretary of State's prior vote certification, allowingGeorge W. Bush to win theElectoral College.[64]
TheEleventh Amendment provides state governments withsovereign immunity from federal lawsuits brought by citizens of other states, and inHans v. Louisiana (1890), the Supreme Court held that it implies immunity from all lawsuits brought by private parties. InFitzpatrick v. Bitzer (1976), the Supreme Court determined that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment'scongressional power of enforcement allows the federal government to limit state sovereign immunity.[65]
Furthermore, inEx parte Young (1908), the Supreme Court held that private individuals could seek federalinjunctions against state officials to prevent enforcement of unconstitutional laws, reasoning that unconstitutional conduct can never be a protectedstate action. Similarly, inShelley v. Kraemer (1948), the Supreme Court held that while the federal government cannot prevent private parties from establishing racially discriminatoryhousing covenants, state and federal courts cannot enforce them.[66]
In cases likeJackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. (1974) andFlagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks (1978), the Supreme Court clarified that state laws do not transform regulated businesses into state actors. Thus, private companies are free to engage in conduct that would be unconstitutional for state governments to pursue, though the federal government can prevent discriminatory private conduct under itsCommerce Clause authority, and state governments may further regulate business operations.[67]
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
Under theEnumeration Clause of Article I, the size of state delegations to theHouse of Representatives wasapportioned by adding their free populations withthree-fifths of their enslaved populations. After theThirteenth Amendment abolished slavery except as criminal punishment, Congress wrote Section 2 to reduce state representation based on the proportion of their male citizens aged 21 years or older that were denied voting rights.[68] Since only two of the eleven referendums on African American suffrage held in northern states between 1865 and 1869 were successful, Congress assumed that the states would not ratify a nationwide grant of such voting rights.[17][69] The Senate also rejected a House proposal ordering "that whenever theelective franchise shall be denied or abridged in any State on account of race or color, all persons therein of such race or color shall be excluded from the basis of representation" because it would have permitted race-neutral discrimination.[68]
Southern states ignored this penalty, and Congress declined to enforce it, prompting the 1870 ratification of theFifteenth Amendment to explicitly prohibit denial of voting rights "on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."[70][71] Legal scholarGabriel J. Chin has argued this repealed Section 2 to provide self-executing voting rights, but David Froomkin and Eric Eisner rebut that Section 2 still addresses other voting restrictions.[70][72] For example, it is unsettled whether Section 2 penalizes states for sending delegations to theElectoral College that contravene their election results.[72][73]
InSaunders v. Wilkins (1945), theCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed whether Virginia'spoll tax constituted a restriction of voting rights under Section 2 as apolitical question, which has been criticized because in 1872, Congress enacted a broad enabling statute under its Section 5congressional power of enforcement (2 U.S.C. § 6).[68] Interest in enforcing Section 2 further declined after theVoting Rights Act of 1965 prohibitedracial discrimination in voting.[72]
InMinor v. Happersett (1875), the Supreme Court rejected voting as among rights protected by thePrivileges or Immunities Clause because Section 2 shows that the Fourteenth Amendment only recognizes the voting rights of male citizens aged 21 years or older.[74] RepresentativeJames G. Blaine had defeated proposals for Section 2 to base representation on each state's voting population by warning that it would incentivize voting rights for women.[17] Suffragettes condemned Section 2 and secured ratification of theNineteenth Amendment in 1920 to prohibit sex-based denial of voting rights.[74]
InRichardson v. Ramirez (1974), the Supreme Court upheld theConstitution of California'sfelony disenfranchisement provisions against an Equal Protection Clause challenge, reasoning that Section 2 allows states to punish crime with a permanent loss of voting rights.[70] However, inHunter v. Underwood (1985), the Supreme Court held that because a similar provision in theAlabama Constitution of 1901 was enacted with discriminatory intent, it was unenforceable.[70] The2020 California Proposition 17 restored the right to vote after completion of one's prison term, and as of 2025[update], half of the states either automatically restore voting rights upon release from prison or never order disenfranchisement.[75]
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
The Insurrection Clause disqualifies candidates for state or federal offices if they previously took an oath to support the Constitution when sworn into a public office but then engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the United States. Prior to the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption, Congress could only disqualify federal officials throughimpeachment and removal proceedings, as it did forTennessee District Court JudgeWest Hughes Humphreys in 1862, and it held no authority over state offices.[76] WhenAlexander H. Stephens, the formerVice President of the Confederate States of America, was elected to representGeorgia as aSenator in the39th US Congress, the Republican-dominated Congress blocked him from taking office. To address the process of readmitting Confederate states, Congress established theJoint Committee on Reconstruction, whose work expanded beyond this clause to the overall Fourteenth Amendment.[77]
Using Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment'scongressional power of enforcement, theEnforcement Act of 1870 authorized federal prosecutors to issue writs ofquo warranto to remove those disqualified by the Insurrection Clause from their political offices. In 1942, Congress' revisions of theUS Code eliminated that provision. However, a section of theConfiscation Act of 1862 (18 U.S.C. § 2383), which precedes the Fourteenth Amendment, continues to disqualify anyone who "incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States."[78]
Finding that it had severely underestimated those affected by Section 3, Congress exercised its authority to remove a disqualification with a two-thirds majority in each chamber by passing theAmnesty Act in 1872. This law exempted all Confederates except former Senators, Representatives, federal judges, military officers, cabinet officials, and ambassadors.[79] In 1898, Congress exempted all people then living and disqualified by Section 3, but the Insurrection Clause continues to disqualify those who engage in subsequent insurrection or rebellion. During the 1970s, Congress posthumously lifted the disqualification ofConfederate General-in-ChiefRobert E. Lee andPresidentJefferson Davis, both of whom died before the 1898 amnesty.[80]
In the only invocation of Section 3 betweenReconstruction and 2021, Congress deemedVictor L. Berger disqualified by his conviction under theEspionage Act of 1917 and refused to seat him for the66th US Congress.[81] After that conviction was overturned based on judicial bias inBerger v. United States (1921), Berger representedWisconsin's 5th congressional district for three terms.[78]
After PresidentDonald Trump instigated theJanuary 6 Capitol attack to disrupt the2021 Electoral College vote count, a group of Colorado voters contested hispresidential eligibility under Section 3, seeking to disqualify him from the state's ballots in the2024 presidential election. InTrump v. Anderson (2024), the Supreme Court held that Section 5 delegates enforcement of the Insurrection Clause to Congress for federal and state officers, while allowing states to also impose disqualification on state candidates.[82] Though theElectoral Count Reform Act of 2022 allows a fifth of members in each chamber of Congress to object to electors whose votes are not "regularly given," which includes constitutional disqualification, no such objections were raised at the2025 Electoral College vote count.[83][84]
A similar group of North Carolina voters sued in federal court to disqualify RepresentativeMadison Cawthorn, but he lost the2022 Republican primary for his district prior to a verdict.[85] AfterNew Mexico state courts removedOtero County commissionerCouy Griffin under Section 3, the Supreme Court declined his appeal, maintaining his disqualification from state and local offices.[86][87]
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 4 legitimizes allpublic debt appropriated by the Congress while rejecting debt associated withemancipation and theConfederacy. In theGold Clause Cases, the Supreme Court held that Congress' authority overmonetary policy allowed it to pass theEmergency Banking Act of 1933, despite the law's practical effect of invalidatinggold clauses, which allowed creditors to demand payment ingold.[88] In the 21st century, constitutional law scholars have debated whether Section 4 authorizes the President to unilaterally raise thedebt ceiling when Congress is unwilling.[89][90] In 2011, former PresidentBill Clinton argued that Section 4 requires theExecutive Branch to ignore the debt ceiling in its fulfillment ofcongressional appropriations.[91]
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
In theSlaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), the Supreme Court opined that Section 5 empowered Congress to enforce theEqual Protection Clause on states that refused to repeal theirBlack Codes.[92] However, theCivil Rights Cases (1883) held that the Fourteenth Amendment does not empower Congress to outlawracial discrimination by private individuals. InHeart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States (1964), the Supreme Court upheldsimilar legislation under theCommerce Clause instead.[93]
InKatzenbach v. Morgan (1966), the Supreme Court upheldVoting Rights Act of 1965's elimination ofliteracy tests by claiming that Congress could expand civil rights further than the judiciary. However,City of Boerne v. Flores (1997) rejected application of theReligious Freedom Restoration Act on state governments because it modified rights under theFree Exercise Clause, rather than protecting existing rights.[92]
In the final years of theAmerican Civil War and subsequentReconstruction era, Congress repeatedly debated the rights of former slaves freed by the 1863Emancipation Proclamation and the 1865Thirteenth Amendment, the latter of which formally abolished slavery.[94] Concerned that southern states would use their African American residents to enlarge their congressional representation while infringing on the civil rights of thesefreedmen,Republicans sought to discourage such disenfranchisement.[11][95]
TheCivil Rights Act of 1866 guaranteed citizenship without regard to race, color, or prior enslavement.[96] The bill also guaranteed equal benefits and access to the law, attacking the discriminatoryBlack Codes passed by formerly Confederate states to restrict the movement, employment, self-defense, and legal rights of African Americans.[97] Ignoring the urging of moderate Republicans, PresidentAndrew Johnson vetoed the bill on March 27, 1866. In hisveto message, Johnson framed the expansion of citizenship to African Americans as racial discrimination for leaving eleven southern states without congressional representation.[71][98] Three weeks later, Johnson's veto was overridden and the measure became law.[99] Unsure of their constitutional power to pass and enforce the law, especially ifSouthern Democrats retook Congress, the experience prompted drafting for a constitutional amendment to protect these civil rights.[100][101][11]

More than seventy proposals for an amendment were drafted.[102][103] In an extensive appendix to hisdissenting opinion inAdamson v. California (1947), JusticeHugo Black detailed statements made by "those who framed, advocated, and adopted the Amendment."[104] In late 1865, theJoint Committee on Reconstruction proposed an amendment where states would only receive representation for their citizens with voting rights.[71] This amendment passed the House, but it was blocked in the Senate by a coalition ofRadical Republicans led byCharles Sumner, who considered the proposal a "compromise with wrong," andDemocrats opposed to black rights.[71] Consideration turned to an amendment by RepresentativeJohn A. Bingham of Ohio, enabling Congress to safeguard "equal protection of life, liberty, and property" of all citizens, but this proposal failed in the House.[71]
In April 1866, the Joint Committee forwarded a third version to Congress, which combined the prior proposals, rejected Confederate debt, and addressed voting by ex-Confederates.[71] Social reformerRobert Dale Owen led the decision to combine the proposals into the constitution's longest amendment, reasoning that its popular provisions would secure its overall ratification.[17][105] On May 29, 1866, the House passed this third version as House Resolution 127. The Senate amended Sections 2, 3, and 4, passing the modified version on June 8 by a 33–11 vote (five not voting). The House agreed to the Senate amendments on June 13 by a 138–36 vote (ten not voting). A concurrent resolution requesting the President to transmit the proposal to state governors was passed by both houses of Congress on June 18.[106][107]
The Radical Republicans lamented that the Fourteenth Amendment only expanded civil rights while leaving political rights unaddressed.[108]Thaddeus Stevens opined, "I find that we shall be obliged to be content with patching up the worst portions of the ancient edifice, and leaving it, in many of its parts, to be swept through by the tempests, the frosts, and the storms of despotism."[108][109] AbolitionistWendell Phillips called it a "fatal and total surrender," prompting theFifteenth Amendment to prohibit government denial of the right to vote "on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."[109]


On June 16, 1866, Secretary of StateWilliam H. Seward transmitted the Fourteenth Amendment to state governors for ratification. After state legislatures in every formerly Confederate state except Tennessee refused to ratify it, Congress passed theReconstruction Acts, which conditioned readmission on ratification.[110] The first 28 states to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment were:[111]
After retaking the state legislatures of New Jersey and Ohio, Democrats rescinded their ratifications. On July 20, 1868, Seward certified that if recessions are invalid, the amendment became law with South Carolina's ratification as the 28th state.[112] The following day, Congress rejected New Jersey's recession as "scandalous", declaring the Fourteenth Amendment as part of the Constitution and directing Seward topromulgate it as such, establishing that states cannot rescind their ratification:[113][112]
Upon receiving Georgia's ratification on July 27, Seward officially proclaimed the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption, listing all thirty ratifying states to prevent federal courts from recognizing recession.[112] On October 16, 1868, three months after adoption, Oregon rescinded its ratification, but this had no impact on Fourteenth Amendment's validity. The Fourteenth Amendment was subsequently ratified by the following states:[111]
Since Ohio and New Jersey re-ratified the Fourteenth Amendment in 2003, all states that existed during Reconstruction have ratified the amendment.[116]
In response to PresidentFranklin D. Roosevelt'sJudicial Procedures Reform Bill of 1937, SenatorWilliam Borah proposed a constitutional amendment that would repeal and revise the Fourteenth Amendment, analogous to the 1933Twenty-First Amendment modifying theEighteenth Amendment.[117] Borah's amendment would have excluded substantive due process rights, explicitly incorporated the First Amendment against state governments, eliminated the Section 2 penalty for denied voting rights, and omitted Sections 3 and 4.[118][119] In March 1937,the switch in time that saved nine ended theLochner era, diminishing interest in either of these judicial reforms.[120][121]