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Foundationalism concernsphilosophical theories of knowledge resting upon non-inferentialjustified belief, or some secure foundation of certainty such as a conclusion inferred from a basis of sound premises.[1] The main rival of thefoundationalist theory of justification is thecoherence theory of justification, whereby a body of knowledge, not requiring a secure foundation, can be established by the interlocking strength of its components, like a puzzle solved without prior certainty that each small region was solved correctly.[1]
Identifying the alternatives as eithercircular reasoning orinfinite regress, and thus exhibiting theregress problem,Aristotle made foundationalism his own clear choice, positingbasic beliefs underpinning others.[2]Descartes, the most famed foundationalist, discovered a foundation in the fact of his own existence and in the "clear and distinct" ideas of reason,[1][2] whereasLocke found a foundation inexperience. Differing foundations may reflect differingepistemological emphases—empiricists emphasizingexperience,rationalists emphasizingreason—but may blend both.[1]
In the 1930s, debate over foundationalism revived.[2] WhereasMoritz Schlick viewed scientific knowledge like a pyramid where a special class of statements does not requireverification through other beliefs and serves as a foundation,Otto Neurath argued that scientific knowledge lacks an ultimate foundation and acts like a raft.[2] In the 1950s, the dominance of foundationalism was challenged by a number of philosophers such asWillard Van Orman Quine andWilfrid Sellars.[2] Quine'sontological relativity found any belief networked[clarification needed] to one's beliefs on all of reality, while auxiliary beliefs somewhere in the vast network are readily modified to protect desired beliefs.
Classically, foundationalism had positedinfallibility of basic beliefs anddeductive reasoning between beliefs—a strong foundationalism.[2] Around 1975, weak foundationalism emerged.[2] Thus recent foundationalists have variously allowedfallible basic beliefs, andinductive reasoning between them, either byenumerative induction or byinference to the best explanation.[2] And whereasinternalists requirecognitive access to justificatory means,externalists find justification without such access.
Some modern forums of foundationalism are foundational pluralism (see:logical pluralism) in which no single logical foundations exists, and foundational coherentism which recognizes thecoherence theory of justification (pure coherentism has a problem on approaching different logical foundations according to foundational coherentists), but also various foundational contexts which are infinite in logical pluralism.
Foundationalism was initiated by Frenchearly modern philosopherRené Descartes.[3] In hisMeditations, Descartes challenged the contemporary principles of philosophy by arguing that everything he knew he learnt from or through his senses. He used various arguments to challenge the reliability of the senses, citing previous errors and the possibilities that he was dreaming or being deceived by anEvil Demon which rendered all of his beliefs about the external world false.[4] Descartes attempted to establish the secure foundations for knowledge to avoidscepticism. He contrasted the information provided by senses, which is unclear and uncertain, with the truths ofgeometry, which are clear and distinct. Geometrical truths are also certain and indubitable; Descartes thus attempted to find truths which were clear and distinct because they would be indubitably true and a suitable foundation for knowledge.[5] His method was to question all of his beliefs until he reached something clear and distinct that was indubitably true. The result was hiscogito ergo sum—'I think therefore I am', or the belief that he was thinking—as his indubitable belief suitable as a foundation for knowledge.[3] This resolved Descartes' problem of the Evil Demon. Even if his beliefs about the external world were false, his beliefs about what he was experiencing were still indubitably true, even if those perceptions do not relate to anything in the world.[6]
Several other philosophers of the early modern period, includingJohn Locke,G. W. Leibniz,George Berkeley,David Hume, andThomas Reid, accepted foundationalism as well.[7]Baruch Spinoza was interpreted asmetaphysical foundationalist byG. W. F. Hegel, a proponent ofcoherentism.[8]Immanuel Kant's foundationalism rests on his theory ofcategories.[9]
Inlate modern philosophy, foundationalism was defended byJ. G. Fichte in his bookGrundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre (1794/1795),[10]Wilhelm Windelband in his bookÜber die Gewißheit der Erkenntniss (1873),[11] andGottlob Frege in his bookDie Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884).[12]
Incontemporary philosophy, foundationalism has been defended byEdmund Husserl,[13]Bertrand Russell[14] andJohn McDowell.[15][16]
Foundationalism is an attempt to respond to theregress problem of justification in epistemology. According to this argument, every proposition requiresjustification to support it, but any justification also needs to be justified itself. If this goes onad infinitum, it is not clear how anything in the chain could be justified. Foundationalism holds that there are 'basic beliefs' which serve as foundations to anchor the rest of our beliefs.[17] Strong versions of the theory assert that an indirectly justified belief is completely justified by basic beliefs; more moderate theories hold that indirectly justified beliefs require basic beliefs to be justified, but can be further justified by other factors.[18]
Sinceancient Greece,Western philosophy has pursued a solid foundation as the ultimate and eternal reference system for allknowledge. This foundation serves not only as a starting point but also as the fundamental basis for understanding the truth of existence. Thinking is the process of proving the validity of knowledge, not proving the rationality of the foundation from which knowledge is shaped. This means, with ultimate cause, the foundation is true, absolute, entire and impossible to prove.Neopragmatist philosopherRichard Rorty, a proponent ofanti-foundationalism, said that the fundamentalism confirmed the existence of theprivileged representation[19] which constitutes the foundation, from which dominates epistemology.[clarification needed] The earliest foundationalism isPlato'stheory of Forms, which shows the generalconcept as a model for the release of existence, which is only the faint copy of the Forms of eternity, that means, understanding the expression of objects leads to acquiring all knowledge, then acquiring knowledge accompanies achieving the truth. Achieving the truth means understanding the foundation. This idea still has some appeal in for exampleinternational relations studies.[20]
Foundationalism holds basic beliefs exist, which are justified without reference to other beliefs, and that nonbasic beliefs must ultimately be justified by basic beliefs. Classical foundationalism maintains that basic beliefs must beinfallible if they are to justify nonbasic beliefs, and that onlydeductive reasoning can be used to transfer justification from one belief to another.[21]Laurence BonJour has argued that the classical formulation of foundationalism requires basic beliefs to be infallible, incorrigible, indubitable, and certain if they are to be adequately justified.[22] Mental states and immediate experience are often taken as good candidates for basic beliefs because it is argued that beliefs about these do not need further support to be justified.[23]
As an alternative to the classic view, modest foundationalism does not require that basic perceptual beliefs are infallible, but holds that it is reasonable to assume that perceptual beliefs are justified unless evidence to the contrary exists.[24] This is still foundationalism because it maintains that all non-basic beliefs must be ultimately justified by basic beliefs, but it does not require that basic beliefs are infallible and allowsinductive reasoning as an acceptable form of inference.[25] For example, a belief that 'I see red' could be defeated with psychological evidence showing my mind to be confused or inattentive. Modest foundationalism can also be used to avoid the problem of inference. Even if perceptual beliefs are infallible, it is not clear that they can infallibly ground empirical knowledge (even if my belief that the table looks red to me is infallible, the inference to the belief that the table actually is red might not be infallible). Modest foundationalism does not require this link between perception and reality to be so strong; our perception of a table being yellow is adequate justification to believe that this is the case, even if it is not infallible.[24]
Reformed epistemology is a form of modest foundationalism which takes religious beliefs as basic because they are non-inferentially justified: their justification arises fromreligious experience, rather than prior beliefs. This takes a modest approach to foundationalism—religious beliefs are not taken to be infallible, but are assumed to beprima facie justified unless evidence arises to the contrary.[26]
Foundationalism can takeinternalist andexternalist forms. Internalism requires that a believer's justification for a belief must be accessible to them for it to be justified.[27] Foundationalist internalists have held that basic beliefs are justified bymental events or states, such as experiences, that do not constitute beliefs. Alternatively, basic beliefs may be justified by some special property of the belief itself, such as its beingself-evident orinfallible. Externalism maintains that it is unnecessary for the means of justification of a belief to be accessible to the believer.[28]
Reliabilism is an externalist foundationalist theory, initially proposed byAlvin Goldman, which argues that a belief is justified if it is reliably produced, meaning that it will be probably true. Goldman distinguished between two kinds of justification for beliefs: belief-dependent and belief-independent. A belief-dependent process uses prior beliefs to produce new beliefs; a belief-independent process does not, using other stimuli instead. Beliefs produced this way are justified because the processes that cause them are reliable; this might be because we have evolved to reach good conclusions when presented withsense-data, meaning the conclusions we draw from our senses are usually true.[7]
Critics of foundationalism often argue that for a belief to be justified it must be supported by other beliefs;[7] inDonald Davidson's phrase, "only a belief can be a reason for another belief". For instance,Wilfrid Sellars argued that non-doxastic mental states cannot be reasons, and so noninferential warrant cannot be derived from them. Similarly, critics ofexternalist foundationalism argue that only mental states or properties the believer is aware of could make a belief justified.
Postmodernists andpost-structuralists such asRichard Rorty andJacques Derrida have attacked foundationalism on the grounds that the truth of a statement or discourse is only verifiable in accordance with other statements and discourses. Rorty in particular elaborates further on this, claiming that the individual, the community, the human body as a whole have a 'means by which they know the world' (this entails language, culture, semiotic systems, mathematics, science etc.). In order to verify particular means, or particular statements belonging to certain means (e.g., the propositions of the natural sciences), a person would have to 'step outside' the means and critique them neutrally, in order to provide a foundation for adopting them. However, this is impossible. The only way in which one can know the world is through the means by which they know the world; a method cannot justify itself. This argument can be seen as directly related toWittgenstein's theory of language, drawing a parallel between postmodernism and latelogical positivism that is united in critique of foundationalism.[29]
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