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A guerrillafoco is a small cadre ofrevolutionaries operating in a nation's countryside. This guerrilla organization was popularized byChe Guevara in his bookGuerrilla Warfare, which was based on his experiences in theCuban Revolution. Guevara would go on to argue that a foco was politically necessary for the success of asocialist revolution. Originally Guevara theorized that a foco was only useful in overthrowingpersonalisticmilitary dictatorships and notliberal democraticcapitalism where a peaceful overthrow was believed possible. Years later, Guevara would revise his thesis and argue all nations inLatin America, including liberal democracies, could be overthrown by a guerrilla foco. Eventually the foco thesis would be that political conditions would not even need to be ripe for revolutions to be successful, since the sheer existence of a guerrilla foco would create ripe conditions by itself. Guevara's theory of foco, known asfoquismo (Spanish:[foˈkizmo]), was self-described as the application ofMarxism-Leninism to Latin American conditions, and would later be further popularized by authorRégis Debray. The proposed necessity of a guerrilla foco proved influential in Latin America, but was also heavily criticized by other socialists.[1][2]
This theory of foco proved heavily influential among armed militants around the world. Che Guevara's success in theCuban Revolution was seen as proof of his thesis and thus popularized foco theory. Some of the famous militant groups to adopt foco theory included theRed Army Faction,Irish Republican Army, andWeather Underground. The theory became especially popular in theNew Left for its breaking with the strategy of incremental political change supported by theSoviet Union, while also encouraging the possibility of immediate revolution.[3]

Foco theory was originally based on Che Guevara's experiences in the Cuban Revolution, in which he was party of a guerrilla army of 82 members who landed in Cuba on board of theGranma in December 1956 and initiated aguerrilla war in theSierra Maestra. During two years, the poorly armedescopeteros, at times fewer than 200 men, won victories againstFulgencio Batista's army and police force, which numbered between 30,000 and 40,000 in strength.[4] The26th of July Movement (M-26-7) itself had arural guerrilla army as well as anurbanunderground that participated in the revolution. Che Guevara often accused the urban section of the movement as being without proper radicalism, which stirred internal controversy.[5] The urban wing was responsible for arming the rural guerrillas and engaged in its ownurban warfare campaign. During the final months of the revolution an alliance of theRevolutionary Directorate of 13 March Movement,Popular Socialist Party,Authentic Party and26th of July Movement was able to overthrow the Batista government. In their new provisional government the M-26-7 rebel army garnered the most popularity and influence.[6]
Che Guevara played an integral role as one of the first historians of the Cuban Revolution. After the revolutionaries' victory, Guevara published various articles in Cuba of his experiences in the revolution. These articles helped formalize his foco theory and a history of the Cuban Revolution that stressed the role of the rural guerrillas as the main revolutionary force.[5] This idea of the lone rural guerrillas deciding the revolution became immediately popular among the rebel army while consolidating their new government, and became a driving force in Cuban politics as anation-building myth. Many early proponents saw the potential of repeating the model of the Cuban Revolution throughout Latin America, and often encouraged it.[7]
While foco theory drew from previousMarxist–Leninist ideas and theMaoist strategy of "protracted people's war", it simultaneously broke with many of the mid-Cold War era's establishedcommunist parties. DespiteNikita Khrushchev's eager support for "wars of national liberation" and the foco's own enthusiasm forSoviet Unionpatronage,Cuba's ownPopular Socialist Party had retreated from active confrontation with theFulgencio Batista regime andCastroism/Guevarism substituted the focomilitia for the more traditionalvanguard party.
Like othercommunist andsocialist theorists of his era (such asMao Zedong andHo Chi Minh),Che Guevara believed that people living in countries still ruled bycolonial powers, or living in countries subject tonewer forms of economic exploitation, could best defeatcolonial powers by taking up arms. Guevara also believed in fostering armed resistance not by concentrating one's forces in urban centers but rather through the accumulation of strength in mountainous and rural regions where the enemy had less presence.[8]
InGuerrilla Warfare (La Guerra de Guerrillas), Guevara did not count on aLeninistinsurrection led by theproletariat, as had happened during the 1917October Revolution, but on popular uprisings which would gain strength in rural areas and would overthrow the regime. Thevanguard guerrilla was supposed to bolster the population'smorale, not to take control of thestate apparatus itself and this overthrow would occur without any external or foreign help. According to him, guerrillas were to be supported byconventional armed forces:
It is well established that guerrilla warfare constitutes one of the phases of war; this phase can not, on its own, lead to victory.[9]
Guevara added that this theory was formulated fordeveloping countries and that the guerrilleros had to look for support among both the workers and thepeasants.[10]
The guerrilla foco will be able to draw the support of the rural peasantry by demonstrating impeccable moral character and self-sacrifice. In the armed struggle the guerrillas themselves would be shaped by hardship into individuals who had an affinity for solidarity and justice. Once the guerrillas overthrow the existing government and come into power, the moral spirit of the guerrillas would become the national ethos of the new government.[11]
Many who opposed the formation of leftist guerrillas took a focused approach to extinguish rural rebel groups from forming who were inspired by foquismo. These measures were often supported by the United States and involvedtorturing andenforced disappearance of political enemies.[12] The development of guerrilla focos in various Latin American countries has been a factor proposed by historians in legitimizing military takeovers of their respective nations in order to defend against guerrillas.[13]
InArgentina, thePeople's Revolutionary Army (ERP), led byRoberto Santucho, attempted to create afoco in theTucumán Province. The attempt failed after the government ofIsabel Perón signed in February 1975 the secret presidential decree 261, which ordered the army to neutralize and/or annihilate the ERP. Destined to collapse without any external pressure, ERP was not supported by a foreign power and lacked support of the working class.Operativo Independencia gave power to theArgentine Armed Forces to "execute all military operations necessary for the effects of neutralizing or annihilating the action of subversive elements acting in the Province of Tucumán."[14]
Abraham Guillén was a writer who frequently made studies of urban warfare in European revolutions and a noted critic of foco theory. While he agreed with Guevara in their shared criticism ofAmerican imperialism, Guillén argued that the foco strategy was unideal compared to a strategy of urban warfare. Guillén regarded the foco aspetit-bourgeois in origin. He regarded that very few peasants and workers actually joined these guerilla armies. He also argued that these rural guerillas only supplied for easy victories by the reigning state power who could easily defeat isolated rebels in the countryside who lacked connections to military resources. Guillén instead argued revolution was possible during dire political crisis, with a mass workers alliance, and taking place in urban centers where most modernized nations populations resided.[15]
TheTupamaros guerillas ofUruguay are also noted critics of foco theory. While the Tupamaros agreed with much of Guevara's theory of revolution, they argued that the ruraltheatre was inefficient for a rebel army. The urban setting houses a greater population which means more sympathizers to rely on. A rural setting is also open to military attack while a city is more populated and delicate which discourages open combat by the state.[15]