| Puolustusvoimien tiedustelulaitos Försvarsmaktens underrättelsetjänst | |
.png) Colours of Defence Command | |
| Agency overview | |
|---|---|
| Formed | 1 May 2014; 11 years ago (1 May 2014) |
| Preceding agencies |
|
| Jurisdiction | Republic of Finland |
| Employees | 150–200 (2014)[1] |
| Annual budget | €15 million (2014)[1] |
| Minister responsible | |
| Agency executive |
|
| Parent department | Intelligence Division ofDefence Command |
| Website | puolustusvoimat.fi |
TheFinnish Defence Intelligence Agency, orFDIA for short, (Finnish:Puolustusvoimien tiedustelulaitos,PVTIEDL;Swedish:Försvarsmaktens underrättelsetjänst) is the combinedsignals (SIGINT),geospatial (GEOINT) andimagery intelligence (IMINT) agency of theFinnish Defence Forces. Operational since 2014, its responsibility is to support the defence of Finland through information gathering and analysis as anintelligence agency,organic to theIntelligence Division ofDefence Command.
PVTIEDL's SIGINT history can be traced back to the establishment of Finnish radio intelligence in 1927 byReino Hallamaa, a Defence Command intelligence officer, while its GEOINT history starts from 1812 with the establishment of the Haapaniemi militarysurveying school andtopographical service. The successes of its predecessors are considered instrumental in key battles of theWinter andContinuation War during 1939–1944, such as intelligence at the largest battle in the history ofNordic countries, theBattle of Tali-Ihantala.[2]
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The Finnish Defence Intelligence Agency is subordinate to theIntelligence Division of Defence Command and its self-stated tasks include analysing military strategies, gatheringgeospatial andmeteorological intelligence, training Defence Forces and partner staff, such aspolice orborder guard, as well as supportingpeacekeeping operations, such as Finnish deployments to theWar in Afghanistan, with information services.[3] News reports and other independent sources usually describe it as the main SIGINT, GEOINT and IMINT agency of the Finnish military.[1][4][5][6][7]
It was formed on 1 May 2014 by merging the Finnish Military Intelligence Centre, the Finnish Intelligence Research Establishment andcounter-intelligence assets from the Intelligence Division. According to a 2014 interview with Chief of Intelligence, then Brigadier GeneralHarri Ohra-aho, the merger enabled a more comprehensive intelligence overview and enhanced analytical cooperation. The Agency's main elements are situated inHelsinki andJyväskylä with separate elements around Finland.[4][5][8] According to a news report, it employed 150–200 persons and its budget was 15 million euros in 2014.[1]
The preceding SIGINT and IMINT arm of the military, the Finnish Intelligence Research Establishment (Finnish:Viestikoelaitos,Swedish:Signalprovanstalten) operated principally as a part ofFinnish Air Force Headquarters atTikkakoski, near Jyväskylä.[5] The facility received its orders fromDefence Command and employed 120–140 personnel according to a 2007 news report. It was renamed the Finnish Intelligence Research Centre (Finnish:Viestikoekeskus,Swedish:Signalsprovancentret) when it became a subunit of the Agency.[7][9][10][11]
According to a 2017exposé by the Finnish newspaperHelsingin Sanomat, the Finnish Intelligence Research Centre is responsible for monitoring theRussian Armed Forces by capturing and analysingelectromagnetic radiation and maintaining an electronic intelligence mapping that contains information on the Russian military, such as unit types, command and control structures, air defences, readiness plans and missions. During peacetime, the Centre monitors at least theLeningrad Military District while only a fraction of its monitoring is focused on theWestern world. The Centre reports its findings first to the Intelligence Division and finally to thePresident,Prime Minister,Defence Minister and high command of the Defence Forces. The newspaper released examples of the Intelligence Research Centre's analysis topics, such as Russiansynthetic-aperture radars from 2005, security-related effects of theNord Stream 1 pipeline,electronic countermeasures againstBuk missiles, and Russian military action during theRusso-Georgian War of 2008.[7]
Before the merger, the strategic analysis-focused Finnish Military Intelligence Centre (Finnish:Puolustusvoimien tiedustelukeskus,Swedish:Militära underrättelsecentret) had been located in Helsinki since 2007 and contained a topographical unit specialized in GEOINT as well as an intelligence school.[5][12] Most information on the Agency or its predecessors is not public per Finnish law.[13] Regarding the Intelligence Research Establishment, virtually every document concerning closer details, such as leadership structure or intelligence processes, were confirmed as secret by aSupreme Administrative Court ruling in 2007—except for budget and employee count.[9]
In addition to land-based intercept and listening stations, the facility gathers airborne IMINT and SIGINT. For example, the Intelligence Research Establishment started using aFokker F27 Friendship airplane in 1991 and procured anEADS CASA C-295 tactical transport aircraft in 2012 to be fitted with aLockheed Martinintermodal container-based Dragon Shieldelectronic signals intelligence suite; the CASA entered service in 2016.[6][11] During procurement, the CASA was required to be able to monitor signals from 1,5MHz to 40 GHz, listen to a minimum of a hundred different channels, and beNATO compatible to fulfil its intended mission. The full cost of the airborne electronic signals intelligence programme was around 250–270 millioneuros according toHelsingin Sanomat.[7]
Finland's history insignals intelligence (SIGINT) can be traced back to 1927 and the birth of Finnish radio intelligence. On 14 June 1927, LieutenantReino Hallamaa was transferred to the Statistics Office (Finnish:Tilastotoimisto) ofDefence Command, a cover for themilitary intelligence unit, and ordered to create a radio intelligence capacity for theFinnish Defence Forces. To kickstart the process, Hallamaa studied radio intelligence theory and methods around Europe, recruited mathematicians and Russiantranslators, procured signal detectors andradio receivers, builtlistening stations and started exchanging decrypted messages with counterparts, such as Polish intelligence. For example, he visited Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, Czechoslovakia and Poland to examine SIGINT andcryptanalysis capabilities and equipment.[14][15][16]
By 1929, the Statistics Office was able to decrypt diplomatic cables, such asUnited States messaging betweenWashington, D.C., and itsembassy in Helsinki, to the benefit of state leadership. By 1934, the Office could intercept and decryptSoviet Navy messages after monitoring and comparing its communications and movement extensively with aHansa-Brandenburg W.33 reconnaissance plane above theGulf of Finland and from neighbouring islands. It also was able to ascertain most of the Soviet Union's Winter War invasion plans in advance through radio listening. On the eve of the Winter War, 29 November 1939, the Office intercepted Soviet messages to armored brigades to commence the invasion as well as thefakel (Russian for torch) invasion codes sent to theSoviet Baltic Fleet.[14][15][17][18][19]
As the Winter War began in 1939, Hallamaa and the SIGINT assets under his command were reorganized as the Signals Intelligence Office (Finnish:Viestitiedustelutoimisto).[16] The Signals Intelligence Office was able to intercept Soviet messages and inform ColonelHjalmar Siilasvuo ofRed Army movements during theBattle of Suomussalmi. With the intelligence, Colonel Siilasvuo had the initiative and couldpocket and destroy the Soviet44th Rifle Division at theBattle of Raate Road. The division had been en route to support the encircled163rd Rifle Division. the Finns intercepted messages guiding the encircled Soviet troops how to light up signal fires for air supply pilots to recognize during night-time. The Finns lit similar fires and some of the Soviet supplies were received by the Finns. Over 20,000 Soviet troops were killed and military hardware in dire need, such as 43 tanks and 71 field guns, was captured. The victory by theFinnish Army against superior forces is cited as one of the most significant battles of the Winter War.[14][18][20][21]
During theInterim Peace in 1940, Hallamaa traded broken Sovietciphers with other states to fund Finnish signals intelligence operations—for example to the Swedes in exchange forRCA transmitters. Hallamaa was promoted to lieutenant colonel and appointed the commander of Defence Command's Radio Battalion (Finnish:Radiopataljoona) in October 1941 during the early months of theContinuation War. Finnish radio intelligence had grown from 75 persons during the Winter War to approximately 1,000 soldiers. Reportedly, they were able to decrypt 80 percent of Soviet messages on the Finnish front. Collaboration and exchange of Sovietciphers withJapan bore fruit when the Soviets switched their western front ciphers in late 1941 with the eastern ciphers used inVladivostok—immediately decryptable due to the exchange.[14][18][19][20] In 1942, Finnish intelligence cracked telegrams of the Allied convoysPQ 17 andPQ 18 heading toArkhangelsk, Soviet Union and supplied the information toAbwehr, German military intelligence.[22] Germans subsequently attacked both convoys.
Finnish intelligence also made mistakes by revealing too much of its knowledge, such as in 1941 when eager personnel messaged theRed Fleet with its own ciphers to surrender. The Fleet immediately switched their ciphers andfrequencies. Too much radio intelligence-based information of theKaleva airplane, shot down by Soviets bombers during peacetime, was published—most likely allowing Soviets to learn of compromised ciphers.[14][18]
During thebattle of Tali-Ihantala in the summer of 1944, considered the largest battle in Nordic military history, Finnish radio intelligence intercepted Soviet messaging of divisions assembling to launch attacks. Due to the captured information, Finnish artillery as well as Finnish and German aircraft, notably the GermanDetachment Kuhlmey, were able to forestall the attacks of Soviet units waiting in assembly zones. Subsequently, the 50,000 Finnish defenders was able to halt the 150,000 men in the Soviet attack and theVyborg-Petrozavodsk Offensive, the last big operation of the Continuation War.[23][24]
TheFinnish Air Force started its independent signals intelligence operations by establishing a radio intelligence company on 10 October 1942, later reorganized into a 500-person radio intelligence battalion in March 1944 and disbanded after the Continuation War. Hallamaa and his intelligence unit focused on land and sea-based messaging, the Air Force concentrated on air-based intelligence.[14]
In the autumn of 1944, after theMoscow Armistice, 700 to 800 Finnish SIGINT staff fled to Sweden with 350 crates of cryptography equipment inoperation Stella Polaris, led by colonelsAladár Paasonen andReino Hallamaa. The goal of the operation was to escape Soviet retribution and thecommunist takeover of the FinnishState Police as well as to try and create a contingency SIGINT service if it would be required later on against a possible Soviet Union occupation of Finland. Likewise, material concerning SIGINT of the Finnish military was destroyed or hidden in Sweden.C-byrån of the Swedish military and theNational Defence Radio Establishment coordinated the operation at their end and received, for example, cracked ciphers from the Finns. Some war-time documents hidden in the operation were later reportedly found inmicrofilms, for example, at theCIA's central archives andNSA'sNational Cryptologic Museum—while some have not resurfaced. Most of the SIGINT staff were returned to Finland by Sweden after temporaryinternment, and some 30 of them were interrogated by the State Police although no indictments were issued. Colonels Paasonen and Hallamaa did not return to Finland for the rest of their lives.[14][18][19][20][25]
The Finnish Intelligence Research Establishment was founded on 24 October 1955 within theFinnish Air Force, first as the Intelligence Research Station (Finnish:Viestikoeasema) in centralHelsinki. The Establishment expanded throughout the 1960s by building intercept stations and by appointing personnel to statistical units of the Air Force and theNavy. In December 1973, its headquarters relocated to theTikkakoski garrison nearJyväskylä. In 2014, the Intelligence Research Establishment was merged into the Finnish Defence Intelligence Agency and it was redesignated the Intelligence Research Centre.[4][10]
In December 2017, the newspaperHelsingin Sanomat wrote anexposé about the Intelligence Research Centre based on leakedclassified Defence Forces' documents.[7] President of FinlandSauli Niinistö issued a statement where he deemed the leak illegal and critical to national security, and a criminal investigation was initiated.[26] The prosecutor decided to press charges against the two journalists who had written the story, and their immediate superior. In 2023, the Helsinki District Court convicted the journalistsTuomo Pietiläinen andLaura Halminen of the crime of revealing security-related secrets. Pietiläinen was sentences to 50day-fines, while Halminen was left without punishment. Their superior was considered not guilty.[27] Both the journalists and the prosecutor appealed. In 2025, theHelsinki Court of Appeals convicted the main writer, Pietiläinen to four months in prison, suspended, and Halminen to 80 day-fines. Pietiläinen was also sentenced to lose his military rank. The Court of Appeals condemned the actions of the pair strongly, noting that their article - and a series of articles already written but left unpublished in the wake of the tumult following the first article - had not been serving public interest but merely revealing defence secrets for the sake of getting respect from some colleagues. "Democratic society, free media as a part of it, cannot be maintained, if freedom of speech is used so that it needlessly erodes the external security of the state vis-á-vis eventually hostile parties", wrote the Court.[28]
Finnish geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) is considered to have started with the Haapaniemi militarysurveying school andtopographical service established in 1812 inRantasalmi,Grand Duchy of Finland (modern Finland).[29][30] During the 1918Finnish Civil War, MajorClaës Stenius organized and led the War Topography Division ofWhite Finland's military and continued in the same role atDefence Command after Finnish independence.[31] The first months of the Division were hectic in assembling all the maps it could find and organizing map printing services. The unit was reorganized more than twenty times until the turn of the century with different names, such as Topography Office, Topography Section and Topography Division. Similarly, GeneralVilho Petter Nenonen created a parallel Surveying Battery (Finnish:Mittauspatteri) in 1924 to support the imagery, meteorological and topographical intelligence of Finnishartillery with officers being educated at theUniversity of Helsinki on surveying theory. The responsibilities of the Topography Section (Finnish:Topografikunta) of Defence Command and the Surveying Battery overlapped during the 1920s and 1930s and the units disagreed on whether to centralize or decentralize GEOINT assets.[16][32][33]
Two separate surveying batteries and a topography company were mobilized in 1939 during theWinter War and four surveying batteries and a topography battalion during theContinuation War. They supported frontline operations of theFinnish Defence Forces mostly at theKarelian Isthmus while the topographical unit of Defence Command continued its headquarters-level GEOINT duties, first as a section and later as a division.[32] During the 2-week battle of Tali-Ihantala in June 1944, the topographical and surveying capability of the Finnish artillery, especially the trajectory corrector developed by Nenonen, allowed accurate, simultaneous and concentrated fire of 21artillery batteries, approximately 240 guns, to support counter-attacks and render assembling Soviet spearheads ineffective with an approximate total of 110,000 to 120,000 rounds of ordnance. Roughly 70% of the approximately 22,000 Soviet casualties were caused by artillery and mortar fire.[23] The barrage was considered a world record of artillery at the time and according to Nenye and others, halted and destroyed over thirty Soviet formations larger than a battalion.[2][24][33]
After the wars and demobilization, the Surveying Battery was transferred from its original location inHämeenlinna toNiinisalo in 1950 and bolstered in 1952 into an independent Surveying Artillery Battalion (Finnish:Mittauspatteristo) directly under Defence Command. Likewise in 1952, the Topography Division (Finnish:Topografiosasto) was organized back into its former name, the Topography Section, as an independent unit. This status quo remained until the Surveying Artillery Battalion was transferred in 1979 within theNiinisalo Artillery School and later renamed as the Intelligence Artillery Battalion (Finnish:Tiedustelupatteristo). In 2007, the Topography Section was merged into the Finnish Military Intelligence Centre and in 2014, to the Finnish Defence Intelligence Agency.[4][32][33]
Today, both foreign and signals intelligence operations are performed by the Finnish Intelligence Research Establishment, which, established under the Defence Forces, only monitors communications outside the Finnish borders, according to its own reports.
For this battle, the Finns had amassed most of their army's artillery. By using the targeting device known as theKorjausmuunnin (trajectory corrector) developed by the Inspector of Artillery GeneralVilho Nenonen, the front-line observers were able to coordinate and concentrate the fire of multiple batteries. This was a technological feat unique to any of the fighting forces of that time. Between 29 June and 6 July, the Finnish artillery managed to repeatedly halt and destroy enemy concentrations still assembling at their jumping-off points. On 30 such occasions the forces destroyed were larger than battalion size.
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